Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People

III — Independent Civil Actions

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Case DigestWeek 4 - Rule 111 - Prosecution of Civil Action

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People

G.R. No. 147703 · April 14, 2004 · First Division

III — Independent Civil Actions

Petitioner: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.Respondent: People of the Philippines

Core Doctrine

The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution: only the civil liability arising from the crime charged (ex delicto, Art. 100, RPC) is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless waived, reserved, or instituted prior to the criminal action (Sec. 1, Rule 111). Civil liabilities arising from other sources of obligation — specifically those recognized under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code — are not deemed included in the criminal prosecution at all, and, as of the 2000 Rules, no longer need to be reserved: they "remain 'separate, distinct and independent' of any criminal prosecution based on the same act." Direct consequences of this 2000-Rules revision, as enumerated by the Court: (1) the right to bring an Art. 32/33/34/2176 action need not be reserved in the criminal case, since it is not deemed included therein; (2) instituting or waiving the ex delicto civil action does not extinguish the separate right to bring the independent action; (3) the only limitation is the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

III. Independent Civil Actions Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/apr2004/gr_147703_2004.html

⚡ Topic Fidelity flag — this case does not itself litigate an independent civil action

No party in this case invoked Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, or 2176, Civil Code, or sought to pursue any civil remedy independently of the criminal prosecution. The dispute is whether an employer — not a party to the criminal case — may appeal a judgment finding its employee guilty, in order to contest its own subsidiary civil liability under Arts. 102-103, RPC (an ex delicto-adjacent, not an independent, civil liability). The Court's discussion of Rule 111 Sec. 1 and the 2000 Rules' treatment of independent civil actions (Arts. 32-34, 2176) is genuine, clearly stated, and doctrinally valuable — but it is offered as background/context to explain what is deemed instituted in the criminal case (so as to explain why the employer's subsidiary liability is bound up with that one judgment), not as the basis for deciding an actual independent-civil-action dispute. Per the Topic Fidelity Rule's own instruction to say plainly when a decision does not squarely address its assigned Topic, this case is classified INCIDENTAL: the independent-civil-action doctrine is substantively discussed but is not load-bearing to the actual disposition, which turns on the employer's non-party status, the employee's waiver of appeal by jumping bail, and the double-jeopardy consequences of allowing the employer's appeal.

Facts

On August 26, 1990, on its regular Laoag-to-Manila run, a bus owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL) and driven by its employee Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union.
On July 27, 1994 the RTC of San Fernando, La Union (Crim. Case No. 2535) convicted Roman of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property, imposing four years, nine months and eleven days to six years, and awarding itemised damages to the heirs of Justino Torres, Estrella Velero and Lorna Ancheta, to injured passengers, and for property damage. It further ruled that PRBL, in the event of Roman's insolvency, shall be liable for his civil liabilities.
Roman jumped bail and remained at large. Counsel — hired and paid for by PRBL — filed a notice of appeal for him, which the trial court denied under Section 8, Rule 124, and the CA affirmed. His flight is what makes the judgment final.
On August 6, 1994 PRBL filed its own notice of appeal, given due course on April 29, 1997, and filed its Appellant's Brief in December 1998.
The OSG moved to be excused from filing a brief, its authority being confined to criminal appeals; the CA denied that motion on May 31, 1999.
On March 29, 2000 the CA dismissed PRBL's appeal, holding that the civil action being impliedly instituted with the criminal case, PRBL's Article 103 subsidiary liability became conclusive and enforceable once determined there, and that allowing a separate employer appeal would amend or nullify a judgment already final as to Roman. Reconsideration was denied March 27, 2001.
On April 14, 2004 the First Division, through Justice Panganiban, denied PRBL's Rule 45 petition with costs.

Issue

Whether an employer who participated in the defence of its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused, in order to contest its own subsidiary civil liability under Articles 102–103.

Background sub-discussion. What civil actions are deemed impliedly instituted under Section 1, Rule 111, and how that differs from independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176.

Secondary issue. Whether allowing the employer's appeal would violate the employee's right against double jeopardy.

Ruling

NO. PRBL, "not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee," had no independent right of appeal; its participation in Roman's defence did not transform its subsidiary liability into a directly litigable, independently appealable interest.

Background sub-discussion. Only the ex delicto liability under Article 100 is deemed instituted with the criminal action; liabilities from quasi-delict, contract or quasi-contract are not, and under the 2000 Rules need no longer be reserved to be pursued separately. No party here invoked that separate track — the discussion serves only to show that PRBL's Article 103 liability is deemed written into the very judgment it sought to appeal.

