ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic
9. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue
Full text (Decision): https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov2014/gr_182601_2014.html
Full text (Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, J.): https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov2014/gr_182601_so_2014.html
ℹ️ Classification rationale — why ANALOGOUS rather than DIRECT
Unlike the other Topic 9 cases in this batch (Cajipe, Chavez Miranda, Hao, Anlud, Maza), this Decision does not apply Section 5(a)/6(a), Rule 112 — the trial judge's post-filing determination of probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest. Its central holding instead construes Section 5(b), Rule 113 — the requisites of a valid warrantless ("hot pursuit") arrest — and the consequent propriety of inquest (rather than regular preliminary investigation) once such an arrest is validly made. The two bodies of doctrine are complementary halves of the same practical question a prosecutor or judge must ask upon a person's apprehension — was a warrant needed at all, or did a valid warrantless arrest already dispense with it — which is why this case is grouped with, and digested alongside, the Topic 9 batch. If the governing syllabus separately itemizes "Warrantless Arrests" under Rule 113 as its own subtopic, this digest should be cross-referenced there instead of, or in addition to, Topic 9.
ℹ️ Codal-numbering variance observed in the source text
The majority's quoted text of Section 5(b), Rule 113 cross-references "Section 7 of Rule 112" for the inquest procedure to be followed after a valid warrantless arrest — this cross-reference appears verbatim in both the 1985 Rules text and the "present" Rule 113 text as quoted in the Decision. Justice Leonen's dissent, however, independently cites the current inquest/no-preliminary-investigation-required provision as "Section 6" of Rule 112. This digest follows the dissent's "Section 6" citation as the operative current numbering (consistent with the numbering used elsewhere in this batch), treating Rule 113's "Section 7" cross-reference as an unrenumbered artifact carried over within that provision's own text.
ℹ️ Name discrepancy in the record
The case caption and the body of the majority Decision consistently spell the fourth petitioner's surname "Jerry Fernandez." Justice Leonen's dissent, however, refers to the same individual once as "Jerry Hernandez (Hernandez)." This digest follows the caption spelling ("Fernandez") as controlling, per the No Invention Rule.
Facts
- On 20 February 2005 at about 3:15 a.m. an altercation broke out between Joey Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez and Ronald Muñoz and their neighbour Atty. Moreno Generoso at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City, where all of them lived.
- Atty. Generoso called the Batasan Hills Police Station; Desk Officer SPO1 Primitivo Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Dominador Javier with Air Force augmentation personnel, who arrived less than an hour later and found him badly beaten. The blotter records the complaint at 4:15 a.m. against a 3:15 a.m. incident — a fact the Court used to correct the CA's two-hour finding.
- He pointed to the petitioners as the men who mauled him, and the officers "invited" them to the station, which they went along to.
- At the inquest the City Prosecutor found they had stabbed him with a bladed weapon; he survived. An Information dated 22 February 2005 charged attempted murder with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, the complainant having parried the attack.
- On 7 March 2005 they moved for a regular preliminary investigation, arguing no valid warrantless arrest had occurred — the police having no personal knowledge they were the perpetrators — and that they were merely "invited," so inquest was improper.
- On 16 March 2005 the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, denied the motion, finding the allegations unpersuasive and citing speedy disposition; reconsideration was denied.
- On 21 January 2008 the Court of Appeals dismissed their Rule 65 petition, holding "invited" carried "the meaning of a command to arrest," the arrest was valid, and inquest was therefore correct. Reconsideration was denied 17 April 2008.
- On 10 November 2014 the Second Division, through Justice Brion, denied the petition. Justice Leonen dissented on a materially different reading of the facts and of the rule.
Issue
Did the police validly effect a warrantless "hot pursuit" arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 — so that no warrant was required and the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying a regular preliminary investigation?
Secondary issue. Whether "invited," as used in the Affidavit of Arrest, should be read as an authoritative command to arrest.
Ancillary issue. Whether the RTC's Order was void for failing to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based.
