ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic
III. Elements of Criminal Jurisdiction — a. Penalty attached
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jan1989/gr_75256_1989.html
⚡ Caption discrepancy
The syllabus and the coverage sheet spell the petitioner "Guevara." The Decision captions him "JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA" — two r's — throughout. Cite it as Guevarra v. Almodovar, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989.
⚡ The coverage sheet’s gist misstates the holding
The sheet says this case holds that "jurisdiction over a reckless imprudence charge is fixed by the penalty Article 365 itself prescribes for the quasi-offense, not by the penalty that would apply had the underlying act been committed with intent." The Court never discusses that comparison. The jurisdictional holding is about the penalty imposable under the law versus the penalty ultimately imposed after appreciating a privileged mitigating circumstance — here, the petitioner's minority, which he argued reduced his exposure to arresto menor and so brought him within the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The sheet's separate remark that a quasi-offence "is treated as a single, distinct crime" is true law but is not what this Decision decides.
ℹ️ Overlap with other Topics
The famous holding in this case — that "discernment" under Article 12(3) is not synonymous with "intent" — is not the assigned Topic. It is digested below as the SECONDARY issue, with the jurisdiction/penalty holding kept as the MAIN issue, consistent with the Topic III.a assignment.
Facts
- On the morning of October 29, 1984, John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children, target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) some fifteen to twenty metres away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour. Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone and died. The Information names the victim "TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE."
- The examining Fiscal exculpated him "due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident." The victim's parents appealed, and the Ministry of Justice ordered the Fiscal to file a case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
- On October 9, 1985 the Information was filed, alleging that the accused, "who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions … wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle … hitting … TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE … causing injuries which directly caused his untimely death." Pairing "acting with discernment" with "wilfully … in a reckless and imprudent manner" in one sentence generated the whole discernment-versus-intent controversy.
- On October 25, 1985 he moved to quash on three grounds — that the facts charged constitute no offence; that the Information contains averments that would constitute a legal excuse; and that the court has no jurisdiction over the offence and his person.
- By Order of April 4, 1986 the motion was denied as to the first and third grounds, resolution of the second deferred until trial. He brought certiorari on July 26, 1986, raising whether an eleven-year-old could be charged with the quasi-offence and whether the court had jurisdiction when the case had not passed through the Barangay Lupon. A TRO effective September 17, 1986 issued. Decided January 26, 1989.
Issue
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction notwithstanding that the case did not pass through the Barangay Lupon — which turns on whether the "penalty attached" for measuring the P.D. No. 1508, Section 2(3) threshold is the penalty imposable under the law defining the offence, or the lower penalty that would ultimately be imposed after his minority is appreciated as a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance.
Secondary issues. Whether an eleven-year-old may be charged with homicide through reckless imprudence — and whether "discernment" under Article 12(3) is synonymous with "intent."
Ancillary issue. Whether non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 is jurisdictional at all.
Ruling
Main issue. The court had jurisdiction. The petitioner's construction "is not correct": "The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed." "The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508," which speaks of offences "punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day, or a fine exceeding P 200.00." Hence "the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered."
Secondary issues. YES, an eleven-year-old may be charged: "a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365," whose text begins "Any person…" without distinction — ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. And NO, discernment is not intent: they "convey two distinct thoughts," the former referring "to the desired of one's act," the latter "to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act."
Ancillary issue. The premise that non-compliance defeats jurisdiction is an "erroneous perception [that] has been corrected long before" — as intimated in Royales vs. IAC and "categorically stated" in Ebol vs. Amin, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost. SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- The Court took the argument at its weakest link — the measuring penalty — rather than at its conclusion. The petitioner's chain depended on converting an entitlement to a mitigating circumstance into a reduction of the offence's penalty for jurisdictional purposes; the Court refused the conversion in one sentence, citing People vs. Caldito, People vs. Purisima and Dioquino vs. Cruz / People vs. Savellano.
- The rule was carried across to P.D. 1508 on the strength of its text, the emphasis falling on a single word: "The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability."
- The holding is then stated as a rule of exclusion: "any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered." This is broader than minority — aggravating, mitigating, privileged mitigating and alternative circumstances are all excluded from the jurisdictional computation.
- An independent ground disposes of the issue anyway: P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional. So the jurisdictional attack fails twice over.
