Dy Teban Trading v. Dy

Rights of the Accused

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Title

Dy Teban Trading v. Dy

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 185647 September 7, 2004

This case has an ANALOGOUS relationship to the requested syllabus subtopic of the Rights of the Accused: Right of Confrontation and Cross-Examination (Rule 115, Section 1(f)), as the constitutional due process principles governing the waiver of the right to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence are applied identically in both civil and criminal litigations; it has a REJECTED relationship to the subtopic of Bail (Rule 114), which is completely inapplicable to this civil action. The controversy was triggered when petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. (DTTI) instituted a civil action for injunction against respondents Peter C. Dy, Johnny C. Dy, and Ramon C. Dy, during the trial of which the respondents repeatedly sought postponements and ultimately failed to appear on the scheduled dates for the cross-examination of DTTI's last witness, Lorencio C. Dy. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared that respondents impliedly waived their right to cross-examine the witness and, subsequently, their right to present their own evidence when they again failed to appear on the scheduled date for presentation, despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA nullified the RTC's orders and decision on the ground that the respondents were deprived of due process, but on a petition for review under Rule 45, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the CA, reinstated the RTC's decision and orders, and declared that respondents had waived their rights.

Core Doctrine

The right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses is a fundamental part of due process, in criminal and civil litigation alike and in quasi-judicial proceedings. But it is a personal right, and it may be waived — expressly, or impliedly by a party who is given repeated opportunities to exercise it and repeatedly fails to appear. Due process is satisfied by the opportunity to be heard, so a party who lets that opportunity pass cannot complain that he was denied it.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 185647)

Case DigestWeek 8 - Rule 114 - Bail

Dy Teban Trading v. Dy

G.R. No. 185647 · September 7, 2004

Rights of the Accused

Petitioner: Dy Teban TradingRespondent: Dy

Gist

Core Doctrine

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

Rights of the Accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr_185647_2017.html

Facts

On 7 September 2004 Dy Teban Trading, Inc. (DTTI), a closed corporation owned by the Dy siblings, sued Peter C. Dy, Johnny C. Dy and Ramon C. Dy for injunction in the RTC of Butuan City, alleging that Johnny, an employee at its Montilla branch, squandered cash sales and stocks, prompting DTTI to close the branch and weld its doors shut, which the respondents then forcibly opened. Their counter-action for dissolution was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees.
On 28 June 2005 DTTI presented its last witness, Lorencio C. Dy; cross-examination did not proceed and was set for 30 August 2005.
On 30 August 2005 it was postponed for the illness of counsel Atty. Dollfuss R. Go — the court warning expressly that the cross-examination would proceed regardless of his absence, otherwise the right would be deemed waived.
Further resets followed — the death of Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, the illness of DTTI's counsel, and on 5 March 2007 a postponement granted to Atty. Go to study newly marked documents — to 18 June 2007.
On Saturday 16 June 2007 Atty. Go telephoned opposing counsel saying he had to fly to Cebu, and claimed a verbal agreement to reset. No written motion was ever filed.
On 18 June 2007 neither counsel appeared and no motion was filed. The court declared the right to cross-examine waived, and on 10 October 2007 denied reconsideration — an unconfirmed verbal agreement cannot bind the court, and co-counsel Atty. Rabor could have appeared to ask.
On 16 November 2007 respondents filed certiorari in the Court of Appeals but obtained no TRO or injunction.
On 26 May 2008, their date to present evidence, neither respondents nor counsel appeared, filing instead an urgent motion for continuance premised on the pending certiorari. The RTC denied it and declared the right to present evidence waived. They stayed away on the strength of a restraining order that did not exist.
On 5 August 2008 the Court of Appeals denied their TRO application; on 22 August 2008 the RTC ruled for DTTI on the unchallenged testimony and admitted exhibits.
On 17 December 2008 the Court of Appeals annulled the orders and decision for denial of due process; on 26 July 2017 the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the RTC.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that respondents were deprived of due process when the trial court declared them to have impliedly waived their right to cross-examine — analogous to the accused's right of confrontation — and their right to present evidence, after repeated failures to appear despite multiple opportunities?

Secondary issue. Whether an RTC branch designated as a Special Commercial Court is divested of general jurisdiction over an ordinary civil action mistakenly docketed as an intra-corporate dispute.

Ruling

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED — THERE WAS NO DEPRIVATION. Respondents were consistently afforded a real opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence and failed to use it for reasons purely attributable to their own counsel's negligence.

