Facts

• On September 23, 1993 Susan V. Llenes, Education Supervisor II of the DECS Region VII Regional Office in Cebu City, allegedly committed grave oral defamation against Vivian G. Ginete, then Officer-in-Charge of the PESS Division of the same office.
• On October 13, 1993 — twenty (20) days later — Ginete filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. Llenes was required to file a counter-affidavit and failed to do so. Those twenty days are all that ever ran.
• On March 15, 1994 Graft Investigation Officer Antonio B. Yap recommended endorsement to the City Prosecutor of Cebu, and the Deputy Ombudsman approved it.
• On March 28, 1994 the City Prosecutor filed the Information in the MTC of Cebu City, Branch 7 (Crim. Case No. 35684-R) — 186 days (six months and six days) after the utterance.
• On May 30, 1994 Llenes moved to quash on prescription under Articles 90 and 91§: the 180-day period for grave oral defamation had lapsed, and under Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. only a court filing halts the period.
• On July 18, 1994 Judge Amado B. Bajarias, Sr. denied the motion, the Ombudsman filing being "equivalent to filing a complaint with the prosecutor's office" under Section 1, Rule 110§; reconsideration denied November 29, 1994.
• On July 3, 1995 the RTC of Cebu, Branch 11, through Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, affirmed on certiorari, holding the denial interlocutory and finding no grave abuse; reconsideration denied August 23, 1995.
• On July 31, 1996 the Court En Banc dismissed her Rule 65 petition.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court began by settling an old conflict in its own jurisprudence. One line (Tayco, Del Rosario, Coquia) held that only a filing in a court with jurisdiction to try the merits interrupts prescription; the other, that a filing even for preliminary examination suffices. The second People v. Olarte resolved it "once and for all."
• Olarte's three reasons are quoted in full: first, Article 91§ says prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether filed for preliminary examination or "for action on the merits"; second, even a court that may only investigate, "its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender"; third, "it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control."
• Francisco v. Court of Appeals extended this to the fiscal's office, criminal prosecution in chartered cities and provinces being generally initiated there, and those proceedings being capable of terminating without conviction or acquittal if no prima facie case is shown.
• The doctrine is now codified: The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.
• Zaldivia is then distinguished on both of its premises. It involved a municipal ordinance under the Rule on Summary Procedure, to which Section 1, Rule 110§ does not apply; and ordinances and special laws are governed by Act No. 3326, whose Section 2 makes the tolling event the "institution of judicial proceedings." Grave oral defamation being an RPC felony outside summary procedure, Zaldivia has no purchase.
• **On the Ombudsman's authority, the Court read Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770§ with Deloso v. Domingo: "The clause 'any [illegal] act or omission of any public official' is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act … It does not require that the act or omission be related to or … arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we."
• The equivalence follows: the Ombudsman being fully empowered to conduct preliminary investigations against public officers, a filing there "is legally equivalent to filing a complaint with the Provincial or City Prosecutor's office," so the October 13, 1993 complaint tolled the period and the March 28, 1994 Information was well within it.

Doctrine

• For Revised Penal Code offences not governed by summary procedure, prescription is interrupted by filing a complaint with the proper officer for preliminary investigation under Section 1, Rule 110§ and Article 91§.
• Ombudsman-filing equivalency: the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations against public officers "regardless of whether the crime is related to the performance of official duties," and a filing there is legally equivalent to one with the prosecutor.
• The Zaldivia rule is the exception, not the rule — confined to offences under the Rule on Summary Procedure and to ordinances and special laws under Act No. 3326, where only the "institution of judicial proceedings" tolls.

• Three categories fall outside the tolling rule, and only in them does a court filing become the sole tolling event:
  1. Violations of municipal or city ordinances.
  2. Offences under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
  3. Violations of special laws governed by Act No. 3326.
• That third category is where Corpus, Jr. v. People lives — and it is worth noting that Corpus, Jr.'s summary-procedure branch was later abandoned prospectively, while Llenes's RPC rule was never disturbed.
• Procedurally, the petition should have failed anyway: the denial of a motion to quash is interlocutory, and the accused must proceed to trial and, if convicted, raise the denial … as an error on appeal.
• And note the constitutional framing: prescription is substantive, and under Section 5(5), Article VIII rules of procedure "cannot diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" — which is why the tolling question is answered from Article 91§, with Rule 110§ merely codifying the answer.
• Read with Arambulo v. Laqui, which applies the same Olarte–Francisco line to a misdirected filing.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

