Velunta v. Chief of Phil. Constabulary

IV.a — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over subject matter

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Case DigestWeek 2 - Jurisdiction

Velunta v. Chief of Phil. Constabulary

G.R. No. 71855 · January 20, 1988 · Third Division

IV.a — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over subject matter

Petitioner: Rizalito VeluntaRespondent: The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Colonel Simeon Kempis Jr., President GCM, Recom. VIII, Palo, Leyte

Gist

The doctrine, and the reason the case is assigned to this subtopic, is the method the Court used. Jurisdiction is not inferred from institutional arrangements; it is read off an express statutory grant. The executive orders transferred operational supervision and direction and administrative control and supervision — matters going to "how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance" — whereas P.D. No. 1850 concerns "the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them." Those are different subjects, so there was no inconsistency and no implied repeal. And because the court-martial's jurisdiction had validly attached when the case was filed in 1982, "jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law."

Core Doctrine

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases," and Philippine courts "have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective." The consequence for practice is a method rather than an intuition: to answer a jurisdictional objection one must "look for an express provision of law." Two further rules follow. First, a statute conferring jurisdiction is not displaced by a later enactment dealing with a different subject — administrative or operational control over a body of officers is not the same thing as the authority of a tribunal to try them, and repeals by implication are not favored and will not be declared unless the legislative intent is manifest. Second, jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law.

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — a. Jurisdiction over subject matter Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l-71855_1988.html

ℹ️ Read this one against *De la Cruz vs. Moya*

The two cases are mirror images, decided three months apart by the same Division. Both concern a uniformed officer who shot a civilian while on duty, and both turn on which forum the statute gave the case to. In Velunta the court-martial had jurisdiction and kept it; in De la Cruz vs. Moya the civil court never had it and its proceedings were void. Together they state the two halves of the subject-matter rule: jurisdiction is conferred only by law, and once it validly attaches it is retained.

Facts

Rizalito Velunta was "a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban City with the rank of Patrolman." His status as a uniformed INP member is the fact that engages P.D. No. 1850.
On April 16, 1982, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, while directing traffic at the intersection of Burgos-Tarcela-Lucente Streets, Tacloban City, he tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a motorized tricycle driver, "for violations of traffic rules and regulations." "An altercation occurred between them which resulted in the shooting and death of Romeo Lozano."
On May 14, 1982 the First Assistant City Fiscal found prima facie evidence that Velunta, "with deliberate intent and with intent to kill," shot Lozano at the left cheek with his service pistol. Finding the offense committed during the performance of official duties, he recommended referral to the Tanodbayan. This duty-connection finding is what routes the case to a court-martial.
With the Tanodbayan's approval, the deputized prosecutor endorsed the filing of an information for homicide, and the case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D. No. 1850, which authorises the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene courts-martial for crimes committed by INP members.
On October 30, 1982 the widow, Mrs. Anacorita Lozano, filed an administrative complaint with NAPOLCOM for grave misconduct; on August 9, 1984 Adjudication Board No. 8 found him guilty and ordered dismissal from the service, later modified on reconsideration to Less Grave Misconduct and six months' suspension without pay. A parallel track that does not bear on the jurisdictional question.
On July 10, 1985, Executive Order No. 1040, in relation to Executive Order No. 1012, took effect — transferring supervision and control over all units and members of the INP to NAPOLCOM and placing it directly under the Office of the President.
Velunta then filed this petition for prohibition to stop the General Court Martial, RECOM VIII — presided over by Colonel Simeon Kempis, Jr. — from assuming jurisdiction, arguing that the executive orders had stripped it of jurisdiction and expressly repealed P.D. No. 1850.
Decided January 20, 1988 (Third Division, Gutierrez, Jr., J.).

Issue

Whether the General Court Martial retained jurisdiction over the subject matter of the homicide case — that is, whether Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040, by transferring operational supervision and administrative control over the INP away from the Philippine Constabulary, repealed or displaced the grant of court-martial jurisdiction in P.D. No. 1850.

Secondary issue. Whether Section 3 of E.O. No. 1040, a general repealing clause, worked an express repeal — and if not, a repeal by implication.

Ancillary issue. What effect Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, mandating a police force national in scope and civilian in character, has pending its implementation.

Ruling

Main issue. The court-martial RETAINED jurisdiction. The contention is "unmeritorious." P.D. No. 1850 expressly vests courts-martial with exclusive jurisdiction over crimes by uniformed INP members; the executive orders transferred something else — operational supervision and direction (E.O. No. 1012) and administrative control and supervision (E.O. No. 1040). "The distinction … is easily discernible. One refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance while the other refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them."