- On discernment, the Court separated the two mental states by definition. Intent is "the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts," and "comprises the third element of dolo." Discernment, per People vs. Doquena, is "his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong."
- Made concrete: "a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act… He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence."
- The structural placement of discernment is what makes a minor liable for a quasi-offence: "intelligence" as an element of dolo "actually embraces the concept of discernment," and in felonies by culpa the indispensable elements are "intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element."
- The petitioner's authority (People vs. Nieto) had been read out of context — "We did not mean to equate the words 'intent' and 'discernment,'" the combined effect of the words used there being to express knowledge of wrongness. The Court closes on the contrast: "the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity."
Doctrine
- The penalty-attached rule: "The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed."
- Its corollary as a rule of exclusion: "the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered" — the textual anchor being that "[t]he law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.'"
- Barangay conciliation is not jurisdictional.
- Discernment is not intent: intent is the design with which a person acts and is the third element of dolo; discernment is the "mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong" and is subsumed in intelligence.
- Minors and quasi-offences: a minor over nine but below fifteen is rebuttably presumed without criminal capacity, and, intelligence being indispensable to culpa even though intent is wanting, "may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365."
Limits. The penalty rule fixes the forum, not the sentence — Guevarra keeps his two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance in full; it simply plays no part in choosing the court. Conflating the two is precisely the error the Decision corrects. Because P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional, the petition would have failed even on the petitioner's own arithmetic, so a rigorous reading treats that as the independent and sufficient ground; the penalty rule is nonetheless squarely reasoned as the rule of decision on the threshold question. What the Court did not decide is whether he in fact acted with discernment — expressly left for trial, as was the second ground of the motion to quash. And do not state this case as holding that a quasi-offence's penalty is compared against that of the corresponding intentional felony; the Decision contains no such comparison. Statutory currency: P.D. No. 1508 has been superseded by the Katarungang Pambarangay provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) — the penalty-imposable construction is unaffected, the section number is not.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
Gist
Classification: DIRECT. John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was target-shooting a bottle cap with a borrowed air rifle when a pellet struck and killed his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. On the victim's parents' appeal, the Ministry of Justice ordered the fiscal — who had exculpated the boy — to charge him with homicide through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. His motion to quash having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court on certiorari raising two questions: whether an 11-year-old can be charged with that quasi-offence, and whether the trial court had jurisdiction when the case had never passed through the Barangay Lupon. The Court dismissed the petition, lifted the temporary restraining order, and remanded for trial on the merits.
On the assigned Topic, the ruling is a clean application of the penalty-imposable rule. Guevarra argued that his minority entitled him to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance, reducing his exposure from arresto mayor maximum to prisión correccional medium (the Article 365 penalty) down to not higher than arresto menor, which would bring the offence below the P.D. 1508 threshold of "imprisonment exceeding 30 days" and so require prior barangay conciliation. The Court rejected the premise: "The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed." The same construction governs Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, because "[t]he law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.'" And in any event, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
Facts
- On the morning of October 29, 1984, petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed some fifteen (15) to twenty (20) metres away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour. In the course of the game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone, which caused his death. The victim is named in the Information as "TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE"; the Decision's narrative calls him Teodoro Almine, Jr.
- After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated the petitioner — "due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident."
- The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against the petitioner for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
- On October 9, 1985, the Information was filed. It narrated in part that the accused, "who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his untimely death." The pairing of "acting with discernment" with "wilfully … in a reckless and imprudent manner" in one sentence is what generated the whole discernment-versus-intent controversy.
- On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the Information on three grounds: (I) that the facts charged do not constitute an offence; (II) that the Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (III) that the court has no jurisdiction over the offence charged and the person of the defendant.
- By Order dated April 4, 1986, the motion was denied with respect to the first and third grounds; resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.
- On July 26, 1986, the present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two issues: whether an eleven-year-old boy could be charged with the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence, and whether the court had jurisdiction notwithstanding that the case did not pass thru the Barangay Lupon.
- By resolution dated September 17, 1986, the Court impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondent, "[c]onsidering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner." A Temporary Restraining Order effective September 17, 1986 was also in force.
- On January 26, 1989, the Second Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Paras, dismissing the petition and remanding the case for trial on the merits.
Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioner (John Philip Guevarra).
