Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong Choi

I — Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions

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Title

Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong Choi

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007

Core Doctrine

Unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, two actions are involved in every criminal case: (1) the criminal action, in which the People of the Philippines is plaintiff and the accused is defendant, with the private complainant merely a witness for the State; and (2) the civil action arising from the delict, in which the private complainant is plaintiff and the accused is defendant. "There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits." A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution cannot appeal it without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy — but either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal, since "the real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused," and the public prosecutor "generally [has] no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused." Where a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court and granted, the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the court decides the whole case — including its civil aspect — on the prosecution's evidence alone, unless enforcement of civil liability has been waived or reserved; the civil action based on delict is extinguished only where the judgment includes a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist (last par., Sec. 2, Rule 111). Because criminal and civil liability require different quanta of proof (proof beyond reasonable doubt versus mere preponderance of evidence), a grant of demurrer for insufficiency of evidence to convict does not automatically mean the same evidence is insufficient to establish civil liability by preponderance — the two must be assessed distinctly, and the civil aspect generally proceeds even after a demurrer-based acquittal, absent the specific "act did not exist" finding.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 165496)

Case DigestWeek 4 - Rule 111 - Prosecution of Civil Action

Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong Choi

G.R. No. 165496 · February 12, 2007 · Second Division

I — Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions

Petitioner: Hun Hyung ParkRespondent: Eung Won Choi

Core Doctrine

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

I. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_165496_2007.html

ℹ️ Frequently cross-cited within this very Week 4 batch

This Decision's "two actions merged into one composite proceeding" passage is quoted or footnoted by at least two other Week 4 cases in this same syllabus batch — Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. CA (footnote 16, on offended-party standing) and, indirectly, the broader BP 22 line (Heirs of Simon v. Chan, Bernardo v. People) — making this one of the doctrinal anchor cases for the entire "Institution" Topic.

Facts

On June 28, 1999 Eung Won Choi issued PNB Check No. 0077133, postdated August 28, 1999, for ₱1,875,000.00, to Hun Hyung Park.
The check was dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
On August 31, 2000 an Information for B.P. Blg. 22 was filed; Choi pleaded not guilty, and after pre-trial the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief and rested.
Choi sought leave and filed a Demurrer to Evidence, asserting the prosecution had failed to prove he received notice of dishonour, so the statutory presumption of knowledge never arose.
On February 27, 2003 the MeTC of Makati, Branch 65, granted the demurrer and dismissed the case — without any finding that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist. That omission is the entire holding. Reconsideration was denied.
Park appealed the civil aspect only to the RTC of Makati. On September 11, 2003 Branch 60 held that though the evidence was insufficient for criminal liability, it did not extinguish the civil liability, and ordered payment of ₱1,875,000.00 with legal interest.
On Choi's motion the RTC set aside its own decision and remanded the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant… may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case." Park's own reconsideration was denied.
By Resolutions of May 20 and September 28, 2004 the CA dismissed his petition on four grounds — a verification not attesting the allegations were "true and correct based on authentic records"; missing material pleadings and orders; an uncertified, illegible copy of the RTC Decision; and failure to implead the People of the Philippines.
On February 12, 2007 the Second Division, through Justice Carpio Morales, denied the petition and directed the remand for reception of evidence on the civil aspect.

Issue

Where a criminal case is dismissed on demurrer to evidence without any finding that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist, does the two-actions framework of Section 1, Rule 111 entitle the accused to a further opportunity to adduce evidence on the civil aspect?

Secondary issues. Whether the CA rightly dismissed for defective verification and missing attachments; whether failure to implead the People was fatal to an appeal of the civil aspect alone; and whether Choi waived his right to present civil-aspect evidence.

Ruling

YES — the remand was proper. "In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." And "[a]bsent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue."

Secondary issues. YES in part — the verification fell short of the required standard, and the failure to submit properly certified copies of material pleadings and orders — some directly relevant, the civil aspect having been dismissed by the very same demurrer order — independently justified dismissal. NO — since Park appealed only the civil aspect, and "[t]he real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused," non-joinder of the People was "of no moment." NO WAIVER — reliance on Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was misplaced, "the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure," and any waiver "must be positively demonstrated," courts "indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against it."

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Costs against petitioner.

