Baranda v. Gustilo

Chapter II, The Land Registration Commission and Its Registries of Deeds (P.D. 1529, Secs. 10, 77, 117) — B. Registration is a Ministerial Act

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Case DigestWeek 3–4 — The Registries of Deeds and Original Registration

Baranda v. Gustilo

G.R. No. L-81163 · September 26, 1988 · Supreme Court — Third Division

Chapter II, The Land Registration Commission and Its Registries of Deeds (P.D. 1529, Secs. 10, 77, 117) — B. Registration is a Ministerial Act

Gist

This case is DIRECT to the Topic/Subtopic that registration is a ministerial act. Petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, whose title to a Sta. Barbara, Iloilo lot this Court had already twice affirmed in earlier, final decisions, sought certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to compel respondent Judge Gustilo to reinstate his own order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel a notice of lis pendens the latter had annotated on their new certificates of title. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the order. The central doctrine is the categorical holding that "the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature," grounded in the mandatory "shall" of Section 10, P.D. 1529; a Register of Deeds who doubts the propriety of a court's registration order has no standing to move for its reconsideration and must instead elevate the question to the Land Registration Administrator by consulta under Section 117.

Core Doctrine

A Register of Deeds' duty to register, annotate, or cancel entries on a Torrens certificate pursuant to a court order is ministerial, compelled by the mandatory "shall" of Section 10, P.D. 1529; where in doubt, the Register's exclusive recourse is consulta under Section 117, not resistance or reconsideration as a litigant. A court may cancel a lis pendens even before final judgment in the case where annotated, upon a showing it is used to molest the adverse party or is unnecessary to protect the registrant.

Facts

Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre, Iloilo, originally covered by OCT No. 6406 in Romana Hitalia's name, underwent reconstitution proceedings leading to cancellation of OCT No. 6406 and issuance of TCT No. 106098 to petitioners.
When Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera, and Susana Silao resisted a writ of possession by invoking their own TCT No. 25772 over the same lot, the trial court found TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired and ordered execution, a ruling this Court affirmed with finality in G.R. No. 62042 (final March 25, 1983) and G.R. No. 64432 (final May 20, 1984), ordering immediate implementation.
Acting on petitioners' motions, the trial court declared TCT No. 25772 void and TCT No. 106098 valid, but this order was set aside when the Acting Register of Deeds cited a separate, pending mandamus case against her.
After this Court again granted petitioners' motions to compel execution (Resolution of September 17, 1986, referred to the Court Administrator), the trial court issued orders on November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987 directing registration and, upon Gotera's failure to surrender TCT No. 25772, its annulment and issuance of new titles.
Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso complied, but also annotated a notice of lis pendens tied to Civil Case No. 15871 — a separate suit by the Providos, still on appeal, to recover the same lot.
On February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo ordered the lis pendens cancelled, but on Saclauso's motion for reconsideration invoking Section 77, second paragraph, P.D. 1529, set that order aside on September 17, 1987, reasoning the Court of Appeals alone could order cancellation while Civil Case No. 15871 remained pending there.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner. Petitioners argued that Maria Provido Gotera, already bound by the final judgment in G.R. No. 62042, was acting on behalf of the same Providos who filed Civil Case No. 15871 as a dilatory tactic; that the lis pendens no longer served any legitimate protective purpose; and that the Register of Deeds' duty to register or cancel entries pursuant to a court's order is ministerial, leaving him no standing to resist it.

Respondent. The Acting Register of Deeds maintained that under the second paragraph of Section 77, P.D. 1529, a lis pendens may be deemed cancelled only upon registration of a Clerk of Court's certificate on the manner of disposal of the case in which it was annotated, so that only the Court of Appeals, where Civil Case No. 15871 was pending, could order its cancellation.

Common Ground / Stipulations (if any). Both sides agreed Civil Case No. 15871 concerned the same Lot No. 4517 already subject of the final judgments in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, and that its plaintiffs had not been formally impleaded in those earlier cases.

Issue

MAIN ISSUE (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Whether the Acting Register of Deeds had standing to move for reconsideration of, and effectively resist, the trial court's order cancelling the notice of lis pendens, given the nature of a Register of Deeds' duty under Section 10, P.D. 1529 as ministerial rather than discretionary.

SECONDARY ISSUES. Whether pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 on appeal barred the trial court from cancelling the lis pendens under Section 77, first paragraph, P.D. 1529.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). Whether the Providos, as privies to G.R. No. 62042, used Civil Case No. 15871 merely to delay execution of final judgments.

Ruling

On the MAIN ISSUE: NO — the Register of Deeds' function is ministerial in nature; he had no legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, his only proper recourse upon doubt being consulta to the LRA Administrator under Section 117. Secondary issue: NO — Section 77's first paragraph independently allows a court, even before final judgment, to cancel a lis pendens upon a showing that it is meant to molest the adverse party or is unnecessary to protect the registrant's rights, which the trial court had already found. Ancillary issue: YES — the Providos were privies to G.R. No. 62042 and were using the later suit to delay final judgments already ordered immediately implemented. The dispositive portion reads verbatim: "WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court first found respondent Judge Gustilo mistaken in believing only the Court of Appeals could act, because he "conveniently forgot the first paragraph" of Section 77, which permits cancellation "[b]efore final judgment... upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered" — squarely the situation shown, given the Providos' privity to the already-final G.R. No. 62042.
Turning to the Register of Deeds' role, the Court quoted Section 10, P.D. 1529: "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration... advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117," and Section 117, under which doubt on the Register's part, or a party's disagreement with his action, "shall be submitted to the [Land Registration Authority]... by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds."
Applying the plain-meaning canon of statutory construction and Webster's definition of "shall" as denoting "obligation... mandatory," the Court held: "the function of a Register of Deeds... is ministerial in nature," and "[t]he respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration" of the court's order — her doubt, if genuine, should have been elevated by consulta, not litigated as a party with a stake of her own.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

A Register of Deeds' duty to register, annotate, or cancel entries on a Torrens certificate pursuant to a court order is ministerial, compelled by the mandatory "shall" of Section 10, P.D. 1529; where in doubt, the Register's exclusive recourse is consulta under Section 117, not resistance or reconsideration as a litigant.
A court may cancel a lis pendens even before final judgment in the case where annotated, upon a showing it is used to molest the adverse party or is unnecessary to protect the registrant.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

The ruling does not strip a Register of Deeds of recourse when genuinely uncertain; it redirects that uncertainty to the statutory consulta procedure rather than allowing the Register to unilaterally adjudicate the question or oppose the court as an interested party.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

DIRECT: Baranda is the leading, most categorical statement of the ministerial-act doctrine, holding in unqualified terms that registration functions are ministerial by the ordinary meaning of the Decree's mandatory language, and prescribing consulta, not resistance, as the sole avenue for a doubting Register of Deeds.

Separate Opinions

None. Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred without separate opinion.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Full-length digest in the format required by the course digest prompt.

Classification: DIRECT · G.R. No. 81163, September 26, 1988

TOPIC/SUBTOPIC FOCUS: Registration with the Office of Register Office — Registration is a Ministerial Act

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

The relationship of the case of Baranda v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 81163, September 26, 1988, to the assigned topic on the ministerial nature of registration under Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is DIRECT [1210, 1212]. The triggering controversy arose when Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia sought the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562, which was based on a pending appeal of a dismissed civil case that sought to relitigate ownership rights over Lot No. 4517 [1197, 1201, 1203]. Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo originally ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, but subsequently set aside the order of cancellation upon the motion for reconsideration of Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso, who argued that the pending appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 prevented the cancellation [1199, 1202]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines granted the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens [1212]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Register of Deeds is bound by a purely ministerial duty to register documents and court orders, and cannot refuse registration or file motions for reconsideration in court based on a personal evaluation of the legal propriety of the registration [1212].

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Sometime prior to 1981, Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia [1186, 1187].
Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda [1187].
The land registration court issued a writ of possession over Lot No. 4517, which writ of possession Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera, and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera, and Susana Silao held Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517 [1187].
The land registration court found Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25772 to have been fraudulently acquired, and ordered that the writ of possession be carried out in favor of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda [1187].
Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals to block the writ of possession [1187].
On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition of Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera [1187].
Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera elevated the denial of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the Philippines via a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 62042 [1187].
On January 7, 1983, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a resolution denying the petition in G.R. No. 62042 [1187].
On March 25, 1983, the Supreme Court of the Philippines denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera with finality, and the judgment in G.R. No. 62042 became final on March 25, 1983 [1187].
Despite the finality of G.R. No. 62042, Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera filed Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court, and obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent the execution of the writ of possession and a writ of demolition [1187].
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia filed a petition before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 64432, contending that the writs of possession and demolition should be immediately implemented and that Civil Case No. 00827 was filed merely to delay the execution [1187].
On December 29, 1983, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a resolution in G.R. No. 64432, directing the Intermediate Appellate Court to dismiss the petition in Civil Case No. 00827, and ordering the immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition [1187].
On May 9, 1984, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a resolution in G.R. No. 64432 denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Gregorio Perez, and issued a resolution in G.R. No. 62042 referring the ex-parte motion of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia for execution of judgment to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo [1188].
On September 5, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, presided over by Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo, issued an order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 null and void, declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 as a valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, and ordering the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to register the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1189, 1190].
On October 8, 1984, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo set aside the order dated September 5, 1984, upon a motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, who argued that an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 67661, filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda against Helen P. Sornito before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, remained unresolved [1191].
Sometime later, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, issued orders dated November 6, 1986, and January 6, 1987 [1193, 1194].
In the order dated November 6, 1986, the Regional Trial Court ordered the Acting Register of Deeds to register the Order of the court dated September 5, 1984 [1193].
In the order dated January 6, 1987, the Regional Trial Court ordered Maria Provido Gotera to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to the court within ten days, after which Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 would be declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo would issue a new certificate of title in lieu thereof in the names of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1194].
In compliance with the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated November 6, 1986, and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 null and void, cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772, and issued new transfer certificates of title, namely Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562, in the names of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 [1197].
However, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated a notice of lis pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562, under Entry No. 427183, on account of a separate civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, pending in the Court of Appeals [1197].
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 from Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido, and Perfecto Provido, who were co-owners of Maria Provido Gotera and claimed under the annulled Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 [1201, 1204].
On October 24, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871, which dismissal was subsequently appealed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido, and Perfecto Provido to the Court of Appeals [1204].
When Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the notice of lis pendens on the new transfer certificates of title, Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia filed an urgent ex-parte motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens [1197, 1199].
On February 12, 1987, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo granted the motion and ordered the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the notice of lis pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098, T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562 [1199].
Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated February 12, 1987, arguing that under the second paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens can only be cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court stating the manner of disposal of the case, and since the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 was still pending with the Court of Appeals, only the Court of Appeals, and not the Regional Trial Court in a cadastral proceeding, possessed the authority to order the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens [1200, 1202].
Adopting the arguments of Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo set aside the order dated February 12, 1987, and maintained the notice of lis pendens on the transfer certificates of title of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1202].
This prompted Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which referred the motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, for appropriate action [1198].
On September 17, 1987, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued an order denying the motion of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia to reinstate the order of February 12, 1987 [1198].
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia subsequently filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court directly before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 81163, to compel Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo to reinstate the order dated February 12, 1987, and direct the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the transfer certificates of title [1186, 1198].
On September 26, 1988, the Supreme Court of the Philippines promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus [1186].

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner/Prosecution:

The petitioners argue that under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Register of Deeds is bound by a purely ministerial and mandatory duty to register deeds, encumbrances, instruments, and court orders affecting registered land, which leaves no room for construction or personal discretion [1210, 1212].
The petitioners contend that the Register of Deeds has no legal standing or authority to file a motion for reconsideration of a court order directing the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens, as the function of the Register of Deeds is strictly non-judicial and administrative [1212].
The petitioners argue that if the Register of Deeds is in doubt regarding any registration matter, the sole legal remedy of the Register of Deeds under Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is to elevate the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration via consulta, rather than actively litigating or opposing court orders [1211, 1212].
The petitioners maintain that the notice of lis pendens annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562 was intended solely to molest and harass the petitioners, and is not necessary to protect any rights of the private respondents because the rights of the private respondents over Lot No. 4517 had already been fully, finally, and conclusively adjudicated against the private respondents with finality in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 [1206, 1208, 1209].
The petitioners assert that the private respondents in Civil Case No. 15871 are privies of Maria Provido Gotera, whose claimed title under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 was already declared null and void, and that the filing of Civil Case No. 15871 is a mere dilatory tactic to block the execution of final and executory resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines [1204, 1205, 1206].

B. Respondent/Defense:

The Acting Register of Deeds argues that under the second paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens can only be cancelled upon final judgment or other disposition of the action, which must be certified by the clerk of court where the action is pending [1200].
The Acting Register of Deeds contends that because Civil Case No. 15871 was appealed and is currently pending before the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, has no jurisdiction to cancel the notice of lis pendens [1201, 1202].
Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo argues that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens cannot be ordered during the pendency of the appeal because the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 are separate parties who were not formally impleaded in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, and are therefore not bound by the prior judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippines [1202, 1204].
The private respondents maintain that the notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect the asserted rights of ownership of the private respondents over Lot No. 4517 during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals [1203, 1204].

C. Common Ground:

The parties agree that Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre is the subject property and was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 [1186, 1187].
The parties agree that the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo dismissed Civil Case No. 15871 on October 24, 1984, and that the dismissal was appealed and is pending before the Court of Appeals [1204].
The parties agree that in compliance with the orders of the Regional Trial Court, the Acting Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562 in the names of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1197].

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE:

Whether the Register of Deeds is bound by a purely ministerial duty under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 to register court orders and cancel notices of lis pendens without exercising personal judgment or filing motions for reconsideration in court, and whether the ministerial character of the duty of registration is mandatory such that the Register of Deeds cannot oppose a court order of cancellation on the ground of the pendency of an appeal [1210, 1212].

B. SECONDARY ISSUES:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has the authority to order the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens before final judgment under the first paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when the notice is shown to be for the purpose of molesting the adverse party and is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused the notice to be registered [1208, 1209].
Whether the private respondents in Civil Case No. 15871 are bound by the final and executory judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, and whether Civil Case No. 15871 constitutes a dilatory tactic to prevent the execution of final judgments [1204, 1205, 1206].

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. RULING ON THE MAIN ISSUE:

YES. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the function of the Register of Deeds with reference to registration is purely ministerial in nature [1212]. Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Register of Deeds is mandated to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real property that complies with the legal requisites [1210]. The Register of Deeds does not possess any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of a court order directing the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens, nor can the Register of Deeds exercise personal discretion or judgment to refuse compliance [1212]. If the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken, the sole legal remedy of the Register of Deeds is to submit the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration via consulta under Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1211, 1212].

B. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 1:

YES. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that under the first paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled before final judgment upon order of the court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that the notice is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused the notice to be registered [1208, 1209]. In the case of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, the Supreme Court held that the notice of lis pendens was clearly intended to molest and harass the petitioners, and was completely unnecessary because the rights of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 had already been declared valid and subsisting with finality [1206, 1208, 1209].

C. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 2:

YES. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 are privies of Maria Provido Gotera, who was a party in G.R. No. 62042, and are therefore fully bound by the prior final and executory decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines [1204, 1205, 1206]. The Supreme Court declared that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772, from which the private respondents derived the claimed rights of the private respondents, was already declared null and void for being fraudulently obtained [1205, 1206]. The filing of Civil Case No. 15871 and the annotation of the notice of lis pendens were clear dilatory tactics to prevent the immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition, which cannot be allowed to block the execution of final judicial determinations [1206, 1208].

VERBATIM DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The Supreme Court of the Philippines' final dispositive portion in G.R. No. L-81163, dated September 26, 1988, is NOT IN RECORD in the provided source materials. However, the dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23's Order in Cadastral Case No. 16, dated February 12, 1987, which ordered the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens, is referenced in the record as follows:

"reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. In [the] order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562." [1199]

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi:

Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree) provides that the Register of Deeds has the duty to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real property that complies with all the requisites for registration [1210].
Under this statutory framework, the law employs the mandatory term "shall" in defining the duty of registration [1212]. In statutory construction, when a statute uses the word "shall", the word denotes an imperative mandate that is obligatory and leaves no room for administrative discretion or personal judgment [1212].
The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, and court orders is strictly ministerial in nature [1212]. The Register of Deeds does not possess the judicial power or legal standing to evaluate the legal correctness of a court order, nor can the Register of Deeds file motions for reconsideration in court to question a judicial directive to cancel a notice of lis pendens [1212].
If the Register of Deeds is in doubt regarding the proper step to be taken in relation to any document or court order presented for registration, the sole administrative remedy provided by law is Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1211, 1212]. Under Section 117, the Register of Deeds must certify and submit the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration via consulta for resolution [1211, 1212].
Under the first paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens is a precautionary measure that can be cancelled before final judgment by order of the court upon proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that the notice is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused the notice to be registered [1208, 1209].
The notice of lis pendens annotated on the new transfer certificates of title of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia was completely unnecessary and was filed solely to molest the petitioners [1206, 1208, 1209]. This is because the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia over Lot No. 4517 had already been fully, finally, and conclusively adjudicated in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, which judgments had already attained incontrovertible finality [1205, 1206].
The private respondents in Civil Case No. 15871 are privies of Maria Provido Gotera, whose claimed title under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 was already declared null and void for being fraudulently obtained [1204, 1205, 1206]. The filing of a separate civil case to relitigate ownership rights over the same registered land is a clear dilatory tactic that violates the principle of res judicata and undermines the integrity of the Torrens system [1205, 1206].

B. Doctrines/Rules:

The Absolute Ministerial Nature of the Duty of Registration: The Register of Deeds is bound by a strict, mandatory, and ministerial duty to register court orders and valid instruments [1212]. The Register of Deeds cannot exercise independent discretion or block a court order by filing motions for reconsideration [1212]. As the Court declared verbatim:

"...the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing [the Acting Register of Deeds] to cancel the notice of lis pendens..." [1212]
The Sole Remedy of Consulta for Registration Doubt: When the Register of Deeds is in doubt regarding the registrability of any instrument or court order, the Register of Deeds must submit the matter to the Land Registration Authority [1211, 1212]. As the Court ruled verbatim:

"In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to [the Register of Deeds], [the Register of Deeds] should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529." [1212]
The Dual Grounds for Pre-Judgment Cancellation of Lis Pendens: Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a land registration court retains full authority to cancel a notice of lis pendens before final judgment under specific exceptional conditions [1208, 1209]. As the Court declared:

"Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that [the notice] is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused [the notice] to be registered." [1209]
The Presumption of Regularity of Land Registration Officers: Public officers of the land registration registry are presumed to perform official duties regularly [1221, 1228]. However, land registration officers cannot be permitted to cause endless delays or participate in dilatory litigation tactics that defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system, which is to quiet title to land [1206, 1213].

C. Limitations/Exceptions:

Requisites for Consulta: The administrative remedy of consulta under Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is a non-adversarial mechanism designed to resolve legal doubts [1211, 1212]. The Register of Deeds cannot use consulta as a means to actively litigate against the parties or to delay the execution of clear judicial mandates [1212].
Ministerial Duty Bounds: While the general rule is that the Register of Deeds performs ministerial functions, this ministerial duty is bounded by the requirement of compliance with the essential requisites for registration [1210]. However, once a court of competent jurisdiction has issued an order directing registration or cancellation, the Register of Deeds cannot invoke administrative objections to block the judicial order [1212].

D. Topic Integration:

Baranda v. Gustilo is the seminal authority defining the ministerial boundaries of land registration under Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1210, 1212]. The decision clearly demonstrates that the Register of Deeds is an administrative officer with zero judicial power [1212]. The case illustrates that the word "shall" in Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 imposes a strict ministerial mandate that cannot be bypassed by the administrative registry [1212]. By establishing that the Register of Deeds has no standing to file motions in court or actively oppose judicial orders, the Supreme Court of the Philippines protected the integrity of the Torrens system from administrative delays and ensured that final judicial determinations are executed with promptness and efficacy [1206, 1212, 1213].

VII. Separate Opinions

NONE. The decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. 81163 was rendered unanimously by the Third Division, with no separate concurring or dissenting opinions filed by the participating Justices [1213].

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Special Law

Section 10, P.D. No. 1529

General functions of Registers of Deeds

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated.

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.

Why it is cited here

The textual footing of the ministerial rule, and it rests on a single auxiliary verb.

"It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration."

"Shall" is mandatory, and the Court's holding follows from it: "the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature."

Note precisely where the discretion is, and where it is not. The Register may examine whether the instrument "complies with all the requisites for registration" — the formal requirements: proper form, acknowledgment, fees, the owner's duplicate. He may not pass on the instrument's validity, the parties' rights, or the wisdom of a court's order.

The reason is structural. Registration is a recording function, and a recorder who could refuse on the merits would be adjudicating without a hearing, without evidence, and without appeal.

Special Law

Section 117, P.D. No. 1529

Procedure

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.

Where the instrument is denied registration, the Register of Deeds shall notify the interested party in writing, setting forth the defects of the instrument or legal grounds relied upon, and advising him that if he is not agreeable to such ruling, he may, without withdrawing the documents from the Registry, elevate the matter by consulta within five days from receipt of notice of the denial of registration to the Commissioner of Land Registration.

The Register of Deeds shall make a memorandum of the pending consulta on the certificate of title which shall be canceled motu proprio by the Register of Deeds after final resolution or decision thereof, or before resolution, if withdrawn by petitioner.

The Commissioner of Land Registration, considering the consulta and the records certified to him after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His resolution or ruling in consultas shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds, provided, that the party in interest who disagrees with the final resolution, ruling or order of the Commissioner relative to consultas may appeal to the Court of Appeals within the period and in manner provided in Republic Act No. 5434.

CHAPTER XVI FINAL PROVISIONS

Why it is cited here

What a doubting Register of Deeds must do instead — and the only thing he may do.

"When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken … the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds" — the consulta.

The Acting Register here did something else: he moved for reconsideration of the judge's order in the case itself. The Court held he had no standing to do so, and the distinction is the case's practical core.

A Register of Deeds is not a party to the litigation whose orders he implements. He has no interest to protect, no pleading on file, and no right to be heard on the merits — so he cannot contest an order; he can only question the manner of its registration, through channels.

The section is his channel, and it is exclusive. Doubt goes up the administrative line to the Land Registration Administrator, never sideways into the court as an adversary.

Implementing Rules

Section 14, Rule 13, Rules of Court

Notice of lis pendens

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 13 (Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers)

In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. (24a, R-14)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

What was being cancelled, and why cancellation was proper once the litigation ended.

A party to "an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property" may record "notice of the pendency of the action," and the court may order the notice cancelled at any time after proper showing.

Lis pendens is wholly derivative — it exists only to warn of a pending suit and it dies with the suit. Baranda's title had already been affirmed by this Court twice, in final decisions, so there was nothing left pending to warn anyone about.

An annotation left standing after final judgment is not a neutral leftover. It clouds the title, obstructs dealings, and gives a defeated litigant leverage he did not win in court.

That is what makes the case one about the ministerial duty rather than about notices: the judge had already ordered the cancellation, on grounds settled twice over. Nothing was left for the Register but to do it.

Source: Baranda v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 81163, September 26, 1988

Cited laws & provisions

Section 10, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

General functions of Registers of Deeds

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

Why it is cited here

The textual footing of the ministerial rule, and it rests on a single auxiliary verb.

The reason is structural. Registration is a recording function, and a recorder who could refuse on the merits would be adjudicating without a hearing, without evidence, and without appeal.

Full entry below ↓

Section 117, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Procedure

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

CHAPTER XVI FINAL PROVISIONS

Why it is cited here

What a doubting Register of Deeds must do instead — and the only thing he may do.

The section is his channel, and it is exclusive. Doubt goes up the administrative line to the Land Registration Administrator, never sideways into the court as an adversary.

Full entry below ↓

Section 14, Rule 13, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Notice of lis pendens

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 13 (Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers)

Why it is cited here

What was being cancelled, and why cancellation was proper once the litigation ended.

An annotation left standing after final judgment is not a neutral leftover. It clouds the title, obstructs dealings, and gives a defeated litigant leverage he did not win in court.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre, Iloilo, originally covered by OCT No. 6406 in Romana Hitalia's name, underwent reconstitution proceedings leading to cancellation of OCT No. 6406 and issuance of TCT No. 106098 to petitioners.
When Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera, and Susana Silao resisted a writ of possession by invoking their own TCT No. 25772 over the same lot, the trial court found TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired and ordered execution, a ruling this Court affirmed with finality in G.R. No. 62042 (final March 25, 1983) and G.R. No. 64432 (final May 20, 1984), ordering immediate implementation.
Acting on petitioners' motions, the trial court declared TCT No. 25772 void and TCT No. 106098 valid, but this order was set aside when the Acting Register of Deeds cited a separate, pending mandamus case against her.
After this Court again granted petitioners' motions to compel execution (Resolution of September 17, 1986, referred to the Court Administrator), the trial court issued orders on November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987 directing registration and, upon Gotera's failure to surrender TCT No. 25772, its annulment and issuance of new titles.
Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso complied, but also annotated a notice of lis pendens tied to Civil Case No. 15871 — a separate suit by the Providos, still on appeal, to recover the same lot.
On February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo ordered the lis pendens cancelled, but on Saclauso's motion for reconsideration invoking Section 77, second paragraph, P.D. 1529, set that order aside on September 17, 1987, reasoning the Court of Appeals alone could order cancellation while Civil Case No. 15871 remained pending there.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

SECONDARY ISSUES. Whether pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 on appeal barred the trial court from cancelling the lis pendens under Section 77, first paragraph, P.D. 1529.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). Whether the Providos, as privies to G.R. No. 62042, used Civil Case No. 15871 merely to delay execution of final judgments.

Ruling

Ratio

The Court first found respondent Judge Gustilo mistaken in believing only the Court of Appeals could act, because he "conveniently forgot the first paragraph" of Section 77, which permits cancellation "[b]efore final judgment... upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered" — squarely the situation shown, given the Providos' privity to the already-final G.R. No. 62042.
Turning to the Register of Deeds' role, the Court quoted Section 10, P.D. 1529: "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration... advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117," and Section 117, under which doubt on the Register's part, or a party's disagreement with his action, "shall be submitted to the [Land Registration Authority]... by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds."
Applying the plain-meaning canon of statutory construction and Webster's definition of "shall" as denoting "obligation... mandatory," the Court held: "the function of a Register of Deeds... is ministerial in nature," and "[t]he respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration" of the court's order — her doubt, if genuine, should have been elevated by consulta, not litigated as a party with a stake of her own.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

A Register of Deeds' duty to register, annotate, or cancel entries on a Torrens certificate pursuant to a court order is ministerial, compelled by the mandatory "shall" of Section 10, P.D. 1529; where in doubt, the Register's exclusive recourse is consulta under Section 117, not resistance or reconsideration as a litigant.
A court may cancel a lis pendens even before final judgment in the case where annotated, upon a showing it is used to molest the adverse party or is unnecessary to protect the registrant.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

The ruling does not strip a Register of Deeds of recourse when genuinely uncertain; it redirects that uncertainty to the statutory consulta procedure rather than allowing the Register to unilaterally adjudicate the question or oppose the court as an interested party.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

DIRECT: Baranda is the leading, most categorical statement of the ministerial-act doctrine, holding in unqualified terms that registration functions are ministerial by the ordinary meaning of the Decree's mandatory language, and prescribing consulta, not resistance, as the sole avenue for a doubting Register of Deeds.

Separate Opinions

None. Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred without separate opinion.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Full-length digest in the format required by the course digest prompt.

Classification: DIRECT · G.R. No. 81163, September 26, 1988

TOPIC/SUBTOPIC FOCUS: Registration with the Office of Register Office — Registration is a Ministerial Act

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Sometime prior to 1981, Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia [1186, 1187].
Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda [1187].
The land registration court issued a writ of possession over Lot No. 4517, which writ of possession Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera, and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera, and Susana Silao held Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517 [1187].
The land registration court found Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25772 to have been fraudulently acquired, and ordered that the writ of possession be carried out in favor of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda [1187].
Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals to block the writ of possession [1187].
On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition of Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera [1187].
Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera elevated the denial of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the Philippines via a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 62042 [1187].
On January 7, 1983, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a resolution denying the petition in G.R. No. 62042 [1187].
On March 25, 1983, the Supreme Court of the Philippines denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera with finality, and the judgment in G.R. No. 62042 became final on March 25, 1983 [1187].
Despite the finality of G.R. No. 62042, Gregorio Perez and Maria P. Gotera filed Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court, and obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent the execution of the writ of possession and a writ of demolition [1187].
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia filed a petition before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 64432, contending that the writs of possession and demolition should be immediately implemented and that Civil Case No. 00827 was filed merely to delay the execution [1187].
On December 29, 1983, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a resolution in G.R. No. 64432, directing the Intermediate Appellate Court to dismiss the petition in Civil Case No. 00827, and ordering the immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition [1187].
On May 9, 1984, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a resolution in G.R. No. 64432 denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Gregorio Perez, and issued a resolution in G.R. No. 62042 referring the ex-parte motion of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia for execution of judgment to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo [1188].
On September 5, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, presided over by Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo, issued an order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 null and void, declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 as a valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, and ordering the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to register the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1189, 1190].
On October 8, 1984, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo set aside the order dated September 5, 1984, upon a motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, who argued that an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 67661, filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda against Helen P. Sornito before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, remained unresolved [1191].
Sometime later, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, issued orders dated November 6, 1986, and January 6, 1987 [1193, 1194].
In the order dated November 6, 1986, the Regional Trial Court ordered the Acting Register of Deeds to register the Order of the court dated September 5, 1984 [1193].
In the order dated January 6, 1987, the Regional Trial Court ordered Maria Provido Gotera to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to the court within ten days, after which Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 would be declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo would issue a new certificate of title in lieu thereof in the names of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1194].
In compliance with the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated November 6, 1986, and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 null and void, cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772, and issued new transfer certificates of title, namely Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562, in the names of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 [1197].
However, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated a notice of lis pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562, under Entry No. 427183, on account of a separate civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, pending in the Court of Appeals [1197].
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 from Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido, and Perfecto Provido, who were co-owners of Maria Provido Gotera and claimed under the annulled Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 [1201, 1204].
On October 24, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871, which dismissal was subsequently appealed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido, and Perfecto Provido to the Court of Appeals [1204].
When Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the notice of lis pendens on the new transfer certificates of title, Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia filed an urgent ex-parte motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens [1197, 1199].
On February 12, 1987, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo granted the motion and ordered the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the notice of lis pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098, T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562 [1199].
Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated February 12, 1987, arguing that under the second paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens can only be cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court stating the manner of disposal of the case, and since the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 was still pending with the Court of Appeals, only the Court of Appeals, and not the Regional Trial Court in a cadastral proceeding, possessed the authority to order the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens [1200, 1202].
Adopting the arguments of Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo set aside the order dated February 12, 1987, and maintained the notice of lis pendens on the transfer certificates of title of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1202].
This prompted Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which referred the motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, for appropriate action [1198].
On September 17, 1987, Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued an order denying the motion of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia to reinstate the order of February 12, 1987 [1198].
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia subsequently filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court directly before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 81163, to compel Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo to reinstate the order dated February 12, 1987, and direct the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the transfer certificates of title [1186, 1198].
On September 26, 1988, the Supreme Court of the Philippines promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus [1186].

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner/Prosecution:

The petitioners argue that under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Register of Deeds is bound by a purely ministerial and mandatory duty to register deeds, encumbrances, instruments, and court orders affecting registered land, which leaves no room for construction or personal discretion [1210, 1212].
The petitioners contend that the Register of Deeds has no legal standing or authority to file a motion for reconsideration of a court order directing the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens, as the function of the Register of Deeds is strictly non-judicial and administrative [1212].
The petitioners argue that if the Register of Deeds is in doubt regarding any registration matter, the sole legal remedy of the Register of Deeds under Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is to elevate the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration via consulta, rather than actively litigating or opposing court orders [1211, 1212].
The petitioners maintain that the notice of lis pendens annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562 was intended solely to molest and harass the petitioners, and is not necessary to protect any rights of the private respondents because the rights of the private respondents over Lot No. 4517 had already been fully, finally, and conclusively adjudicated against the private respondents with finality in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 [1206, 1208, 1209].
The petitioners assert that the private respondents in Civil Case No. 15871 are privies of Maria Provido Gotera, whose claimed title under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 was already declared null and void, and that the filing of Civil Case No. 15871 is a mere dilatory tactic to block the execution of final and executory resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines [1204, 1205, 1206].

B. Respondent/Defense:

The Acting Register of Deeds argues that under the second paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens can only be cancelled upon final judgment or other disposition of the action, which must be certified by the clerk of court where the action is pending [1200].
The Acting Register of Deeds contends that because Civil Case No. 15871 was appealed and is currently pending before the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, has no jurisdiction to cancel the notice of lis pendens [1201, 1202].
Respondent Judge Tito G. Gustilo argues that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens cannot be ordered during the pendency of the appeal because the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 are separate parties who were not formally impleaded in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, and are therefore not bound by the prior judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippines [1202, 1204].
The private respondents maintain that the notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect the asserted rights of ownership of the private respondents over Lot No. 4517 during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals [1203, 1204].

C. Common Ground:

The parties agree that Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre is the subject property and was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 [1186, 1187].
The parties agree that the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo dismissed Civil Case No. 15871 on October 24, 1984, and that the dismissal was appealed and is pending before the Court of Appeals [1204].
The parties agree that in compliance with the orders of the Regional Trial Court, the Acting Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562 in the names of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia [1197].