Ruling
YES — the arrest was valid. "[T]he following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge." On this record the arrest occurred "less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime"; the officers personally observed the bruises, corroborated by a medico-legal certificate; Atty. Generoso positively identified neighbours; and the petitioners, when confronted, "did not deny their participation in the incident… although they narrated a different version." Hence "[w]e deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests."
Secondary issue. YES. "Notwithstanding the term 'invited' in the Affidavit of Arrest, SPO2 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso's account… the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance."
Ancillary issue. NOT VOID. "[N]o less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor." Detailed evidentiary matters are "best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.
Ratio
- The Court traced the rule's whole lineage — from Magna Carta Libertatum and the Fourth Amendment, through the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to the successive 1940, 1964, 1985 and present Rules — showing how "hot pursuit" moved from a broad, subjective "reasonable suspicion" standard toward an objectified one requiring that an offence actually and recently occurred and that the officer's belief rest on facts he personally perceived.
- From which the three-part test follows: the offence must have just been committed; the officer must have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and those must indicate that the person to be arrested committed it.
- And "personal knowledge" is not eyewitness knowledge. The officer need not have seen the crime — only have personally perceived, within the immediacy window, facts patently connecting the suspect to a recently committed offence.
- The label on the paperwork does not control. What matters is the officer's intent and the circumstances, not whether the affidavit says "invited" — force being an alternative reserved for resistance, its absence proves nothing.
Doctrine
Hot pursuit has three requisites. Under Section 5(b), Rule 113: (1) the offence must have just been committed; (2) the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and (3) those must indicate that the person to be arrested committed it. "Personal knowledge" means personally perceived facts, not eyewitness observation of the crime — it suffices that the officer, within the immediacy window, perceives facts patently connecting the suspect to a recently committed offence. An "invitation" backed by the intent to arrest is an arrest. And an order resolving a motion need only state its reasons — the constitutional command to state facts and law clearly and distinctly governs decisions.
Limits. Immediacy is doing real work here. The Court corrected the CA's two-hour finding to under one hour, and the whole analysis depends on that compression of time — a stale trail defeats the second requisite however strong the identification. And note what this case is not about. It construes Section 5(b), Rule 113 — whether a warrant was needed at all — not the judge's post-filing determination under Rule 112; the two are complementary halves of the same practical question, which is why it sits with the warrant cases. Once the arrest is valid, inquest is the correct procedure and a regular preliminary investigation is not owed. Read against Ladlad v. Velasco, where the arrest was warrantless but for a different offence — there the inquest was void; here it was proper. Both turn on the same question: what the officers actually knew, and about what. Note two record defects flagged on this page: the caption spells the fourth petitioner Fernandez while the dissent once writes Hernandez; and Rule 113's cross-reference to "Section 7 of Rule 112" is an unrenumbered artifact, the current inquest provision being Section 6.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
Gist
Classification: ANALOGOUS. to Topic 9, per the rationale explained in the callout above. Petitioners were taken to a police station after their neighbor, Atty. Moreno Generoso, accused them of mauling him and police officers who responded to the scene found him badly beaten. Treated as validly arrested without a warrant, they were subjected to inquest rather than a regular preliminary investigation and were charged with attempted murder. Petitioners moved for a regular preliminary investigation, arguing the "invitation" to the police station did not constitute a valid warrantless arrest. The RTC denied the motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court — over Justice Leonen's dissent — denied the petition, holding that the police had validly effected a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113, because they had personal knowledge, gathered less than an hour after the incident, of facts and circumstances establishing probable cause that petitioners had committed the offense. The Decision is notable for its extensive doctrinal restatement of Section 5(b)'s three requisites and its comparative survey of decades of Philippine "hot pursuit" jurisprudence — making it a leading reference on when a warrant need not issue because a valid warrantless arrest already occurred.
Facts
(Narrated per the majority Decision's controlling factual account; Justice Leonen's materially different factual framing is presented separately in Section VII, since it was central to his dissent.)