Ratio

The framework is two actions merged into one composite proceeding, each with its own standard of proof and its own disposition — which is why the fate of one does not automatically settle the other.
A demurrer disposes of the criminal aspect only. Granting it establishes that the prosecution's evidence failed on the elements; it does not, without more, establish that the underlying act did not exist.
So the required determination is the hinge. Where the dismissal order omits it, the civil aspect survives and must be tried, which necessarily means the accused — who never had occasion to answer on that aspect — gets to present evidence on it.
On waiver the Court set the bar high and refused to infer it from an ambiguous record of oral objections; and it corrected the CA on parties, the People having no stake in a purely civil appeal.
The procedural defects were nonetheless fatal in their own right, so the petition failed even as the merits favoured the remand it attacked.

Doctrine

Two actions in one proceeding.

The criminal and civil actions are merged into a single composite proceeding, so the disposition of the criminal aspect does not automatically dispose of the civil one.
A demurrer-based dismissal that makes no finding that the act or omission did not exist leaves the civil aspect alive: "[a]bsent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue," and the accused is entitled to adduce evidence on it.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect are the offended party and the accused — the People need not be impleaded in an appeal confined to it.
And waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated, every reasonable presumption running against it; the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, govern the civil liability arising within a criminal case.

Limits.

The remand is for a limited purpose only — reception of evidence on the civil aspect — and reopens nothing of the criminal case, which is finally dismissed.
And a defective petition still loses on procedure: Park was substantively right that the civil aspect survives dismissal, and still lost, on verification and attachments.
Pair this with Domingo v. Colina: there the acquitting court wrote the finding without support, here it wrote no finding at all — and both times the civil liability survived. The recurring question is what the dismissing order actually determined, and a court that says nothing has determined nothing.
Read also with Heirs of Simon v. Chan for why, in a B.P. 22 case, that surviving civil aspect must be litigated inside the criminal case and nowhere else.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. The Decision's core substantive holding is precisely how the "two actions" framework operates at the demurrer-to-evidence stage of a BP 22 prosecution, and how the civil aspect survives (or is extinguished) independently of the criminal aspect's disposition.
Eung Won Choi was charged with BP 22 for issuing a postdated check for ₱1,875,000.00 that was dishonored for insufficient funds. After the prosecution rested, Choi filed a Demurrer to Evidence, asserting the prosecution failed to prove he received the required notice of dishonor. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) granted the demurrer and dismissed the case — without any finding that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
Park appealed only the civil aspect to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which initially reversed and ordered Choi to pay, but on Choi's motion for reconsideration, set aside its own decision and remanded the case to the MeTC so Choi could present evidence specifically on the civil aspect. Park's own motion for reconsideration of the remand was denied, and his subsequent petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) was dismissed on several procedural grounds (defective verification; missing certified copies of pleadings; failure to implead the People of the Philippines).
The Supreme Court denied Park's petition (finding the CA's first two procedural grounds correctly applied, though the third — failure to implead the People — was, in fact, immaterial since Park appealed only the civil aspect) but, reaching the merits regardless, upheld the RTC's remand order: since the MeTC's demurrer-based dismissal contained no finding that the act or omission did not exist, Choi retained the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect, and the case was properly remanded for that limited purpose.

Facts

June 28, 1999: Eung Won Choi issued Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133, postdated August 28, 1999, in the amount of ₱1,875,000.00, to Hun Hyung Park.
The check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
August 31, 2000: An Information was filed charging Choi with violation of BP 22. Upon arraignment, Choi pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief and rested.
Choi filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence, attaching his Demurrer, asserting the prosecution failed to prove he received notice of dishonor, so the statutory presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds never arose.
February 27, 2003: The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65, granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Park appealed the civil aspect only of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending the dismissal of the criminal case should not carry with it the civil aspect.
September 11, 2003: RTC Branch 60 held that, while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish Choi's civil liability; it granted Park's appeal and ordered Choi to pay ₱1,875,000.00 with legal interest.
On Choi's motion for reconsideration, the RTC set aside its own decision and ordered the case remanded to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case." Park's own motion for reconsideration of this remand order was denied.
Park elevated the case to the CA, which, by Resolutions dated May 20, 2004 and September 28, 2004, dismissed his petition and denied reconsideration, respectively, citing four defects: (1) a verification that did not properly attest the allegations were "true and correct based on authentic records"; (2) failure to attach certain material pleadings/orders; (3) an uncertified, illegible copy of the RTC's September 11, 2003 Decision; and (4) failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a party-respondent.
Park brought the instant petition to the Supreme Court, challenging all four grounds relied upon by the CA.
February 12, 2007: The Supreme Court (Carpio Morales, J., Second Division) rendered the Decision under digest, denying the petition on the merits (while agreeing the fourth CA ground was, in fact, not fatal) and directing the case be remanded for reception of evidence on the civil aspect.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Hun Hyung Park).