• September 23, 1993: Petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the DECS Region VII Regional Office in Cebu City, allegedly commits the crime of grave oral defamation by directly uttering defamatory words in the presence of private respondent Vivian G. Ginete, who was then the Officer-in-Charge of the Physical Education and School Sports (PESS) Division of the same Regional Office.
• October 13, 1993: Private respondent Vivian G. Ginete files a formal complaint for grave oral defamation against petitioner Llenes with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas). Llenes is subsequently required to file a counter-affidavit pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, but she fails or neglects to do so.
• March 15, 1994: Antonio B. Yap, Graft Investigation Officer I of the Ombudsman-Visayas, issues a resolution recommending that the case be endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City for the filing of the necessary information against Llenes. This resolution is formally approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas.
• March 28, 1994: The City Prosecutor of Cebu City files an Information for grave oral defamation against Llenes with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cebu City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35684-R and assigned to Branch 7.
• May 30, 1994: Petitioner Llenes files a Motion to Quash the Information before the MTC on the ground that the "criminal action or liability" has been extinguished by prescription under Article 90 and Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code§. She contends that since the Information was filed in court only on March 28, 1994, which is 186 days (6 months and 6 days) after the alleged commission on September 23, 1993, the 180-day (6 months) statutory prescriptive period had already lapsed. She cites Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. to support her claim that only a court filing halts the prescriptive period.
• July 18, 1994: The MTC of Cebu City, Branch 7, through Presiding Judge Amado B. Bajarias, Sr., issues an Order denying the Motion to Quash, ruling that the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman-Visayas was equivalent to filing a complaint with the prosecutor's office under Section 1, Rule 110§, which interrupts the period of prescription.
• November 29, 1994: Public respondent Judge Bajarias issues an Order denying Llenes' Motion for Reconsideration.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Llenes files a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16988 and assigned to Branch 11.
• July 3, 1995: The RTC of Cebu, Branch 11, through Presiding Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, renders its Decision affirming the MTC's orders, ruling that the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion as the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman-Visayas successfully tolled the prescriptive period.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Llenes files a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's Decision.
• August 23, 1995: Judge Dicdican issues an Order denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
• Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Llenes files the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
• July 31, 1996: The Supreme Court En Banc promulgates its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Arguments of the Parties

• Facial Prescription of the Offense: The petitioner argued that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave oral defamation prescribes in 6 months. Read in conjunction with Article 13 of the Civil Code, which defines a "month" as 30 days, the prescriptive period is exactly 180 days. Since the offense was committed on September 23, 1993, and the Information was filed in the MTC only on March 28, 1994 (186 days later), the offense had already prescribed on its face.
• The Exclusivity of Judicial Interruptions: Relying on Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., she contended that the filing of a complaint with the prosecutor's office or any other administrative/investigative body does not halt the running of the prescriptive period. Only the "judicial proceeding"—meaning the actual filing of the complaint or Information with the proper court of competent jurisdiction having authority to try the case on the merits—interrupts the running of the period of prescription under Article 91§ of the RPC.
• No Statutory Equivalency: She argued that R.A. No. 6770§ (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) does not contain any provision stating that filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is equivalent to filing a complaint in court, and that Section 1, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court cannot override the statutory requirements of Act No. 3326.

• The Tolling Effect of Preliminary Investigations: The private respondent argued that under Section 1, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, for offenses not subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure, the institution of the criminal action—by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation—successfully interrupts the period of prescription.
• Equivalency of Ombudsman and Prosecutor Filing: She contended that the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Ombudsman-Visayas, is vested with the constitutional and statutory power under Section 13(1) of Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770§ to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases against public officers. Consequently, filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is legally equivalent to filing a complaint with the fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office under Section 1, Rule 110§, which tolls the prescriptive period.
• Inapplicability of the Zaldivia Summary Exception: She argued that Zaldivia is inapplicable because it involved a violation of a municipal ordinance covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, where the rules of procedure explicitly exclude the application of Section 1, Rule 110§, and where Act No. 3326 specifically requires "judicial proceedings" to toll the period of prescription.

• Factual Underpinnings of the Case: Both parties agreed on the exact date of the alleged defamatory utterance (September 23, 1993), the date the complaint was filed with the Ombudsman-Visayas (October 13, 1993), and the date the Information was filed with the MTC of Cebu City (March 28, 1994).

Issue

1. Whether the restrictive ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.—which holds that only a court filing halts the prescriptive period—applies to offenses governed by the Revised Penal Code that are not subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure.
2. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the concurrent authority to conduct preliminary investigations for public offenses committed by public officers that are not directly connected with or do not arise from the performance of their official duties.
3. Whether the order denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order that can be immediately assailed by a petition for certiorari.

Ruling

• MAIN ISSUE: YES. The filing of a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against a public officer for purposes of preliminary investigation successfully interrupts and suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
• SECONDARY ISSUES:
  1. NO. The ruling in Zaldivia is inapplicable to offenses governed by the Revised Penal Code that are not subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure. Such offenses are governed by the general rule under Section 1, Rule 110§ and the Olarte-Francisco doctrines.
  2. YES. The Office of the Ombudsman is vested with concurrent authority to conduct preliminary investigations over any illegal act or omission committed by a public officer or employee, regardless of whether the offense is connected with or arises from the performance of official duties.
  3. NO. An order denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and cannot be immediately assailed by a petition for certiorari. The proper remedy is for the accused to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defense, and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. Resolution of the Division Conflict and the Olarte Doctrine: The Court began by addressing the historical conflict in its jurisprudence regarding the tolling of prescriptive periods. One line of decisions (People v. Tayco, People v. Del Rosario, People v. Coquia) had previously held that only a filing in the proper court with jurisdiction to try the case on its merits could interrupt prescription. The other line held that a filing with the justice of the peace (or municipal court) even for preliminary examination or investigation purposes was sufficient. The Court emphasized that this conflict was resolved "once and for all" by the En Banc in the landmark second case of People vs. Olarte (19 SCRA 494), which laid down the "true doctrine" that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of criminal responsibility:

   "First, the text of Article 91§ of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint."

2. The Francisco Extension to Prosecutor Files: The Court further noted that in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals (122 SCRA 538), it broadened the scope of the Olarte doctrine by holding that the filing of a denuncia or complaint with the fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office for purposes of preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It quoted the reasoning of Justice Claudio Teehankee, who noted that in chartered cities and provinces, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal, whose actuations represent the initial step of the proceedings, and that the proceedings in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal if no prima facie case is shown.
3. Codification under Rule 110§, Section 1: This unified doctrine was formally codified in Section 1, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, which explicitly dictates:

   "The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."

   The Court held that since grave oral defamation is a felony under the Revised Penal Code and is not subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure, it is governed squarely by Section 1, Rule 110§, and the Olarte-Francisco doctrines.
4. Distinguishing Zaldivia: The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., declaring that her invocation was entirely misplaced. Zaldivia involved a violation of a municipal ordinance covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Under the explicit rules, Section 1, Rule 110§ does not apply to cases covered by summary procedure. Moreover, ordinances and violations of special laws are governed by Act No. 3326, where Section 2 explicitly mandates that the period of prescription is interrupted by the "institution of judicial proceedings" (meaning filing in court). Thus, in Zaldivia, the court filing was the sole tolling event. But because the present case involves a Revised Penal Code felony not subject to summary procedure, Zaldivia does not apply, and the filing of a complaint with the appropriate officer for preliminary investigation successfully tolls the period of prescription.
5. The Ombudsman's Shared/Concurrent Preliminary Investigation Jurisdiction: The Court analyzed the constitutional and statutory mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman under Sections 12 and 13(1) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770§. Section 15(1) empowers the Ombudsman to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." Citing Deloso vs. Domingo (191 SCRA 545), the Court held:

   "The clause 'any [illegal] act or omission of any public official' is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we."

   While this authority is concurrent with other investigative agencies of the government, the Ombudsman-Visayas had full, valid jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioner, who, as an Education Supervisor II of the DECS Regional Office, is a public officer.
6. Filing with the Ombudsman is Legally Equivalent to filing with the Prosecutor: Because the Office of the Ombudsman is fully empowered by the Constitution and law to initiate and conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases against public officers and employees, the Court concluded that the filing of a complaint with the Ombudsman for purposes of preliminary investigation is legally equivalent to filing a complaint with the Provincial or City Prosecutor's office under Section 1, Rule 110§. Consequently, the filing of the complaint by private respondent Ginete with the Ombudsman-Visayas on October 13, 1993, which was only 20 days after the commission on September 23, 1993, successfully tolled the prescriptive period of the offense. The filing of the Information on March 28, 1994, was therefore well within the six-month (180-day) prescriptive period.

Doctrine

• The Unified Prescription Interruption Rule: For criminal offenses covered by the Revised Penal Code that are not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted and suspended by the filing of a complaint with the proper officer (e.g. Provincial or City Prosecutor's office) for purposes of preliminary investigation under Section 1, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court and Article 91§ of the Revised Penal Code.
• Ombudsman-Filing Equivalency Rule: The Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases against public officers or employees, regardless of whether the crime is related to the performance of official duties. The filing of a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation is legally equivalent to a filing with the prosecutor's office, thereby halting the prescriptive period of the offense.
• The Zaldivia Exception: The rule in Zaldivia—that only a court filing halts prescription—is restricted to offenses covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and violations of special laws or municipal ordinances governed by Act No. 3326.

• The Summary Procedure and Act No. 3326 Exception: The rule that preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period does not apply to (1) violations of municipal or city ordinances, (2) offenses covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and (3) violations of special laws governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. In those specific instances, only the actual filing of the complaint or Information in court halts the prescriptive period.
• Arraignment as a Bar to Interlocutory Certiorari: An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and cannot be immediately appealed or assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The accused must proceed to trial and, if convicted, raise the denial of the motion to quash as an error on appeal.

Separate Opinions