Secondary issue. NO. The designation is a procedural tool to streamline case management and does not divest the branch of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129.

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City dated August 22, 2008 and its Orders dated June 18, 2007 and May 26, 2008 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The right is satisfied by opportunity, not by an actual examination. The right to confront and cross-examine — criminal or civil — is fundamental and part of due process, but does not command that a cross-examination in fact occur. What the law proscribes is the absence of a chance to conduct one.
It is personal and impliedly waivable by conduct. Where a party had the opportunity and failed to avail of it, he forfeits the right, and the direct testimony remains in the record — and here the failure traced to counsel's negligence, which binds the client.
Postponement is a privilege, not a right. A movant may not assume it will be granted and has no right to rely on the court's liberality or the adversary's generosity — so a telephone call to opposing counsel was legally irrelevant where no motion was filed and co-counsel could have appeared.
And certiorari without a TRO does not stop a trial. Section 7, Rule 65 requires the lower court to proceed within ten days absent a restraining order, so staying away in reliance on a pending petition was a patent attempt to delay — trials cannot be held hostage to one party's whims.
The jurisdictional objection failed too, the designation being an internal rule streamlining procedure, and any objection waived by active participation.

Doctrine

Confrontation is waivable by conduct. "The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record." Postponement is discretionary: "far from being a right, the grant of a motion for postponement is a privilege addressed to the court's sound discretion… He has no right to rely either on the liberality of the court or on the generosity of the adverse party." And due process is satisfied by opportunity: "Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process… If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee."

Limits. The waiver doctrine presupposes a court that actually gave the opportunity. It is confined to cases where the court neutrally and consistently afforded sufficient chances and the party persistently failed to take them. A trial court that arbitrarily denies a first, valid, well-grounded motion for postponement, or forces trial without reasonable time to prepare, commits a miscarriage of justice and grave abuse of discretion — the situation in People v. Bermas, not this one. And the jurisdictional point has its own proper remedy — referral to the Executive Judge for re-docketing and re-raffling under Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc., unless the parties have participated and waived the objection. Carry the principle into criminal practice with care: continuous trial and the right to meet the witnesses face to face coexist because the right is to the chance, not to indefinite postponement — but the accused's stake is liberty, not damages, so the negligence-binds-the-client rule yields in capital cases, as Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan shows.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

The single central doctrine established in this decision dictates that the right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses and to present evidence is a fundamental component of due process under the Constitution, but it is a personal privilege that may be waived either expressly or impliedly by conduct; an implied waiver is deemed to have occurred when a party is repeatedly afforded a real and sufficient opportunity to cross-examine or to present evidence but fails to avail of it due to reasons solely attributable to their own negligence or the negligence of their counsel, and because the grant of a postponement is a mere privilege addressed to the sound discretion of the court, a party has no right to rely on the liberality of the court or the generosity of the adverse party to stay the proceedings, especially when no temporary restraining order has been issued by a higher tribunal.

