Facts

• As the RTC later found, Patrolman Ferdinand Cunanan "was on a mission on that day at Candaba, Pampanga"; he "went out of the Police Station after hearing the commotion and fired a warning shot," his intention being "to restore peace and order" broken by a fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin, and later between the deceased and Pfc. Efren Bass. In that intervention he shot and killed the victim.
• On 5 April 1991 an information for Murder was filed before Branch 46 of the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga (Crim. Case No. 5708). "The Information alleged that petitioner was a member of the Philippine National Police; it contained no averment that he had committed the offense charged in relation to his public office." That omission is the seed of everything that follows. The case moved to Branch 43 under Judge Hermin E. Arceo.
• He pleaded not guilty, trial proceeded, and by Order of 4 November 1993 the case was "deemed submitted for decision."
• On 11 March 1994 this Court promulgated Republic v. Asuncion, holding that such offences belong to the Sandiganbayan where the penalty exceeds prisión correccional, and prescribing that in cases pending at promulgation the RTC "shall conduct a preliminary hearing to determine the existence or absence of this material fact" — transferring the case "as if the same had been originally instituted with it" if present.
• Judge Arceo held that hearing and, by Order of 21 April 1994, ruled that the offence was committed "while in the performance of his official functions," that the RTC "had no jurisdiction," and that any decision "would be null and void"; he dismissed the case "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan." By Order of 23 May 1994 he deleted the dismissal clause, instead ordering the case "forwarded to the Sandiganbayan … as if it was originally filed with the said Court."
• Judge Arceo inhibited on 24 May 1994; Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr. denied the opposition to transmittal (14 July 1994) and reconsideration (18 August 1994). Cunanan came up on certiorari; decided 1 March 1995.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders of the public respondent RTC Judges dated 23 May, 14 July and 18 August 1994 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The statutory grant distils to two concurring requisites: "(a) the offense must have been committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed … is higher than prisión correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of Six Thousand Pesos."
• Jurisdiction is then located in the law rather than in the pleading — the step the petitioner's whole argument had to survive, and did not.
• Asuncion itself arose from the identical omission: "It was precisely to address this situation that the Supreme Court in Asuncion fashioned the rule directing the conduct of a preliminary or separate hearing."
• The RTC's findings satisfy the first requisite: "Maintenance of peace and order is one of the duties of a policeman. And, that was what the accused was doing when the deceased was killed. Thus, it is clear that the offense is intimately connected with the office of the accused and perpetuated while he was in the performance of his official functions." The RTC added the crucial qualifier: "Whether or not the said performance is improper or irregular is a matter that could be determinative of the guilt or innocence but the same at this moment, is inconsequential for the purpose of determining jurisdiction."
• The Court then sets the principle and its exception side by side, drawing on Sanchez v. Demetriou. Montilla v. Hilario: an offence is office-related if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime." People v. Montejo: "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts may show it "intimately connected with [the accused's] respective offices and … perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions," the accused having "no personal motive" and being unable to have committed it "had they not held their aforesaid offices."
• The omission is a curable defect, amendable without "surprising the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive rights."
• Double jeopardy fails for want of its first element — a court of competent jurisdiction.

Doctrine

• Two concurring requisites: the offence committed in relation to office, and a penalty above prisión correccional / six years / P6,000.
• The Montilla principle and the Montejo exception: office-relation exists where the office is a constituent element, or, though "public office is not an element of the crime … in the abstract," where the facts show the offence "intimately connected" with the office and perpetrated in the performance, "though improper or irregular," of official functions.
• Impropriety of the performance is irrelevant to jurisdiction — it bears on guilt, not on which court may try the case.
• Jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the pleading, so the defect is "immaterial and easily remedied" by amendment.
• A court may declare its own want of jurisdiction late. And no jeopardy attaches before a court without jurisdiction; a dismissal on that ground "did not operate as an acquittal."

