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CMS Logging, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

a. Revocation by the principal (Arts. 1920, 1925) — Implied revocation (Arts. 1923-1924, 1926)
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Title

CMS Logging, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. L-41420 July 10, 1992

A log exporter discovered its selling agent had been taking a secret extra commission from the Japanese buyers, and began selling to them directly. The Court let the exporter recover the concealed profits and held the agency impliedly revoked — so no commissions were owed on the direct sales.

Core Doctrine

An agency is impliedly revoked under Article 1924 when the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent and deals directly with third persons; no commission is due on transactions the principal concludes himself thereafter. An agent who secretly profits from the agency violates his fiduciary duty and must account to the principal for the concealed gain.

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-41420)

Case DigestWeek 6 - Extinguishment of Agency

CMS Logging, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-41420 · July 10, 1992 · Supreme Court

a. Revocation by the principal (Arts. 1920, 1925) — Implied revocation (Arts. 1923-1924, 1926)

Petitioner: CMS Logging, Inc.Respondent: Court of Appeals and D.R. Aguinaldo Corporation
Gist

A log exporter discovered its selling agent had been taking a secret extra commission from the Japanese buyers, and began selling to them directly. The Court let the exporter recover the concealed profits and held the agency impliedly revoked — so no commissions were owed on the direct sales.

Core Doctrine

An agency is impliedly revoked under Article 1924 when the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent and deals directly with third persons; no commission is due on transactions the principal concludes himself thereafter. An agent who secretly profits from the agency violates his fiduciary duty and must account to the principal for the concealed gain.

Facts

  • Petitioner CMS Logging, Inc. was engaged in the logging business.
  • It entered into an exclusive agency agreement with respondent D.R. Aguinaldo Corporation (DRACOR) (the agent), under which DRACOR was constituted CMS' exclusive export and sales agent for its logs, principally to buyers in Japan (the third persons), for a commission of 5% of the gross sales — CMS itself being the principal.
  • In the course of the arrangement, CMS discovered that DRACOR had been receiving an additional undisclosed commission — a further amount from the Japanese buyers (through a related entity, Shinko Trading Co.) on the very same shipments — over and above the 5% it was collecting from CMS.
  • This was never disclosed to, nor consented to by, CMS. (The agent was therefore being paid by both sides of the same shipments, without the principal's knowledge — the classic breach of the agent's duty of loyalty.)
  • Upon learning of it, CMS began selling its logs directly to the Japanese buyers, bypassing DRACOR entirely.
  • CMS then sued DRACOR to recover the secret commissions.
  • DRACOR counterclaimed for its 5% commission on the logs CMS had sold directly, arguing that the exclusive agency remained in force.
  • Trial court and Court of Appeals — substantially against CMS. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled substantially against CMS on the secret-commission claim and in DRACOR's favour on the counterclaim.

Issue

  1. Whether DRACOR must account to CMS for the additional commissions it received from the buyers.
  2. Whether DRACOR is entitled to its 5% commission on the logs CMS sold directly to the Japanese buyers.

Ruling

  1. Yes — an agent must account for any secret profit derived from the agency.
  2. No. The agency was impliedly revoked when CMS began dealing directly with the buyers, and no commission is due on those direct sales.

Ratio

1. The Agent's Fiduciary Duty Bars Secret Profits
  • Agency is a fiduciary relation.
  • The agent must act for the principal's benefit alone and may not, without full disclosure and consent, derive any profit or advantage from the transaction beyond his stipulated compensation.
  • Article 1891§ obliges the agent to account for all he receives by virtue of the agency, even what is not owing to the principal.
  • DRACOR's arrangement to collect an additional commission from the very buyers with whom it was negotiating on CMS' behalf placed it in a position of conflict and was concealed from its principal.
  • It must therefore turn over the secret commissions.
2. Article 1924§ — Implied Revocation
  • Article 1924§ provides:
The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
  • CMS did exactly that.
  • Having discovered the betrayal, it took over the marketing of its own logs and transacted directly with the Japanese buyers.
  • From that moment the agency was revoked by operation of law§ — no formal notice or express act of revocation was required, the principal's conduct itself being the revocation.
3. No Commission on the Principal's Own Sales
  • It follows that DRACOR cannot claim commissions on shipments CMS negotiated and concluded by itself.
  • Commission is the price of the agent's service; where the agency has been revoked and the agent rendered no service in the transaction, no commission is earned.
  • To hold otherwise would let the agent profit from a relationship its own misconduct destroyed.
4. The Exclusivity Clause Does Not Survive Revocation
  • That the agreement was styled "exclusive" did not make it irrevocable.
  • Exclusivity governs the parties' obligations while the agency subsists.
  • It does not convert a revocable agency into a perpetual entitlement to commissions.

Doctrine

  • Article 1924§ — revocation by direct management. An agency is impliedly revoked when the principal himself manages the business entrusted to the agent and deals directly with third persons. No formal revocation is needed; the conduct is the revocation.
  • No commission after revocation. The agent earns nothing on transactions the principal concludes himself once the agency has been revoked.
  • Fiduciary duty and secret profits. An agent may not derive an undisclosed benefit from the agency. Under Article 1891§ he must account for and deliver everything received by virtue of it, and any stipulation exempting him from that duty is void.
  • Exclusivity ≠ irrevocability. An "exclusive" agency is still revocable unless coupled with an interest.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 1924, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title X (Agency), Chapter 4 (Modes of Extinguishment of Agency)

The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons. (n)

Why it is cited here

Implied revocation by conduct: "The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons."

No notice, no document, no declaration — the revocation follows from what the principal does. Taking the business back into his own hands is inconsistent with someone else still representing him in it, so the law reads the conduct as the decision.

Two consequences follow for this case. Once the principal is dealing directly with the buyers, the agency is over, and no commission is due on transactions he concludes himself thereafter. And because the revocation is implied from conduct rather than announced, the agent cannot complain of not having been told: the very acts that ended the agency were ones he could see.

Compare Article 1923, where appointing a new agent revokes the old one only "from the day on which notice thereof was given." Substituting one agent for another is ambiguous — the principal might mean to use both — so notice is required. Taking the work back oneself is not ambiguous at all.

Civil Code

Article 1891, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title X (Agency), Chapter 2 (Obligations of the Agent)

Every agent is bound to render an account of his transactions and to deliver to the principal whatever he may have received by virtue of the agency, even though it may not be owing to the principal.

Every stipulation exempting the agent from the obligation to render an account shall be void. (1720a)

Why it is cited here

The fiduciary duty the agent breached, and it is drafted in unusually strong terms.

"Every agent is bound to render an account of his transactions and to deliver to the principal whatever he may have received by virtue of the agency, even though it may not be owing to the principal." And: "Every stipulation exempting the agent from the obligation to render an account shall be void."

Read the italicised idea twice: whatever was received by virtue of the agency goes to the principal, whether or not the principal was entitled to it. That is what disposes of the agent's secret profit. He cannot argue that the principal had no claim to that particular money, because the article does not ask whether the principal was owed it — only whether the agent got it through the agency.

And the duty cannot be bargained away, which is what marks it as fiduciary rather than merely contractual. An agent who secretly profits from his position must account for the profit.

Civil Code

Article 1920, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title X (Agency), Chapter 4 (Modes of Extinguishment of Agency)

The principal may revoke the agency at will, and compel the agent to return the document evidencing the agency. Such revocation may be express or implied. (1733a)

Why it is cited here

The background right: the principal "may revoke the agency at will."

It explains why implied revocation raises no difficulty of principle. If the principal could have revoked expressly at any moment and for no reason, there is nothing troubling about the law treating conduct plainly inconsistent with the agency as having done the same thing. Article 1924 does not create a new power; it recognises an existing one being exercised silently.

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/jul1992/gr_41420_1992.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article 1924, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title X (Agency), Chapter 4 (Modes of Extinguishment of Agency)

The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons. (n)

Why it is cited here

Implied revocation by conduct: "The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons."

No notice, no document, no declaration — the revocation follows from what the principal does. Taking the business back into his own hands is inconsistent with someone else still representing him in it, so the law reads the conduct as the decision.

Two consequences follow for this case. Once the principal is dealing directly with the buyers, the agency is over, and no commission is due on transactions he concludes himself thereafter. And because the revocation is implied from conduct rather than announced, the agent cannot complain of not having been told: the very acts that ended the agency were ones he could see.

Compare Article 1923, where appointing a new agent revokes the old one only "from the day on which notice thereof was given." Substituting one agent for another is ambiguous — the principal might mean to use both — so notice is required. Taking the work back oneself is not ambiguous at all.

Full entry below ↓

Article 1891, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title X (Agency), Chapter 2 (Obligations of the Agent)

Every agent is bound to render an account of his transactions and to deliver to the principal whatever he may have received by virtue of the agency, even though it may not be owing to the principal.

Every stipulation exempting the agent from the obligation to render an account shall be void. (1720a)

Why it is cited here

The fiduciary duty the agent breached, and it is drafted in unusually strong terms.

"Every agent is bound to render an account of his transactions and to deliver to the principal whatever he may have received by virtue of the agency, even though it may not be owing to the principal." And: "Every stipulation exempting the agent from the obligation to render an account shall be void."

Read the italicised idea twice: whatever was received by virtue of the agency goes to the principal, whether or not the principal was entitled to it. That is what disposes of the agent's secret profit. He cannot argue that the principal had no claim to that particular money, because the article does not ask whether the principal was owed it — only whether the agent got it through the agency.

And the duty cannot be bargained away, which is what marks it as fiduciary rather than merely contractual. An agent who secretly profits from his position must account for the profit.

Full entry below ↓

Article 1920, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title X (Agency), Chapter 4 (Modes of Extinguishment of Agency)

The principal may revoke the agency at will, and compel the agent to return the document evidencing the agency. Such revocation may be express or implied. (1733a)

Why it is cited here

The background right: the principal "may revoke the agency at will."

It explains why implied revocation raises no difficulty of principle. If the principal could have revoked expressly at any moment and for no reason, there is nothing troubling about the law treating conduct plainly inconsistent with the agency as having done the same thing. Article 1924 does not create a new power; it recognises an existing one being exercised silently.

Full entry below ↓