Secondary issue. NO on both counts. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1040 — "All laws … inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended and modified accordingly" — "does not repeal in express terms, P.D. No. 1850," and the petitioner's description of it as "clear and precise" is called "inaccurate." Nor is there any inconsistency between the two: "Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest." And in any event: "When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start, it remains with the military court martial unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction."

Ancillary issue. The constitutional provision "is still in the process of being implemented. Police forces continue to remain part of the PC-INP until the civilian police force is finally set-up as contemplated by the fundamental law" (Barcellano vs. Major General Renato de Villa).

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court opens by defining the thing in dispute and fixing where it comes from: "Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice" (Conchada), and Philippine courts have "no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective" (West Coast Life Insurance).
That definition dictates the method, and the Court says so in one sentence: "We have to look for an express provision of law to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner." This is the sentence to carry into an exam answer on subject-matter jurisdiction — the enquiry is textual, not institutional or equitable.
The express provision is quoted and applied. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1850: "[a]ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding … uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial," the term covering "police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards." A Patrolman is squarely within it.
The petitioner's own authorities are read for what they actually transfer — "operational supervision and direction" and "administrative control and supervision," the qualifiers "specifically stated" — with the content of the former supplied from P.D. No. 1160, Section 1(e): the power to see that units "perform their duties properly" and to "employ or deploy" them.
The distinction is then drawn, and it is the heart of the case — performance and direction on one side, the tribunals vested with power to try on the other. Different subjects, so no inconsistency.
Express repeal fails on the text of the clause relied on; implied repeal fails because its condition — inconsistency — is absent, and repeals by implication "are not favored" (PAFLU; Jalandoni; Villegas v. Enrile).
The adherence rule closes the argument even on the petitioner's own timeline: "jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law." The executive orders took effect in 1985, three years after filing — even a genuine transfer of adjudicatory power would have had to be shown to operate retroactively.

Doctrine

Definition and source: "Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice." Philippine courts have "no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes"; therefore, on a jurisdictional objection, "[w]e have to look for an express provision of law."
Control over officers is not competence over cases: supervision, direction and administrative control concern "how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance"; jurisdiction concerns "the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them." A statute transferring the former does not touch a statute conferring the latter.
Repeals by implication are not favored and "will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest"; a general clause reaching "inconsistent" enactments is not an express repeal of any particular statute.
Adherence of jurisdiction: "[J]urisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law."

Limits.

This is a case about which tribunal, not about whether the accused is liable — nothing in the Decision touches the merits, and the NAPOLCOM proceedings are a separate administrative track narrated only as background.
The holding is anchored to a repealed statutory regime: P.D. No. 1850 was repealed by R.A. No. 6975 (1990), which created the PNP under the DILG and returned its members to the civil courts. Recite Velunta for its method — express grant, no implied repeal, adherence — not for the proposition that police officers are court-martialled today.
The adherence rule is expressly conditional: jurisdiction remains "unless a law expressly divests it," and only until "validly transferred … according to law" — it is not a rule that jurisdiction can never move, but a rule about what it takes to move it.
A limit on the analogy to De la Cruz vs. Moya. Both apply the same statute-in-force method, but the outcomes diverge because the statutes differed — here P.D. No. 1850 gave the military tribunal the case and nothing took it away; there General Order No. 59 had already given the military tribunal the case, so the civil court's proceedings were a nullity.
Verbatim caveats: the Decision carries the reporter's "(sic)" on a garbled clause of E.O. No. 1012, prints "Executive Order No. 101 2," and cites P.D. No. 1160 where an earlier passage cites P.D. No. 1162 for the same definition — quote the codal sources, not the Decision's rendering of them.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. Patrolman Rizalito Velunta of the Integrated National Police shot and killed a tricycle driver he was trying to apprehend for traffic violations while directing traffic in Tacloban City. Because the offence was found to have been committed in the performance of official duties, the case was referred to the military authorities under P.D. No. 1850, which gave courts-martial exclusive jurisdiction over crimes by uniformed INP members. Velunta petitioned for prohibition to stop the General Court Martial from proceeding, arguing that Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040 — which transferred supervision and control over the INP away from the Philippine Constabulary and placed NAPOLCOM under the Office of the President — had stripped the court-martial of jurisdiction and had expressly repealed P.D. No. 1850. The Court dismissed the petition.