On the jurisdictional point that is the assigned Topic, the petitioner's argument was a chain: Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes for his quasi-offence a penalty of arresto mayor maximum to prisión correccional medium; his minority entitles him to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance; two degrees down from that range is not higher than arresto menor; arresto menor does not exceed thirty days; Section 2(3) of P.D. No. 1508 subjects to prior barangay conciliation every offence not "punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00"; therefore the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applied to his case, it was not complied with, and — his final step — the trial court consequently had no jurisdiction. What he was seeking to avoid was trial itself, on the footing that the case had never validly entered the judicial system.
On the first issue, he argued that "discernment" as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code connotes "intent," invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto (G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958), where an allegation of "with intent to kill" was held amply to meet the requirement that discernment be alleged for an accused between nine and fifteen. He completed the syllogism thus: "If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted with discernment and wilfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception." The Court notes the consequence of accepting this: "then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense."
B. Respondent (People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General).
The Solicitor General "insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts" and should not be confused — the position the Court adopted. On the jurisdictional issue, the respondents' position was that the penalty by which the forum and the P.D. 1508 threshold are measured is the one the law prescribes for the offence, not the one the accused will ultimately serve after his minority is credited, and further that non-compliance with P.D. 1508 does not affect jurisdiction at all.
C. Common Ground.
Neither side disputed the facts of the shooting — the age of the petitioner, the borrowed air rifle, the target-shooting game, or that the pellet struck Teodoro on the left collar bone and caused his death. Neither disputed that the Information alleged the petitioner was "over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment," nor that the case had not been referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa. Nor was it disputed that Article 365 was the provision charged, or that minority carries a two-degree privileged mitigating effect on the penalty to be served.
Issue
A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding that it did not pass through the Barangay Lupon — which turns on whether the "penalty attached" for measuring the P.D. No. 1508, Section 2(3) threshold (and, generally, for fixing criminal jurisdiction) is the penalty imposable under the law defining the offence, or the lower penalty that would ultimately be imposed on this petitioner after his minority is appreciated as a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance.
B. Secondary Issues.
Whether an eleven-year-old boy could be charged with the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence — and, as a corollary the Court identified as "evident" from the parties' written arguments, whether the term "discernment" as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is synonymous with "intent."
C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.
Whether non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 is jurisdictional at all, independently of how its threshold is measured.
Ruling
Main Issue: the court HAD jurisdiction. The petitioner's construction is "not correct." "The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed" (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). "The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508," which speaks of offences "punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day, or a fine exceeding P 200.00." Accordingly, "in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered."
Secondary Issues: YES, an eleven-year-old may be charged; and NO, discernment is not synonymous with intent. "[A] minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC," whose text begins "Any person. . ." without distinction or exception — ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Intent and discernment "convey two distinct thoughts": the former "refers to the desired of one's act," the latter "relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act."
Ancillary Issue: the premise that non-compliance with P.D. 1508 defeats jurisdiction is an "erroneous perception [that] has been corrected long before." As intimated in Royales vs. IAC (127 SCRA 470) and "categorically stated" in Ebol vs. Amin (135 SCRA 438), P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
Dispositive portion (verbatim):
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- The Court took the jurisdictional argument at its weakest link — the measuring penalty — rather than at its conclusion. The petitioner's chain depended on converting his entitlement to a mitigating circumstance into a reduction of the offence's penalty for jurisdictional purposes. The Court refused the conversion in one sentence: "The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed," citing People vs. Caldito, People vs. Purisima, and Dioquino vs. Cruz / People vs. Savellano.
- The rule was then carried across from jurisdiction proper to the statute the petitioner actually invoked, on the strength of its text. "The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508," which reads: "(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00." The Court's emphasis falls on the single operative word — and it quotes a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 to fix its sense: "The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability."
- The holding is then stated as a rule of exclusion, which is the form worth memorising. "We therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered." This is broader than minority: aggravating, mitigating, privileged mitigating and alternative circumstances are all excluded from the jurisdictional computation.
- An independent ground disposes of the second issue entirely. Even granting the petitioner's threshold arithmetic, his conclusion would not follow, because non-compliance with the barangay-conciliation requirement does not go to jurisdiction: "This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional." So the jurisdictional attack fails twice over — on the measuring penalty, and on the legal character of P.D. 1508.
- On the secondary issue, the Court separated the two mental states by definition. "Intent" is "design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . . the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts" (46 CJS Intent p. 1103) — and it "comprises the third element of dolo," freedom and intelligence being the other two. "Discernment," per People vs. Doquena (68 Phil. 580 [1939], at 583), is "his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong."