Argued the CA erred in its four grounds for dismissal — in particular, that the word "or" in the verification rule (Sec. 4, Rule 7) is disjunctive, permitting him to verify based on personal knowledge alone without reference to authentic records, and that his failure to implead the People of the Philippines was immaterial since he was appealing only the civil aspect of the case.
Argued the documents the CA found missing (the Motion for Leave to File Demurrer, the Demurrer itself, the Opposition, and the MeTC's dismissal Order) were immaterial to his appeal.
Argued Choi had waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect — first, because the reversal of the demurrer grant on appeal should, by analogy to Sec. 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, be deemed a waiver; and second, because Choi orally opposed Park's motion for reconsideration of the remand, which Park read as an implicit waiver.

B. Respondent (Eung Won Choi).

Defended the CA's procedural dismissal on verification and documentary-attachment grounds.
Maintained his right, as an accused whose case was dismissed on demurrer without any finding that the act or omission did not exist, to present evidence specifically on the civil aspect, consistent with the "two actions" framework and the last paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 111.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Where a criminal case is dismissed on demurrer to evidence without any finding that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist, does the "two actions" institution framework (Sec. 1, Rule 111) entitle the accused to a further, separate opportunity to adduce evidence specifically on the civil aspect, notwithstanding the dismissal of the criminal aspect?

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether the CA correctly dismissed Park's petition for defective verification and missing documentary attachments.
Whether failure to implead the People of the Philippines was fatal to a petition appealing only the civil aspect of a criminal case.
Whether Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE — YES, Choi retained the right to present civil-aspect evidence; remand proper. "In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." Because "[a]bsent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue," the RTC's order remanding the case for that limited purpose was correct.
SECONDARY ISSUE 1 — Verification and documentary defects correctly cited (in part). The Court agreed the verification did not meet the required standard and that petitioner's failure to submit properly certified copies of material pleadings and orders (some of which were directly relevant since the civil aspect was dismissed by the very same demurrer order) independently justified dismissal on procedural grounds.
SECONDARY ISSUE 2 — Failure to implead the People was immaterial. Since Park appealed only the civil aspect, and "[t]he real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused," non-joinder of the People was "of no moment."
SECONDARY ISSUE 3 — NO waiver shown. Park's reliance on Rule 33 (Rules of Civil Procedure) was misplaced, since "the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure" for issues of civil liability arising within a criminal case; and any waiver "must be positively demonstrated," with courts "indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against it" — the ambiguous record of Choi's oral objections did not meet this standard.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

Step 1 — The Court restated the foundational "two actions" doctrine as the framework for the entire analysis: "Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case," each with its own parties-in-interest and, correspondingly, its own separate standing to appeal.
Step 2 — The Court explained the demurrer-to-evidence mechanics specific to the civil aspect. When a demurrer is filed without leave of court and is denied, the accused waives the right to present evidence and the case (both aspects) is decided on the prosecution's evidence alone — but "a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect," because the criminal standard (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is higher than the civil standard (preponderance), so evidence sufficient to defeat the demurrer criminally is necessarily sufficient civilly too. Conversely, if the demurrer is granted (as here), it does not follow that the same insufficiency-as-to-guilt necessarily means insufficiency as to civil liability, since the lower preponderance standard may yet be met — hence the civil aspect generally survives and proceeds to trial, unless the acquitting court affirmatively found that the underlying act or omission did not exist.
Step 3 — Applying this to the record, the Court found no such affirmative finding was made by the MeTC, and therefore held Choi retained an undiminished right to adduce evidence specifically on the civil aspect — precisely the relief the RTC's remand order afforded him.
Step 4 — The Court clarified that appellate procedure for the civil aspect is governed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, rejecting Park's attempted analogy to a civil-procedure waiver rule (Rule 33), because "[o]ne of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

1. The "two actions merged into one composite proceeding" doctrine — the doctrinal backbone of this entire Topic, quoted and applied by multiple other cases in this Week 4 batch.
2. Either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of a judgment despite an acquittal, without offending double jeopardy (which protects only against re-litigation of criminal guilt), and without need to implead the People, since the People has no interest in the civil aspect once acquittal has ended the criminal case.
3. A demurrer-based acquittal does not automatically extinguish civil liability; extinction requires the specific, affirmative finding that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist (last par., Sec. 2, Rule 111) — echoing, and directly complementary to, the "three-exception" framework more fully developed in this Week 4 batch's Group V cases (Ching v. Nicdao and its progeny).
4. Criminal and civil liability are assessed under different quanta of proof within the same demurrer proceeding, such that a grant of demurrer (insufficiency to convict) does not necessarily mean insufficiency to hold civilly liable.
5. Civil-aspect appellate procedure in a criminal case follows the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

This case does not disturb the acquittal itself — Choi's demurrer-based acquittal on the criminal charge is undisturbed and final; only the civil aspect is remanded for further proceedings.
The procedural (verification/documentary) grounds for dismissal, while independently sufficient to deny Park's petition, are not the Topic-relevant holding; this digest treats them as Secondary per the Materiality Rule, with the substantive "two actions"/civil-aspect-survival holding as the Main Issue.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification: DIRECT. The Decision directly explains and applies the "two actions" institution doctrine at one of its most consequential procedural junctures — the demurrer to evidence — clarifying precisely when and how the civil aspect detaches from, and survives, the criminal aspect's disposition.

Separate Opinions

None. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concurred per the signature block; no separate concurring or dissenting opinion is indicated.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court

Institution of criminal and civil actions

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The two actions doctrine, quoted as the framework for the whole analysis.

"Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case" — the criminal action, and the civil action deemed instituted with it.

For B.P. Blg. 22 the choice is removed: the criminal action is deemed to include the civil action and no reservation is allowed.

The consequence the case works out is procedural: because there are two actions, a disposition of the criminal one does not necessarily dispose of the civil one — and a court that dismisses the criminal case may still have to resolve the civil aspect.

Special Law

Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22

Checks without sufficient funds

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

B.P. Blg. 22 fixes no prescriptive period of its own, so Act No. 3326 supplies it — four years, the offense being punishable by imprisonment of more than one month but less than two years. See People v. Pangilinan. Note also A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC and the earlier Administrative Circulars 12-2000 and 13-2001, which express a preference for fine over imprisonment; they do not amend the penalty clause below.

Why it is cited here

The offense, and the postdated check that carries the civil claim.

"Any person who makes or draws and issues any check … knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds … which check is subsequently dishonored."

The statute expressly covers checks issued postdated, so the drawer's expectation of funding it later is no defence — the knowledge element is measured at issue.

Because the civil action is mandatorily included, the ₱1,875,000 claim is inside the criminal case whether the complainant wants it there or not, and survives a dismissal that does not find the act never occurred.

Implementing Rules

Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court

When separate civil action is suspended

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)

Why it is cited here

What the criminal court must still do after disposing of the criminal aspect.

"The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment … that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."

Because the civil action was never reservable out, the criminal court is the only forum for it — so dismissing the criminal case without resolving the civil aspect leaves the complainant with a claim and nowhere to bring it.

That is the practical problem the "two actions" framing solves: the criminal court retains jurisdiction over the civil aspect even where the criminal action is disposed of, and must rule on it rather than leave it hanging.

Related notes:

Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. CA — cites this Decision directly (footnote 16) for the "two actions" and offended-party-standing framework.
Heirs of Simon v. Chan / Bernardo v. People — companion BP 22 institution cases in this same batch.
Ching v. Nicdao — the fuller "three-exception" framework for when civil liability survives acquittal, complementary to this case's "act did not exist" extinguishing test.
Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — institution of criminal and civil actions.
Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — demurrer to evidence.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_165496_2007.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Institution of criminal and civil actions

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Why it is cited here

The two actions doctrine, quoted as the framework for the whole analysis.