Secondary issue. YES. An appeal "implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to review," exposing Roman to a possible increase in penalty without his consent — a risk only he, not his employer, could accept or decline.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

Standing follows party status, not financial interest. The Information ran solely against Roman; PRBL's stake, however real, arises only on his insolvency and does not make it a party.
The employee's flight closed the case. Jumping bail is an implied waiver of the right to appeal, so the judgment — criminal and civil aspects alike, including the subsidiary-liability clause deemed written into it — became final and executory.
An employer appeal would necessarily reopen everything. Because the subsidiary liability is derived from and bound to the same judgment, contesting it means reopening Roman's guilt, which no one but Roman may put at risk.
And the independent-civil-action framework explains why the two are inseparable: had PRBL's exposure arisen from quasi-delict rather than from the delict, it would have travelled on its own track, immune to the criminal judgment. It did not.

Doctrine

An employer has no independent right to appeal a criminal judgment. Subsidiary liability under Articles 102–103 is deemed written into the judgment against the employee and becomes conclusive and enforceable once that judgment is final; the employer, never a party, cannot appeal it separately — and funding or providing counsel for the accused changes nothing. The accused's flight waives his own appeal and renders the judgment final in both aspects. And an appeal opens the whole case, waiving double jeopardy — a waiver personal to the accused.

Limits. This is not an independent-civil-action case. No party invoked Articles 31–34 or 2176; the dispute is about ex delicto-adjacent subsidiary liability, and the independent-action discussion is explanatory background, not the ground of decision. The contrast is the point, though: had the heirs sued PRBL directly on quasi-delict under Article 2180, the employer's liability would have been direct and solidary, litigable on its own, and untouched by Roman's conviction or flight — exactly the route taken in Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera. So the employer's predicament here is a consequence of the claimants' election, not of any defect in its rights. Read with Padua v. Robles, which enforces Article 103 subsidiary liability the proper way — after the employee's adjudicated liability proved uncollectible — and note the contrast: there the employer answered because the judgment was final; here it could not be heard for the same reason.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: INCIDENTAL. See the warning callout above. This case squarely decides an ex delicto/subsidiary-liability and appeal-procedure question, using the independent-civil-action doctrine only as explanatory background.
Napoleon Roman, a bus driver employed by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL), was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to property, and ordered to pay substantial damages to multiple victims/heirs, with PRBL declared liable in the event of Roman's insolvency (i.e., subsidiarily, per Arts. 102-103, RPC).
Roman jumped bail and remained at large; his counsel's notice of appeal (filed and funded by PRBL) was denied, and that denial was affirmed by the CA under the rule dismissing appeals of accused who abscond. PRBL itself then filed its own, separate notice of appeal, seeking review of the judgment insofar as its subsidiary liability was concerned.
The CA dismissed PRBL's appeal, reasoning that since the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal case, PRBL's subsidiary liability became conclusive and enforceable once determined in that one proceeding, and that allowing a separate employer appeal would amend or nullify a judgment already final as to the employee.
The Supreme Court affirmed: PRBL, never having been a direct party to the criminal case (filed solely against Roman), had no independent right to appeal; Roman's flight constituted an implied waiver of his own right to appeal, rendering the judgment (both criminal and civil aspects, including the subsidiary-liability clause deemed written into it) final and executory; and permitting PRBL's appeal would improperly reopen the whole case — including Roman's guilt — exposing him to a possible increased penalty without his consent, in violation of his right against double jeopardy, which only he (not his employer) could waive.

Facts

August 26, 1990: While on its regular Laoag-to-Manila trip, a passenger bus owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL) and driven by its employee, Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union.
July 27, 1994: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 2535, found Roman guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to property, sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9) months, eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and ordering payment of itemized damages (death indemnities, funeral and medical expenses, unearned income, moral damages, attorney's fees) to the heirs of Justino Torres, Estrella Velero, and Lorna Ancheta, and to injured passengers Maureen Brennan, Rosie Balajo, Teresita Tamondong, Juliana Tabtab, Miguel Arquitola, Clarita Cabanban, and Mariano Cabanban, plus property damages to La Union Electric Company and a jeepney owner. The trial court further ruled that PRBL, in the event of Roman's insolvency, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Same period: Roman jumped bail and remained at large. Counsel for Roman — admittedly hired and provided by PRBL — filed a notice of appeal on his behalf, which the trial court denied, invoking Sec. 8, Rule 124 (dismissal of appeal where the appellant jumps bail); the CA affirmed this denial.
August 6, 1994: PRBL, simultaneously, filed its own notice of appeal from the RTC judgment.
April 29, 1997: The trial court gave due course to PRBL's notice of appeal.
December 8-9, 1998: PRBL filed its Appellant's Brief with the CA; the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) received a copy.
January 8, 1999: The OSG moved to be excused from filing a brief for respondent, on the ground its authority to represent the People is confined to criminal appeals — a motion the CA denied on May 31, 1999.
March 2, 1999: The private prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss PRBL's appeal.
March 29, 2000: The CA (Second Division) granted the motion to dismiss and ordered PRBL's appeal DISMISSED, holding that since institution of a criminal case implies institution of the civil action arising from the offense, PRBL's Art. 103 subsidiary liability — once determined in the criminal case against its employee — becomes conclusive and enforceable; to allow PRBL to independently dispute this would amend, nullify, or defeat a judgment that had already become final as to Roman (whose own appeal had been dismissed for jumping bail).
March 27, 2001: The CA denied PRBL's motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter: PRBL filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, submitted for resolution as of April 24, 2002 upon the Court's receipt of the OSG's Memorandum.
April 14, 2004: The Supreme Court (Panganiban, J., First Division) rendered the Decision under digest, denying PRBL's petition and affirming the CA.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.).

As an employer whose subsidiary civil liability was directly at stake, PRBL claimed to be considered a party to the criminal case and conclusively bound by its outcome — and, on that premise, argued it should be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion, including appeal.
Argued that its own timely notice of appeal stayed the finality of the RTC judgment, notwithstanding Roman's flight — in effect, that PRBL's appeal could take the place of, or independently supplement, the appeal Roman himself had forfeited.
Argued that having dutifully participated in Roman's defense (supplying counsel), it should not be penalized by the same jumping-bail sanction that barred Roman's own appeal, and invoked Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil in support of its position that it had preserved its right to contest its subsidiary liability.
Its Appellant's Brief before the CA (and its Petition before the Supreme Court) both claimed the trial court's finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence" — i.e., sought review of Roman's guilt itself, not merely the amount or existence of the subsidiary liability.

B. Respondent (People of the Philippines).

Maintained PRBL was never a direct party to Criminal Case No. 2535, which was filed solely against Roman; employers in subsidiary-liability cases are not parties to the criminal prosecution, even though they may, in substance, have an interest in its outcome and may assist in the employee's defense.
Argued Roman's flight constituted an implied waiver of his own right to appeal (settled doctrine dating to People v. Ang Gioc), rendering the judgment against him final and executory, and that the subsidiary-liability clause — deemed written into that same judgment under Arts. 102-103, RPC, even without express pronouncement — became immediately and ipso facto enforceable upon that finality.
Argued PRBL's appeal, aimed at having Roman's conviction reviewed and potentially reversed, amounted to a waiver of Roman's own constitutional protection against double jeopardy that only Roman himself, not his employer, could make — since an appeal opens the whole case to review, including the possibility of an increased penalty.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether an employer who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused, in order to contest its own subsidiary civil liability under Articles 102-103, Revised Penal Code.

B. TOPIC-RELEVANT SUB-DISCUSSION (Independent Civil Actions — Background Only).

What civil actions are deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal prosecution under Sec. 1, Rule 111 (2000 Rules), and how does this differ from the treatment of independent civil actions under Arts. 32, 33, 34, and 2176, Civil Code? — Discussed by the Court as necessary foundation for explaining why the ex delicto/subsidiary-liability track (actually at issue) is inseparably bound up with the single criminal judgment, in contrast to how an independent civil action would instead proceed on its own, wholly separate track.

C. SECONDARY ISSUE.

Whether allowing the employer's appeal would violate the employee's constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE — NO, the employer may not appeal independently. PRBL, "not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee," had no independent right of appeal; its participation in Roman's defense did not transform its liability from subsidiary to a directly-litigable, independently-appealable interest.
TOPIC-RELEVANT SUB-DISCUSSION — Explained, not litigated. The Court explained that only the ex delicto civil liability (Art. 100, RPC) is deemed instituted with the criminal action; civil liabilities arising from quasi-delict, contract, or quasi-contract (Arts. 32-34, 2176, Civil Code) are not, and — under the 2000 Rules — need no longer be reserved to be pursued separately. No party in this case, however, invoked or sought to exercise that separate, independent track; the discussion serves only to underscore that PRBL's Art. 103 subsidiary liability, being ex delicto-adjacent, is deemed written into the very same criminal judgment PRBL sought to appeal.
SECONDARY ISSUE — YES, double jeopardy would be implicated. An appeal "implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to review," exposing Roman to the risk of a penalty increase without his consent — a risk only Roman, not PRBL, was entitled to accept or decline.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

Step 1 — The Court traced the ex delicto civil liability's automatic incorporation into the criminal judgment. Arts. 102-103, RPC "are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable," so the trial court need not expressly pronounce the employer's subsidiary liability in the dispositive portion for it to attach.
Step 2 — The Court held PRBL's non-party status precluded an independent appeal, notwithstanding its practical stake in the outcome and its role in funding Roman's defense — because "strictly speaking, [employers] are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees," and "can only defend the accused," not act independently on their own behalf.
Step 3 — The Court held Roman's flight was an implied waiver of appeal that rendered the entire judgment (criminal and civil aspects alike) final, and that this finality could not be selectively undone for PRBL's benefit alone: "it is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former."
Step 4 — In explaining why PRBL's liability is so inseparably tied to the one criminal judgment, the Court contrasted this with how independent civil actions are treated — clarifying that Arts. 32-34/2176 liabilities are never deemed instituted in the criminal case at all (so they would never be subject to this finality problem), whereas ex delicto-based liability, including the employer's derivative subsidiary liability, is always bound up with the criminal action's single judgment and fate.
Step 5 — The Court held allowing PRBL's appeal would improperly waive Roman's own right against double jeopardy on his behalf, since PRBL's Appellant's Brief and Petition both attacked the sufficiency of the evidence for guilt itself, not merely the subsidiary-liability amount.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

1. Only ex delicto civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; independent civil actions (Arts. 32-34, 2176, Civil Code) are not, and need no longer be reserved. Quoted verbatim: "It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain 'separate, distinct and independent' of any criminal prosecution based on the same act."
2. Employer subsidiary liability (Arts. 102-103, RPC) is deemed written into the criminal judgment without need of express pronouncement, and attaches ipso facto upon the employee's conviction becoming final, subject to proof of insolvency.
3. An employer is not a party to the criminal case against its employee and has no independent right to appeal, even where it assisted in the employee's defense; its remedy is limited to participating in a hearing — held as part of execution proceedings in the same criminal case — on the four requisites of subsidiary liability (employer status; engagement in industry; crime committed in discharge of duties; employee's proven insolvency).
4. An accused who jumps bail impliedly waives the right to appeal, rendering the judgment final and executory as to both criminal and civil aspects.
5. An appeal from a judgment of conviction throws the whole case open to review and risks an increased penalty — a risk only the accused may elect to take, so a non-party (such as the employer) cannot force this risk on the accused by appealing in his stead.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

This case's independent-civil-action discussion is explanatory background, not an applied holding — no party pleaded or relied on Arts. 31-34/2176, Civil Code; contrast Lim v. Kou Co Ping, Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera, Padua v. Robles, and Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA in this batch, where the independent-civil-action provisions are directly applied to resolve the case's actual controversy.
The ruling does not foreclose an employer from being heard on the four subsidiary-liability requisites — only from appealing the underlying criminal judgment; the proper venue for that hearing is a motion/proceeding for execution in the same criminal case, with due notice to the employer.
The 2000 Rules' clarification that independent civil actions need no longer be reserved is presented as settled, general doctrine by the Court, but its application here is confined to explaining, by contrast, the different (automatic, non-severable) treatment of ex delicto/subsidiary civil liability.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification: INCIDENTAL. The Court substantively and accurately restates the post-2000-Rules independent-civil-action doctrine (Arts. 32-34, 2176, Civil Code; no-reservation-needed rule), making this a useful, quotable reference for the Topic — but this discussion is offered only to contrast and explain the different, non-independent, automatically-instituted nature of the ex delicto/subsidiary civil liability that is actually in dispute. No independent civil action was filed, invoked, or adjudicated in this case; the disposition turns entirely on employer non-party status, waiver-by-flight, and double jeopardy.

Separate Opinions

None. Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred per the signature block; no separate concurring or dissenting opinion is indicated.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Special Law

Article 103, Revised Penal Code

Subsidiary civil liability of other persons

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

CHAPTER TWO

WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES

Why it is cited here

The employer's subsidiary liability, and why it needs no separate suit.

"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties."

Articles 102–103 "are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable," so the trial court need not expressly adjudge the employer liable.

The liability attaches by operation of law on the employee's conviction, and is enforced by motion for subsidiary writ of execution in the same criminal case — not by a fresh action.

Special Law

Article 102, Revised Penal Code

Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

Why it is cited here

The article Article 103 extends, and the conditions it carries.

Article 102 imposes subsidiary civil liability on innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments for crimes committed in their houses, where their employees are at fault and the guest gave notice.

Article 103 carries that structure across to employers generally, and the conditions the case law draws from it are four: an employer-employee relationship; the employer engaged in an industry; the employee convicted and civil liability adjudged; and the writ of execution against the employee returned unsatisfied for insolvency.

All four must be shown, and the insolvency requirement is what makes the liability subsidiary rather than solidary.

Special Law

Article 365, Revised Penal Code

Imprudence and negligence

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in article 62.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed, in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

TITLE FIFTEEN

FINAL PROVISIONS

Why it is cited here

The offense, and the employer's procedural standing in the appeal.

The driver was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide and multiple injuries — an Article 365 offense committed in the discharge of his duties.

Because the employer's liability is subsidiary to the conviction, the employer has a real interest in the criminal judgment. But he was not a party to the prosecution.

The settled resolution is that the employer may not appeal the criminal aspect, since the accused's appeal is personal to him; his remedy is to contest the subsidiary liability when execution is sought against him — where he may raise the four conditions above, but not re-litigate guilt.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court

Institution of criminal and civil actions

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Why the employer's exposure rides on the criminal case it was never a party to.

"(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Roman, a Philippine Rabbit driver, was convicted of reckless imprudence and ordered to pay damages, with PRBL subsidiarily liable under Articles 102–103 of the Revised Penal Code should he prove insolvent.

Nothing made PRBL an accused. Its liability attaches to the civil action impliedly instituted with the prosecution, which is why a judgment in a case it did not defend can bind it.

That is the price of subsidiary liability ex delicto: it is derivative, so it follows the criminal judgment — and the employer's protection lies in the driver's defence, not its own.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court

When civil action may proceeded independently

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)

Why it is cited here

The independent route the victims did not take, and what it would have changed.

"In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

Had the claims been brought as quasi-delict under Article 2176, the employer's liability would have been direct and primary under Article 2180 — not subsidiary, and not dependent on the driver's insolvency or on any criminal judgment.

That contrast is the whole practical lesson of the case. Ex delicto the employer pays only if the employee cannot; ex quasi delicto it answers immediately, subject to the defence of due diligence in selection and supervision.

Roman jumped bail, which put the derivative route in jeopardy — an accused who flees loses the right to appeal, and the employer's fate is tied to a judgment it cannot itself contest.

Related notes:

Lim v. Kou Co Ping — contrast: there, the independent civil action (contract/tort) was actually pleaded and adjudicated as a live, applied issue (DIRECT), unlike this case's background-only treatment.
Padua v. Robles — another Art. 103 employer-subsidiary-liability case, but one that squarely applies the culpa-criminal/culpa-aquiliana election doctrine to its own disposition (DIRECT).
Cabugao v. People — another case in this Week 4 batch whose load-bearing holding lies outside "Independent Civil Actions" proper (there, "Effect of Death on Civil Actions," Sec. 4, Rule 111) despite a passing cross-reference to Sec. 3's independent civil actions.
Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — institution of criminal and civil actions.
Articles 100-103, Revised Penal Code — civil liability of persons guilty of felonies; subsidiary liability of employers.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/apr2004/gr_147703_2004.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article 103, Revised Penal Code

Special Law

Subsidiary civil liability of other persons

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

CHAPTER TWO

WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES

Why it is cited here

The employer's subsidiary liability, and why it needs no separate suit.

Articles 102–103 "are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable," so the trial court need not expressly adjudge the employer liable.

The liability attaches by operation of law on the employee's conviction, and is enforced by motion for subsidiary writ of execution in the same criminal case — not by a fresh action.

Full entry below ↓

Article 102, Revised Penal Code

Special Law

Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

Why it is cited here

The article Article 103 extends, and the conditions it carries.

All four must be shown, and the insolvency requirement is what makes the liability subsidiary rather than solidary.

Full entry below ↓

Article 365, Revised Penal Code

Special Law

Imprudence and negligence

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in article 62.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

TITLE FIFTEEN

FINAL PROVISIONS

Why it is cited here

The offense, and the employer's procedural standing in the appeal.

The driver was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide and multiple injuries — an Article 365 offense committed in the discharge of his duties.

Because the employer's liability is subsidiary to the conviction, the employer has a real interest in the criminal judgment. But he was not a party to the prosecution.

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Institution of criminal and civil actions

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Why it is cited here

Why the employer's exposure rides on the criminal case it was never a party to.

Nothing made PRBL an accused. Its liability attaches to the civil action impliedly instituted with the prosecution, which is why a judgment in a case it did not defend can bind it.

That is the price of subsidiary liability ex delicto: it is derivative, so it follows the criminal judgment — and the employer's protection lies in the driver's defence, not its own.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

When civil action may proceeded independently

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 111 (Prosecution of Civil Action)

Why it is cited here

The independent route the victims did not take, and what it would have changed.

Roman jumped bail, which put the derivative route in jeopardy — an accused who flees loses the right to appeal, and the employer's fate is tied to a judgment it cannot itself contest.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

III. Independent Civil Actions Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/apr2004/gr_147703_2004.html

⚡ Topic Fidelity flag — this case does not itself litigate an independent civil action

Facts

On August 26, 1990, on its regular Laoag-to-Manila run, a bus owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL) and driven by its employee Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union.
On July 27, 1994 the RTC of San Fernando, La Union (Crim. Case No. 2535) convicted Roman of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property, imposing four years, nine months and eleven days to six years, and awarding itemised damages to the heirs of Justino Torres, Estrella Velero and Lorna Ancheta, to injured passengers, and for property damage. It further ruled that PRBL, in the event of Roman's insolvency, shall be liable for his civil liabilities.
Roman jumped bail and remained at large. Counsel — hired and paid for by PRBL — filed a notice of appeal for him, which the trial court denied under Section 8, Rule 124, and the CA affirmed. His flight is what makes the judgment final.
On August 6, 1994 PRBL filed its own notice of appeal, given due course on April 29, 1997, and filed its Appellant's Brief in December 1998.
The OSG moved to be excused from filing a brief, its authority being confined to criminal appeals; the CA denied that motion on May 31, 1999.
On March 29, 2000 the CA dismissed PRBL's appeal, holding that the civil action being impliedly instituted with the criminal case, PRBL's Article 103 subsidiary liability became conclusive and enforceable once determined there, and that allowing a separate employer appeal would amend or nullify a judgment already final as to Roman. Reconsideration was denied March 27, 2001.
On April 14, 2004 the First Division, through Justice Panganiban, denied PRBL's Rule 45 petition with costs.

Issue

Secondary issue. Whether allowing the employer's appeal would violate the employee's right against double jeopardy.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

Standing follows party status, not financial interest. The Information ran solely against Roman; PRBL's stake, however real, arises only on his insolvency and does not make it a party.
The employee's flight closed the case. Jumping bail is an implied waiver of the right to appeal, so the judgment — criminal and civil aspects alike, including the subsidiary-liability clause deemed written into it — became final and executory.
An employer appeal would necessarily reopen everything. Because the subsidiary liability is derived from and bound to the same judgment, contesting it means reopening Roman's guilt, which no one but Roman may put at risk.
And the independent-civil-action framework explains why the two are inseparable: had PRBL's exposure arisen from quasi-delict rather than from the delict, it would have travelled on its own track, immune to the criminal judgment. It did not.

Doctrine

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: INCIDENTAL. See the warning callout above. This case squarely decides an ex delicto/subsidiary-liability and appeal-procedure question, using the independent-civil-action doctrine only as explanatory background.
Napoleon Roman, a bus driver employed by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL), was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to property, and ordered to pay substantial damages to multiple victims/heirs, with PRBL declared liable in the event of Roman's insolvency (i.e., subsidiarily, per Arts. 102-103, RPC).
Roman jumped bail and remained at large; his counsel's notice of appeal (filed and funded by PRBL) was denied, and that denial was affirmed by the CA under the rule dismissing appeals of accused who abscond. PRBL itself then filed its own, separate notice of appeal, seeking review of the judgment insofar as its subsidiary liability was concerned.
The CA dismissed PRBL's appeal, reasoning that since the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal case, PRBL's subsidiary liability became conclusive and enforceable once determined in that one proceeding, and that allowing a separate employer appeal would amend or nullify a judgment already final as to the employee.
The Supreme Court affirmed: PRBL, never having been a direct party to the criminal case (filed solely against Roman), had no independent right to appeal; Roman's flight constituted an implied waiver of his own right to appeal, rendering the judgment (both criminal and civil aspects, including the subsidiary-liability clause deemed written into it) final and executory; and permitting PRBL's appeal would improperly reopen the whole case — including Roman's guilt — exposing him to a possible increased penalty without his consent, in violation of his right against double jeopardy, which only he (not his employer) could waive.

Facts

August 26, 1990: While on its regular Laoag-to-Manila trip, a passenger bus owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL) and driven by its employee, Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union.
July 27, 1994: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 2535, found Roman guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to property, sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9) months, eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and ordering payment of itemized damages (death indemnities, funeral and medical expenses, unearned income, moral damages, attorney's fees) to the heirs of Justino Torres, Estrella Velero, and Lorna Ancheta, and to injured passengers Maureen Brennan, Rosie Balajo, Teresita Tamondong, Juliana Tabtab, Miguel Arquitola, Clarita Cabanban, and Mariano Cabanban, plus property damages to La Union Electric Company and a jeepney owner. The trial court further ruled that PRBL, in the event of Roman's insolvency, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Same period: Roman jumped bail and remained at large. Counsel for Roman — admittedly hired and provided by PRBL — filed a notice of appeal on his behalf, which the trial court denied, invoking Sec. 8, Rule 124 (dismissal of appeal where the appellant jumps bail); the CA affirmed this denial.
August 6, 1994: PRBL, simultaneously, filed its own notice of appeal from the RTC judgment.
April 29, 1997: The trial court gave due course to PRBL's notice of appeal.
December 8-9, 1998: PRBL filed its Appellant's Brief with the CA; the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) received a copy.
January 8, 1999: The OSG moved to be excused from filing a brief for respondent, on the ground its authority to represent the People is confined to criminal appeals — a motion the CA denied on May 31, 1999.
March 2, 1999: The private prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss PRBL's appeal.
March 29, 2000: The CA (Second Division) granted the motion to dismiss and ordered PRBL's appeal DISMISSED, holding that since institution of a criminal case implies institution of the civil action arising from the offense, PRBL's Art. 103 subsidiary liability — once determined in the criminal case against its employee — becomes conclusive and enforceable; to allow PRBL to independently dispute this would amend, nullify, or defeat a judgment that had already become final as to Roman (whose own appeal had been dismissed for jumping bail).
March 27, 2001: The CA denied PRBL's motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter: PRBL filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, submitted for resolution as of April 24, 2002 upon the Court's receipt of the OSG's Memorandum.
April 14, 2004: The Supreme Court (Panganiban, J., First Division) rendered the Decision under digest, denying PRBL's petition and affirming the CA.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.).

As an employer whose subsidiary civil liability was directly at stake, PRBL claimed to be considered a party to the criminal case and conclusively bound by its outcome — and, on that premise, argued it should be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion, including appeal.
Argued that its own timely notice of appeal stayed the finality of the RTC judgment, notwithstanding Roman's flight — in effect, that PRBL's appeal could take the place of, or independently supplement, the appeal Roman himself had forfeited.
Argued that having dutifully participated in Roman's defense (supplying counsel), it should not be penalized by the same jumping-bail sanction that barred Roman's own appeal, and invoked Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil in support of its position that it had preserved its right to contest its subsidiary liability.
Its Appellant's Brief before the CA (and its Petition before the Supreme Court) both claimed the trial court's finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence" — i.e., sought review of Roman's guilt itself, not merely the amount or existence of the subsidiary liability.

B. Respondent (People of the Philippines).

Maintained PRBL was never a direct party to Criminal Case No. 2535, which was filed solely against Roman; employers in subsidiary-liability cases are not parties to the criminal prosecution, even though they may, in substance, have an interest in its outcome and may assist in the employee's defense.
Argued Roman's flight constituted an implied waiver of his own right to appeal (settled doctrine dating to People v. Ang Gioc), rendering the judgment against him final and executory, and that the subsidiary-liability clause — deemed written into that same judgment under Arts. 102-103, RPC, even without express pronouncement — became immediately and ipso facto enforceable upon that finality.
Argued PRBL's appeal, aimed at having Roman's conviction reviewed and potentially reversed, amounted to a waiver of Roman's own constitutional protection against double jeopardy that only Roman himself, not his employer, could make — since an appeal opens the whole case to review, including the possibility of an increased penalty.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether an employer who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused, in order to contest its own subsidiary civil liability under Articles 102-103, Revised Penal Code.

B. TOPIC-RELEVANT SUB-DISCUSSION (Independent Civil Actions — Background Only).

What civil actions are deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal prosecution under Sec. 1, Rule 111 (2000 Rules), and how does this differ from the treatment of independent civil actions under Arts. 32, 33, 34, and 2176, Civil Code? — Discussed by the Court as necessary foundation for explaining why the ex delicto/subsidiary-liability track (actually at issue) is inseparably bound up with the single criminal judgment, in contrast to how an independent civil action would instead proceed on its own, wholly separate track.

C. SECONDARY ISSUE.

Whether allowing the employer's appeal would violate the employee's constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE — NO, the employer may not appeal independently. PRBL, "not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee," had no independent right of appeal; its participation in Roman's defense did not transform its liability from subsidiary to a directly-litigable, independently-appealable interest.
TOPIC-RELEVANT SUB-DISCUSSION — Explained, not litigated. The Court explained that only the ex delicto civil liability (Art. 100, RPC) is deemed instituted with the criminal action; civil liabilities arising from quasi-delict, contract, or quasi-contract (Arts. 32-34, 2176, Civil Code) are not, and — under the 2000 Rules — need no longer be reserved to be pursued separately. No party in this case, however, invoked or sought to exercise that separate, independent track; the discussion serves only to underscore that PRBL's Art. 103 subsidiary liability, being ex delicto-adjacent, is deemed written into the very same criminal judgment PRBL sought to appeal.
SECONDARY ISSUE — YES, double jeopardy would be implicated. An appeal "implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to review," exposing Roman to the risk of a penalty increase without his consent — a risk only Roman, not PRBL, was entitled to accept or decline.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

Step 1 — The Court traced the ex delicto civil liability's automatic incorporation into the criminal judgment. Arts. 102-103, RPC "are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable," so the trial court need not expressly pronounce the employer's subsidiary liability in the dispositive portion for it to attach.
Step 2 — The Court held PRBL's non-party status precluded an independent appeal, notwithstanding its practical stake in the outcome and its role in funding Roman's defense — because "strictly speaking, [employers] are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees," and "can only defend the accused," not act independently on their own behalf.
Step 3 — The Court held Roman's flight was an implied waiver of appeal that rendered the entire judgment (criminal and civil aspects alike) final, and that this finality could not be selectively undone for PRBL's benefit alone: "it is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former."
Step 4 — In explaining why PRBL's liability is so inseparably tied to the one criminal judgment, the Court contrasted this with how independent civil actions are treated — clarifying that Arts. 32-34/2176 liabilities are never deemed instituted in the criminal case at all (so they would never be subject to this finality problem), whereas ex delicto-based liability, including the employer's derivative subsidiary liability, is always bound up with the criminal action's single judgment and fate.
Step 5 — The Court held allowing PRBL's appeal would improperly waive Roman's own right against double jeopardy on his behalf, since PRBL's Appellant's Brief and Petition both attacked the sufficiency of the evidence for guilt itself, not merely the subsidiary-liability amount.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

1. Only ex delicto civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; independent civil actions (Arts. 32-34, 2176, Civil Code) are not, and need no longer be reserved. Quoted verbatim: "It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain 'separate, distinct and independent' of any criminal prosecution based on the same act."
2. Employer subsidiary liability (Arts. 102-103, RPC) is deemed written into the criminal judgment without need of express pronouncement, and attaches ipso facto upon the employee's conviction becoming final, subject to proof of insolvency.
3. An employer is not a party to the criminal case against its employee and has no independent right to appeal, even where it assisted in the employee's defense; its remedy is limited to participating in a hearing — held as part of execution proceedings in the same criminal case — on the four requisites of subsidiary liability (employer status; engagement in industry; crime committed in discharge of duties; employee's proven insolvency).
4. An accused who jumps bail impliedly waives the right to appeal, rendering the judgment final and executory as to both criminal and civil aspects.
5. An appeal from a judgment of conviction throws the whole case open to review and risks an increased penalty — a risk only the accused may elect to take, so a non-party (such as the employer) cannot force this risk on the accused by appealing in his stead.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

This case's independent-civil-action discussion is explanatory background, not an applied holding — no party pleaded or relied on Arts. 31-34/2176, Civil Code; contrast Lim v. Kou Co Ping, Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera, Padua v. Robles, and Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA in this batch, where the independent-civil-action provisions are directly applied to resolve the case's actual controversy.
The ruling does not foreclose an employer from being heard on the four subsidiary-liability requisites — only from appealing the underlying criminal judgment; the proper venue for that hearing is a motion/proceeding for execution in the same criminal case, with due notice to the employer.
The 2000 Rules' clarification that independent civil actions need no longer be reserved is presented as settled, general doctrine by the Court, but its application here is confined to explaining, by contrast, the different (automatic, non-severable) treatment of ex delicto/subsidiary civil liability.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification: INCIDENTAL. The Court substantively and accurately restates the post-2000-Rules independent-civil-action doctrine (Arts. 32-34, 2176, Civil Code; no-reservation-needed rule), making this a useful, quotable reference for the Topic — but this discussion is offered only to contrast and explain the different, non-independent, automatically-instituted nature of the ex delicto/subsidiary civil liability that is actually in dispute. No independent civil action was filed, invoked, or adjudicated in this case; the disposition turns entirely on employer non-party status, waiver-by-flight, and double jeopardy.

Separate Opinions

None. Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred per the signature block; no separate concurring or dissenting opinion is indicated.