De Lima v. Guerrero

9 — When Warrant of Arrest May Issue

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Title

De Lima v. Guerrero

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017

The doctrine has two limbs. On sequencing: Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 imposes a ten-day duty that a pending motion to quash does not suspend. "[T]he respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest," and since a motion to quash may be resolved "at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea," nothing was lost by taking the warrant question first — indeed, per Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller, "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused." On the content of the duty: evaluating "all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation" exceeds what Soliven demands, because that phrase "encompasses a broader category than the 'supporting evidence' required to be evaluated in Soliven."

Core Doctrine

Section 5(a) of Rule 112 gives the judge ten days from the filing of the information to "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence," and on that basis to dismiss, to issue a warrant, or to call for additional evidence. Two things follow. First, there is no duty to resolve a pending motion to quash first — "[t]here is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim," and a judge who waited "would have exposed herself to a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112." Second, the constitutionally required personal determination is a personal evaluation, not a personal examination: under Soliven v. Makasiar "the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses," but must "refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings." Under Ho v. People the judge "cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor" and "must decide independently," yet "it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge" — sufficient supporting documents suffice. The standard is probability, not certainty: the judge "merely determine[s] the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused," enjoys "wide latitude of discretion," and need not find evidence enough "to procure a conviction."

Case Digest (G.R. No. 229781)

Case DigestWeek 6 - Rule 112 - Preliminary Investigation

De Lima v. Guerrero

G.R. No. 229781 · October 10, 2017 · En Banc

9 — When Warrant of Arrest May Issue

Petitioner: Senator Leila M. De LimaRespondent: Hon. Juanita Guerrero, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, People of the Philippines, P/Dir. Gen. Ronald M. Dela Rosa, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police, PSupt. Philip Gil M. Philipps, in his capacity as Director, Headquarters Support Service, Supt. Arnel Jamandron Apud, in his capacity as Chief, PNP Custodial Service Unit, and all persons acting under their control, supervision, instruction or direction in relation to the orders that may be issued by the court

Gist

Core Doctrine

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

9. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue (Rule 112, Sec. 5[a]) Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/oct2017/gr_229781_2017.html Separate opinions: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/oct2017/gr_229781_so_2017.html

ℹ️ Same case as [De Lima v. Guerrero](/criminal-procedure/week-02/de-lima-v-guerrero) — a different holding

The sheet assigns this decision twice, for two different rulings. Week 2 takes the jurisdictional holding (R.A. 9165 §90 gives designated RTCs exclusive jurisdiction, so the Sandiganbayan has none despite her Salary Grade 31). This Week 6 digest takes the warrant holding — Rule 112 §5(a), which the Week 2 digest records only as ancillary. Read the jurisdiction ruling there; do not recite it as this week's point.

⚠️ Classified DIRECT — the decision has a captioned section on this exact question

The Decision carries the heading "RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST," and answers two questions squarely: whether a judge must resolve a pending motion to quash before issuing a warrant (she need not), and what personal determination of probable cause requires (personal evaluation of the resolution and its supporting evidence — not personal examination of the complainant).

Facts

An Information was filed in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, presided over by Judge Juanita Guerrero (Crim. Case No. 17-165), charging Senator Leila M. De Lima, formerly Secretary of Justice, with Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos and Ronnie Palisoc Dayan, for violation of Section 5 in relation to Sections 3(jj), 26(b) and 28 of R.A. No. 9165 — illegal drug trading at the New Bilibid Prison.
She filed a Motion to Quash grounded principally on the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the offence. It remained pending and unresolved. That pendency is the first half of the case.
The record held only the complainants' submissions. She "did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert" the prosecutors' findings. Those submissions were the Affidavit of NBI agent Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr. of 3 September 2016 (two deliveries of cash to her Parañaque residence on 24 November and 15 December 2012), the Affidavit of co-accused Ragos of 26 September 2016 (the same deliveries), and the statement of NBP inmate Peter Co that the money came from drug proceeds and was for her 2013 senatorial bid.
On 23 February 2017 the judge issued the assailed Order: "After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x." The warrant of the same date "contained no recommendation for bail."
On 24 February 2017 the PNP served the warrant, and the judge ordered her committed to the PNP Custodial Center.
On 27 February 2017 she filed her Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition; memoranda were filed 17 April 2017.
On 10 October 2017 the En Banc, through Justice Velasco, Jr., dismissed it. Eleven of the fifteen sitting members wrote separately, six voting to grant.