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE:

B. SECONDARY ISSUES:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has the authority to order the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens before final judgment under the first paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when the notice is shown to be for the purpose of molesting the adverse party and is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused the notice to be registered [1208, 1209].
Whether the private respondents in Civil Case No. 15871 are bound by the final and executory judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, and whether Civil Case No. 15871 constitutes a dilatory tactic to prevent the execution of final judgments [1204, 1205, 1206].

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. RULING ON THE MAIN ISSUE:

B. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 1:

C. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 2:

"reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. In [the] order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562." [1199]

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi:

Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree) provides that the Register of Deeds has the duty to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real property that complies with all the requisites for registration [1210].
Under this statutory framework, the law employs the mandatory term "shall" in defining the duty of registration [1212]. In statutory construction, when a statute uses the word "shall", the word denotes an imperative mandate that is obligatory and leaves no room for administrative discretion or personal judgment [1212].
The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, and court orders is strictly ministerial in nature [1212]. The Register of Deeds does not possess the judicial power or legal standing to evaluate the legal correctness of a court order, nor can the Register of Deeds file motions for reconsideration in court to question a judicial directive to cancel a notice of lis pendens [1212].
If the Register of Deeds is in doubt regarding the proper step to be taken in relation to any document or court order presented for registration, the sole administrative remedy provided by law is Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1211, 1212]. Under Section 117, the Register of Deeds must certify and submit the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration via consulta for resolution [1211, 1212].
Under the first paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens is a precautionary measure that can be cancelled before final judgment by order of the court upon proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that the notice is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused the notice to be registered [1208, 1209].
The notice of lis pendens annotated on the new transfer certificates of title of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia was completely unnecessary and was filed solely to molest the petitioners [1206, 1208, 1209]. This is because the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia over Lot No. 4517 had already been fully, finally, and conclusively adjudicated in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, which judgments had already attained incontrovertible finality [1205, 1206].
The private respondents in Civil Case No. 15871 are privies of Maria Provido Gotera, whose claimed title under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 was already declared null and void for being fraudulently obtained [1204, 1205, 1206]. The filing of a separate civil case to relitigate ownership rights over the same registered land is a clear dilatory tactic that violates the principle of res judicata and undermines the integrity of the Torrens system [1205, 1206].

B. Doctrines/Rules:

The Absolute Ministerial Nature of the Duty of Registration: The Register of Deeds is bound by a strict, mandatory, and ministerial duty to register court orders and valid instruments [1212]. The Register of Deeds cannot exercise independent discretion or block a court order by filing motions for reconsideration [1212]. As the Court declared verbatim:

"...the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing [the Acting Register of Deeds] to cancel the notice of lis pendens..." [1212]
The Sole Remedy of Consulta for Registration Doubt: When the Register of Deeds is in doubt regarding the registrability of any instrument or court order, the Register of Deeds must submit the matter to the Land Registration Authority [1211, 1212]. As the Court ruled verbatim:

"In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to [the Register of Deeds], [the Register of Deeds] should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529." [1212]
The Dual Grounds for Pre-Judgment Cancellation of Lis Pendens: Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a land registration court retains full authority to cancel a notice of lis pendens before final judgment under specific exceptional conditions [1208, 1209]. As the Court declared:

"Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that [the notice] is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused [the notice] to be registered." [1209]
The Presumption of Regularity of Land Registration Officers: Public officers of the land registration registry are presumed to perform official duties regularly [1221, 1228]. However, land registration officers cannot be permitted to cause endless delays or participate in dilatory litigation tactics that defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system, which is to quiet title to land [1206, 1213].

C. Limitations/Exceptions:

Requisites for Consulta: The administrative remedy of consulta under Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is a non-adversarial mechanism designed to resolve legal doubts [1211, 1212]. The Register of Deeds cannot use consulta as a means to actively litigate against the parties or to delay the execution of clear judicial mandates [1212].
Ministerial Duty Bounds: While the general rule is that the Register of Deeds performs ministerial functions, this ministerial duty is bounded by the requirement of compliance with the essential requisites for registration [1210]. However, once a court of competent jurisdiction has issued an order directing registration or cancellation, the Register of Deeds cannot invoke administrative objections to block the judicial order [1212].

D. Topic Integration:

Baranda v. Gustilo is the seminal authority defining the ministerial boundaries of land registration under Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1210, 1212]. The decision clearly demonstrates that the Register of Deeds is an administrative officer with zero judicial power [1212]. The case illustrates that the word "shall" in Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 imposes a strict ministerial mandate that cannot be bypassed by the administrative registry [1212]. By establishing that the Register of Deeds has no standing to file motions in court or actively oppose judicial orders, the Supreme Court of the Philippines protected the integrity of the Torrens system from administrative delays and ensured that final judicial determinations are executed with promptness and efficacy [1206, 1212, 1213].