• The "immaterial" holding must be read narrowly — the single most important caution on this case. Cunanan applies the transitional Asuncion procedure to a case already tried when the law changed, and expressly contemplates that the information will be amended on transfer.
• It is not authority that an information need never allege office-relation: Esteban v. Sandiganbayan (2005) states the general rule the other way — the connection "must be alleged in the Information" — and Lacson v. Executive Secretary (1999) settled that the allegations control.
• Cite Cunanan for the Montejo exception and for curability; cite Esteban for the pleading requirement. Note also that the office-relation finding here rested on evidence adduced at a full trial, an artefact of the Asuncion procedure; ordinarily the question is decided on the allegations before trial.
• The double-jeopardy holding is two-edged: it saved the prosecution, but it follows that everything the RTC did was a nullity and the entire trial had to be done again.
• Statutory currency: Section 4 as quoted is P.D. No. 1606§ as amended by P.D. No. 1861, later amended by R.A. Nos. 7975, 8249 and 10660, which add the enumerated-position requirement; the P6,000 / six-year threshold is not current.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

1. The killing. As the RTC later found, Cunanan "was on a mission on that day at Candaba, Pampanga"; he "went out of the Police Station after hearing the commotion and fired a warning shot," which the court read as "a clear indication that his intention was to restore peace and order disturbed and broken by the fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin and later on between the deceased and Pfc. Efren Bass." In the course of that intervention he shot and killed the victim.
2. On 5 April 1991, an information for Murder was filed against Cunanan before Branch 46 of the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, presided over by Judge Norberto C. Ponce, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5708. "The Information alleged that petitioner was a member of the Philippine National Police; it contained no averment that he had committed the offense charged in relation to his public office." That omission is the seed of everything that follows. The case was later transferred to Branch 43, presided over by Judge Hermin E. Arceo.
3. Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment and trial proceeded.
4. In an Order dated 4 November 1993, the parties having presented their evidence, Judge Arceo required them to submit memoranda, "after which the case was deemed submitted for decision."
5. On 11 March 1994, this Court promulgated its En Banc Decision in Republic v. Hon. Asuncion, laying down (a) that "the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction to take cognizance of offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prisión correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or more or a fine of P6,000.00"; and (b) that where an information failed to allege the office-relation, the RTC hearing a case pending at the time of the promulgation of the rule "shall conduct a preliminary hearing to determine the existence or absence of this material fact" — if present, the RTC "shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan … as if the same had been originally instituted with it"; if absent, the RTC "shall proceed with the trial and render judgment."
6. Judge Arceo conducted a hearing solely to ascertain whether Cunanan had committed the offence in relation to his office.
7. In an Order dated 21 April 1994, Judge Arceo ruled that "on the basis of the evidence adduced during the trial, petitioner had committed the offense charged while in the performance of his official functions," that the RTC therefore "had no jurisdiction," and that "any decision it may render thereon would be null and void." He dismissed Criminal Case No. 5708 "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan."
8. In a further Order dated 23 May 1994, Judge Arceo modified the earlier order and deleted the dismissal clause: "WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, this case is hereby ordered forwarded to the Sandiganbayan and the complete records of the same transmitted therewith as if it was originally filed with the said Court."
9. In an Order dated 24 May 1994, upon motion by the prosecution, Judge Arceo inhibited himself. The case was raffled to Branch 42, presided over by Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr.
10. In an Order dated 14 July 1994, Judge Sunga denied petitioner's Opposition to the transmittal of the records to the Sandiganbayan.
11. In an Order dated 18 August 1994, Judge Sunga denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
12. Cunanan came to this Court on certiorari, seeking annulment of those orders as products of grave abuse of discretion.
13. On 1 March 1995, the Third Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Feliciano, dismissing the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders of the public respondent RTC Judges dated 23 May, 14 July and 18 August 1994 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. The Court quotes the grant and distils it to two requisites. Under Section 4(a)(2) of P.D. No. 1606§ as amended by P.D. No. 1861, "whenever two (2) requisites concur, the offenses mentioned thereunder fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: (a) the offense must have been committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is higher than prisión correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00)."
2. Jurisdiction is then located in the law rather than in the pleading — the step the petitioner's whole argument had to survive, and did not. "It is firmly settled that jurisdiction over the offense charged is a matter that is conferred by law. Whenever the above two (2) requisites are present, jurisdiction over the offense is vested in the Sandiganbayan. This is true even though the information originally filed before the RTC did not aver that the accused public officer had committed the offense charged in relation to his office."
3. The Court notes that Asuncion itself arose from the identical omission. "[I]t may be recalled that the Asuncion ruling involved a situation where the information similarly did not contain an averment that the accused public officer had committed the offense charged while carrying out his official duties. It was precisely to address this situation that the Supreme Court in Asuncion fashioned the rule directing the conduct of a preliminary or separate hearing by a trial court to determine the presence or absence of that jurisdictional element."
4. Late discovery of the defect is no bar to acting on it. "The RTC's initial assumption of jurisdiction over the offense charged in this case did not, therefore, prevent it from subsequently declaring itself to be without jurisdiction, that lack of jurisdiction having become apparent from subsequent proceedings in that case."
5. The RTC's factual findings are quoted, and they are what satisfy the first requisite. The accused "was on a mission on that day at Candaba, Pampanga"; "he went out of the Police Station after hearing the commotion and fired a warning shot"; his "intention was to restore peace and order" broken by the fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin and later between the deceased and Pfc. Efren Bass. "Maintenance of peace and order is one of the duties of a policeman. And, that was what the accused was doing when the deceased was killed. Thus, it is clear that the offense is intimately connected with the office of the accused and perpetuated while he was in the performance of his official functions." The RTC added the important qualifier: "Whether or not the said performance is improper or irregular is a matter that could be determinative of the guilt or innocence but the same at this moment, is inconsequential for the purpose of determining jurisdiction."
6. The Court then sets out the principle and its exception, drawing on Sanchez v. Demetriou. The Montilla v. Hilario principle is "that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused's office if 'the offense cannot exist without the office' such that 'the office [is] a constituent element of the crime as … defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code.'" But in People v. Montejo, "the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that 'although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,'" the facts may show that "the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices."
7. The exception is applied. "In the instant case, public office is not, of course, an element of the crime of murder, since murder may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citizen. In the present case, however, the circumstances quoted above found by the RTC bring petitioner Cunanan's case squarely within the meaning of an 'offense committed in relation to the [accused's] public office' as elaborated in the Montejo case."
8. The omission in the information is addressed as a curable defect. It "is immaterial and easily remedied." The records having been transmitted "as if it was originally filed with [the Sandiganbayan]," the information "may be amended at any time before arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, and indeed, by leave of court at any time before judgment … considering that such an amendment would not affect the juridical nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder), the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, or the defenses that petitioner may assert … without surprising the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive rights."
9. Double jeopardy fails for want of its first element. "Petitioner had not been exposed at all to legal jeopardy … because the RTC was not a court of competent jurisdiction to try the case in the first place. Consequently, upon the commencement of this case before the Sandiganbayan petitioner will for the first time be placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense of murder."
10. And the "dismissal" is characterised for what it was. "By the same token, the dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The 'dismissal' (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it had no jurisdiction to try the case at all."