For B.P. Blg. 22 the choice is removed: the criminal action is deemed to include the civil action and no reservation is allowed.

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22

Special Law

Checks without sufficient funds

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Why it is cited here

The offense, and the postdated check that carries the civil claim.

"Any person who makes or draws and issues any check … knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds … which check is subsequently dishonored."

The statute expressly covers checks issued postdated, so the drawer's expectation of funding it later is no defence — the knowledge element is measured at issue.

Full entry below ↓

Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

When separate civil action is suspended

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

Why it is cited here

What the criminal court must still do after disposing of the criminal aspect.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

I. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_165496_2007.html

ℹ️ Frequently cross-cited within this very Week 4 batch

Facts

On June 28, 1999 Eung Won Choi issued PNB Check No. 0077133, postdated August 28, 1999, for ₱1,875,000.00, to Hun Hyung Park.
The check was dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
On August 31, 2000 an Information for B.P. Blg. 22 was filed; Choi pleaded not guilty, and after pre-trial the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief and rested.
Choi sought leave and filed a Demurrer to Evidence, asserting the prosecution had failed to prove he received notice of dishonour, so the statutory presumption of knowledge never arose.
On February 27, 2003 the MeTC of Makati, Branch 65, granted the demurrer and dismissed the case — without any finding that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist. That omission is the entire holding. Reconsideration was denied.
Park appealed the civil aspect only to the RTC of Makati. On September 11, 2003 Branch 60 held that though the evidence was insufficient for criminal liability, it did not extinguish the civil liability, and ordered payment of ₱1,875,000.00 with legal interest.
On Choi's motion the RTC set aside its own decision and remanded the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant… may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case." Park's own reconsideration was denied.
By Resolutions of May 20 and September 28, 2004 the CA dismissed his petition on four grounds — a verification not attesting the allegations were "true and correct based on authentic records"; missing material pleadings and orders; an uncertified, illegible copy of the RTC Decision; and failure to implead the People of the Philippines.
On February 12, 2007 the Second Division, through Justice Carpio Morales, denied the petition and directed the remand for reception of evidence on the civil aspect.

Issue

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Costs against petitioner.

Ratio

The framework is two actions merged into one composite proceeding, each with its own standard of proof and its own disposition — which is why the fate of one does not automatically settle the other.
A demurrer disposes of the criminal aspect only. Granting it establishes that the prosecution's evidence failed on the elements; it does not, without more, establish that the underlying act did not exist.
So the required determination is the hinge. Where the dismissal order omits it, the civil aspect survives and must be tried, which necessarily means the accused — who never had occasion to answer on that aspect — gets to present evidence on it.
On waiver the Court set the bar high and refused to infer it from an ambiguous record of oral objections; and it corrected the CA on parties, the People having no stake in a purely civil appeal.
The procedural defects were nonetheless fatal in their own right, so the petition failed even as the merits favoured the remand it attacked.

Doctrine

Two actions in one proceeding.

The criminal and civil actions are merged into a single composite proceeding, so the disposition of the criminal aspect does not automatically dispose of the civil one.
A demurrer-based dismissal that makes no finding that the act or omission did not exist leaves the civil aspect alive: "[a]bsent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue," and the accused is entitled to adduce evidence on it.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect are the offended party and the accused — the People need not be impleaded in an appeal confined to it.
And waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated, every reasonable presumption running against it; the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, govern the civil liability arising within a criminal case.

Limits.

