Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp.

Appeal — Review of the Decree of Registration

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Case DigestWeek 3–4 — The Registries of Deeds and Original Registration

Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp.

G.R. No. L-29080 · August 17, 1976 · Supreme Court — Second Division

Appeal — Review of the Decree of Registration

Gist

The relationship of the case of Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp., G.R. No. L-29080, August 17, 1976, to the assigned topic of Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (former Section 38 of Act No. 496) regarding the review of the decree of registration on the ground of actual and extrinsic fraud is ANALOGOUS [148, 1059, 1060]. The triggering controversy arose when Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed an ordinary civil action for specific performance to compel Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to execute a Deed of Conditional Contract to Sell Lot No. 27 based on Board Resolution No. 550, which ordinary civil action was opposed by Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes on the ground that a prior final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866 had already declared Board Resolution No. 550 null and void [1037, 1038, 1039]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines dismissed the appeal of Petitioner Macabingkil, thereby affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of dismissal of the trial court [1062].

Core Doctrine

The Rule on the Immutability of Final Judgments: Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved, and the court's judicial function ends, preventing any subsequent relitigation of the merits of the case [1059].

Facts

On January 30, 1957 Irene de Leon applied to buy Lot No. 27, Block E-148, East Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), which approved on February 1, 1957 and took her 10% down payment of ₱1,053.00. On August 13, 1957 Concepcion Macabingkil put down ₱400.00 for a different lot — Lot No. 15, Block E-121 — in the same subdivision.
On December 18, 1959 PHHC's board passed Resolution No. 370, cancelling de Leon's award and giving Lot No. 27 to Macabingkil, a squatter on the lot claiming a preferential right. Before it could be implemented, de Leon sued for injunction (Civil Case No. Q-5411), and the CFI enjoined its implementation.
At pre-trial PHHC's officers agreed to reconsider and honour the original award. On March 21, 1961 Resolution No. 430 kept Lot No. 27 for de Leon, gave Lot No. 15 to Macabingkil, and ordered her to move her improvements there. On March 27, 1961 PHHC executed a "Conditional Contract to Sell" Lot No. 27 to de Leon. De Leon moved to dismiss on April 22, 1961; Macabingkil was given five days to oppose, filed nothing, and on May 10, 1961 the case was dismissed with prejudice.
On May 16, 1961 — six days later — PHHC passed Resolution No. 550, disregarding its own contract with de Leon and re-awarding Lot No. 27 to Macabingkil. De Leon, assisted by her husband Vicente Llanes, sued again (Civil Case No. Q-5866, CFI Rizal, Quezon City Branch V). On September 2, 1961 Macabingkil moved to intervene; on September 9, 1961 the court denied it, the case being partly tried and past the pleading period — and she neither sought reconsideration nor appealed.
On February 21, 1962 the CFI declared Resolution No. 550 void, ordered PHHC to respect the contract with de Leon, and ordered all squatters ejected. On August 31, 1963 the CA affirmed (CA-G.R. No. 31169-R), and that judgment became final.
On February 21, 1964 Macabingkil sued for specific performance (Civil Case No. Q-7832) to compel PHHC to contract with her on the strength of the voided Resolution No. 550. The de Leon spouses intervened, PHHC pleaded prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action, and on June 6, 1964 the complaint was dismissed because its sole basis had already been declared void. On March 1, 1968 the CA affirmed en toto (CA-G.R. No. 34870-R).
Counsel received that decision March 8, 1968 but moved for reconsideration only on March 25 — seventeen days later, past the fifteen-day period; it was denied April 2, 1968 as the judgment was already final. A second motion filed May 20 was denied August 14, 1968, and the appeal to this Court came September 19, 1968. The Court decided on August 17, 1976.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner. Macabingkil argued the complaint stated a cause of action because Resolution No. 550 was a valid exercise of PHHC's corporate authority; that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866 did not bind her, never having been impleaded as a party-defendant; and that the CA departed from People's Homesite & Housing Corporation v. Hilario Cabagbag (CA-G.R. No. 29953-R), said to involve identical facts and to have upheld a like award.

Respondents. PHHC and the de Leon spouses argued the complaint states no cause of action, its sole basis having been declared void by a final judgment; that though Macabingkil was no formal party in Civil Case No. Q-5866, the judgment bound PHHC, which was, and so legally disabled PHHC from contracting over Lot No. 27 with her; and that this Court lacked jurisdiction because the CA decision became final on March 23, 1968, the first motion for reconsideration having been filed two days late.

Common Ground / Stipulations (if any). Both acknowledged that Lot No. 27, Block E-148 had been the subject of successive conflicting awards and resolutions by PHHC's board.

Issue

MAIN ISSUE (Finality-centered). Whether a final and executory judgment may be set aside or collaterally attacked in a later ordinary action for specific performance, and what amounts to the actual and extrinsic fraud required to annul one.

SECONDARY ISSUES. Whether this Court may entertain an appeal where the motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen-day period; and whether a final judgment voiding a corporate resolution binds the corporation and its privies, so that a third party cannot enforce rights under it.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). None separately resolved.

