Gomez v. Court of Appeals

Chapter II, The Land Registration Commission and Its Registries of Deeds (P.D. 1529, Secs. 6, 30, 32) — B. Registration is a Ministerial Act

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Case DigestWeek 3–4 — The Registries of Deeds and Original Registration

Gomez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-77770 · December 15, 1988 · Supreme Court — Second Division

Chapter II, The Land Registration Commission and Its Registries of Deeds (P.D. 1529, Secs. 6, 30, 32) — B. Registration is a Ministerial Act

Gist

This case is DIRECT to the Topic/Subtopic that registration is a ministerial act. Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez, sought to compel implementation of a 1981 trial-court decision adjudicating twelve lots in their favor and its accompanying order directing issuance of decrees of registration, after the same court later set aside both upon learning some of the lots were already covered by decades-old homestead patents. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's reversal. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed. The central doctrine is that the duty of land registration officials to issue a decree pursuant to a court's registration decision is ministerial only in the sense that they must conform to the court's decision and the record, without discretion to deviate; where they entertain doubt — as when a report reveals a pre-existing, indefeasible homestead title over the same land — their ministerial duty is to refer the matter back to the court, which in turn retains jurisdiction and control over its own decision until a final decree has actually been entered and the one-year period under Section 32, P.D. 1529 has lapsed.

Core Doctrine

A land registration or cadastral decision does not attain incontrovertibility until one year after entry of the final decree under Section 32, P.D. 1529; until then, the court retains control over its own decision. Land registration officials' duty to issue a decree is ministerial only insofar as it must conform to the court's decision and record; where doubt arises — as from discovery of a pre-existing, registered homestead patent — their duty is to refer the matter to the court, acting as its officers, not to issue the decree regardless or to decide the doubt themselves.

Facts

On August 30, 1968, petitioners applied before the CFI of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, to register twelve lots in Bayambang, formerly portions of Lots 15, 16, 34, and 41 (Plan Ipd-92), claimed by inheritance from Teodoro Y. Gomez and by quitclaim from Luis Lopez, son of Consolacion M. Gomez, whom this Court had earlier declared owner of certain lots in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran.
After notice and publication drew no opposition, the court entered a general default and, on August 5, 1981, adjudicated the lots to petitioners.
On October 6, 1981, it ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees, declaring the decision final.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, reported that Lots 15, 16, 34, and 41 had already been covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929, and recommended setting aside the decision and order. Petitioners opposed, invoking finality.
After hearing, the trial court, on March 25, 1985, set aside its own decision and order; reconsideration was denied on August 6, 1985.
Petitioners' certiorari and mandamus petition, referred to the Court of Appeals, was dismissed on September 17, 1986, and reconsideration denied on March 10, 1987.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner. Petitioners argued that under Section 30, P.D. 1529, once their August 5, 1981 decision became final and executory, Section 32 required the decree of registration to issue as a matter of course, so the trial court acted without jurisdiction in later setting it aside; and that respondent land registration officials had no alternative but to issue the decrees, their duty being purely ministerial.

Respondent. The Court of Appeals, sustained by respondents, held that prior to actual issuance of the decree of registration, the trial court retained power and control over its own decision, since finality in the sense of incontrovertibility attaches only after the lapse of one year from entry of the final decree, and that land already granted by homestead patent could no longer be the subject of another registration.

Common Ground / Stipulations (if any). Both sides agreed that Lots 15, 16, 34, and 41 had, in fact, been covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929, and that no opposition had been raised by the Bureau of Lands during the original registration proceedings.

Issue

MAIN ISSUE (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Whether the duty of respondent land registration officials to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the trial court's August 5, 1981 decision and October 6, 1981 order was purely ministerial such that they had no alternative but to issue them, and correspondingly, whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside that decision and order after report of the pre-existing homestead patents.

SECONDARY ISSUES. Whether Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran constituted "the law of the case" precluding recognition of the homestead patents over the same lots.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). Whether petitioners retain any remedy notwithstanding the setting aside of their registration decision.