Facts

September 7, 2004: Petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. (DTTI), a domestic closed corporation owned by the Dy siblings, files an action for injunction against respondents Peter C. Dy, Johnny C. Dy, and Ramon C. Dy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, alleging that Johnny, an employee at its Montilla branch, squandered cash sales and stocks, prompting DTTI to close the branch and weld its doors shut, which respondents then forcibly opened. Respondents, on the other hand, file an action for dissolution of the corporation.
[Date not in record]: Both actions are joint-heard before Branch 33 of the RTC of Butuan City, which is also the designated Special Commercial Court. The action for the dissolution of the corporation is eventually dismissed due to the respondents' failure to pay the proper docket fees.
June 28, 2005: During the trial, DTTI presents its last witness, Lorencio C. Dy, but his cross-examination by respondents does not proceed on the same date and is scheduled to continue on August 30, 2005.
August 30, 2005: The scheduled cross-examination is postponed because one of respondents' counsels, Atty. Dollfuss R. Go, is absent due to health problems. The RTC grants the motion for postponement made by co-counsel Atty. Clementino C. Rabor, resetting the hearing to September 22, 2005, but issues an explicit warning in its Order that the cross-examination must proceed regardless of Atty. Go's absence, otherwise the respondents' right to cross-examine Lorencio will be deemed waived.
[Between September 22, 2005 and March 5, 2007]: The trial is further delayed due to the death of Presiding Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, resulting in the transfer of the case to Judge Eduardo S. Casals. The cross-examination of Lorencio is rescheduled several times, including resets to May 9, 2006, and October 16, 2006 (which is postponed due to the illness of DTTI's counsel, Atty. Wilfredo Asis, and reset to March 5, 2007).
March 5, 2007: DTTI's counsel marks three additional documents in connection with Lorencio's testimony, and the RTC grants Atty. Go's open court motion for postponement to study the documents, resetting the cross-examination to June 18, 2007.
June 16, 2007 (Saturday): Atty. Go calls DTTI's counsel, Atty. Asis, informing him that he must fly to Cebu for another case on June 18 and requests a resetting, which he claims Atty. Asis verbally agreed to. No written motion for postponement is filed before the trial court.
June 18, 2007: Neither Atty. Go nor Atty. Rabor appears at the scheduled hearing, and no written motion for postponement is filed. DTTI moves to declare respondents' right to cross-examine waived and asks for fifteen (15) days to file its written formal offer of exhibits. The RTC grants the motion and issues an Order declaring Atty. Go to have waived his right to cross-examine Lorencio.
[Date not in record / after June 18, 2007]: Respondents file a motion for reconsideration of the June 18, 2007 Order, which is denied by the RTC on October 10, 2007, on the ground that an unconfirmed verbal agreement with opposing counsel cannot bind the court, and that Atty. Go should have requested his co-counsel, Atty. Rabor, to appear and request the postponement.
November 16, 2007: Respondents file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the June 18 and October 10, 2007 Orders, but do not obtain any Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or preliminary injunction.
March 3, 2008: The RTC admits DTTI's exhibits and sets the respondents' initial presentation of evidence on May 26, 2008.
April 2, 2008: Respondents file a supplemental petition in the CA, applying for a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction.
May 26, 2008: Neither respondents nor their counsel appear for their scheduled presentation of evidence. Instead, they file an urgent motion for continuance, arguing that the presentation of evidence should be postponed because of the pending certiorari case before the CA. The RTC denies the motion and issues an Order declaring respondents to have waived their right to present evidence, submitting the case for decision.
August 5, 2008: The CA denies the respondents' application for a TRO or preliminary injunction.
August 22, 2008: Relying solely on Lorencio's unchallenged testimony and DTTI's admitted exhibits, the RTC renders its Decision in favor of DTTI, granting the permanent injunction and ordering respondents to pay substantial compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
December 17, 2008: The Court of Appeals delivers its Decision, annulling and setting aside the RTC's Orders of June 18, 2007, and May 26, 2008, as well as the August 22, 2008 Decision, and remanding the case to the trial court.
[Date not in record / after December 17, 2008]: DTTI files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.
July 26, 2017: The Supreme Court Third Division delivers its Decision, reversing the CA and reinstating the RTC's Decision and Orders.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Dy Teban Trading, Inc.).

Implied Waiver of Cross-Examination: DTTI argued that respondents waived their right to cross-examine Lorencio C. Dy. They were given numerous opportunities and liberal postponements since 2005, yet failed to appear on the scheduled date of June 18, 2007, without filing a written motion for postponement before the court. Atty. Go's personal telephone call to DTTI's counsel, Atty. Asis, was legally ineffective and could not bind the trial court, as the grant of postponement is a judicial prerogative.
Forfeiture of Right to Present Evidence: DTTI contended that the RTC's setting of the presentation of evidence on May 26, 2008, was valid. Since no TRO or preliminary injunction was issued by the CA, the RTC was procedurally mandated under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to proceed with the main case. Respondents' failure to appear and their reliance on a mere "urgent motion for continuance" based on the pending certiorari case constituted a voluntary, implied waiver of their right to present evidence.
General Jurisdiction of the Commercial Court: DTTI argued that the RTC, sitting as a commercial court, had general jurisdiction over the action for injunction, and any procedural issues regarding the designation of the branch were waived by respondents' active participation in the proceedings.

B. Respondents (Peter C. Dy, Johnny C. Dy, and Ramon C. Dy).

Deprivation of Due Process: Respondents argued that the RTC's orders declaring them to have waived their right to cross-examine Lorencio and their right to present evidence violated their constitutional right to due process. They claimed they were deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard and to confront DTTI's sole witness.
Pending Certiorari Justified Postponement: They asserted that they filed their certiorari petition with the CA in good faith and that it would have been premature to present their evidence while the issue of their right to cross-examine DTTI's main witness was still pending resolution.
Lack of Jurisdiction: They challenged the RTC's jurisdiction, arguing that the action for injunction was an ordinary civil case and did not constitute an intra-corporate dispute under the "relationship" and "nature of the controversy" tests, thereby rendering the Special Commercial Court's decision void.

C. Common Ground.

NOT IN RECORD.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the respondents were deprived of their right to due process when the Regional Trial Court declared them to have impliedly waived their right to cross-examine the petitioner's sole witness (analogous to the right of confrontation under Rule 115, Section 1(f)) and their right to present evidence, due to their repeated failure to appear and proceed on the scheduled dates despite multiple opportunities.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a designated Special Commercial Court, was divested of its general jurisdiction to hear and decide an ordinary civil action for injunction which was mistakenly docketed as an intra-corporate dispute.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE: YES. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not deprived of due process because they were consistently afforded a real opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence, but failed to do so for reasons purely attributable to the negligence and tactical delays of their own counsel.
SECONDARY ISSUE: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the designation of an RTC branch as a Special Commercial Court is a mere procedural tool to streamline case management and does not divest that branch of its general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Verbatim Dispositive Portion:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City dated August 22, 2008 and its Orders dated June 18, 2007 and May 26, 2008 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

#### 1. The Right of Confrontation and Cross-Examination is satisfied by Opportunity. The Supreme Court parsed the constitutional and procedural boundaries of the right to cross-examine witnesses (applying principles analogous to Rule 115, Section 1(f)). The Court established that the right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right to cross-examine a witness does not imply an absolute command that an actual cross-examination be had; the right is sufficiently protected when there is a real, fair opportunity to conduct the examination. What our laws proscribe is the absence of a chance to cross-examine.

#### 2. The Right is Personal and Waivable by Implication of Negligent Conduct. The Court ruled that the right to cross-examination is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine, and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. By repeatedly seeking postponements since August 30, 2005, failing to appear on June 18, 2007, and neglecting to file a written motion for postponement, the respondents' failure arose out of reasons purely attributable to their counsel's negligence, which binds the clients.

#### 3. Postponement is a Discretionary Privilege and Not a Right. The Court emphasized that the grant of a motion for postponement is not a matter of right but is a privilege addressed to the court's sound discretion. Hence, a party filing such motion must not assume that it will be granted. A lawyer has no right to rely either on the liberality of the court or on the generosity of the adverse party. Atty. Go's unconfirmed telephone conversation with Atty. Asis was legally irrelevant; he had a positive duty to file a formal motion before the court or have his co-counsel, Atty. Rabor, appear to request the postponement.

#### 4. Mandatory Character of Section 7, Rule 65 to Proceed Absent a TRO. Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Since the CA never issued a TRO or an injunction, the RTC was legally mandated to proceed. Respondents' deliberate choice not to appear on May 26, 2008, and their attempt to use the pending certiorari case as an automatic ground for continuance, constituted a patent attempt to delay the trial, justifying the RTC's order declaring them to have waived their right to present evidence. Trials cannot be held hostage by the whims of one party.

#### 5. Designation as Commercial Court does not Divest General Jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the fact that a particular branch which has been designated as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129. The designation is merely a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of jurisdiction, and the general jurisdiction of the RTC is not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure. Any procedural objections were waived by respondents' active participation in the trial.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules.

#### 1. Implied Waiver of Cross-Examination:.

"The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record."

#### 2. Discretionary Nature of Postponement:.

"far from being a right, the grant of a motion for postponement is a privilege addressed to the court's sound discretion. Hence, a party filing such motion must not assume that it will be granted... [A] party moving for postponement should be in court on the day set for trial if the motion is not acted upon favorably before that day. He has no right to rely either on the liberality of the court or on the generosity of the adverse party."

#### 3. Due Process Satisfied by Opportunity to Be Heard:.

"Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee."

#### 4. Jurisdiction of Designated Commercial Courts:.

"the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of jurisdiction. x x x The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure."

C. Limitations/Exceptions.

Arbitrary Denials of Postponement Excluded: The rule on implied waiver of the right of confrontation/cross-examination or the right to present evidence is strictly limited to instances where the court has neutrally and consistently granted the parties sufficient opportunity to participate but they persistently failed to do so. If a trial court arbitrarily denies a party's first, valid, and well-grounded motion for postponement, or forces a trial to proceed without giving the defense counsel a reasonable time to prepare, such action is a "miscarriage of justice" and a "grave abuse of discretion" that violates due process (distinguishing this from People v. Alcantara or People v. Bermas).
No Extrapolative Effect on General Jurisdiction: While a Special Commercial Court can hear ordinary civil cases if mistakenly raffled, the proper procedural remedy under Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc. is still to refer the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing and re-raffling, unless the parties have actively participated and waived their objections.