Doctrine

• The "immaterial" holding must be read narrowly, and this is the single most important caution on this case. Cunanan applies the transitional Asuncion procedure to a case already tried when the law changed, and the Court expressly contemplates that the information will be amended to supply the averment on transfer. It is not authority that an information need never allege office-relation. Esteban vs. Sandiganbayan (2005) states the general rule the other way — the connection "must be alleged in the Information," and an information "wanting in specific factual averments" leaves the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction — and Lacson v. Executive Secretary (1999) settled that the allegations control. Cite Cunanan for the Montejo exception and for the curability of the defect; cite Esteban for the pleading requirement.
• The office-relation finding here rested on evidence adduced at a full trial, not on the face of the information — an artefact of the Asuncion preliminary-hearing procedure. In the ordinary case the question is decided on the allegations before trial.
• The double-jeopardy holding is a two-edged proposition. It saved the prosecution here, but it follows from the same premise that everything the RTC did was a nullity: the entire trial, to submission, had to be done again before the Sandiganbayan.
• Statutory currency. Section 4 as quoted is P.D. No. 1606§ as amended by P.D. No. 1861; it was later amended by R.A. Nos. 7975, 8249 and 10660, and the modern provision adds the enumerated-position requirement that Geduspan and Inding turn on. The P6,000 / six-year threshold quoted here is not current.
• The petitioner's Deloso v. Domingo point was never squarely answered, the Court disposing of the case on the ground that jurisdiction is conferred by law regardless of the averment.
• Verbatim caveat: the published text cites "Section 4 (a-2) of P.D. No. 1602 as amended by P.D. No. 1861" — P.D. No. 1602 is the anti-gambling decree; the Sandiganbayan charter is P.D. No. 1606§. The text also prints "perpetuated" for perpetrated in the quoted RTC order.

Separate Opinions