Ruling

On the MAIN ISSUE: NO — a final judgment is immutable, conclusive, and not collaterally assailable in a later ordinary action. It may be set aside in only three ways: by a petition for relief under Rule 38; by a direct action to annul and enjoin it for actual and extrinsic fraud; or by direct or collateral attack where it is void on the face of the record for want of jurisdiction. The fraud must be extrinsic — a scheme worked by the prevailing litigant outside the trial, by which the defeated party is prevented from having a real trial or fully presenting his case. Macabingkil neither alleged nor proved such fraud, and the judgment is not void on its face, so it stands conclusive. On timeliness: NO jurisdiction — the CA decision received March 8, 1968 had to be moved against by March 23; the motion of March 25 was two days late, so the decision became final, the late motion did not toll anything, and this Court was divested of power to review. On binding effect: YES — though Macabingkil was no formal party, the judgment bound PHHC, which was, and having declared Resolution No. 550 void, it left PHHC legally disabled from disposing of Lot No. 27 to her; her specific-performance suit therefore rested on nothing and was rightly dismissed. The dispositive portion reads verbatim: "WHEREFORE, the present appeal should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED, with costs against plaintiff-appellant Concepcion Macabingkil."

Ratio

Litigation must end somewhere. Public policy and sound practice require that, at the risk of occasional error, judgments become final at a date fixed by law — the very purpose for which courts exist is to put an end to controversies.
The three avenues are exclusive and each has its own premise: Rule 38 for fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence within sixty days of learning of the judgment and six months of entry; annulment for a judgment regular in form but infected with extrinsic fraud; and nullity where want of jurisdiction appears from the judgment's own recitals.
Extrinsic fraud is about being kept from court — held in ignorance of the suit, or lured away by a false promise of compromise — so that there was never a real contest. Forged instruments and perjured testimony at trial are intrinsic and do not qualify, the adverse party having been able to participate.
Perfecting an appeal on time is jurisdictional, not merely mandatory. Missing the fifteen days ends the appellate court's power altogether.
A party may not take the benefit of a compromise and repudiate its burden. Having accepted Lot No. 15 under Resolution No. 430 and contracted for it as part of the settlement of Civil Case No. Q-5411, Macabingkil was estopped from turning around to enforce Resolution No. 550 over Lot No. 27.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

Once a judgment is final and executory every issue between the parties is resolved and the court's function ends — the merits cannot be relitigated.
Only actual and extrinsic fraud, a scheme worked outside the trial that prevents a party from presenting his case, will annul a final judgment or reopen a decree of registration.
And the fifteen-day period for a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible and jurisdictional: a late filing makes the judgment immutable and bars review.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

A final judgment regular on the face of the record cannot be collaterally attacked in a later ordinary action — only a direct action for annulment will do. And even where extrinsic fraud exists, relief cannot be had once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value, whose rights may not be prejudiced.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

ANALOGOUS: the case supplies the standard of actual and extrinsic fraud that governs review of a registration decree under Section 32 as much as annulment of an ordinary judgment — both being extraordinary equitable remedies requiring positive, extrinsic fraud.
That common test lets registration courts protect final titles from frivolous challenge while preserving procedural due process for those genuinely kept from court.

Separate Opinions

None. The Second Division decided through Justice Felix Q. Antonio, with Justices Fernando, Makasiar, Aquino and Martin concurring and Justice Barredo taking no part; no separate opinion was filed.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Facts

On January 30, 1957: Respondent Irene de Leon filed an application with Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to purchase Lot No. 27, Block E-148 of the East Avenue Subdivision in Quezon City [1047].
On February 1, 1957: Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation approved the application of Respondent Irene de Leon and issued an order of payment requiring an advance down payment of ten percent (10%) of the total purchase price, equivalent to One Thousand Fifty-Three Pesos (P1,053.00), which advance down payment Respondent Irene de Leon paid [1047].
On August 13, 1957: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil deposited a ten percent (10%) down payment of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) for a different lot, specifically Lot No. 15, Block E-121, in the same East Avenue Subdivision [1040, 1058].
On December 18, 1959: The Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation passed and approved Board Resolution No. 370, which cancelled the award previously made in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon and instead awarded Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, who was a squatter on the lot and claimed a preferential right [1048].
Sometime thereafter: Before Board Resolution No. 370 could be implemented or a formal contract executed in favor of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, Respondent Irene de Leon filed Civil Case No. Q-5411 for injunction against Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, and three other defendants before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City [1048, 1061].
Sometime thereafter: The Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-5411 issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation from implementing Board Resolution No. 370 [1048].
Sometime thereafter (during pre-trial in Civil Case No. Q-5411): The authorized officers and representatives of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation agreed to reconsider Board Resolution No. 370 and to respect the original award in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon [1048, 1061].
On March 21, 1961: Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation passed Board Resolution No. 430, which maintained the original award of Lot No. 27 in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon and awarded Lot No. 15, Block E-121, in favor of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, ordering Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil to transfer all improvements on Lot No. 27 to Lot No. 15 [1048, 1061].
On March 27, 1961: Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation executed a "Conditional Contract to Sell" Lot No. 27 in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon [1048, 1061].
On April 22, 1961: On the basis of the pre-trial agreement and the executed contract, Respondent Irene de Leon filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. Q-5411 without prejudice [1048, 1061].
On April 25, 1961: The Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-5411 granted the counsel of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil five (5) days to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss [1061].
On May 10, 1961: Because no opposition was filed by Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil or any other defendant, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed Civil Case No. Q-5411 with prejudice [1061].
On May 16, 1961: Shortly after the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-5411 with prejudice, the Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation passed Board Resolution No. 550, which reconsidered the commitments of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, disregarded the Conditional Contract to Sell executed in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon, and re-awarded Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil [1049, 1061].
Sometime thereafter: Respondent Irene de Leon, assisted by the husband of Respondent Irene de Leon, Respondent Vicente Llanes, instituted Civil Case No. Q-5866 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, seeking to enjoin Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation from implementing Board Resolution No. 550 [1049].
On September 2, 1961: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" in Civil Case No. Q-5866, praying that Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil be allowed to join Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation in answering the complaint of Respondent Irene de Leon [1060].
On September 9, 1961: The Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-5866 denied the motion for leave to intervene filed by Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil because Civil Case No. Q-5866 had already been partially tried and was outside the pleading period [1060]. Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil did not seek reconsideration or appeal this denial [1060].
On February 21, 1962: The Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-5866 rendered judgment declaring Board Resolution No. 550 null and void, enjoining Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to respect the Conditional Contract to Sell in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon, and ordering the ejection of all squatters on Lot No. 27 [1050, 1059].
On August 31, 1963: On appeal by Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31169-R affirmed the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-5866, declaring Board Resolution No. 550 void and of no effect, and enjoining the enforcement of Board Resolution No. 550 [1050, 1059]. This judgment became final and executory [1059].
On February 21, 1964: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed Civil Case No. Q-7832 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, seeking specific performance to compel Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to execute a Deed of Conditional Contract to Sell Lot No. 27 in favor of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil on the strength of Board Resolution No. 550 [1037].
On March 25, 1964: Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-7832 [1038].
On April 15, 1964: The Court of First Instance of Rizal granted the motion for intervention of Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes [1039].
On April 28, 1964: Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation filed an Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was a squatter on Lot No. 27 and raising the affirmative defenses of prior judgment, conclusiveness of judgment, and failure to state a cause of action [1039, 1040].
On June 6, 1964: The Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-7832 conducted a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses, and on the same date, issued an Order dismissing the complaint of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil for failure to state a cause of action, on the ground that Board Resolution No. 550, which served as the sole basis of the complaint of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, had already been declared void and of no legal effect by a final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866 [1042, 1043, 1045, 1046].
Sometime thereafter: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals, which appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34870-R [1036, 1046].
On March 1, 1968: The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. No. 34870-R, affirming en toto the order of dismissal of the trial court [1036, 1046].
On March 8, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil received a copy of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34870-R [1056].
On March 25, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed a first motion for reconsideration of the decision, which filing occurred seventeen (17) days after receipt of the copy of the decision, and therefore beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period [1056].
On April 2, 1968: The Court of Appeals denied the first motion for reconsideration because the judgment had already become final and executory [1056].
On May 14, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil received the copy of the order of denial of the first motion for reconsideration [1056].
On May 20, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed a second motion for reconsideration [1056].
On August 14, 1968: The Court of Appeals denied the second motion for reconsideration [1056].
On September 4, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil received the copy of the order of denial of the second motion for reconsideration [1056].
On September 19, 1968: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court of the Philippines [1056].
On October 1, 1968: The Supreme Court of the Philippines initially gave due course to the petition for certiorari [1056].
On October 14, 1968: Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that the Supreme Court of the Philippines lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the judgment of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory prior to the filing of the first motion for reconsideration [1056].
On August 17, 1976: The Supreme Court of the Philippines promulgated the Decision dismissing the appeal of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil [1062].

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil.

Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil argues that the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-7832 states a sufficient cause of action because Board Resolution No. 550, which re-awarded Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, was a valid exercise of corporate authority by Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation [1037].
Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil contends that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866 is not final and binding as to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil because Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was never impleaded as a party-defendant in that case [1060].
Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil asserts that the Court of Appeals departed from established jurisprudence, specifically the decision in People's Homesite & Housing Corporation vs. Hilario Cabagbag (CA-G.R. No. 29953-R), which supposedly involved identical facts and upheld a similar award [1055].

Respondents (PHHC and Spouses de Leon/Llanes).

Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes argue that the complaint states no cause of action because Board Resolution No. 550, which is the sole legal basis of the claim of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, had already been declared void and of no effect by a final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31169-R [1039, 1059].
The respondents contend that although Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was not a formal party-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-5866, the judgment therein is binding on Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, thereby legally disabling Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation from executing any conditional contract to sell or transferring Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil [1060].
The respondents assert that the Supreme Court of the Philippines has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34870-R became final and executory on March 23, 1968, since the first motion for reconsideration of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was filed out of time on March 25, 1968 [1056].

Common Ground.

Both Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil and the respondents acknowledge that Lot No. 27, Block E-148, East Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, was the subject of prior conflicting awards and resolutions by the Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation [1037, 1038].

Issue

MAIN ISSUE. Whether a final and executory judgment may be set aside or collaterally attacked in a subsequent ordinary civil action for specific performance, and what constitutes the requisite actual and extrinsic fraud under the rules of procedure to justify the annulment of a final judicial decision [1059, 1060].

SECONDARY ISSUES.

Whether the Supreme Court of the Philippines has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if the petitioner failed to file the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals within the fifteen-day reglementary period under Section 1 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court [1056].
Whether a final judgment declaring a corporate resolution null and void is binding upon the corporation and the privies of the corporation, so as to preclude a third party from enforcing rights under the voided resolution in a subsequent ordinary civil action [1060].

Ruling

Ruling on the MAIN ISSUE. NO. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that a final and executory judgment is immutable, conclusive, and cannot be collaterally attacked or set aside in a subsequent ordinary civil action for specific performance [1059]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that under the rules of procedure, a final and executory judgment may only be set aside in three (3) specific ways: (1) by a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court; (2) by a direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment on the ground of actual and extrinsic fraud; and (3) by a direct or collateral attack where the judgment is void upon the face of the record for lack of jurisdiction [1059, 1060]. To justify the annulment of a final judgment, the fraud must be actual and extrinsic—meaning a fraudulent scheme executed by the prevailing litigant outside the trial of the case which prevents the defeated party from having a real trial or fully presenting the case [1059, 1060]. Since Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil did not allege or prove that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866 was procured through extrinsic fraud, and since the judgment is not void upon the face of the record, the final judgment remains conclusive on the subject matter and cannot be collaterally attacked in an ordinary civil suit [1059, 1060].

Ruling on SECONDARY ISSUE 1. NO. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the Supreme Court of the Philippines has no jurisdiction to review the case because the decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory prior to the filing of the first motion for reconsideration [1056]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that under Section 1 of Rule 52 and Section 10 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment [1056]. Since the counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil received the copy of the CA decision on March 8, 1968, the last day to file a motion for reconsideration was March 23, 1968 [1056]. The filing of the first motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1968, was two (2) days late; hence, the CA decision became final and executory, and the late motion did not toll the period to appeal, thereby divesting the Supreme Court of the Philippines of jurisdiction to review the case [1056].

Ruling on SECONDARY ISSUE 2. YES. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that a final judgment declaring a corporate resolution null and void is binding upon the corporation and the privies of the corporation, thereby disabling the corporation from executing any contract based on the voided resolution [1060]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that although Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was not a formal party-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-5866, the final judgment was binding upon Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, which was a party therein [1060]. Because the judgment declared Board Resolution No. 550 void and of no effect, Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was legally disabled from disposing of Lot No. 27 in favor of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil [1060]. Thus, the complaint of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil for specific performance lacks any valid legal basis and was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action [1059].

Dispositive portion (verbatim). The final dispositive portion of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-29080, dated August 17, 1976, is quoted verbatim as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present appeal should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED, with costs against plaintiff-appellant Concepcion Macabingkil.

Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Aquino, JJ., concur

Ratio

The Inviolability of the Finality of Judgments: A final and executory judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is res judicata, binding upon the parties and the privies of the parties, and can no longer be relitigated on the merits in any subsequent proceeding [1059, 1060]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines emphasized that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law, as the very object for which courts were instituted is to put an end to controversies [1059].
The Three (3) Exclusive Methods to Set Aside a Final Judgment: Under the Philippine rules of civil procedure, there are only three (3) distinct ways by which a final and executory judgment may be validly set aside, namely:
- 1. A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court: This remedy is available when a judgment is taken against a party through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, and not more than six (6) months after the judgment was entered [1059].
- 2. A direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment: This remedy is equitable in character and presupposes that the challenged judgment is entirely regular in form but is infected with actual and extrinsic fraud [1059].
- 3. A direct or collateral attack on the ground of nullity: This remedy is available only when the challenged judgment is void upon the face of the record, or when the lack of jurisdiction of the court is apparent by the own recitals of the judgment [1059].
The Strict Definition of Extrinsic Fraud (The Macabingkil Doctrine): Extrinsic or collateral fraud, which is the only species of fraud that can serve as a valid legal basis to annul a final judgment or to reopen a decree of registration under the Torrens system, refers to any fraudulent scheme executed by the prevailing litigant outside the trial of the case against the defeated party, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully and fairly presenting the case to the court [148, 1059, 1060]. Extrinsic fraud includes situations where the unsuccessful party is kept in ignorance of the suit by the acts of the plaintiff, or is kept away from court by a false promise of a compromise, showing that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case [1059]. In contrast, intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts committed during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which do not prevent the adverse party from participating in the proceedings [148, 1059].
The Jurisdictional Character of Appeal Timelines: The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional [1056]. The failure of a party to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary period under the Rules of Court renders the judgment final and executory, thereby completely divesting the appellate court of jurisdiction to review or alter the decision [1056].
The Estoppel by Compromise Principle: A party cannot, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a compromise agreement and subsequently repudiate the aspects of the compromise that do not suit the party [1061]. Since Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil accepted the re-award of Lot No. 15 under Board Resolution No. 430 and entered into a purchase agreement over said lot as part of a compromise in Civil Case No. Q-5411, Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil is heavily estopped from subsequently seeking the enforcement of Board Resolution No. 550 over Lot No. 27 [1061].

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

The Rule on the Immutability of Final Judgments: Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved, and the court's judicial function ends, preventing any subsequent relitigation of the merits of the case [1059].
The Extrinsic Fraud Standard (Macabingkil Rule): Only actual and extrinsic fraud—defined as a fraudulent scheme perpetrated outside the trial that prevents a party from presenting the case to the court—can justify the annulment of a final judgment or the reopening of a decree of registration under the Torrens system [1059, 1060].
The Strict Jurisdictional Timeline Rule: The fifteen-day period to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 1 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is non-extendible and jurisdictional; a late filing renders the judgment immutable and prevents the Supreme Court of the Philippines from assuming jurisdiction over the appeal [1056].

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

The Collateral Attack Prohibition: A final and executory judgment that is regular on the face of the record cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent ordinary civil action [1060]. The validity of such judgment can only be assailed through a direct action for annulment filed in accordance with the rules of procedure [1060].
The Innocent Purchaser Exception: Although a decree of registration or a final judgment may be reopened or annulled on the ground of actual and extrinsic fraud, this remedy cannot be entertained if the property has already passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith, whose rights cannot be prejudiced [1032, 1059].

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification of Relationship: ANALOGOUS [148, 1059, 1060].
Integration: The case of Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp. is an analogous and highly illustrative authority on Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (former Section 38 of Act No. 496) because the decision establishes the definitive standard for what constitutes actual and extrinsic fraud under Philippine law [148, 1059, 1060]. The decision clarifies that both the reopening of a decree of registration under Section 32 and the annulment of a final judgment in ordinary civil actions are extraordinary equitable remedies that require proof of actual, positive, and extrinsic fraud [1059, 1060]. By adopting the classic Miller doctrine from American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of the Philippines established that extrinsic fraud must consist of deliberate, fraudulent acts committed outside the trial of the case that prevent the aggrieved party from having a real contest or presenting the case fully to the court [1059]. This standard serves as the foundational test used by land registration courts to determine whether a petition for review of a registration decree under Section 32 should be granted, ensuring that final titles are protected from frivolous challenges while safeguarding the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process [104, 1059, 1060].

Separate Opinions

NOT APPLICABLE / NOT IN RECORD. (The decision was rendered unanimously by the Second Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, with Associate Justice Felix Q. Antonio as the ponente, and with Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Felix V. Makasiar, Ramon C. Aquino, and Ruperto G. Martin concurring, and with Associate Justice Julio D. Barredo taking no part, and with no separate concurring or dissenting opinions filed) [1062].

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 2, Rule 47, Rules of Court

Grounds for annulment

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 47 (Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and Resolutions)

The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

The extrinsic fraud standard, applied outside land registration and so showing its real reach.

"The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief."

Macabingkil attacked a final and executory judgment in an earlier civil case that had voided the very Board Resolution her specific-performance suit depended on. The label on her action — specific performance — did not change what she was doing.

Which is the transferable lesson. Courts look at the effect sought, not the caption: a suit that cannot succeed unless an earlier final judgment falls is a collateral attack on it, and must satisfy the requisites for annulment.

The second sentence adds a subsidiarity rule that is easy to miss. Even genuine extrinsic fraud is unavailable if the party could have raised it by new trial or petition for relief — annulment is a last resort, not an alternative route.

Special Law

Section 32, P.D. No. 1529

Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

Why it is cited here

The provision the case is filed under, and why the analogy holds.

Review of a decree is available for actual fraud, within one year after entry, and never against an innocent purchaser for value; thereafter the decree is incontrovertible.

Macabingkil is not a Section 32 petition — it is an ordinary civil action against a judgment, not a decree. It earns its place here because it applies the same extrinsic-fraud test the section's case law has built, and applies it to the same underlying problem: when may a final adjudication be disturbed?

Seeing the doctrine outside its usual home makes its shape clearer. The extrinsic requirement is not a peculiarity of land registration; it is the general law of finality of judgments, which Section 32 imports.

What Section 32 adds on top is a hard one-year clock and the innocent-purchaser cut-off — protections a Torrens decree needs and an ordinary judgment does not.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court

Time for filing petition; contents and verification

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings)

A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (3)

Why it is cited here

The remedy Rule 47 says must be tried first, with the periods that make it easy to lose.

A petition for relief "must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered," with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

The two periods are concurrent, not alternative — both must be satisfied, so a party who learns of the judgment in month five has one month, not sixty days.

Neither is extendible, and both are jurisdictional. That severity is deliberate: relief from a final judgment is an exception to finality, and the exception is kept small by keeping the window short.

Read forward to Rule 47, the sequence is complete. Relief under Rule 38 first, within its periods; annulment only if relief was genuinely unavailable. A litigant who slept through the sixty days has not preserved a ground — he has forfeited it.

Source: Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp., G.R. No. L-29080, August 17, 1976

Cited laws & provisions

Section 2, Rule 47, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds for annulment

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 47 (Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and Resolutions)

The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)

Why it is cited here

The extrinsic fraud standard, applied outside land registration and so showing its real reach.

Full entry below ↓

Section 32, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

Why it is cited here

The provision the case is filed under, and why the analogy holds.

Review of a decree is available for actual fraud, within one year after entry, and never against an innocent purchaser for value; thereafter the decree is incontrovertible.

What Section 32 adds on top is a hard one-year clock and the innocent-purchaser cut-off — protections a Torrens decree needs and an ordinary judgment does not.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Time for filing petition; contents and verification

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings)

Why it is cited here

The remedy Rule 47 says must be tried first, with the periods that make it easy to lose.

The two periods are concurrent, not alternative — both must be satisfied, so a party who learns of the judgment in month five has one month, not sixty days.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

On January 30, 1957 Irene de Leon applied to buy Lot No. 27, Block E-148, East Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), which approved on February 1, 1957 and took her 10% down payment of ₱1,053.00. On August 13, 1957 Concepcion Macabingkil put down ₱400.00 for a different lot — Lot No. 15, Block E-121 — in the same subdivision.
On December 18, 1959 PHHC's board passed Resolution No. 370, cancelling de Leon's award and giving Lot No. 27 to Macabingkil, a squatter on the lot claiming a preferential right. Before it could be implemented, de Leon sued for injunction (Civil Case No. Q-5411), and the CFI enjoined its implementation.
At pre-trial PHHC's officers agreed to reconsider and honour the original award. On March 21, 1961 Resolution No. 430 kept Lot No. 27 for de Leon, gave Lot No. 15 to Macabingkil, and ordered her to move her improvements there. On March 27, 1961 PHHC executed a "Conditional Contract to Sell" Lot No. 27 to de Leon. De Leon moved to dismiss on April 22, 1961; Macabingkil was given five days to oppose, filed nothing, and on May 10, 1961 the case was dismissed with prejudice.
On May 16, 1961 — six days later — PHHC passed Resolution No. 550, disregarding its own contract with de Leon and re-awarding Lot No. 27 to Macabingkil. De Leon, assisted by her husband Vicente Llanes, sued again (Civil Case No. Q-5866, CFI Rizal, Quezon City Branch V). On September 2, 1961 Macabingkil moved to intervene; on September 9, 1961 the court denied it, the case being partly tried and past the pleading period — and she neither sought reconsideration nor appealed.
On February 21, 1962 the CFI declared Resolution No. 550 void, ordered PHHC to respect the contract with de Leon, and ordered all squatters ejected. On August 31, 1963 the CA affirmed (CA-G.R. No. 31169-R), and that judgment became final.
On February 21, 1964 Macabingkil sued for specific performance (Civil Case No. Q-7832) to compel PHHC to contract with her on the strength of the voided Resolution No. 550. The de Leon spouses intervened, PHHC pleaded prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action, and on June 6, 1964 the complaint was dismissed because its sole basis had already been declared void. On March 1, 1968 the CA affirmed en toto (CA-G.R. No. 34870-R).
Counsel received that decision March 8, 1968 but moved for reconsideration only on March 25 — seventeen days later, past the fifteen-day period; it was denied April 2, 1968 as the judgment was already final. A second motion filed May 20 was denied August 14, 1968, and the appeal to this Court came September 19, 1968. The Court decided on August 17, 1976.

Arguments of the Parties

Common Ground / Stipulations (if any). Both acknowledged that Lot No. 27, Block E-148 had been the subject of successive conflicting awards and resolutions by PHHC's board.

Issue

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). None separately resolved.

Ruling

Ratio

Litigation must end somewhere. Public policy and sound practice require that, at the risk of occasional error, judgments become final at a date fixed by law — the very purpose for which courts exist is to put an end to controversies.
The three avenues are exclusive and each has its own premise: Rule 38 for fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence within sixty days of learning of the judgment and six months of entry; annulment for a judgment regular in form but infected with extrinsic fraud; and nullity where want of jurisdiction appears from the judgment's own recitals.
Extrinsic fraud is about being kept from court — held in ignorance of the suit, or lured away by a false promise of compromise — so that there was never a real contest. Forged instruments and perjured testimony at trial are intrinsic and do not qualify, the adverse party having been able to participate.
Perfecting an appeal on time is jurisdictional, not merely mandatory. Missing the fifteen days ends the appellate court's power altogether.
A party may not take the benefit of a compromise and repudiate its burden. Having accepted Lot No. 15 under Resolution No. 430 and contracted for it as part of the settlement of Civil Case No. Q-5411, Macabingkil was estopped from turning around to enforce Resolution No. 550 over Lot No. 27.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

Once a judgment is final and executory every issue between the parties is resolved and the court's function ends — the merits cannot be relitigated.
Only actual and extrinsic fraud, a scheme worked outside the trial that prevents a party from presenting his case, will annul a final judgment or reopen a decree of registration.
And the fifteen-day period for a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible and jurisdictional: a late filing makes the judgment immutable and bars review.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

A final judgment regular on the face of the record cannot be collaterally attacked in a later ordinary action — only a direct action for annulment will do. And even where extrinsic fraud exists, relief cannot be had once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value, whose rights may not be prejudiced.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

ANALOGOUS: the case supplies the standard of actual and extrinsic fraud that governs review of a registration decree under Section 32 as much as annulment of an ordinary judgment — both being extraordinary equitable remedies requiring positive, extrinsic fraud.
That common test lets registration courts protect final titles from frivolous challenge while preserving procedural due process for those genuinely kept from court.

Separate Opinions

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Facts

On January 30, 1957: Respondent Irene de Leon filed an application with Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to purchase Lot No. 27, Block E-148 of the East Avenue Subdivision in Quezon City [1047].
On February 1, 1957: Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation approved the application of Respondent Irene de Leon and issued an order of payment requiring an advance down payment of ten percent (10%) of the total purchase price, equivalent to One Thousand Fifty-Three Pesos (P1,053.00), which advance down payment Respondent Irene de Leon paid [1047].
On August 13, 1957: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil deposited a ten percent (10%) down payment of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) for a different lot, specifically Lot No. 15, Block E-121, in the same East Avenue Subdivision [1040, 1058].
On December 18, 1959: The Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation passed and approved Board Resolution No. 370, which cancelled the award previously made in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon and instead awarded Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, who was a squatter on the lot and claimed a preferential right [1048].
Sometime thereafter: Before Board Resolution No. 370 could be implemented or a formal contract executed in favor of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, Respondent Irene de Leon filed Civil Case No. Q-5411 for injunction against Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, and three other defendants before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City [1048, 1061].
Sometime thereafter: The Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-5411 issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation from implementing Board Resolution No. 370 [1048].
Sometime thereafter (during pre-trial in Civil Case No. Q-5411): The authorized officers and representatives of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation agreed to reconsider Board Resolution No. 370 and to respect the original award in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon [1048, 1061].
On March 21, 1961: Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation passed Board Resolution No. 430, which maintained the original award of Lot No. 27 in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon and awarded Lot No. 15, Block E-121, in favor of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, ordering Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil to transfer all improvements on Lot No. 27 to Lot No. 15 [1048, 1061].
On March 27, 1961: Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation executed a "Conditional Contract to Sell" Lot No. 27 in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon [1048, 1061].
On April 22, 1961: On the basis of the pre-trial agreement and the executed contract, Respondent Irene de Leon filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. Q-5411 without prejudice [1048, 1061].
On April 25, 1961: The Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-5411 granted the counsel of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil five (5) days to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss [1061].
On May 10, 1961: Because no opposition was filed by Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil or any other defendant, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed Civil Case No. Q-5411 with prejudice [1061].
On May 16, 1961: Shortly after the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-5411 with prejudice, the Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation passed Board Resolution No. 550, which reconsidered the commitments of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, disregarded the Conditional Contract to Sell executed in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon, and re-awarded Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil [1049, 1061].
Sometime thereafter: Respondent Irene de Leon, assisted by the husband of Respondent Irene de Leon, Respondent Vicente Llanes, instituted Civil Case No. Q-5866 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, seeking to enjoin Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation from implementing Board Resolution No. 550 [1049].
On September 2, 1961: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" in Civil Case No. Q-5866, praying that Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil be allowed to join Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation in answering the complaint of Respondent Irene de Leon [1060].
On September 9, 1961: The Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-5866 denied the motion for leave to intervene filed by Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil because Civil Case No. Q-5866 had already been partially tried and was outside the pleading period [1060]. Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil did not seek reconsideration or appeal this denial [1060].
On February 21, 1962: The Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-5866 rendered judgment declaring Board Resolution No. 550 null and void, enjoining Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to respect the Conditional Contract to Sell in favor of Respondent Irene de Leon, and ordering the ejection of all squatters on Lot No. 27 [1050, 1059].
On August 31, 1963: On appeal by Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31169-R affirmed the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-5866, declaring Board Resolution No. 550 void and of no effect, and enjoining the enforcement of Board Resolution No. 550 [1050, 1059]. This judgment became final and executory [1059].
On February 21, 1964: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed Civil Case No. Q-7832 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, seeking specific performance to compel Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to execute a Deed of Conditional Contract to Sell Lot No. 27 in favor of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil on the strength of Board Resolution No. 550 [1037].
On March 25, 1964: Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-7832 [1038].
On April 15, 1964: The Court of First Instance of Rizal granted the motion for intervention of Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes [1039].
On April 28, 1964: Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation filed an Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was a squatter on Lot No. 27 and raising the affirmative defenses of prior judgment, conclusiveness of judgment, and failure to state a cause of action [1039, 1040].
On June 6, 1964: The Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-7832 conducted a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses, and on the same date, issued an Order dismissing the complaint of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil for failure to state a cause of action, on the ground that Board Resolution No. 550, which served as the sole basis of the complaint of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, had already been declared void and of no legal effect by a final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866 [1042, 1043, 1045, 1046].
Sometime thereafter: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals, which appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34870-R [1036, 1046].
On March 1, 1968: The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. No. 34870-R, affirming en toto the order of dismissal of the trial court [1036, 1046].
On March 8, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil received a copy of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34870-R [1056].
On March 25, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed a first motion for reconsideration of the decision, which filing occurred seventeen (17) days after receipt of the copy of the decision, and therefore beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period [1056].
On April 2, 1968: The Court of Appeals denied the first motion for reconsideration because the judgment had already become final and executory [1056].
On May 14, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil received the copy of the order of denial of the first motion for reconsideration [1056].
On May 20, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed a second motion for reconsideration [1056].
On August 14, 1968: The Court of Appeals denied the second motion for reconsideration [1056].
On September 4, 1968: The counsel for Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil received the copy of the order of denial of the second motion for reconsideration [1056].
On September 19, 1968: Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court of the Philippines [1056].
On October 1, 1968: The Supreme Court of the Philippines initially gave due course to the petition for certiorari [1056].
On October 14, 1968: Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that the Supreme Court of the Philippines lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the judgment of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory prior to the filing of the first motion for reconsideration [1056].
On August 17, 1976: The Supreme Court of the Philippines promulgated the Decision dismissing the appeal of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil [1062].

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil.

Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil argues that the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-7832 states a sufficient cause of action because Board Resolution No. 550, which re-awarded Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, was a valid exercise of corporate authority by Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation [1037].
Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil contends that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866 is not final and binding as to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil because Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was never impleaded as a party-defendant in that case [1060].
Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil asserts that the Court of Appeals departed from established jurisprudence, specifically the decision in People's Homesite & Housing Corporation vs. Hilario Cabagbag (CA-G.R. No. 29953-R), which supposedly involved identical facts and upheld a similar award [1055].

Respondents (PHHC and Spouses de Leon/Llanes).

Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and Respondent Spouses Irene de Leon and Vicente Llanes argue that the complaint states no cause of action because Board Resolution No. 550, which is the sole legal basis of the claim of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil, had already been declared void and of no effect by a final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31169-R [1039, 1059].
The respondents contend that although Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was not a formal party-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-5866, the judgment therein is binding on Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, thereby legally disabling Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation from executing any conditional contract to sell or transferring Lot No. 27 to Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil [1060].
The respondents assert that the Supreme Court of the Philippines has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34870-R became final and executory on March 23, 1968, since the first motion for reconsideration of Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil was filed out of time on March 25, 1968 [1056].

Common Ground.

Both Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil and the respondents acknowledge that Lot No. 27, Block E-148, East Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, was the subject of prior conflicting awards and resolutions by the Board of Directors of Respondent People's Homesite and Housing Corporation [1037, 1038].

Issue

SECONDARY ISSUES.

Whether the Supreme Court of the Philippines has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if the petitioner failed to file the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals within the fifteen-day reglementary period under Section 1 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court [1056].
Whether a final judgment declaring a corporate resolution null and void is binding upon the corporation and the privies of the corporation, so as to preclude a third party from enforcing rights under the voided resolution in a subsequent ordinary civil action [1060].

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim). The final dispositive portion of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-29080, dated August 17, 1976, is quoted verbatim as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present appeal should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED, with costs against plaintiff-appellant Concepcion Macabingkil.

Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Aquino, JJ., concur

Ratio

The Inviolability of the Finality of Judgments: A final and executory judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is res judicata, binding upon the parties and the privies of the parties, and can no longer be relitigated on the merits in any subsequent proceeding [1059, 1060]. The Supreme Court of the Philippines emphasized that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law, as the very object for which courts were instituted is to put an end to controversies [1059].
The Three (3) Exclusive Methods to Set Aside a Final Judgment: Under the Philippine rules of civil procedure, there are only three (3) distinct ways by which a final and executory judgment may be validly set aside, namely:
- 1. A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court: This remedy is available when a judgment is taken against a party through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, and not more than six (6) months after the judgment was entered [1059].
- 2. A direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment: This remedy is equitable in character and presupposes that the challenged judgment is entirely regular in form but is infected with actual and extrinsic fraud [1059].
- 3. A direct or collateral attack on the ground of nullity: This remedy is available only when the challenged judgment is void upon the face of the record, or when the lack of jurisdiction of the court is apparent by the own recitals of the judgment [1059].
The Strict Definition of Extrinsic Fraud (The Macabingkil Doctrine): Extrinsic or collateral fraud, which is the only species of fraud that can serve as a valid legal basis to annul a final judgment or to reopen a decree of registration under the Torrens system, refers to any fraudulent scheme executed by the prevailing litigant outside the trial of the case against the defeated party, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully and fairly presenting the case to the court [148, 1059, 1060]. Extrinsic fraud includes situations where the unsuccessful party is kept in ignorance of the suit by the acts of the plaintiff, or is kept away from court by a false promise of a compromise, showing that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case [1059]. In contrast, intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts committed during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which do not prevent the adverse party from participating in the proceedings [148, 1059].
The Jurisdictional Character of Appeal Timelines: The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional [1056]. The failure of a party to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary period under the Rules of Court renders the judgment final and executory, thereby completely divesting the appellate court of jurisdiction to review or alter the decision [1056].
The Estoppel by Compromise Principle: A party cannot, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a compromise agreement and subsequently repudiate the aspects of the compromise that do not suit the party [1061]. Since Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil accepted the re-award of Lot No. 15 under Board Resolution No. 430 and entered into a purchase agreement over said lot as part of a compromise in Civil Case No. Q-5411, Petitioner Concepcion Macabingkil is heavily estopped from subsequently seeking the enforcement of Board Resolution No. 550 over Lot No. 27 [1061].

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

The Rule on the Immutability of Final Judgments: Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved, and the court's judicial function ends, preventing any subsequent relitigation of the merits of the case [1059].
The Extrinsic Fraud Standard (Macabingkil Rule): Only actual and extrinsic fraud—defined as a fraudulent scheme perpetrated outside the trial that prevents a party from presenting the case to the court—can justify the annulment of a final judgment or the reopening of a decree of registration under the Torrens system [1059, 1060].
The Strict Jurisdictional Timeline Rule: The fifteen-day period to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 1 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is non-extendible and jurisdictional; a late filing renders the judgment immutable and prevents the Supreme Court of the Philippines from assuming jurisdiction over the appeal [1056].

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

The Collateral Attack Prohibition: A final and executory judgment that is regular on the face of the record cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent ordinary civil action [1060]. The validity of such judgment can only be assailed through a direct action for annulment filed in accordance with the rules of procedure [1060].
The Innocent Purchaser Exception: Although a decree of registration or a final judgment may be reopened or annulled on the ground of actual and extrinsic fraud, this remedy cannot be entertained if the property has already passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith, whose rights cannot be prejudiced [1032, 1059].

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification of Relationship: ANALOGOUS [148, 1059, 1060].
Integration: The case of Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp. is an analogous and highly illustrative authority on Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (former Section 38 of Act No. 496) because the decision establishes the definitive standard for what constitutes actual and extrinsic fraud under Philippine law [148, 1059, 1060]. The decision clarifies that both the reopening of a decree of registration under Section 32 and the annulment of a final judgment in ordinary civil actions are extraordinary equitable remedies that require proof of actual, positive, and extrinsic fraud [1059, 1060]. By adopting the classic Miller doctrine from American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of the Philippines established that extrinsic fraud must consist of deliberate, fraudulent acts committed outside the trial of the case that prevent the aggrieved party from having a real contest or presenting the case fully to the court [1059]. This standard serves as the foundational test used by land registration courts to determine whether a petition for review of a registration decree under Section 32 should be granted, ensuring that final titles are protected from frivolous challenges while safeguarding the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process [104, 1059, 1060].

Separate Opinions

NOT APPLICABLE / NOT IN RECORD. (The decision was rendered unanimously by the Second Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, with Associate Justice Felix Q. Antonio as the ponente, and with Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Felix V. Makasiar, Ramon C. Aquino, and Ruperto G. Martin concurring, and with Associate Justice Julio D. Barredo taking no part, and with no separate concurring or dissenting opinions filed) [1062].