D. Topic Integration.

This case has an ANALOGOUS relationship to Rights of the Accused: Right of Confrontation / Cross-Examination (Rule 115, Section 1(f)) and a REJECTED relationship to Bail (Rule 114).
Dy Teban Trading serves as a critical procedural precedent on the boundaries of the right of confrontation. In criminal prosecutions under Rule 115, Section 1(f), the accused has the constitutional right to "meet the witnesses face-to-face" and cross-examine them.
This decision reinforces that the right of confrontation is a personal privilege that can be waived through negligent, evasive, or dilatory conduct during the trial.
By establishing that the right to confront is satisfied by the "opportunity" to examine rather than an "actual" examination, the Court prevents accused individuals from using Section 1(f) of Rule 115 as a tool of procedural sabotage to delay trials indefinitely.
The decision integrates these rules with the continuous trial system, declaring that if the defense repeatedly fails to proceed with cross-examination without a written, court-approved postponement, the court has a positive duty to declare the right of confrontation waived, thereby ensuring that the prosecution of the case proceeds conformably with the constitutional mandate of speedy and orderly justice.

Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD (The decision of the Third Division, penned by Associate Justice Jardeleza, was unanimous, and no separate concurring or dissenting opinions are recorded in the decision of G.R. No. 185647).

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court

Rights of accused at the trial

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 115 (Rights of Accused)

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. (1a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Confrontation as a waivable personal privilege — the principle read across from criminal procedure.

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: … (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased … or whose testimony has been taken … at the trial of another case …"

This is a civil action for injunction, so Rule 115 does not apply of its own force. The Court's point is that the due process principles governing waiver of cross-examination and of the right to present evidence "are applied identically in both civil and criminal litigations."

The right is fundamental but personal, and may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct.

Note what makes the waiver implied rather than fictional: the party must have been repeatedly afforded a real and sufficient opportunity and failed to take it for reasons solely attributable to his own negligence or his counsel's.

Constitution

Article III, Section 14, 1987 Constitution

Bill of Rights

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III (Bill of Rights)

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Why it is cited here

The constitutional source, and its limit.

"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall … enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel … to meet the witnesses face to face …"

Due process guarantees an opportunity to be heard — not a hearing on the party's own timetable.

The Court of Appeals had nullified the trial court's orders as a deprivation of due process. The Supreme Court reversed: respondents sought repeated postponements and then simply failed to appear, first for cross-examination and again for their own evidence.

Compare Bermas, where counsel's failures voided the conviction. The difference is whose default it was and how the court responded — there the accused was given no real chance; here the chances were given and let go.

Implementing Rules

Section 2, Rule 119, Rules of Court

Continuous trial until terminated; postponements

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 119 (Trial)

Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. (2a)

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (sec. 8, cir. 38-98).

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial. (n)

Why it is cited here

Why a postponement is a privilege, not an entitlement.

"Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. … In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court."

Continuity is the rule and postponement the exception, granted only "for good cause" and addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

So a party "has no right to rely on the liberality of the court or the generosity of the adverse party" to stay proceedings — "especially when no temporary restraining order has been issued by a higher tribunal."

That last clause is the practical rule worth carrying away: a pending petition for certiorari does not, by itself, suspend anything. Without a TRO or injunction, the trial court may proceed, and a party who stays away is taken to have waived.

Related notes:

Assigned under the same subtopic — Rights of the Accused:

(and 16 more under this subtopic — see the Week 8 coverage table.)

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr_185647_2017.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Rights of accused at the trial

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 115 (Rights of Accused)

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. (1a)

Why it is cited here

Confrontation as a waivable personal privilege — the principle read across from criminal procedure.

The right is fundamental but personal, and may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct.

Full entry below ↓

Article III, Section 14, 1987 Constitution

Constitution

Bill of Rights

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III (Bill of Rights)

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

Why it is cited here

The constitutional source, and its limit.

Due process guarantees an opportunity to be heard — not a hearing on the party's own timetable.

Full entry below ↓

Section 2, Rule 119, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Continuous trial until terminated; postponements

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 119 (Trial)

Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. (2a)

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial. (n)

Why it is cited here

Why a postponement is a privilege, not an entitlement.

Continuity is the rule and postponement the exception, granted only "for good cause" and addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

Rights of the Accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr_185647_2017.html

Facts

On 7 September 2004 Dy Teban Trading, Inc. (DTTI), a closed corporation owned by the Dy siblings, sued Peter C. Dy, Johnny C. Dy and Ramon C. Dy for injunction in the RTC of Butuan City, alleging that Johnny, an employee at its Montilla branch, squandered cash sales and stocks, prompting DTTI to close the branch and weld its doors shut, which the respondents then forcibly opened. Their counter-action for dissolution was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees.
On 28 June 2005 DTTI presented its last witness, Lorencio C. Dy; cross-examination did not proceed and was set for 30 August 2005.
On 30 August 2005 it was postponed for the illness of counsel Atty. Dollfuss R. Go — the court warning expressly that the cross-examination would proceed regardless of his absence, otherwise the right would be deemed waived.
Further resets followed — the death of Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, the illness of DTTI's counsel, and on 5 March 2007 a postponement granted to Atty. Go to study newly marked documents — to 18 June 2007.
On Saturday 16 June 2007 Atty. Go telephoned opposing counsel saying he had to fly to Cebu, and claimed a verbal agreement to reset. No written motion was ever filed.
On 18 June 2007 neither counsel appeared and no motion was filed. The court declared the right to cross-examine waived, and on 10 October 2007 denied reconsideration — an unconfirmed verbal agreement cannot bind the court, and co-counsel Atty. Rabor could have appeared to ask.
On 16 November 2007 respondents filed certiorari in the Court of Appeals but obtained no TRO or injunction.
On 26 May 2008, their date to present evidence, neither respondents nor counsel appeared, filing instead an urgent motion for continuance premised on the pending certiorari. The RTC denied it and declared the right to present evidence waived. They stayed away on the strength of a restraining order that did not exist.
On 5 August 2008 the Court of Appeals denied their TRO application; on 22 August 2008 the RTC ruled for DTTI on the unchallenged testimony and admitted exhibits.
On 17 December 2008 the Court of Appeals annulled the orders and decision for denial of due process; on 26 July 2017 the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the RTC.

Issue

Ruling

Secondary issue. NO. The designation is a procedural tool to streamline case management and does not divest the branch of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129.

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City dated August 22, 2008 and its Orders dated June 18, 2007 and May 26, 2008 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The right is satisfied by opportunity, not by an actual examination. The right to confront and cross-examine — criminal or civil — is fundamental and part of due process, but does not command that a cross-examination in fact occur. What the law proscribes is the absence of a chance to conduct one.
It is personal and impliedly waivable by conduct. Where a party had the opportunity and failed to avail of it, he forfeits the right, and the direct testimony remains in the record — and here the failure traced to counsel's negligence, which binds the client.
Postponement is a privilege, not a right. A movant may not assume it will be granted and has no right to rely on the court's liberality or the adversary's generosity — so a telephone call to opposing counsel was legally irrelevant where no motion was filed and co-counsel could have appeared.
And certiorari without a TRO does not stop a trial. Section 7, Rule 65 requires the lower court to proceed within ten days absent a restraining order, so staying away in reliance on a pending petition was a patent attempt to delay — trials cannot be held hostage to one party's whims.
The jurisdictional objection failed too, the designation being an internal rule streamlining procedure, and any objection waived by active participation.

