Facts
- Respondent Engr. Eduardo M. Paule (the principal) was the proprietor of E.M. Paule Construction and Trading (EMPCT).
- On May 24, 1999, he executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorising petitioner Zenaida G. Mendoza to represent EMPCT in all transactions relating to projects of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) — including participating in biddings, signing contracts, and collecting payments.
- Acting under the SPA, Mendoza participated in the bidding for the NIA-CMIPP project and EMPCT was awarded the contracts for Packages A-10 and B-11, valued at about ₱5,613,591.69.
- To carry out the work, Mendoza (the agent) entered into agreements on December 2 and 20, 1999 with petitioner Manuel Dela Cruz (the third person) for the lease of heavy equipment, to be used on the NIA project.
- On April 27, 2000, Paule revoked the SPA. (By then the contracts had been won and the equipment committed on the strength of that authority, so the revocation landed on third persons who had already performed.)
- NIA thereupon refused to process payments to Mendoza, and Dela Cruz was left unable to collect his rentals.
- Both Mendoza and Dela Cruz sued.
- Trial court and Court of Appeals — against them. The trial court and Court of Appeals rulings were unfavourable to them, essentially treating the revocation as an unqualified exercise of the principal's right.
Issue
- Whether Paule may revoke the SPA and disclaim the obligations Mendoza incurred under it.
- Whether Paule/EMPCT is liable to Dela Cruz, the equipment lessor who dealt with Mendoza.
Ruling
Ratio
- The SPA was broad: it empowered Mendoza to represent EMPCT in all transactions relating to NIA projects.
- Leasing the heavy equipment necessary to perform the very contracts she had been authorised to bid for and sign was incidental and necessary to the purpose of the agency.
- Under Article 1881 an agent must act within the scope of his authority, and under Article 1910 the principal is bound by everything the agent contracts within it.
- Paule revoked only after the contracts had been awarded — that is, after the agency had produced its intended fruit. The timing was decisive.
- A principal is generally free to revoke (Art. 1920), but the right is not absolute in its consequences: revocation exercised to appropriate the benefit of the agent's efforts and to shed the obligations incurred in obtaining it is an abuse of right, and the principal answers in damages.
- The Court applied the standard of Articles 19 and 21 — every person must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
- Paule took the projects and discarded the agent who won them, along with the liabilities she had properly incurred.
- Dela Cruz was a stranger to whatever grievance Paule had with Mendoza.
- He contracted with an agent holding a written SPA, for equipment used on the principal's own project, from which the principal benefited.
- Article 1910 binds the principal to obligations contracted by the agent within the scope of authority, and the subsequent revocation cannot operate retroactively to defeat rights already acquired by a third person in good faith.
- Under Article 1921, moreover, a revocation of an agency entrusted for dealing with specified persons does not prejudice them until they are given notice.
- Allowing Paule to keep the awarded contracts and the work done with Dela Cruz's equipment, while paying neither the agent nor the lessor, would enrich him at their expense without just cause.
Doctrine
- Revocability with responsibility. Agency is revocable, but revocation in bad faith — timed to seize the fruits of the agency or to escape its liabilities — makes the principal liable in damages under Articles 19 and 21.
- Article 1910. The principal is bound by all obligations the agent contracts within the scope of his authority, including those incidental to and necessary for the agency's purpose.
- Protection of third persons. Revocation does not defeat rights already vested in third persons who dealt with the agent in good faith, and under Article 1921 it does not prejudice specified persons until notice is given to them.