The remand is for a limited purpose only — reception of evidence on the civil aspect — and reopens nothing of the criminal case, which is finally dismissed.
And a defective petition still loses on procedure: Park was substantively right that the civil aspect survives dismissal, and still lost, on verification and attachments.
Pair this with Domingo v. Colina: there the acquitting court wrote the finding without support, here it wrote no finding at all — and both times the civil liability survived. The recurring question is what the dismissing order actually determined, and a court that says nothing has determined nothing.
Read also with Heirs of Simon v. Chan for why, in a B.P. 22 case, that surviving civil aspect must be litigated inside the criminal case and nowhere else.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. The Decision's core substantive holding is precisely how the "two actions" framework operates at the demurrer-to-evidence stage of a BP 22 prosecution, and how the civil aspect survives (or is extinguished) independently of the criminal aspect's disposition.
Eung Won Choi was charged with BP 22 for issuing a postdated check for ₱1,875,000.00 that was dishonored for insufficient funds. After the prosecution rested, Choi filed a Demurrer to Evidence, asserting the prosecution failed to prove he received the required notice of dishonor. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) granted the demurrer and dismissed the case — without any finding that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
Park appealed only the civil aspect to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which initially reversed and ordered Choi to pay, but on Choi's motion for reconsideration, set aside its own decision and remanded the case to the MeTC so Choi could present evidence specifically on the civil aspect. Park's own motion for reconsideration of the remand was denied, and his subsequent petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) was dismissed on several procedural grounds (defective verification; missing certified copies of pleadings; failure to implead the People of the Philippines).
The Supreme Court denied Park's petition (finding the CA's first two procedural grounds correctly applied, though the third — failure to implead the People — was, in fact, immaterial since Park appealed only the civil aspect) but, reaching the merits regardless, upheld the RTC's remand order: since the MeTC's demurrer-based dismissal contained no finding that the act or omission did not exist, Choi retained the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect, and the case was properly remanded for that limited purpose.

Facts

June 28, 1999: Eung Won Choi issued Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133, postdated August 28, 1999, in the amount of ₱1,875,000.00, to Hun Hyung Park.
The check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
August 31, 2000: An Information was filed charging Choi with violation of BP 22. Upon arraignment, Choi pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief and rested.
Choi filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence, attaching his Demurrer, asserting the prosecution failed to prove he received notice of dishonor, so the statutory presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds never arose.
February 27, 2003: The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65, granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Park appealed the civil aspect only of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending the dismissal of the criminal case should not carry with it the civil aspect.
September 11, 2003: RTC Branch 60 held that, while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish Choi's civil liability; it granted Park's appeal and ordered Choi to pay ₱1,875,000.00 with legal interest.
On Choi's motion for reconsideration, the RTC set aside its own decision and ordered the case remanded to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case." Park's own motion for reconsideration of this remand order was denied.
Park elevated the case to the CA, which, by Resolutions dated May 20, 2004 and September 28, 2004, dismissed his petition and denied reconsideration, respectively, citing four defects: (1) a verification that did not properly attest the allegations were "true and correct based on authentic records"; (2) failure to attach certain material pleadings/orders; (3) an uncertified, illegible copy of the RTC's September 11, 2003 Decision; and (4) failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a party-respondent.
Park brought the instant petition to the Supreme Court, challenging all four grounds relied upon by the CA.
February 12, 2007: The Supreme Court (Carpio Morales, J., Second Division) rendered the Decision under digest, denying the petition on the merits (while agreeing the fourth CA ground was, in fact, not fatal) and directing the case be remanded for reception of evidence on the civil aspect.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Hun Hyung Park).

Argued the CA erred in its four grounds for dismissal — in particular, that the word "or" in the verification rule (Sec. 4, Rule 7) is disjunctive, permitting him to verify based on personal knowledge alone without reference to authentic records, and that his failure to implead the People of the Philippines was immaterial since he was appealing only the civil aspect of the case.
Argued the documents the CA found missing (the Motion for Leave to File Demurrer, the Demurrer itself, the Opposition, and the MeTC's dismissal Order) were immaterial to his appeal.
Argued Choi had waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect — first, because the reversal of the demurrer grant on appeal should, by analogy to Sec. 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, be deemed a waiver; and second, because Choi orally opposed Park's motion for reconsideration of the remand, which Park read as an implicit waiver.

B. Respondent (Eung Won Choi).

Defended the CA's procedural dismissal on verification and documentary-attachment grounds.
Maintained his right, as an accused whose case was dismissed on demurrer without any finding that the act or omission did not exist, to present evidence specifically on the civil aspect, consistent with the "two actions" framework and the last paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 111.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Where a criminal case is dismissed on demurrer to evidence without any finding that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist, does the "two actions" institution framework (Sec. 1, Rule 111) entitle the accused to a further, separate opportunity to adduce evidence specifically on the civil aspect, notwithstanding the dismissal of the criminal aspect?