Doctrine

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

September 7, 2004: Petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. (DTTI), a domestic closed corporation owned by the Dy siblings, files an action for injunction against respondents Peter C. Dy, Johnny C. Dy, and Ramon C. Dy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, alleging that Johnny, an employee at its Montilla branch, squandered cash sales and stocks, prompting DTTI to close the branch and weld its doors shut, which respondents then forcibly opened. Respondents, on the other hand, file an action for dissolution of the corporation.
[Date not in record]: Both actions are joint-heard before Branch 33 of the RTC of Butuan City, which is also the designated Special Commercial Court. The action for the dissolution of the corporation is eventually dismissed due to the respondents' failure to pay the proper docket fees.
June 28, 2005: During the trial, DTTI presents its last witness, Lorencio C. Dy, but his cross-examination by respondents does not proceed on the same date and is scheduled to continue on August 30, 2005.
August 30, 2005: The scheduled cross-examination is postponed because one of respondents' counsels, Atty. Dollfuss R. Go, is absent due to health problems. The RTC grants the motion for postponement made by co-counsel Atty. Clementino C. Rabor, resetting the hearing to September 22, 2005, but issues an explicit warning in its Order that the cross-examination must proceed regardless of Atty. Go's absence, otherwise the respondents' right to cross-examine Lorencio will be deemed waived.
[Between September 22, 2005 and March 5, 2007]: The trial is further delayed due to the death of Presiding Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, resulting in the transfer of the case to Judge Eduardo S. Casals. The cross-examination of Lorencio is rescheduled several times, including resets to May 9, 2006, and October 16, 2006 (which is postponed due to the illness of DTTI's counsel, Atty. Wilfredo Asis, and reset to March 5, 2007).
March 5, 2007: DTTI's counsel marks three additional documents in connection with Lorencio's testimony, and the RTC grants Atty. Go's open court motion for postponement to study the documents, resetting the cross-examination to June 18, 2007.
June 16, 2007 (Saturday): Atty. Go calls DTTI's counsel, Atty. Asis, informing him that he must fly to Cebu for another case on June 18 and requests a resetting, which he claims Atty. Asis verbally agreed to. No written motion for postponement is filed before the trial court.
June 18, 2007: Neither Atty. Go nor Atty. Rabor appears at the scheduled hearing, and no written motion for postponement is filed. DTTI moves to declare respondents' right to cross-examine waived and asks for fifteen (15) days to file its written formal offer of exhibits. The RTC grants the motion and issues an Order declaring Atty. Go to have waived his right to cross-examine Lorencio.
[Date not in record / after June 18, 2007]: Respondents file a motion for reconsideration of the June 18, 2007 Order, which is denied by the RTC on October 10, 2007, on the ground that an unconfirmed verbal agreement with opposing counsel cannot bind the court, and that Atty. Go should have requested his co-counsel, Atty. Rabor, to appear and request the postponement.
November 16, 2007: Respondents file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the June 18 and October 10, 2007 Orders, but do not obtain any Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or preliminary injunction.
March 3, 2008: The RTC admits DTTI's exhibits and sets the respondents' initial presentation of evidence on May 26, 2008.
April 2, 2008: Respondents file a supplemental petition in the CA, applying for a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction.
May 26, 2008: Neither respondents nor their counsel appear for their scheduled presentation of evidence. Instead, they file an urgent motion for continuance, arguing that the presentation of evidence should be postponed because of the pending certiorari case before the CA. The RTC denies the motion and issues an Order declaring respondents to have waived their right to present evidence, submitting the case for decision.
August 5, 2008: The CA denies the respondents' application for a TRO or preliminary injunction.
August 22, 2008: Relying solely on Lorencio's unchallenged testimony and DTTI's admitted exhibits, the RTC renders its Decision in favor of DTTI, granting the permanent injunction and ordering respondents to pay substantial compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
December 17, 2008: The Court of Appeals delivers its Decision, annulling and setting aside the RTC's Orders of June 18, 2007, and May 26, 2008, as well as the August 22, 2008 Decision, and remanding the case to the trial court.
[Date not in record / after December 17, 2008]: DTTI files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.
July 26, 2017: The Supreme Court Third Division delivers its Decision, reversing the CA and reinstating the RTC's Decision and Orders.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Dy Teban Trading, Inc.).

Implied Waiver of Cross-Examination: DTTI argued that respondents waived their right to cross-examine Lorencio C. Dy. They were given numerous opportunities and liberal postponements since 2005, yet failed to appear on the scheduled date of June 18, 2007, without filing a written motion for postponement before the court. Atty. Go's personal telephone call to DTTI's counsel, Atty. Asis, was legally ineffective and could not bind the trial court, as the grant of postponement is a judicial prerogative.
Forfeiture of Right to Present Evidence: DTTI contended that the RTC's setting of the presentation of evidence on May 26, 2008, was valid. Since no TRO or preliminary injunction was issued by the CA, the RTC was procedurally mandated under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to proceed with the main case. Respondents' failure to appear and their reliance on a mere "urgent motion for continuance" based on the pending certiorari case constituted a voluntary, implied waiver of their right to present evidence.
General Jurisdiction of the Commercial Court: DTTI argued that the RTC, sitting as a commercial court, had general jurisdiction over the action for injunction, and any procedural issues regarding the designation of the branch were waived by respondents' active participation in the proceedings.

B. Respondents (Peter C. Dy, Johnny C. Dy, and Ramon C. Dy).

Deprivation of Due Process: Respondents argued that the RTC's orders declaring them to have waived their right to cross-examine Lorencio and their right to present evidence violated their constitutional right to due process. They claimed they were deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard and to confront DTTI's sole witness.
Pending Certiorari Justified Postponement: They asserted that they filed their certiorari petition with the CA in good faith and that it would have been premature to present their evidence while the issue of their right to cross-examine DTTI's main witness was still pending resolution.
Lack of Jurisdiction: They challenged the RTC's jurisdiction, arguing that the action for injunction was an ordinary civil case and did not constitute an intra-corporate dispute under the "relationship" and "nature of the controversy" tests, thereby rendering the Special Commercial Court's decision void.

C. Common Ground.

NOT IN RECORD.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the respondents were deprived of their right to due process when the Regional Trial Court declared them to have impliedly waived their right to cross-examine the petitioner's sole witness (analogous to the right of confrontation under Rule 115, Section 1(f)) and their right to present evidence, due to their repeated failure to appear and proceed on the scheduled dates despite multiple opportunities.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a designated Special Commercial Court, was divested of its general jurisdiction to hear and decide an ordinary civil action for injunction which was mistakenly docketed as an intra-corporate dispute.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE: YES. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not deprived of due process because they were consistently afforded a real opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence, but failed to do so for reasons purely attributable to the negligence and tactical delays of their own counsel.
SECONDARY ISSUE: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the designation of an RTC branch as a Special Commercial Court is a mere procedural tool to streamline case management and does not divest that branch of its general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Verbatim Dispositive Portion:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City dated August 22, 2008 and its Orders dated June 18, 2007 and May 26, 2008 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules.

#### 1. Implied Waiver of Cross-Examination:.

"The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record."

#### 2. Discretionary Nature of Postponement:.

"far from being a right, the grant of a motion for postponement is a privilege addressed to the court's sound discretion. Hence, a party filing such motion must not assume that it will be granted... [A] party moving for postponement should be in court on the day set for trial if the motion is not acted upon favorably before that day. He has no right to rely either on the liberality of the court or on the generosity of the adverse party."

#### 3. Due Process Satisfied by Opportunity to Be Heard:.

"Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee."

#### 4. Jurisdiction of Designated Commercial Courts:.

"the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of jurisdiction. x x x The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure."

C. Limitations/Exceptions.

Arbitrary Denials of Postponement Excluded: The rule on implied waiver of the right of confrontation/cross-examination or the right to present evidence is strictly limited to instances where the court has neutrally and consistently granted the parties sufficient opportunity to participate but they persistently failed to do so. If a trial court arbitrarily denies a party's first, valid, and well-grounded motion for postponement, or forces a trial to proceed without giving the defense counsel a reasonable time to prepare, such action is a "miscarriage of justice" and a "grave abuse of discretion" that violates due process (distinguishing this from People v. Alcantara or People v. Bermas).
No Extrapolative Effect on General Jurisdiction: While a Special Commercial Court can hear ordinary civil cases if mistakenly raffled, the proper procedural remedy under Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc. is still to refer the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing and re-raffling, unless the parties have actively participated and waived their objections.

D. Topic Integration.

This case has an ANALOGOUS relationship to Rights of the Accused: Right of Confrontation / Cross-Examination (Rule 115, Section 1(f)) and a REJECTED relationship to Bail (Rule 114).
Dy Teban Trading serves as a critical procedural precedent on the boundaries of the right of confrontation. In criminal prosecutions under Rule 115, Section 1(f), the accused has the constitutional right to "meet the witnesses face-to-face" and cross-examine them.
This decision reinforces that the right of confrontation is a personal privilege that can be waived through negligent, evasive, or dilatory conduct during the trial.
By establishing that the right to confront is satisfied by the "opportunity" to examine rather than an "actual" examination, the Court prevents accused individuals from using Section 1(f) of Rule 115 as a tool of procedural sabotage to delay trials indefinitely.
The decision integrates these rules with the continuous trial system, declaring that if the defense repeatedly fails to proceed with cross-examination without a written, court-approved postponement, the court has a positive duty to declare the right of confrontation waived, thereby ensuring that the prosecution of the case proceeds conformably with the constitutional mandate of speedy and orderly justice.

Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD (The decision of the Third Division, penned by Associate Justice Jardeleza, was unanimous, and no separate concurring or dissenting opinions are recorded in the decision of G.R. No. 185647).