- The distinction is then made concrete. "While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle." So "[h]e may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence."
- The structural placement of discernment is what makes a minor liable for a quasi-offence. "[I]ntelligence" as an element of dolo "actually embraces the concept of discernment." Minors nine and below "are not capable of performing a criminal act"; those above nine but below fifteen "are not absolutely exempt" but "are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were 'capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment.'" In felonies committed by means of culpa, "three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element" — so a minor in that bracket must "discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act." Article 365 begins "Any person. . ." without distinction: ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
- The petitioner's authority was shown to have been read out of context. He "failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes" in People vs. Nieto — the sentence explaining that the allegation there "clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act … and that she knew it to be wrong." Hence "We did not mean to equate the words 'intent' and 'discernment.' What We meant was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge … of the wrongness or rightness of her act." The Court closes with the contrast: "The former may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity."
Doctrine
B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.
The penalty-attached rule (assigned Topic). "The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed."
Its corollary as a rule of exclusion. In construing a provision keyed to a penalty, "the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered." The textual anchor: "The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.'"
Barangay conciliation is not jurisdictional. Non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 does not deprive the court of jurisdiction (Royales vs. IAC; Ebol vs. Amin).
Discernment is not intent. Intent is the design or determination with which a person acts and is the third element of dolo; discernment is the "mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong" (People vs. Doquena) and is subsumed in intelligence. Intent "refers to the desired of one's act"; discernment "relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act."
Minors and quasi-offences. A minor over nine but below fifteen is presumed to be without criminal capacity, rebuttably; and, intelligence being indispensable to culpa even though intent is wanting, such a minor "may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC."
C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.
- The penalty rule fixes the forum, not the sentence. Guevarra keeps his two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance for minority in full; it simply plays no part in choosing the court or in measuring the P.D. 1508 threshold. Conflating the two is precisely the error the Decision corrects.
- The ruling on P.D. 1508 makes the penalty holding, strictly, not indispensable to the disposition of the second issue: since P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional, the petition would have failed even on the petitioner's own arithmetic. Both grounds are stated as holdings, but a rigorous reading treats the non-jurisdictional character of P.D. 1508 as the independent and sufficient one. The penalty rule is nonetheless squarely stated as the rule of decision on the threshold question and is reasoned, not assumed — which is why the classification is DIRECT rather than INCIDENTAL.
- What the Court did not decide: whether Guevarra in fact acted with discernment. That is a question of evidence, expressly left for trial — as was the second ground of the motion to quash, whose resolution the trial court deferred "until evidence shall have been presented during trial."
- Do not state this case as holding that a quasi-offence's penalty is compared against that of the corresponding intentional felony. The Decision contains no such comparison; see the callout above.
- A verbatim caveat: at one point the published text refers to "a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC" where the provision under discussion is Article 365 — the Decision uses 365 correctly everywhere else. Treat the single "265" as a typographical slip in the report, and recite Article 365.
- Statutory currency: P.D. No. 1508 has since been superseded by the Katarungang Pambarangay provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which appear in this week's Topic IV.g reading list. The penalty-imposable construction the case lays down is unaffected; the specific section number is.
D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).
Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Court states and reasons the "penalty attached" rule as its ground of decision on the jurisdictional question the petitioner raised, naming three lines of authority and then extending the rule to the statute in issue on the strength of the word "punishable." The Topic asks what penalty fixes jurisdiction, and the case answers: the one the law prescribes for the offence charged, with every circumstance affecting criminal liability excluded from the computation.
Placed against the week's other cases, this is the temporal refinement of the penalty element: jurisdiction is settled at filing, by the statute's own penalty, and does not move as the defense establishes mitigating circumstances — the counterpart of People vs. Mariano's rule that jurisdiction is fixed by the statute in force when the action is commenced. People vs. Buissan supplies the other refinement, and points the opposite way in effect: there the penalty alone was too narrow a measure, because the accessory civil liabilities the offence carried had to be read together with it. Held side by side, the pair states the test completely — the penalty the law attaches, together with the other legal obligations the offence carries, and nothing that depends on the evidence or on the accused's personal circumstances.
Separate Opinions
None. The Decision, penned by Justice Paras, was concurred in by Justices Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado.