Facts

• In three letters of 14 December 2006 a police inspector referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City three murder cases against Liza Maza, Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño and Rafael Mariano — sitting or former Gabriela, Bayan Muna and Anakpawis representatives — with fifteen others, for the killings of Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe, AKBAYAN community organisers, and Jimmy Peralta, mistaken for another AKBAYAN supporter.
• Their motion to quash the complaint and subpoena was denied 13 July 2007, and reconsideration denied 14 November 2007.
• On 11 April 2008 the panel's Joint Resolution found probable cause for murder (Bayudang and Peralta) and kidnapping with murder (Felipe) against nineteen suspects, one — Julie Flores Sinohin — having been made a state witness. Two murder Informations were filed in the RTC of Palayan City, Branch 40 (Crim. Cases Nos. 1879-P and 1880-P).
• They moved for judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to dismiss. In the separate Guimba case a different judge simply dismissed for lack of probable cause on 5 August 2008 — the course this Court says was available here.
• On 18 July 2008 Judge Evelyn Atienza-Turla instead found "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed," citing that the principal witnesses never appeared before or subscribed their affidavits before the panel — a defect one panel member's own marginal note acknowledged; that the non-bailable charge and petitioners' status as representatives warranted a "deeper and more thorough" investigation than reliance on Sinohin's unsubscribed affidavit; and that they had been denied the chance to move for reconsideration before the Informations were filed. Finding "undue haste" and prosecutors "overly-eager" for a non-bailable warrant, she set aside the Joint Resolution and ordered a new preliminary investigation.
• Their motion for partial reconsideration, praying for outright dismissal, was denied 2 December 2008.
• On 15 February 2017 the Second Division, through Justice Leonen, partially granted their Rule 65 petition and set the Orders aside.

Issue

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 18, 2008 and December 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 in Criminal Case Nos. 1879-P and 1880-P are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 for further proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

• The list of options is closed. Nothing in Section 5(a) contemplates a fourth option of sending the matter back for a fresh investigation.
• The two functions belong to different branches. Quoting Napoles v. De Lima and De Lima v. Reyes, the propriety and completeness of the investigation — whether witnesses were subscribed, whether reconsideration was allowed — sits in the prosecutors' executive domain, insulated absent grave abuse; the judge§'s task is the separate, narrower question whether probable cause exists on the record before her.
• So she substituted a review of prosecutorial process for the determination that was hers. The Court recharacterised her own concerns — weak, unsubscribed statements; a key witness's uncorroborated, unsworn account — as reasons to have doubted probable cause and ordered additional evidence, or to have dismissed outright.
• And it did not decide probable cause itself, setting aside the remand and returning the case so the judge could actually exercise one of her three options — which is why the grant is partial.

Doctrine

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

1. In three letters dated 14 December 2006, a police inspector referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City three murder cases against petitioners Liza Maza, Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, and Rafael Mariano, together with fifteen others, alleging they had conspired in the killings of Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe (AKBAYAN community organizers) and Jimmy Peralta (mistaken for another AKBAYAN supporter), as part of a rivalry between AKBAYAN and the Bayan Muna/Gabriela/Anakpawis coalition.
2. Petitioners moved to quash the complaint and subpoena for lack of jurisdiction and due-process defects (9 March 2007); the panel of investigating prosecutors denied this motion (13 July 2007) and, after petitioners submitted counter-affidavits and further motions, denied reconsideration as well (14 November 2007).
3. On 11 April 2008, the panel issued a Joint Resolution, approved by the OIC Provincial Prosecutor, finding probable cause for murder (as to Bayudang and Peralta) and kidnapping with murder (as to Felipe) against the nineteen suspects (one, Julie Flores Sinohin, having been made a state witness). Two Informations for murder were filed before the RTC of Palayan City, Branch 40 (the "Palayan cases," Criminal Case Nos. 1879-P and 1880-P); a separate Information for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (the "Guimba case").
4. Petitioners filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright in both the Guimba case and the Palayan cases. In the Guimba case, a different judge dismissed for lack of probable cause (Order dated 5 August 2008). In the Palayan cases, the motion was heard (25 April and 12 May 2008) and memoranda submitted.
5. On 18 July 2008, Judge Evelyn Atienza-Turla issued an Order finding that "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed," citing:
   • (a) The principal prosecution witnesses had not been presented before, or subscribed their affidavits before, the panel of prosecutors — a defect one panel member's own marginal note acknowledged.
   • (b) The gravity of the (non-bailable) charge and petitioners' status as incumbent or former party-list representatives warranted a "deeper and more thorough" investigation than the panel's reliance on unsubscribed affidavits, principally that of alleged co-conspirator Julie Sinohin.
   • (c) Petitioners had been denied the opportunity to move for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution before the Informations were filed, rendering the investigation "incomplete."
   Judge Turla also found "undue haste" suggesting the prosecutors were "overly-eager" to secure a non-bailable warrant of arrest. She set aside the Joint Resolution and ordered the Provincial Prosecutor's Office to conduct another preliminary investigation "in accordance with the mandates of Rule 112§."
6. Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration, praying instead for outright dismissal for lack of probable cause; this was denied (Order dated 2 December 2008).
7. Petitioners filed the instant Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly with the Supreme Court, without first going to the Court of Appeals, alleging Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion by remanding rather than ruling on probable cause, by failing to dismiss despite insufficient evidence, by refusing to rule on the sufficiency of evidence that petitioners were principals by inducement, and by ignoring the inadmissibility of evidence under the res inter alios acta rule. The Supreme Court (Leonen, J., Second Division) rendered the Decision under digest on 15 February 2017, partially granting the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 18, 2008 and December 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 in Criminal Case Nos. 1879-P and 1880-P are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 for further proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio

1. The Court began from the closed, enumerated character of Section 5(a), Rule 112§'s menu of options — dismiss, issue a warrant, or require additional evidence — noting that nothing in the provision's text contemplates a fourth option of remanding the matter to the prosecutor for a fresh investigation.
2. Drawing on the executive/judicial probable-cause distinction (quoting Napoles v. De Lima and De Lima v. Reyes at length), the Court explained that the propriety and completeness of the preliminary investigation process itself — whether witnesses were properly subscribed, whether a motion for reconsideration was permitted — falls within the prosecutors' executive domain, insulated from judicial interference absent grave abuse of discretion, whereas the judge's only assigned task at this stage is the separate, narrower question of whether probable cause exists on the evidence actually before the court.
3. By using the investigation's procedural shortcomings as the basis for her ruling, Judge Turla effectively substituted a review of prosecutorial process — not her business under Section 5(a) — for the substantive probable-cause determination that was. The Court thus recharacterized her stated concerns (weak, unsubscribed witness statements; a key witness's uncorroborated, unsworn account) as reasons to have found doubt as to probable cause and ordered additional evidence, or even to have dismissed outright — not as grounds for remand.
4. Having thus corrected the character of the judge's task, the Court did not resolve probable cause itself in the first instance; it set aside the remand order and returned the case to the RTC so the judge could actually exercise one of her three lawful Section 5(a) options — which is why the disposition is a partial grant (setting aside the flawed remand) rather than the outright dismissal petitioners sought.

Doctrine

1. "[U]pon filing of the information, the trial court judge has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause," quoting Section 5(a), Rule 112§ and citing Ong v. Genio — a judge has no option to remand the case to the prosecutor for another preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier investigation was improperly conducted.
2. The determination of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function; the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is an executive function — quoting Napoles v. De Lima: "Absent grave abuse of discretion, this determination cannot be interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers." Once the information is filed, "the trial court acquires jurisdiction and 'any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.'"
3. "The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary investigation[; t]he prosecutor's determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion," quoting De Lima v. Reyes.
4. The judge's exclusive and personal responsibility is to satisfy himself or herself of the existence of probable cause — not to personally examine the complainant and witnesses — by (1) personally evaluating the prosecutor's report and supporting documents, and (2), if unsatisfied, disregarding the report and requiring submission of additional supporting affidavits, quoting Leviste v. Hon. Alameda.
5. Admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence, including objections grounded on the res inter alios acta rule, cannot be ruled upon during preliminary investigation, since a preliminary investigation "is merely preparatory to a trial" and is not expected to present all evidence necessary for conviction, citing De Los Santos-Dio v. CA.
6. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not iron-clad; direct resort to the Supreme Court is permitted upon a showing of compelling circumstances — including genuine constitutional issues, transcendental importance, cases of first impression, or exigency — as elaborated in The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC.

• The ruling does not diminish a judge's Section 5(a) authority to weigh the strength or credibility of the prosecutor's evidence — indeed, it affirms she "could even disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory" — it only forecloses one particular disposition (remand for a redone investigation) as outside that authority's scope.
• A judge troubled by defects such as unsubscribed affidavits or a denied motion for reconsideration remains free to treat those defects as grounds for doubting probable cause and requiring additional evidence, or for finding probable cause clearly absent and dismissing outright; what she may not do is treat them as grounds for sending the case back to square one at the executive stage.

• Maza v. Turla is a leading case for Topic 9 precisely because it identifies what is not among the trial judge's Section 5(a), Rule 112§ options: unlike the companion cases in this Topic, which confirm the judge's power to dismiss, issue a warrant, or require additional evidence, this Decision forecloses a fourth, judicially-improvised option — remanding for a new preliminary investigation — thereby sharpening the boundary between the judge's judicial probable-cause function and the prosecutor's executive investigative function.

Separate Opinions