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether the CA correctly dismissed Park's petition for defective verification and missing documentary attachments.
Whether failure to implead the People of the Philippines was fatal to a petition appealing only the civil aspect of a criminal case.
Whether Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE — YES, Choi retained the right to present civil-aspect evidence; remand proper. "In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." Because "[a]bsent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue," the RTC's order remanding the case for that limited purpose was correct.
SECONDARY ISSUE 1 — Verification and documentary defects correctly cited (in part). The Court agreed the verification did not meet the required standard and that petitioner's failure to submit properly certified copies of material pleadings and orders (some of which were directly relevant since the civil aspect was dismissed by the very same demurrer order) independently justified dismissal on procedural grounds.
SECONDARY ISSUE 2 — Failure to implead the People was immaterial. Since Park appealed only the civil aspect, and "[t]he real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused," non-joinder of the People was "of no moment."
SECONDARY ISSUE 3 — NO waiver shown. Park's reliance on Rule 33 (Rules of Civil Procedure) was misplaced, since "the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure" for issues of civil liability arising within a criminal case; and any waiver "must be positively demonstrated," with courts "indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against it" — the ambiguous record of Choi's oral objections did not meet this standard.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

Step 1 — The Court restated the foundational "two actions" doctrine as the framework for the entire analysis: "Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case," each with its own parties-in-interest and, correspondingly, its own separate standing to appeal.
Step 2 — The Court explained the demurrer-to-evidence mechanics specific to the civil aspect. When a demurrer is filed without leave of court and is denied, the accused waives the right to present evidence and the case (both aspects) is decided on the prosecution's evidence alone — but "a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect," because the criminal standard (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is higher than the civil standard (preponderance), so evidence sufficient to defeat the demurrer criminally is necessarily sufficient civilly too. Conversely, if the demurrer is granted (as here), it does not follow that the same insufficiency-as-to-guilt necessarily means insufficiency as to civil liability, since the lower preponderance standard may yet be met — hence the civil aspect generally survives and proceeds to trial, unless the acquitting court affirmatively found that the underlying act or omission did not exist.
Step 3 — Applying this to the record, the Court found no such affirmative finding was made by the MeTC, and therefore held Choi retained an undiminished right to adduce evidence specifically on the civil aspect — precisely the relief the RTC's remand order afforded him.
Step 4 — The Court clarified that appellate procedure for the civil aspect is governed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, rejecting Park's attempted analogy to a civil-procedure waiver rule (Rule 33), because "[o]ne of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

1. The "two actions merged into one composite proceeding" doctrine — the doctrinal backbone of this entire Topic, quoted and applied by multiple other cases in this Week 4 batch.
2. Either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of a judgment despite an acquittal, without offending double jeopardy (which protects only against re-litigation of criminal guilt), and without need to implead the People, since the People has no interest in the civil aspect once acquittal has ended the criminal case.
3. A demurrer-based acquittal does not automatically extinguish civil liability; extinction requires the specific, affirmative finding that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist (last par., Sec. 2, Rule 111) — echoing, and directly complementary to, the "three-exception" framework more fully developed in this Week 4 batch's Group V cases (Ching v. Nicdao and its progeny).
4. Criminal and civil liability are assessed under different quanta of proof within the same demurrer proceeding, such that a grant of demurrer (insufficiency to convict) does not necessarily mean insufficiency to hold civilly liable.
5. Civil-aspect appellate procedure in a criminal case follows the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

This case does not disturb the acquittal itself — Choi's demurrer-based acquittal on the criminal charge is undisturbed and final; only the civil aspect is remanded for further proceedings.
The procedural (verification/documentary) grounds for dismissal, while independently sufficient to deny Park's petition, are not the Topic-relevant holding; this digest treats them as Secondary per the Materiality Rule, with the substantive "two actions"/civil-aspect-survival holding as the Main Issue.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification: DIRECT. The Decision directly explains and applies the "two actions" institution doctrine at one of its most consequential procedural junctures — the demurrer to evidence — clarifying precisely when and how the civil aspect detaches from, and survives, the criminal aspect's disposition.

Separate Opinions

None. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concurred per the signature block; no separate concurring or dissenting opinion is indicated.