Issue

Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion — turning on (a) whether Section 5(a), Rule 112 obliged her to resolve the pending Motion to Quash first, and (b) whether she made the personal determination of probable cause the Constitution and Soliven require, her Order having recited evaluation of "all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation" rather than the prosecutor's report and supporting documents.

Secondary issues. Whether probable cause in fact existed, and whether the standard is probability or certainty.

Ancillary issues. Whether the evidence was inadmissible as coming from convicted felons and as hearsay, and whether provisional relief should issue.

Ruling

(a) NO DUTY TO RESOLVE THE MOTION FIRST. "In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim." On the contrary, Section 5(a) "required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days," so "had the respondent judge waited longer and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible administrative liability." A motion to quash may be resolved "at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea," and per Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller, "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused." Categorically: "there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest." Miranda v. Tuliao "does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused even pending a motion to quash the information. At most, it simply explains that an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law."

(b) THE DETERMINATION WAS MADE — the contention "hardly deserves serious consideration." Under Soliven, the judge "is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses," but shall (1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents or (2) if unsatisfied, require supporting affidavits. Here she evaluated the Information and "all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation," which exceeds the standard: "'All the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation' encompasses a broader category than the 'supporting evidence' required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may perhaps even be stated that respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her by the rules."

Secondary issues. PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED, AND THE TEST IS PROBABILITY. The judge determines "merely… the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused," with "wide latitude of discretion," and no inquiry "into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction." On the record, "All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in conspiracy by the petitioner and her co-accused."

Ancillary issues. THE OBJECTIONS FAIL AT THIS STAGE. Ramos v. Sandiganbayan held co-accused testimony "should be received with great caution, but not that they would not be considered"; and per Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Admissibility, weight and credibility are "best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial… nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest." Hence "the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence, have to be rejected."

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED."

Reproduced as published; "N6.17-165" is a typographical error for No. 17-165.

Ratio

The standard of review frames everything. "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law" — so the petitioner had to show an evaded positive duty.
Section 5(a)'s ten-day clock reverses her argument. The rule commands action, so delay is the risk, not haste — and deferring the motion prejudiced nothing, it being resolvable any time before plea.
Personal determination is evaluation, not examination, and it is required by the Constitution, not merely the Rules: the judge must "refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties."
The duty has a floor and a ceiling, both from Ho v. People. The floor: the judge "cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor," "must decide independently," and "must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report" — "a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer." The ceiling: "it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts… What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents… upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor."
The quantum, from Ho quoting Allado and Webb: "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested"; the judge "is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence," and "need not conduct a de novo hearing."
Applied, the record sufficed — the DOJ findings rested on Ablen, Ragos and Peter Co, and "the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this."

Doctrine

A pending motion to quash does not suspend the Section 5(a) duty — "there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest." Personal determination is not personal examination: the judge must personally evaluate the resolution and supporting evidence, need not examine the complainant (Soliven), and need not hold a de novo hearing (Webb). But he may not rubber-stamp — independent judgment on supporting evidence beyond the bare report is required (Ho). Yet he need not read the whole record — sufficient supporting documents suffice. Evaluating all the evidence over-complies. The test is probability, not certainty, with wide latitude. And hearsay and co-accused testimony are usable at this stage, "received with great caution," not excluded.

Limits. The over-compliance point is easy to state backwards. The complaint was that the Order recited the broader basis; the answer is that the broader basis includes the narrower. Do not recite this as authority that a judge must review all the preliminary-investigation evidence — Ho expressly says the complete record is not required. The holding is about sequencing, not the merits of the motion — the Court did not belittle jurisdictional objections; it held they need not come first, and then rejected the objection on its own terms in De Lima v. Guerrero (Week 2), which is where the jurisdictional ruling belongs. Nothing here validates the absent bail recommendation — the fact is recorded; the question was not assigned. And this limb drew targeted dissents: Justice Jardeleza would require the jurisdictional question settled "simultaneous with, if not prior to, the issuance of the warrant of arrest," and Justice Caguioa framed the same objection. Read with Hao v. People, which upholds a warrant on the judge's own evaluation, and against Mendoza v. People, the counter-pole where the failure to make an independent determination was fatal.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. Two days after an Information charging Senator Leila M. De Lima with illegal drug trading was set for evaluation, and with her Motion to Quash still pending and unresolved, Judge Juanita Guerrero issued a February 23, 2017 Order finding probable cause and directing that warrants of arrest issue; the warrant bore no recommendation for bail and she was committed to PNP custody the next day. She assailed the Order as grave abuse of discretion on two grounds — that the judge should have resolved the Motion to Quash first, and that the judge failed to determine probable cause personally because the Order recited that she had evaluated the evidence "presented during the preliminary investigation" rather than the prosecutor's report and supporting documents. Sitting En Banc, the Court held there was no grave abuse of discretion and dismissed the petition.

Facts

An Information was filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, presided over by respondent Judge Juanita Guerrero, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-165, charging petitioner Leila M. De Lima — then a Senator, formerly Secretary of Justice — together with Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos and Ronnie Palisoc Dayan, with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165," for illegal drug trading at the New Bilibid Prison.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, grounded principally on the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the offence. It remained pending and unresolved.
The evidence on record consisted only of the complainants' submissions. Petitioner "did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert" the prosecutors' findings. That evidence included the Affidavit of NBI agent Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr. dated September 3, 2016 (describing two deliveries of cash to petitioner's Parañaque residence on November 24, 2012 and December 15, 2012), the Affidavit of co-accused Rafael Ragos dated September 26, 2016 (describing the same deliveries), and the statement of NBP inmate Peter Co (that the money came from proceeds of illegal drugs and was for petitioner's 2013 senatorial bid).
On February 23, 2017, the respondent judge issued the assailed Order, which found: "After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x," and directed: "WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the abovementioned accused." The Warrant of Arrest of the same date "contained no recommendation for bail."
On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest, and the respondent judge issued an Order committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
On February 27, 2017, petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, assailing the February 23, 2017 Order, the Warrant of Arrest and the February 24, 2017 Order, and praying for provisional relief.
On April 17, 2017, "[t]he parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda."
On October 10, 2017, the Court En Banc, through Justice Velasco, Jr., dismissed the petition. Eleven of the fifteen sitting members wrote separately, six of them voting to grant.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Senator Leila M. De Lima).

Her attack on the Order was, in the Court's words, "two-pronged: respondent judge should have first resolved the pending Motion to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no probable cause to justify the petitioner's arrest."

On sequencing, she urged that a judge put on notice of a jurisdictional objection must settle her own competence before touching the accused's liberty, invoking Miranda v. Tuliao.

On personal determination, she contended that "the language of the February 23, 2017 Order violated her constitutional rights and is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v. Makasiar," maintaining that "respondent judge failed to personally determine the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the assailed Order, respondent judge based her findings on the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and not on the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor."

She "would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is inadmissible, provided as they were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons and whose testimonies are but hearsay evidence," relying on Ramos v. Sandiganbayan.

B. Respondents (Judge Guerrero; the People; the PNP officers).

That "the first and foremost task of the judge is to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused," and that [t]he Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a judge to resolve a pending motion to quash prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. (As framed in Justice Jardeleza's dissent.)

C. Common Ground.

It was not disputed that the Motion to Quash was pending and unresolved when the warrant issued; that the Order recited an evaluation of "the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation"; that the judge did not personally examine the complainants or their witnesses; or that petitioner filed no counter-affidavit, so that the only evidence on record was the complainants'. Nor was it disputed that the warrant carried no bail recommendation.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the February 23, 2017 Order and the warrant of arrest — which turns on (a) whether Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 obliged her to resolve the pending Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant, and (b) whether she made the personal determination of probable cause that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Soliven require, given that she evaluated the Information and "all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation."

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether probable cause in fact existed on the record to justify the arrest; and whether the standard at this stage is the probability or the certainty of guilt.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Whether the prosecution's evidence was inadmissible as coming from convicted felons and as hearsay; and whether the provisional reliefs should issue. (The petition's jurisdictional and procedural branches — hierarchy of courts, prematurity, forum shopping, and whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction — are the subject of De Lima v. Guerrero.)

Ruling

Main Issue (a) — NO duty to resolve the Motion to Quash first. "In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim." On the contrary, "Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days." Hence: "It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court." Her discretion "was sound and in conformity with the provisions of the Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a trial court judge, at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea," and it accorded with Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller. The Court concluded: "Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest." And: "There is certainly no indication that respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in finding probable cause to issue the petitioner's arrest."

Miranda v. Tuliao does not help the petitioner. "Miranda does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused even pending a motion to quash the information. At most, it simply explains that an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law."

Main Issue (b) — the personal determination was made; the contention "hardly deserves serious consideration." "Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before a warrant of arrest may issue." But under Soliven, "the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses"; he shall "(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal … or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses." Here, "in determining the probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and 'all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case.'" That is more than the rule asks: "'All the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation' encompasses a broader category than the 'supporting evidence' required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may perhaps even be stated that respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents. At the very least, she certainly discharged a judge's duty in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, as described in Ho v. People." Accordingly, "this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to have evaded her duty or refused to perform her obligation to satisfy herself that substantial basis exists for the petitioner's arrest."

Secondary Issues — probable cause existed, and the test is probability. "[T]he judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused," is "given wide latitude of discretion," and "[a] finding of probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged." On the record — the DOJ findings supported by the Ablen, Ragos and Peter Co statements, and no counter-affidavit — "All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in conspiracy by the petitioner and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the allegation that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order for petitioner's arrest."

Ancillary Issues — the evidence objection fails at this stage. "Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan … did this Court rule that testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held that said testimonies should be received with great caution, but not that they would not be considered." Per Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Hence "the admissibility of evidence, their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the credibility of the witness are matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial, not during a preliminary investigation where the technical rules of evidence are not applied nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest." "With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence, have to be rejected."

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED."

Reproduced as published; "N6.17-165" is a typographical error for No. 17-165.

Ratio

The standard of review is set first. "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law." The petitioner therefore had to show an evaded positive duty — which frames the whole analysis.
The rule is quoted in full, and its ten-day clock is the reason the warrant came first. Sec. 5(a), Rule 112: "Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information."
The duty runs the other way from what the petitioner argued. Because the rule commands action within ten days, delay is the risk, not haste: "had the respondent judge waited longer and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112." Nor does deferring the motion prejudice the accused, since a motion to quash may be resolved "at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea" (Sec. 1, Rule 117).
Precedent puts the probable-cause determination first in order of business. Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller: "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused." The rule announced is categorical and expressly covers jurisdictional motions: "there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest."
Miranda v. Tuliao is confined to its own point. It "does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused even pending a motion to quash the information. At most, it simply explains that an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law." (This is why the Week 2 custody-of-the-law line and this week's warrant line do not collide.)
Personal determination is required — by the Constitution, not merely the Rules. The Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties."
But personal determination is evaluation, not examination. Soliven v. Makasiar: "What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause."
What the judge did here exceeded the standard. "'All the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation' encompasses a broader category than the 'supporting evidence' required to be evaluated in Soliven." So the recital petitioner attacked was in fact proof of over-compliance: she "performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents."
The floor and the ceiling of the duty, from Ho v. People. The floor: "the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest… However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings… This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer." The ceiling: "it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor." Ho also records the practical suggestion that the prosecutor forward "not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand."
The quantum, from Ho quoting Allado and Webb. "Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested." The judge "'must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof'"; "[a]t this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause." Per Webb v. De Leon, "the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
Applied, the record sufficed. The DOJ's findings were supported by the affidavits and testimonies of Ablen, Ragos and Peter Co, and "the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this. Thus, there is nothing to disprove the … preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors."
Evidentiary objections do not belong at this stage. Hearsay is admissible in determining probable cause, "because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights"; and admissibility, weight, probative value and credibility are "best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial … nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

A pending motion to quash does not suspend the Sec. 5(a) duty.

"[T]here is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest." The judge's first business upon the filing of the Information is the probable-cause determination (Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller), and the motion can still be resolved any time before plea.

Personal determination ≠ personal examination.

The judge must personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence; he "is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses" (Soliven), and "need not conduct a de novo hearing" (Webb).

But he may not rubber-stamp.

He must "refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings," "must decide independently," and "must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report"; "a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer" (Ho).

Yet he need not read the whole record.

"[I]t is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge" — sufficient supporting documents are enough to make an independent judgment or at least to verify the prosecutor's findings (Ho).

Evaluating all the evidence over-complies.

"All the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation" is "a broader category than the 'supporting evidence' required to be evaluated in Soliven."
The test is probability, not certainty, with "wide latitude of discretion" in the judge, and no inquiry "into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction."
Hearsay and co-accused testimony are usable at this stage — "received with great caution," not excluded (Ramos); "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay" (Estrada).

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The over-compliance point is easy to state backwards. Petitioner's complaint was that the Order recited the wrong, broader basis; the Court answered that the broader basis includes the narrower one. Do not recite this as authority that a judge must review all the preliminary-investigation evidence — Ho expressly says the complete record is not required.
Two poles in one cluster. Read this case with Mendoza v. People and Hao v. People: Hao upholds a warrant on the judge's own evaluation, and this case does the same on an even fuller record, while Mendoza is the counter-pole where the judge's failure to make an independent judicial determination was fatal. The Ho passage quoted here is the standard all three are measured against.
The holding is about sequencing, not about the merits of the motion to quash. The Court did not say jurisdictional objections are unimportant; it said they need not be resolved first. It went on to reject the jurisdictional objection on its own terms — see De Lima v. Guerrero.
Nothing here validates the absence of a bail recommendation. The digest records that the warrant "contained no recommendation for bail" as a fact; the ponencia resolves the petition on the grounds above and the bail question was not the assigned issue.
This limb of the ruling drew a dissent aimed squarely at it. See Section VII: Justice Jardeleza would require the jurisdictional question to be settled "simultaneous with, if not prior to, the issuance of the warrant of arrest," and Justice Caguioa framed the same objection. The majority's rule is the doctrine; the dissents show precisely where it is contested.
Verbatim caveats: the fallo prints "Criminal Case N6.17-165" for No. 17-165; the reported text also carries "infonnation", "n1ling", "PS million"/"PIO Million" (for ₱5 million and ₱10 million), "Section 3Gj)"/"3(W" (for §3[jj]), and "suf ficient" broken across a page.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Decision devotes a captioned section to this precise question and decides it as a matter of Sec. 5(a), Rule 112.
For the subtopic the case contributes two rules that sit at the front of the analysis: when the judge must act (within ten days, and before or without regard to a pending motion to quash, including a jurisdictional one), and what acting requires (personal evaluation of the resolution and its supporting evidence — the Soliven/Ho standard, with its floor of independent judgment and its ceiling of not having to read the whole record).
Within the Week 6 cluster it pairs naturally with Hao vs. People (warrant upheld on the judge's own evaluation; executive versus judicial probable cause) and stands against Mendoza vs. People (the judge who failed to determine probable cause independently).
Its treatment of hearsay at the probable-cause stage connects to Estrada vs. Ombudsman (2015), which it quotes. And its reading of Miranda v. Tuliao is the bridge back to Week 2's jurisdiction-over-the-person material — Miranda concerns an accused's standing to seek relief before custody, not a limit on the court's power to order an arrest.

Separate Opinions

Eleven of the fifteen sitting members wrote separately, and six voted to grant the petition — a 9–6 decision. Titles are taken from the opinions themselves (gr_229781_so_2017.html).

Dissenting Opinions — Sereno, C.J.; Carpio, J.; Leonen, J.; Jardeleza, J.; Caguioa, J.; and Perlas-Bernabe, J. (hers is titled "Dissenting Opinion" in the document and indexed by lawphil as a "Separate Concurring & Dissenting Opinion"; she concurs that the Information charges Illegal Drug Trading but "vote[s] to GRANT the petition" on jurisdiction).

Concurring Opinions — Leonardo-De Castro, J. and Martires, J. (whose vote of concurrence was certified as left with the Chief Justice). Separate Opinion — Peralta, J. Separate Concurring Opinions — Del Castillo, J. and Tijam, J. Justices Bersamin, Reyes and Gesmundo concurred without writing.

On this week's issue specifically, the sharpest dissent is Justice Jardeleza's. He frames it exactly as the assigned subtopic does — "When a judge is put on alert, through a motion to quash filed by the accused challenging her jurisdiction over the offense charged, she must first resolve the issue of jurisdiction before issuing a warrant of arrest," against the respondents' position that [t]he Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a judge to resolve a pending motion to quash prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. His conclusion: I respectfully dissent. While I do not fully subscribe to petitioner's analysis, I find that, under the present Rules, the demands of due process require the judge to resolve the issue of jurisdiction simultaneous with, if not prior to, the issuance of the warrant of arrest. He votes "to grant the petition," reasoning that where the information was filed in a court without jurisdiction, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.

Justice Caguioa put the same objection as a question: Can a trial judge, when called upon to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, simply ignore the accused's motion to quash the Information raising lack of jurisdiction — on the expedient pretext that the rules of procedure are … ? Justice Leonen would hold that "Respondent Regional Trial Court could not have cured its lack of jurisdiction over the offense by issuing a warrant of arrest," and that [h]aving failed to determine probable cause as required by the Constitution, her issuance of the warrant of arrest was likewise arbitrary. Justice Carpio would hold it impossible for the presiding judge to determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest where the Information does not allege any of the essential elements of the offense. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, concurring, works through Rule 112, Sec. 5(a) at length and reads the judge's action as "only in compliance" with it.

⚠️ Note on lawphil’s signature-page transcription

The signature block on the main Decision page places "See Separate Concurring & Dissenting Opinion" beside Bersamin, J. and leaves Jardeleza, J. and Perlas-Bernabe, J. unannotated. That does not match the opinions themselves: there is no Bersamin opinion in the document, while Jardeleza and Perlas-Bernabe each filed one titled "Dissenting Opinion." The annotations appear shifted in transcription — the opinion titles and lawphil's own opinion index are the reliable source, and both agree.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court

Petition for certiorari

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 65 (Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus)

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

The standard the petitioner had to meet, defined before anything else.

Certiorari lies where a tribunal "acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

"Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law."

Read that definition closely, because it is far narrower than "error." It describes a refusal to exercise judgment, not a judgment one disagrees with — which is why petitions attacking a judge's probable-cause finding on its merits almost always fail.

Implementing Rules

Section 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court

When warrant of arrest may issue

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 112 (Preliminary Investigation)

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule. If the findings and recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. — A warrant of arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the municipal trial court in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or if the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized by fine only. The court shall then proceed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. (6a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The act complained of, and the duty it imposes.

Within ten days from the filing of the information the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence, and may dismiss, issue a warrant of arrest, or require additional evidence.

A judge who evaluates and issues a warrant has exercised the discretion the section confers. Whether he weighed the record correctly is not the certiorari question.

To succeed, a petitioner must show the judge did not evaluate at all — issued the warrant mechanically, or on a record that could not conceivably support it. That is the "virtual refusal to act" the standard describes.

Constitution

Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution

Bill of Rights

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III (Bill of Rights)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Why it is cited here

The constitutional duty whose breach would qualify.

"No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

This supplies the "positive duty" the grave-abuse formula refers to. A judge who issues a warrant without personally determining probable cause has evaded a duty the Constitution imposes on him by name.

So the two provisions interlock: Article III, Section 2 creates the duty; Rule 65 supplies the remedy when it is evaded.

Compare Hao v. People, where the order's articulation showed actual weighing and the challenge failed — the same standard, applied to a record that satisfied it.

Related notes:

De Lima v. Guerrero — the same decision on its jurisdictional holding (R.A. 9165 §90; no Sandiganbayan jurisdiction).
Hao v. People — warrant upheld on the judge's own evaluation; executive versus judicial probable cause.
Mendoza v. People — the counter-pole: failure to make an independent judicial determination.
Estrada v. Ombudsman — the hearsay-at-preliminary-investigation holding quoted here.
Miranda v. Tuliao — custody of the law versus jurisdiction over the person, and why it does not bar an arrest order.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/oct2017/gr_229781_2017.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Petition for certiorari

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 65 (Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus)

Why it is cited here

The standard the petitioner had to meet, defined before anything else.

"Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law."

Full entry below ↓

Section 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

When warrant of arrest may issue

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 112 (Preliminary Investigation)

Why it is cited here

The act complained of, and the duty it imposes.

A judge who evaluates and issues a warrant has exercised the discretion the section confers. Whether he weighed the record correctly is not the certiorari question.

Full entry below ↓

Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution

Constitution

Bill of Rights

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III (Bill of Rights)

Why it is cited here

The constitutional duty whose breach would qualify.

So the two provisions interlock: Article III, Section 2 creates the duty; Rule 65 supplies the remedy when it is evaded.

Compare Hao v. People, where the order's articulation showed actual weighing and the challenge failed — the same standard, applied to a record that satisfied it.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

ℹ️ Same case as [De Lima v. Guerrero](/criminal-procedure/week-02/de-lima-v-guerrero) — a different holding

⚠️ Classified DIRECT — the decision has a captioned section on this exact question

Facts

An Information was filed in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, presided over by Judge Juanita Guerrero (Crim. Case No. 17-165), charging Senator Leila M. De Lima, formerly Secretary of Justice, with Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos and Ronnie Palisoc Dayan, for violation of Section 5 in relation to Sections 3(jj), 26(b) and 28 of R.A. No. 9165 — illegal drug trading at the New Bilibid Prison.
She filed a Motion to Quash grounded principally on the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the offence. It remained pending and unresolved. That pendency is the first half of the case.
The record held only the complainants' submissions. She "did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert" the prosecutors' findings. Those submissions were the Affidavit of NBI agent Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr. of 3 September 2016 (two deliveries of cash to her Parañaque residence on 24 November and 15 December 2012), the Affidavit of co-accused Ragos of 26 September 2016 (the same deliveries), and the statement of NBP inmate Peter Co that the money came from drug proceeds and was for her 2013 senatorial bid.
On 23 February 2017 the judge issued the assailed Order: "After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x." The warrant of the same date "contained no recommendation for bail."
On 24 February 2017 the PNP served the warrant, and the judge ordered her committed to the PNP Custodial Center.
On 27 February 2017 she filed her Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition; memoranda were filed 17 April 2017.
On 10 October 2017 the En Banc, through Justice Velasco, Jr., dismissed it. Eleven of the fifteen sitting members wrote separately, six voting to grant.

Issue

Secondary issues. Whether probable cause in fact existed, and whether the standard is probability or certainty.

Ancillary issues. Whether the evidence was inadmissible as coming from convicted felons and as hearsay, and whether provisional relief should issue.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED."

Reproduced as published; "N6.17-165" is a typographical error for No. 17-165.

Ratio

The standard of review frames everything. "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law" — so the petitioner had to show an evaded positive duty.
Section 5(a)'s ten-day clock reverses her argument. The rule commands action, so delay is the risk, not haste — and deferring the motion prejudiced nothing, it being resolvable any time before plea.
Personal determination is evaluation, not examination, and it is required by the Constitution, not merely the Rules: the judge must "refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties."
The duty has a floor and a ceiling, both from Ho v. People. The floor: the judge "cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor," "must decide independently," and "must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report" — "a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer." The ceiling: "it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts… What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents… upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor."
The quantum, from Ho quoting Allado and Webb: "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested"; the judge "is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence," and "need not conduct a de novo hearing."
Applied, the record sufficed — the DOJ findings rested on Ablen, Ragos and Peter Co, and "the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this."

Doctrine

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

An Information was filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, presided over by respondent Judge Juanita Guerrero, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-165, charging petitioner Leila M. De Lima — then a Senator, formerly Secretary of Justice — together with Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos and Ronnie Palisoc Dayan, with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165," for illegal drug trading at the New Bilibid Prison.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, grounded principally on the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the offence. It remained pending and unresolved.
The evidence on record consisted only of the complainants' submissions. Petitioner "did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert" the prosecutors' findings. That evidence included the Affidavit of NBI agent Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr. dated September 3, 2016 (describing two deliveries of cash to petitioner's Parañaque residence on November 24, 2012 and December 15, 2012), the Affidavit of co-accused Rafael Ragos dated September 26, 2016 (describing the same deliveries), and the statement of NBP inmate Peter Co (that the money came from proceeds of illegal drugs and was for petitioner's 2013 senatorial bid).
On February 23, 2017, the respondent judge issued the assailed Order, which found: "After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x," and directed: "WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the abovementioned accused." The Warrant of Arrest of the same date "contained no recommendation for bail."
On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest, and the respondent judge issued an Order committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
On February 27, 2017, petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, assailing the February 23, 2017 Order, the Warrant of Arrest and the February 24, 2017 Order, and praying for provisional relief.
On April 17, 2017, "[t]he parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda."
On October 10, 2017, the Court En Banc, through Justice Velasco, Jr., dismissed the petition. Eleven of the fifteen sitting members wrote separately, six of them voting to grant.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Senator Leila M. De Lima).

On sequencing, she urged that a judge put on notice of a jurisdictional objection must settle her own competence before touching the accused's liberty, invoking Miranda v. Tuliao.

B. Respondents (Judge Guerrero; the People; the PNP officers).

C. Common Ground.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether probable cause in fact existed on the record to justify the arrest; and whether the standard at this stage is the probability or the certainty of guilt.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED."

Reproduced as published; "N6.17-165" is a typographical error for No. 17-165.

Ratio

The standard of review is set first. "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law." The petitioner therefore had to show an evaded positive duty — which frames the whole analysis.
The rule is quoted in full, and its ten-day clock is the reason the warrant came first. Sec. 5(a), Rule 112: "Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information."
The duty runs the other way from what the petitioner argued. Because the rule commands action within ten days, delay is the risk, not haste: "had the respondent judge waited longer and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112." Nor does deferring the motion prejudice the accused, since a motion to quash may be resolved "at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea" (Sec. 1, Rule 117).
Precedent puts the probable-cause determination first in order of business. Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller: "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused." The rule announced is categorical and expressly covers jurisdictional motions: "there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest."
Miranda v. Tuliao is confined to its own point. It "does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused even pending a motion to quash the information. At most, it simply explains that an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law." (This is why the Week 2 custody-of-the-law line and this week's warrant line do not collide.)
Personal determination is required — by the Constitution, not merely the Rules. The Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties."
But personal determination is evaluation, not examination. Soliven v. Makasiar: "What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause."
What the judge did here exceeded the standard. "'All the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation' encompasses a broader category than the 'supporting evidence' required to be evaluated in Soliven." So the recital petitioner attacked was in fact proof of over-compliance: she "performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents."
The floor and the ceiling of the duty, from Ho v. People. The floor: "the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest… However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings… This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer." The ceiling: "it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor." Ho also records the practical suggestion that the prosecutor forward "not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand."
The quantum, from Ho quoting Allado and Webb. "Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested." The judge "'must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof'"; "[a]t this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause." Per Webb v. De Leon, "the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
Applied, the record sufficed. The DOJ's findings were supported by the affidavits and testimonies of Ablen, Ragos and Peter Co, and "the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this. Thus, there is nothing to disprove the … preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors."
Evidentiary objections do not belong at this stage. Hearsay is admissible in determining probable cause, "because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights"; and admissibility, weight, probative value and credibility are "best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial … nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

A pending motion to quash does not suspend the Sec. 5(a) duty.

"[T]here is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest." The judge's first business upon the filing of the Information is the probable-cause determination (Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller), and the motion can still be resolved any time before plea.

Personal determination ≠ personal examination.

The judge must personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence; he "is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses" (Soliven), and "need not conduct a de novo hearing" (Webb).

But he may not rubber-stamp.

He must "refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings," "must decide independently," and "must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report"; "a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer" (Ho).

Yet he need not read the whole record.

"[I]t is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge" — sufficient supporting documents are enough to make an independent judgment or at least to verify the prosecutor's findings (Ho).

Evaluating all the evidence over-complies.

"All the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation" is "a broader category than the 'supporting evidence' required to be evaluated in Soliven."
The test is probability, not certainty, with "wide latitude of discretion" in the judge, and no inquiry "into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction."
Hearsay and co-accused testimony are usable at this stage — "received with great caution," not excluded (Ramos); "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay" (Estrada).

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The over-compliance point is easy to state backwards. Petitioner's complaint was that the Order recited the wrong, broader basis; the Court answered that the broader basis includes the narrower one. Do not recite this as authority that a judge must review all the preliminary-investigation evidence — Ho expressly says the complete record is not required.
Two poles in one cluster. Read this case with Mendoza v. People and Hao v. People: Hao upholds a warrant on the judge's own evaluation, and this case does the same on an even fuller record, while Mendoza is the counter-pole where the judge's failure to make an independent judicial determination was fatal. The Ho passage quoted here is the standard all three are measured against.
The holding is about sequencing, not about the merits of the motion to quash. The Court did not say jurisdictional objections are unimportant; it said they need not be resolved first. It went on to reject the jurisdictional objection on its own terms — see De Lima v. Guerrero.
Nothing here validates the absence of a bail recommendation. The digest records that the warrant "contained no recommendation for bail" as a fact; the ponencia resolves the petition on the grounds above and the bail question was not the assigned issue.
This limb of the ruling drew a dissent aimed squarely at it. See Section VII: Justice Jardeleza would require the jurisdictional question to be settled "simultaneous with, if not prior to, the issuance of the warrant of arrest," and Justice Caguioa framed the same objection. The majority's rule is the doctrine; the dissents show precisely where it is contested.
Verbatim caveats: the fallo prints "Criminal Case N6.17-165" for No. 17-165; the reported text also carries "infonnation", "n1ling", "PS million"/"PIO Million" (for ₱5 million and ₱10 million), "Section 3Gj)"/"3(W" (for §3[jj]), and "suf ficient" broken across a page.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Decision devotes a captioned section to this precise question and decides it as a matter of Sec. 5(a), Rule 112.
For the subtopic the case contributes two rules that sit at the front of the analysis: when the judge must act (within ten days, and before or without regard to a pending motion to quash, including a jurisdictional one), and what acting requires (personal evaluation of the resolution and its supporting evidence — the Soliven/Ho standard, with its floor of independent judgment and its ceiling of not having to read the whole record).
Within the Week 6 cluster it pairs naturally with Hao vs. People (warrant upheld on the judge's own evaluation; executive versus judicial probable cause) and stands against Mendoza vs. People (the judge who failed to determine probable cause independently).
Its treatment of hearsay at the probable-cause stage connects to Estrada vs. Ombudsman (2015), which it quotes. And its reading of Miranda v. Tuliao is the bridge back to Week 2's jurisdiction-over-the-person material — Miranda concerns an accused's standing to seek relief before custody, not a limit on the court's power to order an arrest.

Separate Opinions

Eleven of the fifteen sitting members wrote separately, and six voted to grant the petition — a 9–6 decision. Titles are taken from the opinions themselves (gr_229781_so_2017.html).

⚠️ Note on lawphil’s signature-page transcription