Ruling

On the MAIN ISSUE: the officials' duty was ministerial only as to conformity with the court's decision and record, not as to blind issuance despite a discovered defect, and their proper course upon doubt was to refer the matter to the court; correspondingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction to set aside its decision because no final decree had yet been entered and the one-year period had not run. Secondary issue: NO — Abran expressly excluded homestead-patented portions from Consolacion Gomez's adjudicated lands, so it does not control. Ancillary issue: petitioners may still pursue an ordinary action for reconveyance if they can prove superior title. The dispositive portion reads verbatim: "WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-appellants. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court rejected petitioners' theory that Section 30 in relation to Section 32, P.D. 1529 required automatic issuance of the decree once the decision became final, explaining that "[u]nlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility[,] until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration," and that "as long as a final decree has not been entered... and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision... continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."
On the ministerial-duty argument, the Court agreed the duty "is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter," but qualified this immediately: "if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court," citing their statutory role to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings" under Section 6(2)(6), P.D. 1529.
The Court added that such reports may properly be submitted even after the decision's finality, since decrees require accurate technical descriptions demanding surveys and technical work "hardly... done by the court itself."
On the homestead patents, the Court held these, once registered, become "indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title" and may no longer be the subject of cadastral investigation.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

A land registration or cadastral decision does not attain incontrovertibility until one year after entry of the final decree under Section 32, P.D. 1529; until then, the court retains control over its own decision.
Land registration officials' duty to issue a decree is ministerial only insofar as it must conform to the court's decision and record; where doubt arises — as from discovery of a pre-existing, registered homestead patent — their duty is to refer the matter to the court, acting as its officers, not to issue the decree regardless or to decide the doubt themselves.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

The ruling does not hold that registration officials may withhold a decree at will; their referral duty is triggered only by genuine doubt grounded in the record, such as a report of conflicting prior registration, not mere discretion to disagree with the court's decision.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

DIRECT: Gomez defines the ministerial-act doctrine's affirmative content and its principal internal limit — officials must follow the court's decision and data of record without discretion, but must refer genuine doubts back to the court rather than unilaterally act, and the court's own continuing control over undecreed registrations is the mechanism by which such doubts are actually resolved.

Separate Opinions

None. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, and Regalado, JJ., concurred; Sarmiento, J., on leave.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Full-length digest in the format required by the course digest prompt.

Classification: DIRECT · G.R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988

TOPIC/SUBTOPIC FOCUS: Registration with the Office of Register Office — Registration is a Ministerial Act

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

The relationship of Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988, to the requested topic on the ministerial nature of registration under Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is DIRECT [6, 1199]. The triggering controversy arose when Petitioners applied for the registration of twelve lots in Bayambang, Pangasinan, which the land registration court granted in a decision that became final and executory, leading to an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decrees of registration [1191, 1192]. Upon discovery by the Chief of the Division of Original Registration of the Land Registration Commission that the subject lots were already covered by registered homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929, the Land Registration Commission submitted a report recommending the nullification of the final decision and the order for the issuance of decrees, which recommendation the land registration court subsequently adopted [1192, 1193]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Petitioners and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, thereby upholding the land registration court's second decision setting aside the prior final judgment [1193, 1194, 1203]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that while the duty of the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of registration is ministerial in character, the ministerial duty is not absolute or mechanical, and the duty ceases when the issuance of the decree would result in the double titling of lands [6, 1199].

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Sometime in 1928 and 1929, homestead patents were issued over Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 34, and Lot 41 of Plan Ipd-92, and the corresponding original certificates of title were registered under the Land Registration Act [1192, 1202].
On December 31, 1931, the Supreme Court of the Philippines promulgated the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran, which declared Consolacion M. Gomez as the owner of certain lands in Sitio Poponto, Bayambang, Pangasinan, but explicitly excluded the portions covered by the registered homestead certificates [1191, 1201].
Upon the intestate demise of Consolacion M. Gomez, the father of Consolacion M. Gomez, Teodoro Y. Gomez, and the son of Consolacion M. Gomez, Luis Lopez, inherited the parcels of land [1191].
Luis Lopez subsequently executed a Quitclaim in favor of Petitioners, who are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez, making Petitioners the absolute owners of the subject lots [1191].
The lots, which were formerly portions of Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 34, and Lot 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92, were subdivided into twelve lots, specifically Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2 [1191].
On November 30, 1963, the Bureau of Lands duly approved the subdivision plan, and Petitioners agreed to allocate the subdivided lots among Petitioners [1191].
On August 30, 1968, Petitioners filed an application for the registration of the twelve subdivided lots in the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court, of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. SC-24 [1191, 1195].
On August 5, 1981, the land registration court rendered a decision declaring Petitioners as the absolute owners of the subject lots, which decision eventually became final and executory [1192, 1196].
On October 6, 1981, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decrees of registration and certificates of title in favor of Petitioners [1192, 1195, 1196].
On July 11, 1984, Respondent Silverio G. Perez, in the official capacity of Respondent Silverio G. Perez as the Chief of the Division of Original Registration of the Land Registration Commission, submitted a report to the land registration court stating that Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 34, and Lot 41 of Plan Ipd-92 were already covered by the registered homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 [1192].
In the report, Respondent Silverio G. Perez recommended that the decision of the land registration court dated August 5, 1981, and the order dated October 6, 1981, be set aside to prevent the double titling of the lands [1192].
Petitioners filed an opposition to the report of Respondent Silverio G. Perez, arguing that the Bureau of Lands failed to raise any opposition during the registration proceedings and that the final and executory decision of August 5, 1981, must be executed as a matter of course [1192].
On March 25, 1985, after conducting a hearing on the report, the land registration court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated August 5, 1981, and the order dated October 6, 1981, for the issuance of decrees [1193].
Petitioners filed a motion for recollection and reconsideration of the second decision, but the land registration court denied the motion for reconsideration on August 6, 1985, for lack of merit [1193].
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which referred the petition to the Court of Appeals [1193].
On September 17, 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition of Petitioners, holding that the land registration court retains jurisdiction and control over the decision prior to the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission [1193, 1194].
On March 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Petitioners [1195].
Petitioners subsequently elevated the case to the Supreme Court of the Philippines via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court [1195].

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner/Prosecution:

Petitioners argue that under Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, once a land registration judgment becomes final and executory, the land registration court has no choice but to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration [1196].
Petitioners contend that the duty of the Land Registration Commission and the officers of the Land Registration Commission to issue the decrees of registration is purely ministerial, meaning that the Land Registration Commission and the officers of the Land Registration Commission have no authority to evaluate, review, or refuse to comply with the order of the land registration court [1195, 1196, 1199].
Petitioners maintain that because the decision of the land registration court dated August 5, 1981, had already become final and executory, the land registration court acted without jurisdiction and gravely abused the discretion of the land registration court when the land registration court set aside the decision of August 5, 1981, and the order of October 6, 1981 [1196].
Petitioners also argue that the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran constitutes "the law of the case" between the parties, which declared Consolacion M. Gomez as the absolute owner of the Sitio Poponto property, thereby rendering any subsequent administrative titles or registered homestead patents over the same area void and of no effect [1195, 1200].
Petitioners further argue that the Bureau of Lands did not raise any opposition to the application for registration filed by Petitioners during the entire land registration proceedings, which should bar the Government from subsequently questioning the registrability of the subject lots [1192].

B. Respondent/Defense:

Respondents, representing the Land Registration Commission and the division officers of the Land Registration Commission, contend that the duty of the Land Registration Commission to issue decrees is ministerial only in the sense that the Land Registration Commission acts under the orders of the court and that the decree must conform to the decision of the court [1199].
Respondents assert that if the officers of the Land Registration Commission find that there is a duplication of titles or that the land is already registered in the name of another person under the Torrens system, the duty of the Land Registration Commission ceases to be purely ministerial, and the officers of the Land Registration Commission are legally obligated to report the matter to the land registration court to avoid double titling and preserve the integrity of the Torrens system [1192, 1199].
Respondents argue that the land registration court retains full jurisdiction and control over the decision until after the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission [1194, 1197].
Respondents maintain that the subject lots are already covered by valid and subsisting homestead patents registered in 1928 and 1929, which makes the subject lots registered land under the Torrens system and therefore no longer subject to original registration proceedings [1192, 1194].
Respondents point out that the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran specifically and explicitly excluded the portions covered by the registered homestead certificates from the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez [1201].

C. Common Ground:

Both Petitioners and Respondents agree that the land registration court rendered a decision in favor of Petitioners on August 5, 1981, and issued an order for the issuance of decrees on October 6, 1981, which decisions and orders were made after the lapse of the period for ordinary appeal [1192, 1195, 1196].
Both Petitioners and Respondents admit that the original land registration case was initiated on August 30, 1968, and that the Land Registration Commission discovered the prior registered homestead patents only after the land registration court had issued the order for the issuance of decrees on October 6, 1981 [1191, 1192].

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE:

Whether the Land Registration Commission is bound by a purely ministerial duty to issue a decree of registration pursuant to Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 upon the finality of a decision in a land registration proceeding, such that the Land Registration Commission cannot report to the land registration court any prior registered homestead patents covering the same land, and whether the duty of the Land Registration Commission ceases to be ministerial if the issuance of the decree would result in the double titling of lands [1192, 1196, 1199].

B. SECONDARY ISSUES:

Whether the land registration court retains jurisdiction and control over the decision declaring the land registrable even after the decision has become final and executory, but before the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission under Section 31 and Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1194, 1197].
Whether the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran serves as "the law of the case" that bars the setting aside of the land registration court's decision in favor of Petitioners, notwithstanding the explicit exclusion of the registered homestead patents in the Abran decision [1195, 1200, 1201].

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. RULING ON THE MAIN ISSUE:

NO. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the duty of the Land Registration Commission and the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration is not an absolute or mechanical ministerial duty that prevents the Land Registration Commission from reporting a prior registration of the land to the land registration court [1199]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that while the duty of the Land Registration Commission is ministerial in the sense that the Land Registration Commission acts under the orders of the land registration court and must conform to the decision of the land registration court, this duty ceases to be ministerial if the issuance of the decree of registration would result in the double titling of lands [6, 1199].

B. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 1:

YES. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the land registration court retains full jurisdiction, control, and sound discretion over the land registration decision until after the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission and the expiration of the one-year period after the entry of the final decree of registration under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1194, 1197]. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a land registration or cadastral proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until the lapse of one year from the date of the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission [1197]. Prior to the entry of the final decree, the land registration court possesses the power to set aside the decision of the land registration court and the order for the issuance of decrees upon learning that the land is already registered under the Torrens system [1194, 1197].

C. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 2:

NO. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran is not "the law of the case" that would prevent the land registration court from setting aside the decision in favor of Petitioners [1203]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines emphasized that the Abran decision explicitly and specifically excluded the portions of land covered by the registered homestead certificates from the lands adjudicated to the predecessor-in-interest of Petitioners, Consolacion M. Gomez [1201]. Since the subject lots were registered under the homestead patents in 1928 and 1929, the subject lots were clearly excluded from the Abran decision and were already private lands not subject to new original registration proceedings [1202, 1203].

VERBATIM DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The Supreme Court of the Philippines' final dispositive portion in G.R. No. L-77770, dated December 15, 1988, is NOT IN RECORD in the provided source materials. However, the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 07621, dated September 17, 1986, which the Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed, is quoted verbatim in the record as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." [1194]

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi:

Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree) provides that after a judgment in a land registration proceeding becomes final and executory, the land registration court shall issue an order for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title [1196, 1198].
While Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 directs the issuance of the decree, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 mandates that the Land Registration Commission shall extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings [1199]. Under this statutory framework, the Land Registration Commission acts as an officer of the court and not as an independent administrative body [1199].
The duty of the land registration officials to issue the decree of registration is ministerial in that the officials must conform with the decision of the land registration court and have no discretion to alter the decision [1199]. However, if the officials of the Land Registration Commission discover any doubt, discrepancy, overlap, or prior registration of the land under the Torrens system, the officials are legally bound to refer the matter to the land registration court for determination [1192, 1199].
The ministerial duty of the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of registration ceases to be ministerial when the issuance of the decree would result in the double titling of the same parcel of land [1199]. Double titling violates the foundational purpose of the Torrens system, which is to quiet title to land and prevent duplication of certificates of title [3, 1194, 1199].
Unlike ordinary civil actions where a judgment becomes final and unalterable upon the expiration of the period for appeal, an adjudication of land in a land registration or cadastral proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1197]. Until the final decree is entered and the one-year period has elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated, and the land registration case remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decision [1197].
Once land is registered under the Torrens system pursuant to a public land patent, the land is brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act and becomes private land [1112, 1194]. The land registration court has no power or jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case, and a second decree issued for the same land is null and void [24, 1060, 1194].

B. Doctrines/Rules:

The Principle of Incontrovertibility of Torrens Titles: A Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the registered owner [2, 1112, 1197]. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to quiet title to land [3, 162, 1195, 1221]. Once a title is registered under the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing the land [112, 1221].
The Exception to the Ministerial Duty of Land Registration Officers: While the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Commission perform ministerial functions, this ministerial duty is not absolute [9, 1199]. The duty of the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree ceases to be ministerial where the issuance of the decree would result in double titling [6, 1199]. As the Supreme Court of the Philippines held:

"[The duty] is ministerial only in the sense that [the officials of the Land Registration Commission] act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court." Furthermore, the detailed nature of this duty is outlined as follows: "The duty of respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. [The duty] is ministerial in the sense that [the land registration officials] act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and [the land registration officials] have no discretion in the matter. However, if [the land registration officials] are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, [the land registration officials' duty is] to refer the matter to the court." [1199]
Jurisdiction over the Res and Control of the Land Registration Court: The land registration court retains jurisdiction and control over the decision until the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission and the lapse of one year therefrom [1194, 1197]. As the Court declared:

"Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree of registration." [1197] This is reinforced by the holding that: "prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision [the respondent Judge] rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after entry of the final decree of registration." [1194]

C. Limitations/Exceptions:

Extension of Period for Land Registration Authority Reports: The duty of the Land Registration Commission to report on double titling or other registration defects is not limited to the period before the court's decision becomes final; the duty of the Land Registration Commission extends even after the finality of the decision, provided that the final decree of registration has not yet been entered [1199].
Double Titling Bar: A land registration court has absolutely no jurisdiction or authority to order the registration of land already decreed in an earlier case under the Torrens system [24, 1060, 1194]. Any such subsequent registration is void ab initio [1060].
The Limit of the Ministerial Duty: The ministerial nature of land registration is bounded by the public policy of preventing fraud and double titling. When these threats arise, the ministerial duty is suspended, and the administrative agency must assist the court [1199].

D. Topic Integration:

The case of Gomez v. Court of Appeals is the leading authority on the scope and limits of the ministerial duties of the Land Registration Commission under Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [6, 1199]. G.R. No. L-77770 is illustrative because G.R. No. L-77770 clearly defines the dual nature of the Commission's role: on one hand, the Commission is an administrative arm that must execute judicial directives to issue decrees without exercising personal discretion on the merits of the case; on the other hand, the Commission functions as an auxiliary officer of the court with a duty to extend technical assistance [1199]. When the Commission discovers prior registrations, the Commission acts within the legal mandate of the Commission to suspend the issuance of the decree and report the facts to the court, thereby showing that the "ministerial duty" under Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is not a blind, mechanical mandate that can be used to destroy the integrity of the Torrens system [1199].

VII. Separate Opinions

NONE. The decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-77770, dated December 15, 1988, was rendered unanimously, with no separate concurring or dissenting opinions [1113].

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Special Law

Section 39, P.D. No. 1529

Preparation of decree and Certificate of Title

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owner's duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book.

Why it is cited here

The duty said to be ministerial, stated precisely.

"After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title."

The Court's gloss is the case's central sentence, and it narrows the word considerably. The duty is ministerial "only in the sense that they must conform to the court's decision and the record, without discretion to deviate."

So "ministerial" does not mean automatic. It means bounded — the officials may not substitute their own judgment for the court's, but neither may they issue a decree the decision and the record do not support.

Where the record itself contradicts the decision — here, a report revealing decades-old homestead patents over some of the same lots — conforming to the record and conforming to the decision pull apart, and the officials cannot do both.

Special Law

Section 32, P.D. No. 1529

Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

Why it is cited here

Why the trial court could still take back its own decision.

The decree becomes incontrovertible only "upon the expiration of one year from and after the date of entry" — and entry presupposes that a decree has actually issued.

In this case no decree had ever been entered. The one-year clock had therefore never started, and the registration court retained jurisdiction and control over its own decision — which is how a 1981 adjudication could be set aside years later.

The timeline is the thing to carry, because the vocabulary invites confusion. Judgment → final → order for decree (Section 39) → decree entered → one year → decree incontrovertible. Indefeasibility attaches at the last step, not the first.

A litigant holding a favourable but unexecuted registration judgment therefore holds much less than he thinks: until the decree is entered, the court that gave it may take it back.

Special Law

Section 117, P.D. No. 1529

Procedure

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.

Where the instrument is denied registration, the Register of Deeds shall notify the interested party in writing, setting forth the defects of the instrument or legal grounds relied upon, and advising him that if he is not agreeable to such ruling, he may, without withdrawing the documents from the Registry, elevate the matter by consulta within five days from receipt of notice of the denial of registration to the Commissioner of Land Registration.

The Register of Deeds shall make a memorandum of the pending consulta on the certificate of title which shall be canceled motu proprio by the Register of Deeds after final resolution or decision thereof, or before resolution, if withdrawn by petitioner.

The Commissioner of Land Registration, considering the consulta and the records certified to him after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His resolution or ruling in consultas shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds, provided, that the party in interest who disagrees with the final resolution, ruling or order of the Commissioner relative to consultas may appeal to the Court of Appeals within the period and in manner provided in Republic Act No. 5434.

CHAPTER XVI FINAL PROVISIONS

Why it is cited here

What officials must do when the record and the decision conflict.

"When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken … the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration."

The principle the section embodies runs wider than its letter, and the Court applies it here to the land registration officials generally: where they entertain doubt, their ministerial duty is to refer the matter back — not to comply, and not to refuse on their own view of the merits.

Referral is the only course that respects both halves of the duty. Issuing the decree would produce double titling over land already covered by homestead patents; simply refusing would put an executive officer above a court's judgment.

So the ministerial duty has a built-in escape valve, and the valve is procedural: send the problem to whoever has authority to resolve it — the Commissioner, or, as here, the court that rendered the decision.

Source: Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988

Cited laws & provisions

Section 39, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Preparation of decree and Certificate of Title

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

Why it is cited here

The duty said to be ministerial, stated precisely.

Full entry below ↓

Section 32, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

Why it is cited here

Why the trial court could still take back its own decision.

The decree becomes incontrovertible only "upon the expiration of one year from and after the date of entry" — and entry presupposes that a decree has actually issued.

A litigant holding a favourable but unexecuted registration judgment therefore holds much less than he thinks: until the decree is entered, the court that gave it may take it back.

Full entry below ↓

Section 117, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Procedure

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

CHAPTER XVI FINAL PROVISIONS

Why it is cited here

What officials must do when the record and the decision conflict.

"When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken … the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration."

Full entry below ↓

Facts

On August 30, 1968, petitioners applied before the CFI of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, to register twelve lots in Bayambang, formerly portions of Lots 15, 16, 34, and 41 (Plan Ipd-92), claimed by inheritance from Teodoro Y. Gomez and by quitclaim from Luis Lopez, son of Consolacion M. Gomez, whom this Court had earlier declared owner of certain lots in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran.
After notice and publication drew no opposition, the court entered a general default and, on August 5, 1981, adjudicated the lots to petitioners.
On October 6, 1981, it ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees, declaring the decision final.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, reported that Lots 15, 16, 34, and 41 had already been covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929, and recommended setting aside the decision and order. Petitioners opposed, invoking finality.
After hearing, the trial court, on March 25, 1985, set aside its own decision and order; reconsideration was denied on August 6, 1985.
Petitioners' certiorari and mandamus petition, referred to the Court of Appeals, was dismissed on September 17, 1986, and reconsideration denied on March 10, 1987.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

SECONDARY ISSUES. Whether Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran constituted "the law of the case" precluding recognition of the homestead patents over the same lots.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). Whether petitioners retain any remedy notwithstanding the setting aside of their registration decision.

Ruling

Ratio

The Court rejected petitioners' theory that Section 30 in relation to Section 32, P.D. 1529 required automatic issuance of the decree once the decision became final, explaining that "[u]nlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility[,] until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration," and that "as long as a final decree has not been entered... and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision... continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."
On the ministerial-duty argument, the Court agreed the duty "is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter," but qualified this immediately: "if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court," citing their statutory role to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings" under Section 6(2)(6), P.D. 1529.
The Court added that such reports may properly be submitted even after the decision's finality, since decrees require accurate technical descriptions demanding surveys and technical work "hardly... done by the court itself."
On the homestead patents, the Court held these, once registered, become "indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title" and may no longer be the subject of cadastral investigation.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

A land registration or cadastral decision does not attain incontrovertibility until one year after entry of the final decree under Section 32, P.D. 1529; until then, the court retains control over its own decision.
Land registration officials' duty to issue a decree is ministerial only insofar as it must conform to the court's decision and record; where doubt arises — as from discovery of a pre-existing, registered homestead patent — their duty is to refer the matter to the court, acting as its officers, not to issue the decree regardless or to decide the doubt themselves.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

The ruling does not hold that registration officials may withhold a decree at will; their referral duty is triggered only by genuine doubt grounded in the record, such as a report of conflicting prior registration, not mere discretion to disagree with the court's decision.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

DIRECT: Gomez defines the ministerial-act doctrine's affirmative content and its principal internal limit — officials must follow the court's decision and data of record without discretion, but must refer genuine doubts back to the court rather than unilaterally act, and the court's own continuing control over undecreed registrations is the mechanism by which such doubts are actually resolved.

Separate Opinions

None. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, and Regalado, JJ., concurred; Sarmiento, J., on leave.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Full-length digest in the format required by the course digest prompt.

Classification: DIRECT · G.R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988

TOPIC/SUBTOPIC FOCUS: Registration with the Office of Register Office — Registration is a Ministerial Act

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Sometime in 1928 and 1929, homestead patents were issued over Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 34, and Lot 41 of Plan Ipd-92, and the corresponding original certificates of title were registered under the Land Registration Act [1192, 1202].
On December 31, 1931, the Supreme Court of the Philippines promulgated the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran, which declared Consolacion M. Gomez as the owner of certain lands in Sitio Poponto, Bayambang, Pangasinan, but explicitly excluded the portions covered by the registered homestead certificates [1191, 1201].
Upon the intestate demise of Consolacion M. Gomez, the father of Consolacion M. Gomez, Teodoro Y. Gomez, and the son of Consolacion M. Gomez, Luis Lopez, inherited the parcels of land [1191].
Luis Lopez subsequently executed a Quitclaim in favor of Petitioners, who are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez, making Petitioners the absolute owners of the subject lots [1191].
The lots, which were formerly portions of Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 34, and Lot 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92, were subdivided into twelve lots, specifically Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2 [1191].
On November 30, 1963, the Bureau of Lands duly approved the subdivision plan, and Petitioners agreed to allocate the subdivided lots among Petitioners [1191].
On August 30, 1968, Petitioners filed an application for the registration of the twelve subdivided lots in the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court, of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. SC-24 [1191, 1195].
On August 5, 1981, the land registration court rendered a decision declaring Petitioners as the absolute owners of the subject lots, which decision eventually became final and executory [1192, 1196].
On October 6, 1981, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decrees of registration and certificates of title in favor of Petitioners [1192, 1195, 1196].
On July 11, 1984, Respondent Silverio G. Perez, in the official capacity of Respondent Silverio G. Perez as the Chief of the Division of Original Registration of the Land Registration Commission, submitted a report to the land registration court stating that Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 34, and Lot 41 of Plan Ipd-92 were already covered by the registered homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 [1192].
In the report, Respondent Silverio G. Perez recommended that the decision of the land registration court dated August 5, 1981, and the order dated October 6, 1981, be set aside to prevent the double titling of the lands [1192].
Petitioners filed an opposition to the report of Respondent Silverio G. Perez, arguing that the Bureau of Lands failed to raise any opposition during the registration proceedings and that the final and executory decision of August 5, 1981, must be executed as a matter of course [1192].
On March 25, 1985, after conducting a hearing on the report, the land registration court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated August 5, 1981, and the order dated October 6, 1981, for the issuance of decrees [1193].
Petitioners filed a motion for recollection and reconsideration of the second decision, but the land registration court denied the motion for reconsideration on August 6, 1985, for lack of merit [1193].
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which referred the petition to the Court of Appeals [1193].
On September 17, 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition of Petitioners, holding that the land registration court retains jurisdiction and control over the decision prior to the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission [1193, 1194].
On March 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Petitioners [1195].
Petitioners subsequently elevated the case to the Supreme Court of the Philippines via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court [1195].

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner/Prosecution:

Petitioners argue that under Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, once a land registration judgment becomes final and executory, the land registration court has no choice but to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration [1196].
Petitioners contend that the duty of the Land Registration Commission and the officers of the Land Registration Commission to issue the decrees of registration is purely ministerial, meaning that the Land Registration Commission and the officers of the Land Registration Commission have no authority to evaluate, review, or refuse to comply with the order of the land registration court [1195, 1196, 1199].
Petitioners maintain that because the decision of the land registration court dated August 5, 1981, had already become final and executory, the land registration court acted without jurisdiction and gravely abused the discretion of the land registration court when the land registration court set aside the decision of August 5, 1981, and the order of October 6, 1981 [1196].
Petitioners also argue that the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran constitutes "the law of the case" between the parties, which declared Consolacion M. Gomez as the absolute owner of the Sitio Poponto property, thereby rendering any subsequent administrative titles or registered homestead patents over the same area void and of no effect [1195, 1200].
Petitioners further argue that the Bureau of Lands did not raise any opposition to the application for registration filed by Petitioners during the entire land registration proceedings, which should bar the Government from subsequently questioning the registrability of the subject lots [1192].

B. Respondent/Defense:

Respondents, representing the Land Registration Commission and the division officers of the Land Registration Commission, contend that the duty of the Land Registration Commission to issue decrees is ministerial only in the sense that the Land Registration Commission acts under the orders of the court and that the decree must conform to the decision of the court [1199].
Respondents assert that if the officers of the Land Registration Commission find that there is a duplication of titles or that the land is already registered in the name of another person under the Torrens system, the duty of the Land Registration Commission ceases to be purely ministerial, and the officers of the Land Registration Commission are legally obligated to report the matter to the land registration court to avoid double titling and preserve the integrity of the Torrens system [1192, 1199].
Respondents argue that the land registration court retains full jurisdiction and control over the decision until after the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission [1194, 1197].
Respondents maintain that the subject lots are already covered by valid and subsisting homestead patents registered in 1928 and 1929, which makes the subject lots registered land under the Torrens system and therefore no longer subject to original registration proceedings [1192, 1194].
Respondents point out that the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran specifically and explicitly excluded the portions covered by the registered homestead certificates from the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez [1201].

C. Common Ground:

Both Petitioners and Respondents agree that the land registration court rendered a decision in favor of Petitioners on August 5, 1981, and issued an order for the issuance of decrees on October 6, 1981, which decisions and orders were made after the lapse of the period for ordinary appeal [1192, 1195, 1196].
Both Petitioners and Respondents admit that the original land registration case was initiated on August 30, 1968, and that the Land Registration Commission discovered the prior registered homestead patents only after the land registration court had issued the order for the issuance of decrees on October 6, 1981 [1191, 1192].

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE:

B. SECONDARY ISSUES:

Whether the land registration court retains jurisdiction and control over the decision declaring the land registrable even after the decision has become final and executory, but before the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission under Section 31 and Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1194, 1197].
Whether the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran serves as "the law of the case" that bars the setting aside of the land registration court's decision in favor of Petitioners, notwithstanding the explicit exclusion of the registered homestead patents in the Abran decision [1195, 1200, 1201].

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. RULING ON THE MAIN ISSUE:

B. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 1:

C. RULING ON SECONDARY ISSUE NO. 2:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." [1194]

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi:

Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree) provides that after a judgment in a land registration proceeding becomes final and executory, the land registration court shall issue an order for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title [1196, 1198].
While Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 directs the issuance of the decree, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 mandates that the Land Registration Commission shall extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings [1199]. Under this statutory framework, the Land Registration Commission acts as an officer of the court and not as an independent administrative body [1199].
The duty of the land registration officials to issue the decree of registration is ministerial in that the officials must conform with the decision of the land registration court and have no discretion to alter the decision [1199]. However, if the officials of the Land Registration Commission discover any doubt, discrepancy, overlap, or prior registration of the land under the Torrens system, the officials are legally bound to refer the matter to the land registration court for determination [1192, 1199].
The ministerial duty of the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of registration ceases to be ministerial when the issuance of the decree would result in the double titling of the same parcel of land [1199]. Double titling violates the foundational purpose of the Torrens system, which is to quiet title to land and prevent duplication of certificates of title [3, 1194, 1199].
Unlike ordinary civil actions where a judgment becomes final and unalterable upon the expiration of the period for appeal, an adjudication of land in a land registration or cadastral proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [1197]. Until the final decree is entered and the one-year period has elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated, and the land registration case remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decision [1197].
Once land is registered under the Torrens system pursuant to a public land patent, the land is brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act and becomes private land [1112, 1194]. The land registration court has no power or jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case, and a second decree issued for the same land is null and void [24, 1060, 1194].

B. Doctrines/Rules:

The Principle of Incontrovertibility of Torrens Titles: A Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the registered owner [2, 1112, 1197]. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to quiet title to land [3, 162, 1195, 1221]. Once a title is registered under the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing the land [112, 1221].
The Exception to the Ministerial Duty of Land Registration Officers: While the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Commission perform ministerial functions, this ministerial duty is not absolute [9, 1199]. The duty of the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree ceases to be ministerial where the issuance of the decree would result in double titling [6, 1199]. As the Supreme Court of the Philippines held:

"[The duty] is ministerial only in the sense that [the officials of the Land Registration Commission] act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court." Furthermore, the detailed nature of this duty is outlined as follows: "The duty of respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. [The duty] is ministerial in the sense that [the land registration officials] act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and [the land registration officials] have no discretion in the matter. However, if [the land registration officials] are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, [the land registration officials' duty is] to refer the matter to the court." [1199]
Jurisdiction over the Res and Control of the Land Registration Court: The land registration court retains jurisdiction and control over the decision until the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Commission and the lapse of one year therefrom [1194, 1197]. As the Court declared:

"Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree of registration." [1197] This is reinforced by the holding that: "prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision [the respondent Judge] rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after entry of the final decree of registration." [1194]

C. Limitations/Exceptions:

Extension of Period for Land Registration Authority Reports: The duty of the Land Registration Commission to report on double titling or other registration defects is not limited to the period before the court's decision becomes final; the duty of the Land Registration Commission extends even after the finality of the decision, provided that the final decree of registration has not yet been entered [1199].
Double Titling Bar: A land registration court has absolutely no jurisdiction or authority to order the registration of land already decreed in an earlier case under the Torrens system [24, 1060, 1194]. Any such subsequent registration is void ab initio [1060].
The Limit of the Ministerial Duty: The ministerial nature of land registration is bounded by the public policy of preventing fraud and double titling. When these threats arise, the ministerial duty is suspended, and the administrative agency must assist the court [1199].

D. Topic Integration:

VII. Separate Opinions

NONE. The decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-77770, dated December 15, 1988, was rendered unanimously, with no separate concurring or dissenting opinions [1113].