Lee Hong Hok v. David

Basic Concepts and Principles — Regalian Doctrine

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Case DigestWeek 1–2 — Background, Basic Concepts, and General Provisions

Lee Hong Hok v. David

G.R. No. L-30389 · December 27, 1972 · Supreme Court — First Division

Basic Concepts and Principles — Regalian Doctrine

Gist

DIRECT — the Court grounds its affirmance chiefly in the Regalian Doctrine's imperium-dominium distinction, holding that reclaimed land, absent proof of any grant from the State, remains public domain and cannot be acquired by private persons through accretion or mere possession. Petitioners, the Lee Hong Hok siblings, sued to nullify the Torrens title of respondent Aniano David over a 226-square-meter Naga City lot, which David acquired through a miscellaneous sales patent from the Director of Lands. Petitioners claimed the lot — formed by reclamation — belonged to them by accretion. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme Court AFFIRMED. The dominant doctrine is the classic distinction between imperium (governmental authority) and dominium (proprietary capacity to own and dispose of land), explaining why reclaimed land is, until validly granted away, public domain under the Regalian Doctrine — a status explaining both why private persons without a grant lack standing to attack a patent-based title, and why such a title becomes indefeasible after one year.

Core Doctrine

The State's power over public land has a dual aspect — imperium and dominium — and land not shown granted away remains public domain under the Regalian Doctrine. "Only the Government... can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent." Under Section 38, Act 496, fraud-based challenges to a patent-based title must be raised within one year, after which it "becomes indefeasible."

Facts

Respondent Aniano David's wife had occupied the disputed lot, later Lot 2892 (226 square meters, part of Lot 2863, Naga Cadastre), since 1938. (226 square metres of reclaimed land at Naga, and note the route David took to it: Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, Bureau of Lands entry No. V-9033. He asked the State to sell him the land rather than claiming he already owned it — the concession the Regalian Doctrine requires of anyone dealing with public domain.)
David renewed her miscellaneous sales application after her death, with notices published and the sale conducted openly.
On June 18, 1958, the Director of Lands ordered award and issuance of a sales patent.
On August 26, 1959, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209.
And on October 21, 1959, the Register of Deeds of Naga City issued OCT No. 510 to David.
Per stipulation, petitioners never opposed or adverse-claimed throughout the application's pendency. Stipulated, and fatal. The application ran openly from filing through award to patent without a word from them, so by the time they sued, the year for attacking a patent-based title had long closed.
Petitioners later sued to nullify David's title, claiming ownership through accretion — a claim the Court of Appeals rejected as factual, finding the lot instead formed by reclamation. Accretion against reclamation is the entire Regalian question here: accretion vests in the riparian owner by operation of law, while reclaimed land stays public domain until the State grants it away — so the factual finding of reclamation decided the case before any title argument was reached.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the CA, per then-Justice Salvador Esguerra, affirmed, holding a "fatal defect of parties" since only the government may sue to cancel a patent-based title, and that the title, unattacked within one year of the patent, had become indefeasible under Section 38, Act 496.
Petitioners appealed by certiorari, assigning three errors: the rejected accretion theory; the parties ruling; and the indefeasibility ruling.
The Supreme Court decided on December 27, 1972.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners. Petitioners argued the lot had formed by accretion to their property, making David's patent and title void from inception, and disputed the CA's rulings that only government may challenge a public land grant and that a patent-based title becomes indefeasible after one year, as unsupported restrictions on their right to attack a title they considered void.

Respondents (David; Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; Director of Lands). Respondents argued the CA correctly found the lot arose from reclamation, not accretion, foreclosing petitioners' theory; that David's patent and title issued through regular, open, unopposed proceedings; and that only the government may question a land grant's validity, with David's title having in any event become indefeasible after one year.

Common Ground/Stipulations (if any). The parties stipulated petitioners never opposed or adverse-claimed between the filing of David's application and issuance of his patent — a fact central to the Court's ruling.

Issue

MAIN ISSUE (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Given the lot was formed by reclamation and no grant to petitioners was shown, does the land remain public domain under the Regalian Doctrine, so private parties absent a grant acquire no title by accretion and have no right superior to David's patent-based grant?

SECONDARY ISSUES. (1) Whether only the Government may sue to cancel a certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent. (2) Whether David's title, unchallenged for over a year after the patent, became indefeasible under Section 38, Act No. 496.

ANCILLARY/INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). NOT IN RECORD beyond the foregoing.

