Week 1 Coverage Table
The table below mirrors the syllabus list for August 5, 2026 and links each item to its digest page. Entries marked supra re-assign a case already digested earlier in the same week.
Class. records how the case actually stands to the subtopic it was assigned under — DIRECT (the Court squarely applies the doctrine), ANALOGOUS (it decides the point under a different provision or doctrine), REJECTED (the Court found the doctrine not established), INCIDENTAL (the doctrine is mentioned but the disposition rests elsewhere). Reciting a REJECTED case as if it were DIRECT inverts the holding.
On item 9. Eurotech is assigned here for Arts. 1876-1877, but the decision never cites either article by number — its discussion of the "general agent or manager" rests on 3 Am Jur 2d §91. The codal link is a pedagogical inference, not the Court's own.
Recitation Map
One line per case — what it is for, and the categorical holding.
| Case | What it is for | Categorical holding |
|---|---|---|
| Eurotech v. Cuizon | Principle, purpose, basis; agent's non-liability to third persons; breadth of a managing agency | Agent acted within authority; not personally liable under Art. 1897; not a real party in interest |
| Doles v. Angeles | Purpose of agency operating as ratio; substance over nomenclature | Both parties were agents; not privy to the principals' loan; sale void for want of cause |
| Angeles v. PNR | Third party's liability runs to the principal; agent cannot sue | Lizette was agent, not assignee; no standing to sue PNR |
| Rallos v. Felix Go Chan | Source of the four-element formulation; representative/derivative character | Agency extinguished by death; Art. 1931 inapplicable, the agent having known of the death |
| Bordador v. Luz | Consent of the principal is indispensable; duty of inquiry | No express or implied agency proven; alleged principal absolved |
| Litonjua v. Eternit | Mutual consent; corporate consent must come from the board | No agency with EC; board resolution a condition sine qua non |
| Orient Air v. CA | Essential characteristics; consensual and representative | No judicial reinstatement of a terminated agent |
| Philex Mining v. CIR | Agency v. partnership/joint venture; agency v. loan; Art. 1927 corrected | "Power of Attorney" was a partnership; advances were capital, not bad debts |
| Sps. Viloria v. Continental | Agency v. sale — who holds title and who is bound | Holiday Travel is CAI's agent, not a buyer-reseller; but no vicarious tort liability |
Threads to Carry into Recitation
💡 The three-word answer to “what is the basis of agency?”
Representation. Every Week 1 case says so — Eurotech v. Cuizon ("the basis of agency is representation"), Doles v. Angeles ("under Article 1868 of the Civil Code, the basis of agency is representation"), Bordador v. Luz ("The basis for agency is representation"), Rallos v. Felix Go Chan ("the juridical basis of agency which is representation").
ℹ️ The purpose formula, quoted three times in Week 1
"[T]he purpose of agency is to extend the personality of the principal through the facility of the agent." Stated as premise in Eurotech; used as ratio in Doles; and traced by Doles itself to Orient Air Services, which supplies the fuller version: "the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do."
⚡ Consent means the consent of the principal
Three Week 1 cases turn on its absence: Bordador v. Luz (natural person — sister never authorized her brother), Litonjua v. Eternit (juridical person — no board resolution, "not a mere formality but … a condition sine qua non"), and Orient Air Services (consent "must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any court").
⚡ Nomenclature never controls
Doles: a self-described "re-lender" was an agent. Angeles v. PNR: a "representative" was an agent. Philex Mining: a document titled "Power of Attorney," naming a "PRINCIPAL" and referring throughout to "this Agency," was a partnership. Sps. Viloria: what the CA called a "sale" was an agency.
💡 Two-question test for subtopic (g)
- Who holds title, and who is bound by the resulting contract? Principal retains ownership and is the party bound → agency to sell. Title passes and the transferee becomes a debtor for the price → sale. (Sps. Viloria, applying CIR v. Constantino and Salisbury v. Brooks.)
- Is representation the paramount undertaking, or merely incidental to it? If representation is "merely incidental or necessary for the proper discharge of one's paramount undertaking," the contract is not agency — look for contribution to a common fund, community of interest, sharing of profits and losses, and mutual right of control under Arts. 1767 and 1769(4). (Philex Mining.)
⚡ Finding an agency is not the same as finding liability
Sps. Viloria found the agency and still denied the petition: "[t]here is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agent's employees," and Art. 2180 "does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent's employees." Conversely, Eurotech and Angeles v. PNR show that finding an agency removes the agent from the case.
ℹ️ Where Week 1 hands off to Week 2
Litonjua v. Eternit already supplies the codal chain for Week 2(c): Art. 1869 par. 2 (agency may be oral as a rule) → Art. 1878(12) (special power to create or convey real rights) → Art. 1874 (sale of land through an agent — authority must be in writing, else void). Angeles v. PNR supplies the counterpoint on form: absent a statutory requirement, "no form or method of execution is required for a valid power of attorney."
Study Notes
The four essential elements of agency (Eurotech, Doles, Viloria) recur in every case this week:
- There is consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship;
- The object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
- The agent acts as a representative and not for himself; and
- The agent acts within the scope of his authority.
Two threads to keep separate. The first is whether an agency exists at all — which is a question of the parties' intent, never of the label they use (Philex Mining: a document captioned "Power of Attorney" was really a partnership; Viloria: a "sale" of tickets was really an agency). The second is what follows once it exists — the agent drops out of the transaction and cannot sue or be sued on it (Angeles v. PNR), and the principal, not the agent, absorbs the contract's consequences (Eurotech, Art. 1897).
Where the burden lies. Bordador and Litonjua are the counterweight: a person alleging agency must prove it, and for the sale of land the agent's authority must additionally appear in writing or the sale is void (Art. 1874).
Codal Provisions Engaged Across Week 1
Arts. 1317 · 1352 · 1371 · 1374 · 1377 · 1403 · 1767 · 1769 · 1868 · 1869 · 1870 · 1874 · 1876 · 1877 · 1878 · 1881 · 1892 · 1897 · 1910 · 1919 · 1927 · 1930 · 1931 · 1932 · 1953 · 2180