- On 20 February 2005, at around 3:15 a.m., an altercation occurred between petitioners Joey Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Muñoz, on one hand, and their neighbor Atty. Moreno Generoso, on the other, at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City, where both petitioners and Atty. Generoso resided.
- Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to report the incident. Desk Officer SPO1 Primitivo Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Dominador Javier, together with Air Force augmentation personnel, to the scene. They arrived less than one hour after the altercation and found Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
- Atty. Generoso pointed to petitioners as those who had mauled him. The police officers "invited" petitioners to the Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation, and petitioners went along. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that petitioners had stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon; he survived the attack.
- In an Information dated 22 February 2005, petitioners were indicted for attempted murder, allegedly committed with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength, the complainant having been able to parry the attack.
- On 7 March 2005, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, arguing that no valid warrantless arrest had taken place — the police had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators — and that they had merely been "invited" to the station; hence, inquest was improper and a regular preliminary investigation under Rule 112 should have been conducted instead.
- On 16 March 2005, the RTC (Branch 96, Quezon City) denied the Urgent Motion, finding the motion unpersuasive on its evidentiary allegations and citing the interest of speedy disposition of the case; the court likewise denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioners challenged the RTC's ruling before the Court of Appeals via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, attributing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
- On 21 January 2008, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the word "invited" in SPO2 Javier's Affidavit of Arrest carried the meaning of a command to arrest, that the arrest was a valid warrantless arrest, that inquest was accordingly the correct procedure, and that the RTC's order had sufficiently explained the grounds for denying the motion. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA's Resolution of 17 April 2008.
- Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, raising three assignments of error: (I) whether petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant; (II) whether they were lawfully arrested when merely "invited" to the precinct; and (III) whether the RTC's order denying the motion for preliminary investigation was void for failure to state the facts and law on which it was based.
- The Supreme Court (Brion, J., Second Division) rendered the Decision under digest on 10 November 2014, denying the petition and affirming the CA. Justice Leonen dissented, on a materially different reading of the facts and of Section 5(b), Rule 113.
Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioners (Pestilos, Macapanas, Gaces, Fernandez, and Muñoz).
Petitioners argued that they were never lawfully arrested: no warrant was issued, and they went to the police station only in response to what the Affidavit of Arrest itself called an "invitation." They contended that no valid warrantless arrest occurred under Section 5(b), Rule 113, because the police officers arrived at the scene after the incident and had no personal knowledge that petitioners were the perpetrators — the only basis for the arrest was Atty. Generoso's own accusation. They further argued that the RTC's order denying their motion for a regular preliminary investigation was void for failing to state clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it was based, as required by Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
B. Respondents (Generoso and the People, through the OSG).
Respondents maintained that the police had validly effected a warrantless "hot pursuit" arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 — the officers responded to the scene promptly, personally observed Atty. Generoso's injuries, and were told by the victim himself, at the scene, that petitioners were responsible; the use of the word "invited" in the affidavit did not negate the arrest's true, coercive character. Since the arrest was valid, inquest rather than a regular preliminary investigation was the correct procedure, and the RTC's order denying the motion adequately stated its reasons.
C. Common Ground.
The parties did not dispute the police blotter's timeline, the medico-legal findings on Atty. Generoso's injuries, or the fact that petitioners went to the police station without a warrant having been issued; the dispute concerned whether the circumstances satisfied Section 5(b), Rule 113's requisites for a valid warrantless arrest, whether "invited" could be legally equated with "arrested," and whether the RTC's terse order was constitutionally adequate.
Issue
A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).
Did the police validly effect a warrantless ("hot pursuit") arrest of petitioners under Section 5(b), Rule 113 — such that no warrant of arrest was required to be secured or issued, and the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for a regular preliminary investigation?
B. Secondary Issues.
Whether the term "invited," as used in the Affidavit of Arrest, should nonetheless be construed as an authoritative command to arrest, given the surrounding circumstances.
C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.
Whether the RTC's order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation was void for failing to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based, under Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling
MAIN ISSUE — YES, the warrantless arrest was valid. The Court held that "the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge." Applying this, the Court found: the police blotter recorded the complaint at 4:15 a.m. against a 3:15 a.m. incident, meaning the arrest occurred "less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime" (correcting the CA's erroneous finding of a two-hour gap); the responding officers personally observed Atty. Generoso's bruises, corroborated by a medico-legal certificate; Atty. Generoso positively identified petitioners, who lived in the same neighborhood; and petitioners, when confronted, "did not deny their participation in the incident... although they narrated a different version." The Court concluded: "[W]e deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests."
SECONDARY ISSUE — YES, "invited" is properly construed as a command to arrest. "Notwithstanding the term 'invited' in the Affidavit of Arrest, SPO2 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso's account... the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance."
ANCILLARY ISSUE — NO, the RTC Order was not void. "[N]o less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor." Detailed evidentiary matters are "best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial."
Dispositive portion (verbatim):
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.
Ratio
-
The Court undertook an extended historical review — from the Magna Carta Libertatum and the Fourth Amendment, through the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions, to the successive reformulations of the warrantless-arrest rule across the 1940, 1964, 1985, and present Rules of Court — tracing how the "hot pursuit" arrest provision evolved from an officer's broad, subjective "reasonable suspicion" standard toward an increasingly objectified standard requiring an offense to have actually and recently occurred, and requiring the officer's belief to rest on his own personally-perceived facts or circumstances.
-
From that lineage, the Court distilled the operative three-part test under the present Section 5(b):
- The offense must have just been committed.
- The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, indicating
- That the person to be arrested has committed it.
The Court clarified that "personal knowledge" need not mean the officer witnessed the crime itself, only that he personally perceived, within the immediacy window, facts or circumstances patently connecting the suspect to a recently committed offense. -
Applying this test, the Court treated the following as the officers' own personally-perceived facts or circumstances, gathered within less than an hour: Atty. Generoso's visible, corroborated injuries; his contemporaneous, on-the-spot identification of petitioners; the parties' shared residence in the same small locality; and petitioners' own admission of involvement (even while asserting self-defense) when confronted. Taken together, the Court found these sufficient to constitute the officers' personal knowledge of facts and circumstances establishing probable cause — distinguishing this case from the line of authority (surveyed at length in the Decision) invalidating warrantless arrests where days had elapsed or where the officers acted purely on a third party's uncorroborated tip.
-
Because the warrantless arrest was valid, the Court treated the subsequent procedural questions — the meaning of "invited" and the adequacy of the RTC's order — as governed by, and largely following from, that central determination: an arrest validly made without a warrant carries with it the inquest (not regular preliminary investigation) procedure, and a court resolving a motion attacking that arrest need not restate the evidentiary record in exhaustive detail.
Doctrine
B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.
- The requisites of a valid warrantless ("hot pursuit") arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113: "1) the offense has just been committed; and 2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it," these facts and circumstances being such "that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."
- On the meaning of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances": "[P]ersonal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent... and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime." Circumstances "may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime."
- The rationale for the immediacy requirement: "[A]s the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay[; with] the element of immediacy... the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time."
- A single, invariable probable-cause standard applied by three different actors on three different bodies of fact: "[T]he standard for determining 'probable cause' is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest[; but] although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause[; t]he arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame."
- On the meaning of "arrest": "[A]pplication of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary."
- On the adequacy of an order resolving a motion (as distinguished from a decision): a court resolving a motion "is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor," and need not restate all evidentiary matters, which are "best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case."
C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.
- The Decision's own comparative survey is itself instructive on the doctrine's outer limits. It distinguished valid hot-pursuit arrests — People v. Tonog, Jr. (same-day arrest based on the officer's personally gathered facts); People v. Gerente (arrest three hours after the killing, officers had personal knowledge of the violent death and of facts pointing to the accused); People v. Alvario and People v. Jayson (immediate arrest following the victim's or witnesses' on-the-spot identification); People v. Acol and Cadua v. CA (immediate response and identification at the scene); Abelita III v. Doria (flight coupled with an investigated incident report) — from invalid ones: Posadas v. Ombudsman (arrest three days after the killing, based on witness identification, not personal knowledge); People v. Burgos (arrest based solely on a third person's tip); People v. del Rosario and People v. Cendana (arrests a day after the crime, with no personal eyewitness knowledge); and Rolito Go v. CA (arrest six days later, based on statements of alleged eyewitnesses rather than the officers' own perception).
- The common thread distinguishing the two lines is the presence, or absence, of both immediacy and the officers' own first-hand perception of facts connecting the specific suspect to the crime — a general tip or an identification made well after the fact does not suffice.
D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).
Classification: ANALOGOUS.
- Pestillos v. Generoso does not apply Rule 112's judicial warrant-issuance framework, but it addresses the necessary antecedent question within the same practical inquiry: whether a warrant needed to be secured and issued at all.
- Where — as here — the requisites of Section 5(b), Rule 113 are satisfied, a valid warrantless arrest already accomplishes what a judicially issued warrant would otherwise be needed to accomplish, and the case proceeds to inquest rather than to a Section 5(a)/6(a) judicial probable-cause determination.
- The case thus usefully frames the boundary of Topic 9 from the opposite direction — marking out the circumstances in which no warrant of arrest need issue in the first place.
Separate Opinions
Leonen, J., dissenting — would have GRANTED the petition, on the view that no valid warrantless arrest occurred and that petitioners were therefore entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.
Justice Leonen's dissent rested on a materially fuller and different factual account than the majority's, drawn from the same record: that petitioners Pestilos and Macapanas, immediately after the altercation, went first to the barangay hall to report the incident and have it entered in the barangay blotter, as complainants; that the barangay tanod advised them to first secure a medical certificate, and then escorted them back to Kasiyahan Street at around 5:30 a.m. — "to avoid further trouble" — where police officers were already present; that Atty. Generoso then pointed to Pestilos and Macapanas as his attackers; and that two separate police reports were filed that same occasion — one by Atty. Generoso against petitioners (frustrated murder), and one by Macapanas against Atty. Generoso himself (slight physical injuries) — which, in Justice Leonen's view, showed the police were still investigating reciprocal accusations rather than pursuing an obvious fleeing perpetrator.
On the law, Justice Leonen agreed with the majority's three-element formulation of Section 5(b) but drew a sharper distinction between "personal knowledge of the offense" (which SPO2 Javier had, from seeing Atty. Generoso's injuries) and "personal knowledge of the identity or liability of the perpetrator" (which, he argued, the police did not have — Atty. Generoso's own act of pointing to petitioners was, as to the police themselves, hearsay, not personal knowledge). Citing People v. Cogaed, he argued that more than a single circumstance is ordinarily required to build probable cause, contrasting this case (only the victim's own accusatory pointing) with Jayson and Tonog (where officers personally perceived multiple independent facts, such as flight or blood on clothing). He found no urgency justifying dispensing with a warrant, since petitioners had voluntarily gone to the barangay hall and later to the police station as complainants, showing no intent to flee. He also invoked the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Teehankee and Justices Regalado and Feliciano in Martial Law-era cases (In Re Ilagan, Umil v. Ramos) as the better view requiring true immediacy, and raised a broader rule-of-law concern: that strict standards should be imposed on law enforcement given the resource asymmetry between the State and the accused, noting that petitioners were young, of limited means, and unrepresented at the time, while Atty. Generoso — a lawyer aware of his rights, and himself the subject of a separate complaint — was never arrested. He concluded: "[C]onsidering that petitioners were not arrested in accordance with the strict guidelines of our Constitution and the Rules of Court, petitioners' statutory right to preliminary investigation is mandatory," and voted to grant the petition.