Ruling

MAIN ISSUE: YES — the reclaimed land, never granted to petitioners, remained public domain; "no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." SECONDARY (1): YES — "[o]nly the Government... can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent." SECONDARY (2): YES — the title had become indefeasible under Section 38, Act 496. Dispositive portion (verbatim): "WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants."

Ratio

The Court's reasoning centers on the Regalian Doctrine's imperium-dominium distinction: "The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium... In such capacity, [the State] may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution."
Tracing dominium to Cariño v.
Insular Government and Valenton v.
Murciano, and to the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias' declaration that unclaimed Crown lands "may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish," the Court held public lands "continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant," and, quoting Heirs of Datu Pendatun v.
Director of Lands, that absent proof of acquisition "by composition title... or by possessory information title or by any other means," property "must be held to be public domain."
Since the lot arose by reclamation and petitioners showed no grant, it was public domain to which only the State could confer private title — precisely what occurred through David's patent.
From this premise the Court derived both secondary rulings: because the State's own dominium is at stake in the validity of its grants, only the State may attack that validity (tracing to Maninang v.
Consolacion, 1908); and because David's title rested on a valid state grant, it fell under Act 496's one-year indefeasibility period, after which "the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible."

Doctrine

Doctrines/Rules/Principles Laid Down.

The State's power over public land has a dual aspect — imperium and dominium — and land not shown granted away remains public domain under the Regalian Doctrine.
"Only the Government... can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent." Under Section 38, Act 496, fraud-based challenges to a patent-based title must be raised within one year, after which it "becomes indefeasible."

Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The private right to sue is limited to plaintiffs showing a decreed title or ownership interest of their own; petitioners, never declared owners and having stipulated their own inaction, could not invoke exceptions available to registered owners.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification: DIRECT. Lee Hong Hok is a foundational articulation of the Regalian Doctrine's imperium-dominium framework and its direct consequence for Torrens registration — that only the State may attack its own grants, and titles from such grants share ordinary registration's one-year indefeasibility.

Separate Opinions

None; the Decision records unanimous concurrence — Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Full-length digest in the format required by the course digest prompt.

Classification: DIRECT · Ponente: Fernando, J., First Division · G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972

TOPIC/SUBTOPIC FOCUS: Basic Concepts and Principles > Regalian Doctrine

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

The relationship of the case of Lee Hong Hok v. David (G.R. No. L-30389) to the requested topic of the Regalian Doctrine is DIRECT. The controversy arose when the petitioners filed a complaint to declare the Torrens title of respondent Aniano David null and void, claiming that the disputed lot was an accretion to the private property of the petitioners. Respondent Aniano David defended the title by presenting a government-issued miscellaneous sales patent, which was granted after the land was categorized as public land formed by reclamation. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint of the petitioners, and the Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because the Court of Appeals rejected the factual claim of the petitioners regarding ownership by accretion. The Supreme Court en banc affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and dismissed the petition of the petitioners. The central doctrine established by the Supreme Court dictates that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and any land not otherwise shown to have passed into private ownership remains public land that can be validly disposed of by the State through the appropriate public officials. Furthermore, private individuals who do not possess any vested private right or registered title over the subject property lack the legal standing to challenge the validity of a public land patent or the Torrens title issued pursuant to the patent.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Since 1938: The deceased wife of respondent Aniano David occupied and possessed a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2892 of the Naga Cadastre, containing an area of 226 square meters, which lot was formed by reclamation.
[Sometime after 1938]: Respondent Aniano David filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application (designated as Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747 and entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands as Miscellaneous Sales Entry No. V-9033), which application was a renewal of the application of the deceased wife of respondent Aniano David.
June 18, 1958: The Director of Lands issued an order of award and for the issuance of a sales patent in favor of respondent Aniano David covering Lot No. 2892 of the Naga Cadastre.
[From the filing of the application until the actual issuance of the sales patent]: The petitioners (Pedro Lee Hong Hok, Simeon Lee Hong Hok, Rosita Lee Hong Hok, and Leoncio Lee Hong Hok) did not file any opposition or adverse claim of ownership to the sales application of respondent Aniano David.
August 26, 1959: The Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 in favor of respondent Aniano David on the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands.
October 21, 1959: The Register of Deeds of Naga City issued Original Certificate of Title No. 510 in the name of respondent Aniano David pursuant to the registered Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209.
[Sometime after October 21, 1959]: The petitioners filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Naga City to have the Torrens title of respondent Aniano David (Original Certificate of Title No. 510) declared null and void, asserting that the petitioners are the owners of the land by virtue of accretion.
[During the trial before the Court of First Instance]: The Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources intervened and sustained the public character of the disputed lot as land formed by reclamation.
[Sometime after the trial]: The Court of First Instance rendered a judgment dismissing the complaint of the petitioners, ruling in favor of respondent Aniano David and the government officials.
[Sometime after the CFI Judgment]: The petitioners appealed the adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals.
January 31, 1969: The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance, rejecting the petitioners' factual contention of ownership through accretion and confirming that the land was public land formed by reclamation.
March 14, 1969: The Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
[Sometime after March 14, 1969]: The petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. L-30389.
December 27, 1972: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated the Decision in G.R. No. L-30389, affirming the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and dismissing the petition of the petitioners.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner / Prosecution

The petitioners argued that the patent and the resulting Torrens title (Original Certificate of Title No. 510) issued in favor of respondent Aniano David are null and void because the land in question is private land belonging to the petitioners by virtue of accretion.
The petitioners contended that as private citizens, the petitioners have the legal standing and personality to initiate an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent.
The petitioners asserted that the government possesses no authority to grant public land patents over lands that are subject to private claims or have already become private property.

B. Respondent / Defense

Respondent Aniano David, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Director of Lands argued that the disputed lot is public land formed by reclamation, and that the public character of the land has been consistently sustained by the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The respondents contended that the petitioners' failure to file any opposition or adverse claim during the entire administrative proceedings—from the filing of the application up to the actual issuance of the sales patent—is fatal to the action of the petitioners.
The respondents asserted that under Section 38 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), any challenge to the validity of a Torrens certificate of title based on fraud must be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent, and because more than one year has lapsed, the title of respondent Aniano David has become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
The respondents maintained that only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, possesses the personality and authority to bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent.

C. Common Ground

The parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts during the proceedings, agreeing that from the filing of the sales application by respondent Aniano David until the actual issuance of the sales patent, the petitioners did not file any opposition or adverse claim of ownership over the subject property.

IV. Issues

A. Main Issue

Whether a public land patent (specifically Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209) and the resulting Torrens title (Original Certificate of Title No. 510) issued by the government over unappropriated public land formed by reclamation can be declared null and void in an action for cancellation initiated by private parties who are not the registered owners of the land and who have failed to establish any vested private right or title over the subject property.

B. Secondary Issues

Whether a certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent automatically comes under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act after the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Whether only the Government, through the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, has the exclusive authority and personality to file an action to cancel a public land patent and the corresponding certificate of title on the ground of nullity.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that a public land patent and the resulting Torrens title issued by the government over unappropriated public land cannot be declared null and void in an action for cancellation initiated by private parties who are not the registered owners and who have failed to prove any private ownership or vested right over the land. Under the Regalian Doctrine, the State owns all lands of the public domain, and unappropriated public lands remain part of the public domain until severed by a government grant. Since the petitioners failed to prove ownership of the lot by accretion, and the land was shown to be public land formed by reclamation, the State had the absolute authority to dispose of the land through a sales patent to respondent Aniano David. Consequently, the petitioners have no legal right or interest to challenge the validity of the government grant.
B. SECONDARY ISSUES:
1. YES. The Supreme Court held that once a public land patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land automatically comes under the operation of Act No. 496. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, any challenge to the validity of the title must be filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. After the expiration of the one-year period, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible, incontrovertible, and secure from subsequent attacks.
2. YES. The Supreme Court declared that only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent. Private individuals who have not been declared the registered owners of the land, nor have established a vested right of ownership over the property, have no standing to question the legality of the patent or the certificate of title.

Verbatim Dispositive Portion

"WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Distinction Between Imperium and Dominium: The Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the State, which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty (imperium), and the proprietary capacity of the State to own or acquire property (dominium). The power of dominium applies with reference to public lands held by the State in the proprietary character of the State, and in such capacity, the State may provide for the exploitation, use, and disposition of public lands and other natural resources under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Constitutional Basis of State Ownership (Jura Regalia): Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (formerly Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution), all lands of the public domain and other natural resources are owned by the State. This constitutional provision adopts the Regalian Doctrine (jura regalia), first introduced through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which establishes that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and the true and only source of private land titles.
Presumption of Public Character of Unalienated Land: Unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain remain part of the public domain and are owned by the State until severed therefrom by an express, positive grant of the State. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and any person claiming private title to public land carries the burden of proving that the title was acquired from the State or through a mode of acquisition recognized by law.
Application of the Cariño and Oh Cho Exception: The only recognized exception to the Regalian Doctrine is native title, as established in Cariño v. Insular Government and reiterated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands. Under this exception, when land has been occupied and possessed by an individual and the predecessors-in-interest of the individual since time immemorial under a claim of private ownership, a legal presumption arises that the land had never been part of the public domain and was private property even before the Spanish Conquest. Since the petitioners' claim of ownership through accretion over the reclaimed lot was rejected by the Court of Appeals, and there was no evidence of possession since time immemorial, the land in question remained public land, and the Cariño exception was completely inapplicable.
Exclusive Prerogative of the Executive Department: The power to classify, reclassify, administer, and dispose of lands of the public domain belongs exclusively to the Executive Department, through the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), and the Director of Lands, pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141). Courts have no authority to interfere with or set aside the administrative determinations and grants made by the executive officials within the scope of the statutory authority of the executive officials, unless there is a showing of a violation of law or private rights.
Exclusive Standing of the Government for Cancellation: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Private individuals who do not hold a registered title over the land, nor have established a vested private right over the property, have no legal standing to file an action to cancel or nullify the public land patent or the resulting Torrens title. This principle, first laid down in Maninang v. Consolacion and reiterated in Lucas v. Durian and Salazar v. Court of Appeals, prevents private individuals from collaterally attacking or questioning public grants where the government itself does not contest the validity of the grant.
Indefeasibility of Title Based on Public Land Patent: Once a public land patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued by the Register of Deeds, the land automatically comes under the operation of Act No. 496 (now Presidential Decree No. 1529) and enjoys all the safeguards of the Torrens system. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, any petition for review or action to question the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud must be filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Upon the expiration of the one-year prescriptive period, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible, incontrovertible, and immune from collateral attack, ensuring the stability and security of land titles in the Philippines.

B. Doctrines/Rules

1. The Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia) and State Power of Dominium

The Regalian Doctrine, rooted in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, establishes that all public lands belong to the State. In Lee Hong Hok v. David, the Supreme Court distinguished the State's sovereign power (imperium) from its proprietary capacity to own and dispose of property (dominium):

"The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, [the State] may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including [the State's] disposition, except as limited by the Constitution."

2. Absolute Prerogative to Dispose of Public Lands

No public land can be acquired by private persons without an express or implied grant from the government. Public lands not otherwise alienated remain in the public domain:

"it is well-settled 'that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government.' It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law."

3. Exclusive Standing of the Government to Cancel Void Patents

Private individuals who do not hold registered titles or vested rights have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation of patents or titles granted by the State:

"Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent... This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners..."

The Court cited the foundational rule in Maninang v. Consolacion:

"Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until [the grant] is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question [the grant]. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government."

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Native Title Exception (Cariño Doctrine): The Regalian Doctrine is subject to the native title exception. Land possessed and occupied since time immemorial under a claim of private ownership is presumed to have been private land even before the Spanish Conquest, and therefore never formed part of the public domain. This exception does not apply to unclassified reclaimed land where no immemorial possession is established.
The One-Year Prescriptive Limit for Reopening: Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, the right to petition for the review or reopening of a decree of registration on the ground of actual fraud is strictly limited to one year from the date of the entry of the decree (or the issuance of the public land patent). After the lapse of the one-year prescriptive period, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible, and any subsequent action to nullify the title on the ground of fraud is barred.
Government Standing for Cancellation: The right to sue for the cancellation of a void public land patent and the reversion of the land to the public domain belongs exclusively to the State through the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. This right is a proprietary right of the State under the power of dominium and cannot be exercised by private individuals who fail to prove a superior private title or vested right over the land.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship of the case of Lee Hong Hok v. David (G.R. No. L-30389) to the requested topic of the Regalian Doctrine is DIRECT. The decision in Lee Hong Hok v. David is a seminal precedent delineating the boundaries of the Regalian Doctrine and the State's power of dominium under Philippine land law. The Supreme Court's ruling is controlling for the topic because the ruling clarifies that all lands not shown to have passed into private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and that the State retains the absolute authority to dispose of unappropriated public lands (such as reclaimed lands) through administrative patents. By enforcing the exclusive standing of the government to cancel public land patents, the Court protected the integrity of the Torrens system and confirmed that the State's proprietary authority under the Regalian Doctrine cannot be collaterally attacked by private litigants who do not possess any vested private rights.

VII. Separate Opinions

The en banc decision of the Supreme Court in Lee Hong Hok v. David (G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972) was rendered unanimously by the members of the Supreme Court. There are no separate concurring or dissenting opinions. Consequently, the details of any separate opinions are NOT IN RECORD.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Constitution

Article XII, Section 2, 1987 Constitution

National Economy and Patrimony

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony)

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Why it is cited here

The Regalian Doctrine, and this case is where its two aspects are distinguished.

"All lands of the public domain … are owned by the State."

The State's power over public land is dual. As imperium it governs — the sovereign authority to regulate, to classify, to legislate. As dominium it owns — the capacity to hold land as a proprietor and to grant it away.

The distinction is not decorative. It explains why the State can both make the rules about land and be a party to dealings in it, and why an act done in one capacity does not necessarily bind it in the other.

From ownership follows the presumption: land not shown to have been granted away remains public domain. And from that, the case's holding on standing — "[o]nly the Government … can bring an action to cancel a void certificate" issued over public land. A private party may not sue to annul it, because the interest injured is the State's, and the property returns to the State rather than to him.

The practical lesson is about who may sue: a private claimant who discovers that titled land was inalienable does not thereby gain a claim to it. His route is to ask the Solicitor General to bring reversion proceedings.

Civil Code

Article 420, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title I (Classification of Property), Chapter 3 (Property in Relation to the Person to Whom It Belongs)

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

Why it is cited here

The Civil Code's parallel classification, which explains why State-held land resists private acquisition.

Property of public dominion is that "intended for public use" or which belongs to the State "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."

Such property is outside the commerce of man — it cannot be sold, possessed adversely, or acquired by prescription. That is the private-law mechanism behind the constitutional rule: the Constitution says the State owns it, and the Civil Code says nobody can take it from the State by the ordinary means.

Article 421 supplies the contrast: what is not of that character is patrimonial, and the State holds it much as a private owner does. So the whole question in a Regalian problem is which side of Articles 420–421 the land falls on — and Article 422 says only the State's own act can move it across.

Special Law

Section 38, Act No. 496

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

If the court after hearing lines that the applicant has title as stated in his application, and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Laud Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Superseded. P.D. No. 1529 replaced Act No. 496 in 1978; the decree provision is now its Section 31. This 1972 decision applies the Act.

Why it is cited here

Why the petitioners had to attack the title and could not simply assert accretion.

"Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto … It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern.'"

David held a Torrens title issued on a government miscellaneous sales patent, granted after the land was classified as public land formed by reclamation.

The petitioners' claim was that the lot was an accretion to their private property. But a title standing on a patent is conclusive of what it covers, so the claim could only succeed by showing the patent should never have issued — and the courts below rejected the accretion theory as a matter of fact.

Note the reach of the section: conclusive even against the Government. Once the State has patented and registered land, its own later change of mind is as ineffective as a private claimant's.

Special Law

Section 47, Act No. 496

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

The original certificate in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is pituate, and the seal of the court, and also the owner's duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act.

SUPERSEDED. P.D. No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree, 1978) repealed and replaced this Act, and Section 2 of the Decree carried the Torrens system forward. Act No. 496 still has to be read, though, because registrations decreed under it remain valid and the older cases apply its sections by their own numbers — Section 38 (decree of registration and the one-year period to review for fraud) is now Section 32 of the Decree, and Section 39 (title free from encumbrances) is now Section 44. Check which statute governed at the time of registration before quoting either.

Why it is cited here

The evidentiary force of the certificate the petitioners were up against.

"The original certificate in the registration book … and also the owner's duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act."

Under the Regalian doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State, so a private claimant must trace his right to a grant from it. David could produce one; the petitioners could not.

That is the structural point the case is cited for. Accretion under the Civil Code operates on private riparian land; land formed by reclamation is public until the State disposes of it, and the certificate here recorded exactly that disposition.

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.

Source: Lee Hong Hok v. David, G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972

Cited laws & provisions

Article XII, Section 2, 1987 Constitution

Constitution

National Economy and Patrimony

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony)

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Why it is cited here

The Regalian Doctrine, and this case is where its two aspects are distinguished.

"All lands of the public domain … are owned by the State."

Full entry below ↓

Article 420, Civil Code

Civil Code

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

Why it is cited here

The Civil Code's parallel classification, which explains why State-held land resists private acquisition.

Property of public dominion is that "intended for public use" or which belongs to the State "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."

Full entry below ↓

Section 38, Act No. 496

Special Law

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

Superseded. P.D. No. 1529 replaced Act No. 496 in 1978; the decree provision is now its Section 31. This 1972 decision applies the Act.

Why it is cited here

Why the petitioners had to attack the title and could not simply assert accretion.

David held a Torrens title issued on a government miscellaneous sales patent, granted after the land was classified as public land formed by reclamation.

Note the reach of the section: conclusive even against the Government. Once the State has patented and registered land, its own later change of mind is as ineffective as a private claimant's.

Full entry below ↓

Section 47, Act No. 496

Special Law

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

Why it is cited here

The evidentiary force of the certificate the petitioners were up against.

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

Respondent Aniano David's wife had occupied the disputed lot, later Lot 2892 (226 square meters, part of Lot 2863, Naga Cadastre), since 1938. (226 square metres of reclaimed land at Naga, and note the route David took to it: Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, Bureau of Lands entry No. V-9033. He asked the State to sell him the land rather than claiming he already owned it — the concession the Regalian Doctrine requires of anyone dealing with public domain.)
David renewed her miscellaneous sales application after her death, with notices published and the sale conducted openly.
On June 18, 1958, the Director of Lands ordered award and issuance of a sales patent.
On August 26, 1959, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209.
And on October 21, 1959, the Register of Deeds of Naga City issued OCT No. 510 to David.
Per stipulation, petitioners never opposed or adverse-claimed throughout the application's pendency. Stipulated, and fatal. The application ran openly from filing through award to patent without a word from them, so by the time they sued, the year for attacking a patent-based title had long closed.
Petitioners later sued to nullify David's title, claiming ownership through accretion — a claim the Court of Appeals rejected as factual, finding the lot instead formed by reclamation. Accretion against reclamation is the entire Regalian question here: accretion vests in the riparian owner by operation of law, while reclaimed land stays public domain until the State grants it away — so the factual finding of reclamation decided the case before any title argument was reached.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the CA, per then-Justice Salvador Esguerra, affirmed, holding a "fatal defect of parties" since only the government may sue to cancel a patent-based title, and that the title, unattacked within one year of the patent, had become indefeasible under Section 38, Act 496.
Petitioners appealed by certiorari, assigning three errors: the rejected accretion theory; the parties ruling; and the indefeasibility ruling.
The Supreme Court decided on December 27, 1972.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

ANCILLARY/INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). NOT IN RECORD beyond the foregoing.

Ruling

Ratio

The Court's reasoning centers on the Regalian Doctrine's imperium-dominium distinction: "The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium... In such capacity, [the State] may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution."
Tracing dominium to Cariño v.
Insular Government and Valenton v.
Murciano, and to the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias' declaration that unclaimed Crown lands "may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish," the Court held public lands "continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant," and, quoting Heirs of Datu Pendatun v.
Director of Lands, that absent proof of acquisition "by composition title... or by possessory information title or by any other means," property "must be held to be public domain."
Since the lot arose by reclamation and petitioners showed no grant, it was public domain to which only the State could confer private title — precisely what occurred through David's patent.
From this premise the Court derived both secondary rulings: because the State's own dominium is at stake in the validity of its grants, only the State may attack that validity (tracing to Maninang v.
Consolacion, 1908); and because David's title rested on a valid state grant, it fell under Act 496's one-year indefeasibility period, after which "the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible."

Doctrine

Doctrines/Rules/Principles Laid Down.

The State's power over public land has a dual aspect — imperium and dominium — and land not shown granted away remains public domain under the Regalian Doctrine.
"Only the Government... can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent." Under Section 38, Act 496, fraud-based challenges to a patent-based title must be raised within one year, after which it "becomes indefeasible."

Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The private right to sue is limited to plaintiffs showing a decreed title or ownership interest of their own; petitioners, never declared owners and having stipulated their own inaction, could not invoke exceptions available to registered owners.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification: DIRECT. Lee Hong Hok is a foundational articulation of the Regalian Doctrine's imperium-dominium framework and its direct consequence for Torrens registration — that only the State may attack its own grants, and titles from such grants share ordinary registration's one-year indefeasibility.

Separate Opinions

None; the Decision records unanimous concurrence — Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Full-length digest in the format required by the course digest prompt.

Classification: DIRECT · Ponente: Fernando, J., First Division · G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972

TOPIC/SUBTOPIC FOCUS: Basic Concepts and Principles > Regalian Doctrine

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Since 1938: The deceased wife of respondent Aniano David occupied and possessed a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2892 of the Naga Cadastre, containing an area of 226 square meters, which lot was formed by reclamation.
[Sometime after 1938]: Respondent Aniano David filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application (designated as Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747 and entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands as Miscellaneous Sales Entry No. V-9033), which application was a renewal of the application of the deceased wife of respondent Aniano David.
June 18, 1958: The Director of Lands issued an order of award and for the issuance of a sales patent in favor of respondent Aniano David covering Lot No. 2892 of the Naga Cadastre.
[From the filing of the application until the actual issuance of the sales patent]: The petitioners (Pedro Lee Hong Hok, Simeon Lee Hong Hok, Rosita Lee Hong Hok, and Leoncio Lee Hong Hok) did not file any opposition or adverse claim of ownership to the sales application of respondent Aniano David.
August 26, 1959: The Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 in favor of respondent Aniano David on the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands.
October 21, 1959: The Register of Deeds of Naga City issued Original Certificate of Title No. 510 in the name of respondent Aniano David pursuant to the registered Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209.
[Sometime after October 21, 1959]: The petitioners filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Naga City to have the Torrens title of respondent Aniano David (Original Certificate of Title No. 510) declared null and void, asserting that the petitioners are the owners of the land by virtue of accretion.
[During the trial before the Court of First Instance]: The Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources intervened and sustained the public character of the disputed lot as land formed by reclamation.
[Sometime after the trial]: The Court of First Instance rendered a judgment dismissing the complaint of the petitioners, ruling in favor of respondent Aniano David and the government officials.
[Sometime after the CFI Judgment]: The petitioners appealed the adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals.
January 31, 1969: The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance, rejecting the petitioners' factual contention of ownership through accretion and confirming that the land was public land formed by reclamation.
March 14, 1969: The Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
[Sometime after March 14, 1969]: The petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. L-30389.
December 27, 1972: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated the Decision in G.R. No. L-30389, affirming the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and dismissing the petition of the petitioners.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner / Prosecution

The petitioners argued that the patent and the resulting Torrens title (Original Certificate of Title No. 510) issued in favor of respondent Aniano David are null and void because the land in question is private land belonging to the petitioners by virtue of accretion.
The petitioners contended that as private citizens, the petitioners have the legal standing and personality to initiate an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent.
The petitioners asserted that the government possesses no authority to grant public land patents over lands that are subject to private claims or have already become private property.

B. Respondent / Defense

Respondent Aniano David, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Director of Lands argued that the disputed lot is public land formed by reclamation, and that the public character of the land has been consistently sustained by the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The respondents contended that the petitioners' failure to file any opposition or adverse claim during the entire administrative proceedings—from the filing of the application up to the actual issuance of the sales patent—is fatal to the action of the petitioners.
The respondents asserted that under Section 38 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), any challenge to the validity of a Torrens certificate of title based on fraud must be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent, and because more than one year has lapsed, the title of respondent Aniano David has become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
The respondents maintained that only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, possesses the personality and authority to bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent.

C. Common Ground

The parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts during the proceedings, agreeing that from the filing of the sales application by respondent Aniano David until the actual issuance of the sales patent, the petitioners did not file any opposition or adverse claim of ownership over the subject property.

IV. Issues

A. Main Issue

B. Secondary Issues

Whether a certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent automatically comes under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act after the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Whether only the Government, through the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, has the exclusive authority and personality to file an action to cancel a public land patent and the corresponding certificate of title on the ground of nullity.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that a public land patent and the resulting Torrens title issued by the government over unappropriated public land cannot be declared null and void in an action for cancellation initiated by private parties who are not the registered owners and who have failed to prove any private ownership or vested right over the land. Under the Regalian Doctrine, the State owns all lands of the public domain, and unappropriated public lands remain part of the public domain until severed by a government grant. Since the petitioners failed to prove ownership of the lot by accretion, and the land was shown to be public land formed by reclamation, the State had the absolute authority to dispose of the land through a sales patent to respondent Aniano David. Consequently, the petitioners have no legal right or interest to challenge the validity of the government grant.
B. SECONDARY ISSUES:
1. YES. The Supreme Court held that once a public land patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land automatically comes under the operation of Act No. 496. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, any challenge to the validity of the title must be filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. After the expiration of the one-year period, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible, incontrovertible, and secure from subsequent attacks.
2. YES. The Supreme Court declared that only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent. Private individuals who have not been declared the registered owners of the land, nor have established a vested right of ownership over the property, have no standing to question the legality of the patent or the certificate of title.

Verbatim Dispositive Portion

"WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Distinction Between Imperium and Dominium: The Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the State, which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty (imperium), and the proprietary capacity of the State to own or acquire property (dominium). The power of dominium applies with reference to public lands held by the State in the proprietary character of the State, and in such capacity, the State may provide for the exploitation, use, and disposition of public lands and other natural resources under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Constitutional Basis of State Ownership (Jura Regalia): Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (formerly Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution), all lands of the public domain and other natural resources are owned by the State. This constitutional provision adopts the Regalian Doctrine (jura regalia), first introduced through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which establishes that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and the true and only source of private land titles.
Presumption of Public Character of Unalienated Land: Unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain remain part of the public domain and are owned by the State until severed therefrom by an express, positive grant of the State. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and any person claiming private title to public land carries the burden of proving that the title was acquired from the State or through a mode of acquisition recognized by law.
Application of the Cariño and Oh Cho Exception: The only recognized exception to the Regalian Doctrine is native title, as established in Cariño v. Insular Government and reiterated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands. Under this exception, when land has been occupied and possessed by an individual and the predecessors-in-interest of the individual since time immemorial under a claim of private ownership, a legal presumption arises that the land had never been part of the public domain and was private property even before the Spanish Conquest. Since the petitioners' claim of ownership through accretion over the reclaimed lot was rejected by the Court of Appeals, and there was no evidence of possession since time immemorial, the land in question remained public land, and the Cariño exception was completely inapplicable.
Exclusive Prerogative of the Executive Department: The power to classify, reclassify, administer, and dispose of lands of the public domain belongs exclusively to the Executive Department, through the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), and the Director of Lands, pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141). Courts have no authority to interfere with or set aside the administrative determinations and grants made by the executive officials within the scope of the statutory authority of the executive officials, unless there is a showing of a violation of law or private rights.
Exclusive Standing of the Government for Cancellation: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Private individuals who do not hold a registered title over the land, nor have established a vested private right over the property, have no legal standing to file an action to cancel or nullify the public land patent or the resulting Torrens title. This principle, first laid down in Maninang v. Consolacion and reiterated in Lucas v. Durian and Salazar v. Court of Appeals, prevents private individuals from collaterally attacking or questioning public grants where the government itself does not contest the validity of the grant.
Indefeasibility of Title Based on Public Land Patent: Once a public land patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued by the Register of Deeds, the land automatically comes under the operation of Act No. 496 (now Presidential Decree No. 1529) and enjoys all the safeguards of the Torrens system. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, any petition for review or action to question the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud must be filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Upon the expiration of the one-year prescriptive period, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible, incontrovertible, and immune from collateral attack, ensuring the stability and security of land titles in the Philippines.

B. Doctrines/Rules

1. The Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia) and State Power of Dominium

"The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, [the State] may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including [the State's] disposition, except as limited by the Constitution."

2. Absolute Prerogative to Dispose of Public Lands

No public land can be acquired by private persons without an express or implied grant from the government. Public lands not otherwise alienated remain in the public domain:

"it is well-settled 'that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government.' It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law."

3. Exclusive Standing of the Government to Cancel Void Patents

Private individuals who do not hold registered titles or vested rights have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation of patents or titles granted by the State:

"Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent... This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners..."

The Court cited the foundational rule in Maninang v. Consolacion:

"Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until [the grant] is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question [the grant]. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government."

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Native Title Exception (Cariño Doctrine): The Regalian Doctrine is subject to the native title exception. Land possessed and occupied since time immemorial under a claim of private ownership is presumed to have been private land even before the Spanish Conquest, and therefore never formed part of the public domain. This exception does not apply to unclassified reclaimed land where no immemorial possession is established.
The One-Year Prescriptive Limit for Reopening: Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, the right to petition for the review or reopening of a decree of registration on the ground of actual fraud is strictly limited to one year from the date of the entry of the decree (or the issuance of the public land patent). After the lapse of the one-year prescriptive period, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible, and any subsequent action to nullify the title on the ground of fraud is barred.
Government Standing for Cancellation: The right to sue for the cancellation of a void public land patent and the reversion of the land to the public domain belongs exclusively to the State through the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. This right is a proprietary right of the State under the power of dominium and cannot be exercised by private individuals who fail to prove a superior private title or vested right over the land.