Facts

Rizalito Velunta was, at all material times, "a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban City with the rank of Patrolman." His status as a uniformed INP member is the fact that engages P.D. No. 1850.
On April 16, 1982, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, while directing traffic at the intersection of Burgos-Tarcela-Lucente Streets, Tacloban City, Velunta tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a motorized tricycle driver, for violations of traffic rules and regulations. "An altercation occurred between them which resulted in the shooting and death of Romeo Lozano."
On May 14, 1982, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Tacloban City issued a resolution in I.S. No. 82-203 finding prima facie evidence that Velunta, then an INP member stationed in Tacloban City, "with deliberate intent and with intent to kill," shot with his service pistol one Romeo Lozano, a tricycle driver, at the left cheek, causing his death. Finding that the offense was committed during the performance of official duties, the City Fiscal recommended that the case be referred to the Tanodbayan for further investigation. This duty-connection finding is what routes the case to a court-martial.
With the approval of Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez, Second Assistant Fiscal Jose B. Sano of Tacloban City, as deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, endorsed the filing of an information for homicide against Velunta. The case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D. No. 1850, which authorises the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene courts-martial to try, hear and decide cases for criminal acts committed by members of the Integrated National Police.
On October 30, 1982, Mrs. Anacorita Lozano, widow of the deceased, filed an administrative complaint against Velunta with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Region VIII, Tacloban City, for grave misconduct. This is a parallel track and does not bear on the jurisdictional question; it is narrated because the Decision does.
On August 9, 1984, after hearings on the merits, Adjudication Board No. 8, NAPOLCOM, Manila, rendered a decision finding Velunta guilty of grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of "Dismissal from the Service." On a motion for reconsideration, the Adjudication Board modified its decision, finding him guilty only of Less Grave Misconduct and reducing the penalty from dismissal to suspension from service for six months without pay.
During the pendency of the administrative case, Mrs. Lozano also filed a complaint for homicide with the City Fiscal's Office of Tacloban.
On July 10, 1985, Executive Order No. 1040, in relation to Executive Order No. 1012, took effect — transferring supervision and control over all units and members of the Integrated National Police to NAPOLCOM and placing it directly under the Office of the President.
Velunta then filed the present petition for prohibition to prevent the General Court Martial, RECOM VIII — presided over by Colonel Simeon Kempis, Jr. — from assuming jurisdiction over the criminal case for homicide.
On January 20, 1988, the Third Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Gutierrez, Jr., dismissing the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Rizalito Velunta).

Velunta's case was that the statutory foundation of the court-martial's authority had been pulled out from under it. He argued that "the General Court Martial has no more jurisdiction to continue the hearing against him as a result of the provisions of Executive Order No. 1040, in relation to Executive Order No. 1012, which became effective last July 10, 1985, whereby supervision and control over all units and members of the Integrated National Police have been transferred to NAPOLCOM and placed directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines, thereby removing police officers from the supervision and control of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary under the Department of National Defense." His second and more pointed submission was that P.D. No. 1850 — the decree authorising the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene courts-martial to try INP members for offences committed in the performance of their duties — "has been expressly repealed by Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 as of July 10, 1985." The relief he sought was prohibition: to be tried, if at all, somewhere other than before a military tribunal.

B. Respondents (The Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr.).

The respondents' position, which the Court adopted, was that the executive orders did not touch the grant in P.D. No. 1850 at all. What Executive Order No. 1012 transferred was operational supervision and direction; what Executive Order No. 1040 transferred was administrative control and supervision. Neither addresses the competence of a tribunal to try a criminal case, so neither is inconsistent with P.D. No. 1850 and neither repeals it, expressly or by implication. Since the court-martial's jurisdiction had attached when the case was filed in 1982 — three years before the executive orders took effect — it continued.

C. Common Ground.

Neither side disputed that Velunta was a uniformed member of the Integrated National Police, that the shooting occurred while he was directing traffic and attempting to apprehend Lozano for traffic violations, or that the City Fiscal had found the offence to have been committed during the performance of official duties. Nor was it disputed that P.D. No. 1850, on its own terms, vested exclusive court-martial jurisdiction over such a case, or that the case had been referred to the military authorities in 1982 on that footing. The disagreement was confined to the legal effect of the 1985 executive orders.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether the General Court Martial retained jurisdiction over the subject matter of the homicide case against Velunta — which turns on whether Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040, by transferring operational supervision and administrative control over the Integrated National Police away from the Philippine Constabulary, repealed or otherwise displaced the grant of court-martial jurisdiction in P.D. No. 1850.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 — a general repealing clause — worked an express repeal of P.D. No. 1850, and if not, whether it worked a repeal by implication.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

What effect, if any, Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution — mandating a police force national in scope and civilian in character — has on the continuing competence of courts-martial over INP members pending its implementation.

Ruling

Main Issue: the court-martial RETAINED jurisdiction. The petitioner's contention is "unmeritorious." P.D. No. 1850 expressly vests courts-martial with exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by uniformed members of the Integrated National Police, and the executive orders invoked transferred something else entirely — operational supervision and direction under E.O. No. 1012, and administrative control and supervision under E.O. No. 1040. "The distinction … is easily discernible. One refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance while the other refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them."

Secondary Issues: NO on both counts. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 — "All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other enactments, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended and modified accordingly" — "does not repeal in express terms, P.D. No. 1850." Neither is there any inconsistency between the two, and "[r]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest." "When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start, it remains with the military court martial unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction."

Ancillary Issue: the constitutional provision "is still in the process of being implemented. Police forces continue to remain part of the PC-INP until the civilian police force is finally set-up as contemplated by the fundamental law" (Barcellano vs. Major General Renato de Villa, et al., G.R. No. 75952, October 20, 1987).

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court opened by defining the thing in dispute and fixing where it comes from. "Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases" (Conchada v. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 94). And "[a]s early as 1914, it was declared that the courts of the Philippine Islands have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective" (West Coast Life Insurance Co. v. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401).
That definition dictates the method, and the Court says so in one sentence: "We have to look for an express provision of law to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner." This is the sentence to carry into an exam answer on subject-matter jurisdiction — the enquiry is textual, not institutional or equitable.
The express provision is then quoted and applied. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1850 provides that "[a]ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War," and defines "uniformed members of the Integrated National Police" to "refer to police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards." Velunta, a Patrolman, is squarely within it.
The petitioner's authorities are then read for what they actually transfer. Executive Order No. 1012 states that "the operational supervision and direction exercised by the Philippine Constabulary over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force … is hereby transferred to the city or municipal government concerned"; Executive Order No. 1040 states that NAPOLCOM "shall exercise administrative control and supervision over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force throughout the country." The Court notes the qualifiers are "specifically stated." It then supplies the definition of the transferred power from P.D. No. 1160, Section 1(e): operational supervision and direction is "the power to see to it that the units or elements of the Integrated National Police perform their duties properly according to existing laws and the rules, regulations and policies promulgated by competent authority, and the power to employ or deploy such units or elements … to insure public safety and the effective maintenance of peace and order within the locality."
The distinction is then drawn, and it is the heart of the case. "The distinction between operational supervision and direction over the Integrated National Police and jurisdiction or authority of a court-martial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding against a police officer so that the appropriate penalty for the commission of a crime or offense may be imposed is easily discernible. One refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance while the other refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them."
The claim of express repeal is tested against the text of the clause relied on and fails. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 is a standard general repealing clause — "All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other enactments, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended and modified accordingly" — and "[t]he aforecited provision does not repeal in express terms, P.D. No. 1850." The petitioner's description of it as "clear and precise" is called "inaccurate."
The fallback of implied repeal fails because its condition — inconsistency — is absent. "Neither is there any inconsistency between P.D. No. 1850, which confers upon courts-martial, jurisdiction over crimes and offenses involving members of the Integrated National Police, and Executive Order No. 1040 which gives the city and municipal governments … operational supervision and direction over members of the Integrated National Police. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest" (PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 72 SCRA 396; Jalandoni v. Endaya, 85 SCRA 261; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 10; The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees Asso., 49 SCRA 149).
The adherence rule closes the argument even on the petitioner's own timeline. "When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start, it remains with the military court martial unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction. It is an established rule that jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law." Because the executive orders took effect in 1985, three years after the case was filed, even a genuine transfer of adjudicatory power would have had to be shown to operate retroactively.
A constitutional argument is anticipated and set aside as premature. Article XVI, Section 6 of the Constitution, on a police force "national and civilian in character," "is still in the process of being implemented. Police forces continue to remain part of the PC-INP until the civilian police force is finally set-up as contemplated by the fundamental law" (Barcellano v. Major General Renato de Villa, G.R. No. 75952, October 20, 1987).

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

Definition and source. "Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases." Philippine courts have "no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective." Therefore, on a jurisdictional objection, "[w]e have to look for an express provision of law."

Control over officers is not competence over cases. Supervision, direction and administrative control over a body of officers concern "how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance"; jurisdiction concerns "the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them." A statute transferring the former does not touch a statute conferring the latter.

Repeals by implication are not favored and "will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest." A general repealing clause reaching enactments "inconsistent" with the new law is not an express repeal of any particular statute.

Adherence of jurisdiction. "[J]urisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law"; having been properly exercised from the start, it remains "unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction."

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

This is a case about which tribunal, not about whether the accused is liable. Nothing in the Decision touches the merits of the homicide charge; the NAPOLCOM proceedings that found less grave misconduct are a separate administrative track and are narrated only as background.
The holding is anchored to a repealed statutory regime. P.D. No. 1850 was later repealed by R.A. No. 6975 (1990), which created the Philippine National Police under the Department of the Interior and Local Government and returned PNP members to the civil courts. Recite Velunta for its method — express grant, no implied repeal, adherence of jurisdiction — not for the proposition that police officers are tried by courts-martial today.
The adherence rule is expressly conditional. Jurisdiction remains "unless a law expressly divests it," and only until "validly transferred by the proper authority according to law." It is not a rule that jurisdiction can never move; it is a rule about what it takes to move it.
A limit on the analogy to De la Cruz vs. Moya. Both cases apply the same statute-in-force method, but the outcomes diverge because the statutes differed: here P.D. No. 1850 gave the military tribunal the case and nothing took it away; there General Order No. 59 had already given the military tribunal the case, so the civil court's proceedings were a nullity. The lesson common to both is that the forum is settled by reading the grant in force at filing — not by which court happens to be seised.
The Decision's quotation of Executive Order No. 1012 carries the reporter's own "(sic)" on a garbled final clause; and the text refers at one point to "Executive Order No. 101 2" and to "P.D. No. 1160" where the earlier passage cites "Presidential Decree No. 1162" for the same definition. Quote the codal sources rather than the Decision's rendering of them.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Court treats the case purely as a question of subject-matter jurisdiction and resolves it by the canonical method the Topic teaches: identify the express statutory grant, confirm the accused falls within its terms, and then ask whether any later enactment has taken the grant away — a question answered by comparing subjects, not institutions. The requisite in issue is the first of the three the syllabus lists, and the Decision supplies both its definition and the two rules that most often decide it in practice: jurisdiction is conferred only by law, and once conferred and validly exercised it adheres.

Placed beside the week's other cases, Velunta completes a chain. People vs. Mariano defines criminal jurisdiction and holds that its conferment "is derived exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum"; Velunta turns that into an operating instruction — "look for an express provision of law" — and adds the adherence rule. De la Cruz vs. Moya, decided by the same Division three months later, supplies the converse and the sanction: where the statute in force at filing gave the case to another tribunal, the proceedings of the court that took it are "null and void." Bilag vs. Ay-Ay then states the same principle in its most quotable modern form — subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.

Separate Opinions

None. The Decision, penned by Justice Gutierrez, Jr., was concurred in by Justices Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Constitution

Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution

Judicial Department

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article VIII (Judicial Department)

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Why it is cited here

The method the case is assigned for: jurisdiction is read off an express grant, never inferred.

"The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."

The argument the Court rejected was an inference from institutional arrangements — that executive orders placing the police under civilian authority must have carried criminal jurisdiction with them.

The Court separated the subjects. The executive orders transferred operational supervision and direction and administrative control and supervision, which go to "how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance." P.D. No. 1850 concerns "the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them."

Different subjects, so no inconsistency and no implied repeal. The general principle is worth carrying beyond this case: implied repeals are disfavoured, and two statutes are reconciled unless they are irreconcilable on the same subject.

Special Law

Section 20, B.P. Blg. 129

Jurisdiction in criminal cases

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.

AMENDED. Section 20 gives Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in criminal cases "not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body", so it is read together with Section 32 (first-level courts) and with P.D. No. 1606, Section 4 (Sandiganbayan). What falls to the RTC is therefore a residue, and the residue moves whenever the other two move.

LawPhil posts the 1981 text. The jurisdictional amounts and several grants of jurisdiction have been amended since — most consequentially by R.A. No. 7691 (1994), which raised the thresholds in Sections 19, 32, 33 and 34, and by R.A. No. 11576 (2021), which raised them again. The court names are also original: the "Intermediate Appellate Court" of Sections 3-12 is now the Court of Appeals. Check the date of the decision against the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The residual grant, and why an exclusive special grant displaces it.

"Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body."

A court-martial is such a body. Where P.D. No. 1850 gave it exclusive jurisdiction over offenses by members of the Integrated National Police, the case is carved out of the civil courts' residue before Section 20 is even consulted.

This is the same structure as De la Cruz v. Moya, and the pairing is worth holding: in both, the civil court's grant was residual, and a special exclusive grant to a military tribunal emptied it.

The reading habit that follows: when a special statute confers jurisdiction on a named tribunal, check whether the grant is exclusive before assuming the ordinary courts retain anything. "Exclusive" is not decoration.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The ground, and the adherence rule that decides who keeps a case once it starts.

Among the grounds for quashal: "(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged."

Because the court-martial's jurisdiction had validly attached when the case was filed in 1982, the Court applied the principle of adherence: "jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law."

Two limbs, and both matter. Jurisdiction is fixed at commencement — the companion to De la Cruz's rule that it is determined by the statute then in force. And it is not lost by subsequent events: a later change in the law, in the accused's status, or in institutional arrangements does not move a pending case.

The only thing that moves it is a valid transfer by the proper authority according to law — which is to say, another statute doing so expressly. Nothing less will do, and an inference from reorganisation certainly will not.

Related notes:

De la Cruz v. Moya — the mirror case: the statute in force at filing gave the case to a military tribunal, so the civil court's proceedings were null and void.
Bilag v. Ay-Ay — the modern formulation: subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by consent, acquiescence, or the court's erroneous belief.
People v. Mariano — jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the constitution and statutes of the forum.
P.D. No. 1850 — court-martial jurisdiction over the Integrated National Police, later repealed by R.A. No. 6975.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l-71855_1988.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution

Constitution

Judicial Department

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article VIII (Judicial Department)

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Why it is cited here

The method the case is assigned for: jurisdiction is read off an express grant, never inferred.

"The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."

Full entry below ↓

Section 20, B.P. Blg. 129

Special Law

Jurisdiction in criminal cases

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)

Why it is cited here

The residual grant, and why an exclusive special grant displaces it.

"Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body."

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

The ground, and the adherence rule that decides who keeps a case once it starts.

Among the grounds for quashal: "(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged."

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — a. Jurisdiction over subject matter Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l-71855_1988.html

ℹ️ Read this one against *De la Cruz vs. Moya*

Facts

Rizalito Velunta was "a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban City with the rank of Patrolman." His status as a uniformed INP member is the fact that engages P.D. No. 1850.
On April 16, 1982, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, while directing traffic at the intersection of Burgos-Tarcela-Lucente Streets, Tacloban City, he tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a motorized tricycle driver, "for violations of traffic rules and regulations." "An altercation occurred between them which resulted in the shooting and death of Romeo Lozano."
On May 14, 1982 the First Assistant City Fiscal found prima facie evidence that Velunta, "with deliberate intent and with intent to kill," shot Lozano at the left cheek with his service pistol. Finding the offense committed during the performance of official duties, he recommended referral to the Tanodbayan. This duty-connection finding is what routes the case to a court-martial.
With the Tanodbayan's approval, the deputized prosecutor endorsed the filing of an information for homicide, and the case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D. No. 1850, which authorises the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene courts-martial for crimes committed by INP members.
On October 30, 1982 the widow, Mrs. Anacorita Lozano, filed an administrative complaint with NAPOLCOM for grave misconduct; on August 9, 1984 Adjudication Board No. 8 found him guilty and ordered dismissal from the service, later modified on reconsideration to Less Grave Misconduct and six months' suspension without pay. A parallel track that does not bear on the jurisdictional question.
On July 10, 1985, Executive Order No. 1040, in relation to Executive Order No. 1012, took effect — transferring supervision and control over all units and members of the INP to NAPOLCOM and placing it directly under the Office of the President.
Velunta then filed this petition for prohibition to stop the General Court Martial, RECOM VIII — presided over by Colonel Simeon Kempis, Jr. — from assuming jurisdiction, arguing that the executive orders had stripped it of jurisdiction and expressly repealed P.D. No. 1850.
Decided January 20, 1988 (Third Division, Gutierrez, Jr., J.).

Issue

Secondary issue. Whether Section 3 of E.O. No. 1040, a general repealing clause, worked an express repeal — and if not, a repeal by implication.

Ancillary issue. What effect Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, mandating a police force national in scope and civilian in character, has pending its implementation.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court opens by defining the thing in dispute and fixing where it comes from: "Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice" (Conchada), and Philippine courts have "no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective" (West Coast Life Insurance).
That definition dictates the method, and the Court says so in one sentence: "We have to look for an express provision of law to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner." This is the sentence to carry into an exam answer on subject-matter jurisdiction — the enquiry is textual, not institutional or equitable.
The express provision is quoted and applied. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1850: "[a]ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding … uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial," the term covering "police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards." A Patrolman is squarely within it.
The petitioner's own authorities are read for what they actually transfer — "operational supervision and direction" and "administrative control and supervision," the qualifiers "specifically stated" — with the content of the former supplied from P.D. No. 1160, Section 1(e): the power to see that units "perform their duties properly" and to "employ or deploy" them.
The distinction is then drawn, and it is the heart of the case — performance and direction on one side, the tribunals vested with power to try on the other. Different subjects, so no inconsistency.
Express repeal fails on the text of the clause relied on; implied repeal fails because its condition — inconsistency — is absent, and repeals by implication "are not favored" (PAFLU; Jalandoni; Villegas v. Enrile).
The adherence rule closes the argument even on the petitioner's own timeline: "jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law." The executive orders took effect in 1985, three years after filing — even a genuine transfer of adjudicatory power would have had to be shown to operate retroactively.

Doctrine

Definition and source: "Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice." Philippine courts have "no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes"; therefore, on a jurisdictional objection, "[w]e have to look for an express provision of law."
Control over officers is not competence over cases: supervision, direction and administrative control concern "how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance"; jurisdiction concerns "the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them." A statute transferring the former does not touch a statute conferring the latter.
Repeals by implication are not favored and "will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest"; a general clause reaching "inconsistent" enactments is not an express repeal of any particular statute.
Adherence of jurisdiction: "[J]urisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law."

Limits.

This is a case about which tribunal, not about whether the accused is liable — nothing in the Decision touches the merits, and the NAPOLCOM proceedings are a separate administrative track narrated only as background.
The holding is anchored to a repealed statutory regime: P.D. No. 1850 was repealed by R.A. No. 6975 (1990), which created the PNP under the DILG and returned its members to the civil courts. Recite Velunta for its method — express grant, no implied repeal, adherence — not for the proposition that police officers are court-martialled today.
The adherence rule is expressly conditional: jurisdiction remains "unless a law expressly divests it," and only until "validly transferred … according to law" — it is not a rule that jurisdiction can never move, but a rule about what it takes to move it.
A limit on the analogy to De la Cruz vs. Moya. Both apply the same statute-in-force method, but the outcomes diverge because the statutes differed — here P.D. No. 1850 gave the military tribunal the case and nothing took it away; there General Order No. 59 had already given the military tribunal the case, so the civil court's proceedings were a nullity.
Verbatim caveats: the Decision carries the reporter's "(sic)" on a garbled clause of E.O. No. 1012, prints "Executive Order No. 101 2," and cites P.D. No. 1160 where an earlier passage cites P.D. No. 1162 for the same definition — quote the codal sources, not the Decision's rendering of them.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

Rizalito Velunta was, at all material times, "a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban City with the rank of Patrolman." His status as a uniformed INP member is the fact that engages P.D. No. 1850.
On April 16, 1982, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, while directing traffic at the intersection of Burgos-Tarcela-Lucente Streets, Tacloban City, Velunta tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a motorized tricycle driver, for violations of traffic rules and regulations. "An altercation occurred between them which resulted in the shooting and death of Romeo Lozano."
On May 14, 1982, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Tacloban City issued a resolution in I.S. No. 82-203 finding prima facie evidence that Velunta, then an INP member stationed in Tacloban City, "with deliberate intent and with intent to kill," shot with his service pistol one Romeo Lozano, a tricycle driver, at the left cheek, causing his death. Finding that the offense was committed during the performance of official duties, the City Fiscal recommended that the case be referred to the Tanodbayan for further investigation. This duty-connection finding is what routes the case to a court-martial.
With the approval of Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez, Second Assistant Fiscal Jose B. Sano of Tacloban City, as deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, endorsed the filing of an information for homicide against Velunta. The case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D. No. 1850, which authorises the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene courts-martial to try, hear and decide cases for criminal acts committed by members of the Integrated National Police.
On October 30, 1982, Mrs. Anacorita Lozano, widow of the deceased, filed an administrative complaint against Velunta with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Region VIII, Tacloban City, for grave misconduct. This is a parallel track and does not bear on the jurisdictional question; it is narrated because the Decision does.
On August 9, 1984, after hearings on the merits, Adjudication Board No. 8, NAPOLCOM, Manila, rendered a decision finding Velunta guilty of grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of "Dismissal from the Service." On a motion for reconsideration, the Adjudication Board modified its decision, finding him guilty only of Less Grave Misconduct and reducing the penalty from dismissal to suspension from service for six months without pay.
During the pendency of the administrative case, Mrs. Lozano also filed a complaint for homicide with the City Fiscal's Office of Tacloban.
On July 10, 1985, Executive Order No. 1040, in relation to Executive Order No. 1012, took effect — transferring supervision and control over all units and members of the Integrated National Police to NAPOLCOM and placing it directly under the Office of the President.
Velunta then filed the present petition for prohibition to prevent the General Court Martial, RECOM VIII — presided over by Colonel Simeon Kempis, Jr. — from assuming jurisdiction over the criminal case for homicide.
On January 20, 1988, the Third Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Gutierrez, Jr., dismissing the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Rizalito Velunta).

B. Respondents (The Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr.).

C. Common Ground.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 — a general repealing clause — worked an express repeal of P.D. No. 1850, and if not, whether it worked a repeal by implication.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court opened by defining the thing in dispute and fixing where it comes from. "Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases" (Conchada v. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 94). And "[a]s early as 1914, it was declared that the courts of the Philippine Islands have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective" (West Coast Life Insurance Co. v. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401).
That definition dictates the method, and the Court says so in one sentence: "We have to look for an express provision of law to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner." This is the sentence to carry into an exam answer on subject-matter jurisdiction — the enquiry is textual, not institutional or equitable.
The express provision is then quoted and applied. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1850 provides that "[a]ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War," and defines "uniformed members of the Integrated National Police" to "refer to police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards." Velunta, a Patrolman, is squarely within it.
The petitioner's authorities are then read for what they actually transfer. Executive Order No. 1012 states that "the operational supervision and direction exercised by the Philippine Constabulary over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force … is hereby transferred to the city or municipal government concerned"; Executive Order No. 1040 states that NAPOLCOM "shall exercise administrative control and supervision over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force throughout the country." The Court notes the qualifiers are "specifically stated." It then supplies the definition of the transferred power from P.D. No. 1160, Section 1(e): operational supervision and direction is "the power to see to it that the units or elements of the Integrated National Police perform their duties properly according to existing laws and the rules, regulations and policies promulgated by competent authority, and the power to employ or deploy such units or elements … to insure public safety and the effective maintenance of peace and order within the locality."
The distinction is then drawn, and it is the heart of the case. "The distinction between operational supervision and direction over the Integrated National Police and jurisdiction or authority of a court-martial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding against a police officer so that the appropriate penalty for the commission of a crime or offense may be imposed is easily discernible. One refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance while the other refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them."
The claim of express repeal is tested against the text of the clause relied on and fails. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 is a standard general repealing clause — "All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other enactments, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended and modified accordingly" — and "[t]he aforecited provision does not repeal in express terms, P.D. No. 1850." The petitioner's description of it as "clear and precise" is called "inaccurate."
The fallback of implied repeal fails because its condition — inconsistency — is absent. "Neither is there any inconsistency between P.D. No. 1850, which confers upon courts-martial, jurisdiction over crimes and offenses involving members of the Integrated National Police, and Executive Order No. 1040 which gives the city and municipal governments … operational supervision and direction over members of the Integrated National Police. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest" (PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 72 SCRA 396; Jalandoni v. Endaya, 85 SCRA 261; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 10; The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees Asso., 49 SCRA 149).
The adherence rule closes the argument even on the petitioner's own timeline. "When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start, it remains with the military court martial unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction. It is an established rule that jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law." Because the executive orders took effect in 1985, three years after the case was filed, even a genuine transfer of adjudicatory power would have had to be shown to operate retroactively.
A constitutional argument is anticipated and set aside as premature. Article XVI, Section 6 of the Constitution, on a police force "national and civilian in character," "is still in the process of being implemented. Police forces continue to remain part of the PC-INP until the civilian police force is finally set-up as contemplated by the fundamental law" (Barcellano v. Major General Renato de Villa, G.R. No. 75952, October 20, 1987).

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

This is a case about which tribunal, not about whether the accused is liable. Nothing in the Decision touches the merits of the homicide charge; the NAPOLCOM proceedings that found less grave misconduct are a separate administrative track and are narrated only as background.
The holding is anchored to a repealed statutory regime. P.D. No. 1850 was later repealed by R.A. No. 6975 (1990), which created the Philippine National Police under the Department of the Interior and Local Government and returned PNP members to the civil courts. Recite Velunta for its method — express grant, no implied repeal, adherence of jurisdiction — not for the proposition that police officers are tried by courts-martial today.
The adherence rule is expressly conditional. Jurisdiction remains "unless a law expressly divests it," and only until "validly transferred by the proper authority according to law." It is not a rule that jurisdiction can never move; it is a rule about what it takes to move it.
A limit on the analogy to De la Cruz vs. Moya. Both cases apply the same statute-in-force method, but the outcomes diverge because the statutes differed: here P.D. No. 1850 gave the military tribunal the case and nothing took it away; there General Order No. 59 had already given the military tribunal the case, so the civil court's proceedings were a nullity. The lesson common to both is that the forum is settled by reading the grant in force at filing — not by which court happens to be seised.
The Decision's quotation of Executive Order No. 1012 carries the reporter's own "(sic)" on a garbled final clause; and the text refers at one point to "Executive Order No. 101 2" and to "P.D. No. 1160" where the earlier passage cites "Presidential Decree No. 1162" for the same definition. Quote the codal sources rather than the Decision's rendering of them.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Separate Opinions

None. The Decision, penned by Justice Gutierrez, Jr., was concurred in by Justices Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes.