Miranda v. Tuliao

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

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Title

Miranda v. Tuliao

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

The doctrine is announced in the Court's own sub-heading: "Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused." Getting there required the Court to separate two ideas the Court of Appeals had run together — custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person — and to explain that Pico v. Combong, on which the appellate court relied, was a bail case and could not be generalised. The rule that emerges is the one this subtopic exists to teach: seeking affirmative relief submits the accused to the court's jurisdiction, except where the very prayer is to avoid that jurisdiction, in which case the appearance is special and neither jurisdiction nor custody is required. And the reason is stated in a line worth keeping: "as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it."

Core Doctrine

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired by arrest or voluntary appearance, and "as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court" — "seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance." Custody of the law is a different thing: it is "literally custody over the body of the accused," acquired by arrest or voluntary surrender, and it is required only where the accused applies for bail, since "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." For every other relief, the mere application waives the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, and no custody is needed. To that general rule there is a narrow exception — the special appearance — for pleadings "whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court": in civil cases a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person; in criminal cases a motion to quash a complaint on that ground; and a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. In those narrow cases the accused "can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law" — but if he applies for bail, he must first surrender to custody.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 158763)

Case DigestWeek 2 - Jurisdiction

Miranda v. Tuliao

G.R. No. 158763 · March 31, 2006 · First Division

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Petitioner: Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, and Romeo B. OconRespondent: Virgilio M. Tuliao

Gist

Core Doctrine

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_158763_2006.html

ℹ️ The distinction the whole subtopic turns on

Custody of the law is restraint on the body — acquired by arrest or voluntary surrender. Jurisdiction over the person is the court's authority over the accused as a party — acquired by arrest or voluntary appearance. They are not the same, and the Court gives the two crossing examples: one can be under custody of the law but not yet subject to jurisdiction over the person (a person arrested on a warrant who moves to quash it before arraignment); and one can be subject to jurisdiction over the person and yet not in custody of the law (an accused who escapes after trial has commenced).

⚠️ This case is not about trial in absentia

The file this digest replaces described Miranda as an accused who attended early hearings, then absented himself, with the court proceeding to judgment. No part of that is in the decision. Miranda concerns three men who had never been arrested and who asked the court to quash the warrants against them; the question was whether a court may entertain that motion from someone not yet in its custody.

Facts

On 8 March 1996 two burnt cadavers were found in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, identified as Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of respondent Virgilio Tuliao. Two murder informations were filed against six police officers; venue was transferred to Manila, where all were convicted on 22 April 1999 — and acquitted on reasonable doubt by this Court on 9 October 2001.
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, at large during that trial, was arrested in September 1999 and on 27 April 2001 executed a sworn confession naming petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio as those responsible.
On 25 June 2001 Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest. From this point the petitioners are wanted men who have never been taken into custody — the fact the case turns on.
On 29 June 2001 they filed an "urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest." At the hearing on 6 July 2001 Judge Tumaliuan noted their absence and denied the motion "on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard."
On 17 August 2001 the new Judge Anastacio D. Anghad reversed him and cancelled the warrant as to Miranda, extending the order to Ocon and Dalmacio on 21 September 2001; he denied reconsideration and a prayer for his inhibition in October.
Tuliao petitioned this Court, which resolved to grant a TRO on 12 November 2001 — and shortly after that resolution Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two informations. The Court issued the TRO, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, and also referred a motion to cite the judge in contempt.
On 18 December 2002 the Court of Appeals ordered the cases reinstated and warrants issued, and denied reconsideration on 12 June 2003. Decided 31 March 2006.

Issue

Whether the adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused or custody of the law over his body — that is, whether petitioners never arrested could ask the court to recall the warrants, and whether by that motion they submitted their persons.

Secondary issue. Whether Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion in quashing the warrants on the strength of a later petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and doubts "engendered by the political climate," and in then dismissing the informations.

Ruling

Main issue. NEITHER is required. "Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused." Custody "is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs." As a general rule "one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court," but there is an exception for pleadings "whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance" — among them a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. So "an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law"; but "if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law."

Secondary issue. YES, grave abuse. "Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion," and "the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest."

Ancillary. "[T]he number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad," and the venue was transferred to the City of Manila.

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila… 6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners… The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court identifies the conflation in the ruling under review: the Court of Appeals had held that an accused "must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs," citing Pico v. Combong.
The two concepts are prised apart, with Santiago v. Vasquez as the hinge: "Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance."
Two crossing illustrations make it concrete: "One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced." Custody "signifies restraint on the person," and "is literally custody over the body."
Pico is confined to its facts — it concerned "the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law" — and the general rule is stated the other way.
The bail rule is explained rather than asserted: "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free," the rationale being that it "discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail."
The exception is enumerated exhaustively: "(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant…; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest" — the third because "it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue."
The Court then recapitulates the whole rule — the passage to memorise: jurisdiction over the person "is deemed waived … when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person."
A policy comparison justifies treating warrants differently from bail: allowing quashal to persons not in custody risks little, since "it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution," while a warrant "continues in force and effect until it is quashed" and "the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause."
Then the principle: "as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after."

Doctrine

The governing distinction: "Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance." Custody "is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs."
The general rule: seeking affirmative relief "constitutes voluntary appearance."
The special-appearance exception, exhaustively enumerated: civil motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person; criminal motions to quash a complaint on that ground; and motions to quash a warrant of arrest — in which "an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law."
The bail proviso: one invoking that special jurisdiction who "applies for bail … must first submit himself to the custody of the law." A warrant "continues in force and effect until it is quashed," and "the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash" it.

Limits.

The exception is a closed list, not a principle of convenience — only the three enumerated pleadings produce a special appearance.
A motion for reinvestigation, a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, or a motion to defer arraignment is not on the list, and filing one does submit the movant, which is exactly what happened in Jimenez v. Sorongon.
The petitioners here filed a composite motion, and a movant who bundles a special-appearance prayer with affirmative reliefs risks being held to have appeared generally — say expressly that the appearance is special.
Custody remains indispensable for bail. And note that the petitioners lost: the Court accepted their legal premise on jurisdiction but affirmed, because Judge Anghad's quashal and dismissal were themselves grave abuse — warrants were ordered issued and the venue moved.
Finally, distinguish Antiporda v. Garchitorena, where a motion to quash submitted the accused because it impugned jurisdiction over the offense: the label on the motion does not decide; the object of the prayer does.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. After a co-accused's sworn confession named them as the killers of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, warrants of arrest issued against Jose C. Miranda, Romeo B. Ocon and Alberto P. Dalmacio. Before being arrested, they moved to complete the preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrants. Judge Tumaliuan denied the motion precisely because "the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons"; his successor, Judge Anghad, reversed him, cancelled the warrants, and ultimately dismissed the two murder informations. The Court of Appeals set all of that aside, and the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed, with a transfer of venue to Manila.

Facts

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of respondent Virgilio Tuliao, "who is now under the witness protection program."
Two informations for murder were filed in the RTC of Santiago City against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez. These are the first-round accused — none of the present petitioners.
The venue was transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua, except SPO2 Maderal, who was "yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large."
On 9 October 2001, on automatic review, the Supreme Court acquitted those accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested.
On 27 April 2001, Maderal executed a sworn confession identifying petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, together with "a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe," as the persons responsible for the two deaths.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners, dela Cruz and Amado Doe, submitting Maderal's sworn confession.
On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. From this point the petitioners are wanted men who have not been taken into custody — the fact the case turns on.
On 29 June 2001, the petitioners filed an "urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest."
At the hearing on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying the urgent motion "on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court." In the meantime, the petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over and issued a Joint Order reversing Judge Tumaliuan, cancelling the warrant of arrest against petitioner Miranda; he applied the same Order to Ocon and Dalmacio by Order dated 21 September 2001.
State Prosecutor Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for reconsideration and prayed for Judge Anghad's inhibition. The motion for reconsideration was denied on 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition denied on 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, Tuliao filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a TRO, to enjoin Judge Anghad and nullify his Orders of 17 August, 21 September, 16 October and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, the Supreme Court resolved to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order. Shortly after that resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two informations for murder.
On 19 November 2001, the Court noted the respondent's cash bond (O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001), issued the TRO, and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Tuliao moved to cite Judge Anghad in contempt, alleging he "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001." On 21 November 2001 the Court referred that motion to the Court of Appeals as well.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City and the issuance of warrants of arrest. On 12 June 2003 it denied reconsideration.
On 4 August 2003, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order in the present proceedings.
On 31 March 2006, the First Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Chico-Nazario, denying the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Miranda, Dalmacio and Ocon).

The petitioners attacked the premise the Court of Appeals had adopted from Pico v. Combong — "that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court." Their first submission was that jurisdiction over the person is required only in applications for bail, and they supported it with retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: "Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief," noting that outright dismissal before custody is authorised by Section 6(a), Rule 112 and by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, and pointing to Allado v. Diokno, Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Lacson v. Executive Secretary as cases where relief was granted to accused not in custody. Their second and alternative submission was that even if such jurisdiction were required, the court had already acquired it — by their own filing of the Urgent Motion — invoking Santiago v. Vasquez, where Justice Regalado wrote that voluntary appearance "is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail." They further argued that the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the criminal cases and in ordering re-issuance of the warrants, the order of dismissal having become final and executory.

B. Respondent (Virgilio M. Tuliao).

Tuliao's case, sustained below, was that Judge Anghad had acted with grave abuse of discretion at every turn: quashing a standing warrant issued by his predecessor merely because an appeal to the Secretary of Justice had been filed and because of "his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city"; and then, after the Secretary of Justice had affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, dismissing the informations on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused — doing so two days after this Court had resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceedings. He asked as well that Judge Anghad be cited in contempt and disqualified from further proceeding with the case.

C. Common Ground.

The Court records that "[t]he facts of the case being undisputed," the petitioners brought the matter up on assignments of error alone. It was not disputed that the petitioners had not been arrested and were not in custody when they filed the Urgent Motion of 29 June 2001; that warrants had issued against them on 25 June 2001 on the strength of Maderal's sworn confession; or that the accused in the first round of informations had been acquitted on reasonable doubt in October 2001.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Framed by the Court in its own internal sub-heading: whether the adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused or custody of the law over his body — that is, whether petitioners who had never been arrested could ask the trial court to recall or quash the warrants against them, and whether, by filing that motion, they thereby submitted their persons to the court's jurisdiction.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion in quashing the warrants of arrest on the strength of a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and of doubts "engendered by the political climate," and in thereafter dismissing the informations.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Whether the order of dismissal had become final and executory so as to bar reinstatement of the criminal cases; and whether Judge Anghad should be disqualified and the venue transferred.

Ruling

Main Issue: NEITHER is required. "Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused." Custody of the law "is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person." As a general rule "one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court," but there is an exception for pleadings "whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance" — among them a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. So in such narrow cases "an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law"; but "if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law."

Secondary Issue: YES, grave abuse of discretion. "Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion." "[T]he pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest" (Webb v. de Leon). Judge Anghad "seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners."

Ancillary Issues: the Court found "the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad," and resolved to transfer the venue of Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 to the City of Manila pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution, following People v. SPO1 Leaño.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;

The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;

The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and

The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.

Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court identifies the conflation in the ruling under review. The Court of Appeals had held that "an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court," and that "an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs," citing Pico v. Combong. On that premise it ruled the petitioners could seek nothing, not having been arrested when they filed their Urgent Motion.
The two concepts are then prised apart, with Santiago v. Vasquez as the hinge. "Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance."
The distinction is made concrete by two crossing illustrations. "One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced." And custody is defined: "Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law"; it "is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention."
Pico is confined to its facts. "The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr. … should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law." Read whole, Pico says: "A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty…" The Court stands by it "insofar as it concerns bail," and then states the general rule the other way: "as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court… seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance."
The special rule for bail is explained rather than merely asserted. Quoting Feliciano v. Pasicolan: "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.'" Its rationale "is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein."
The exception — special appearance — is then carved out and enumerated exhaustively. "There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance… This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant…; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest." The first two "are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person"; the third, "a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest."
The Court then recapitulates the whole rule in one paragraph — the passage to memorise: "in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law."
Three authorities show the general rule in operation. In Allado v. Diokno, on the accused's prayer in a certiorari petition for lack of probable cause, the Court issued a TRO enjoining enforcement of the warrant; in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, it directed the judge to cease proceeding and defer issuance of warrants; in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, it directed transfer of the cases to the RTC "even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest." The Court notes what these have in common: "none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest."
A policy comparison justifies treating warrants differently from bail. "[T]he circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large… On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free — because "it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause."
Two practical safeguards are noted, and then the principle. "[P]ursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time"; and "the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt." Then: "In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after."
On the secondary issue, the quashal is condemned on two independent grounds. Quashing the warrant because an appeal to the Secretary of Justice had been filed is grave abuse: "It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest … just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal"; and in any event "the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest," following Webb v. de Leon.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

The governing distinction. "Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance." Custody "is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs."

The general rule. "[O]ne who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court"; "seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance."

The special-appearance exception, exhaustively enumerated: motions to dismiss in civil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the person; motions to quash a complaint in criminal cases on that ground; and motions to quash a warrant of arrest. In these, "an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law."

The bail proviso. "[I]f a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law."

On warrants pending challenge. A warrant "continues in force and effect until it is quashed" under the presumption of regularity; and "the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt."

On quashal. "[T]he pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest."

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The exception is a closed list, not a principle of convenience. Only the three enumerated pleadings produce a special appearance. A motion for reinvestigation, a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, or a motion to defer arraignment is not on the list, and filing one does submit the movant's person — which is exactly what happened in Jimenez vs. Sorongon, where Alamil's motions seeking dismissal on the merits of probable cause were held to be voluntary submission.
The petitioners here filed a composite motion. Their Urgent Motion sought to complete the preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrants. The Court's holding addresses the quashal prayer; a movant who bundles a special-appearance prayer with affirmative reliefs risks being held to have appeared generally, and should say expressly that the appearance is special.
Custody is still indispensable for bail, and the Court is emphatic that it is not relaxing that requirement: it "stand[s] by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail."
The petitioners lost. It is easy to remember this case as a win for accused not in custody; it is not. The Court accepted their legal premise on jurisdiction — Judge Tumaliuan's stated ground for denying the motion was wrong — but affirmed the Court of Appeals because Judge Anghad's quashal and dismissal were themselves grave abuse of discretion. Warrants were ordered issued and the venue moved.
Not a trial-in-absentia case, and not about waiver by flight. The observation that "flight is indicative of guilt" goes to the probable cause determination, not to any forfeiture of the right to be heard.
Distinguish the sibling doctrine in Antiporda vs. Garchitorena: there the accused's motion to quash was treated as voluntary submission, because what they impugned was the court's jurisdiction over the offense, not over their persons. The label on the motion does not decide; the object of the prayer does.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Court devotes a captioned section of the Decision to the assigned requisite and resolves the first assignment of error entirely within it. For the subtopic, this is the controlling modern authority: it supplies the definition of jurisdiction over the person (acquired by arrest or voluntary appearance), the general rule (seeking affirmative relief is voluntary appearance), the exception (special appearance, three enumerated pleadings), the carve-out from the exception (bail always requires custody), and the companion concept that students most often conflate with it (custody of the law).

Read against the rest of the week, the four IV.c cases divide neatly. Antiporda vs. Garchitorena and Jimenez vs. Sorongon show the general rule operating — a motion to quash the information and motions to dismiss for want of probable cause both submitted the movants' persons. Miranda supplies the exception and the reason for it, together with the custody/jurisdiction distinction that makes the exception coherent. And where People vs. Mariano and De la Cruz vs. Moya show that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be created by the parties, Miranda shows the opposite property of jurisdiction over the person: it is a personal defense, and the accused can and routinely does confer it on the court by his own act.

Separate Opinions

None reported in the published text. The Decision was penned by Justice Chico-Nazario for the First Division.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The distinction the Court had to make, between two ideas the Court of Appeals ran together.

"Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."

That is custody of the law — a physical fact about where the accused's body is. Jurisdiction over the person is a legal relation, acquired by arrest or by voluntary appearance.

The two usually coincide, which is why they are so easily conflated, but they come apart in both directions. An accused who appears voluntarily is within the court's jurisdiction without being in custody; one who is arrested and escapes is in the court's jurisdiction while out of custody.

Separating them yields the holding, which the Court put in its own sub-heading: "Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused."

Implementing Rules

Section 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 114 (Bail)

An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)

Why it is cited here

The rule that the accused may contest his arrest without thereby submitting.

"An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor … provided that he raises them before entering his plea."

The general principle is that seeking affirmative relief submits the accused to the court's jurisdiction. This section states the exception, and the Court generalises it: the exception applies "where the very prayer is for relief from the custody or the process by which it was obtained."

The reason is fairness. If challenging an unlawful arrest were itself a submission, no one could ever test an unlawful arrest — the challenge would supply what the arrest failed to confer.

The Court also had to explain away Pico v. Combong, on which the appellate court relied: it was a bail case, and could not be generalised. Bail presupposes custody; a motion to quash a warrant presupposes its absence.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

Why the ordinary submission rule does not reach this motion.

A motion to quash raises grounds going to the information and the court's authority — the facts charged, jurisdiction over the offense, double jeopardy — and is the paradigm of affirmative relief whose filing submits the accused, as Antiporda holds.

A motion to quash a warrant of arrest is a different animal despite the similar name. It does not ask the court to act on the charge; it asks the court to undo the process by which custody was sought.

That is the line the case draws, and it is worth holding precisely: relief directed at the case submits; relief directed at the custody does not.

The practical consequence for counsel is real. An accused with a defective warrant may challenge it without first surrendering, and need not choose between contesting the arrest and staying at liberty.

Related notes:

Antiporda v. Garchitorena — the general rule: a motion to quash the information is voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction over the person.
Jimenez v. Sorongon — motions seeking dismissal for want of probable cause are affirmative relief, and custody of the law is not required for reliefs other than bail.
Gomez v. People — jurisdiction over the person of an accused who has not been arrested.
Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — bail, for which custody of the law remains indispensable.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_158763_2006.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

Why it is cited here

The distinction the Court had to make, between two ideas the Court of Appeals ran together.

"Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."

That is custody of the law — a physical fact about where the accused's body is. Jurisdiction over the person is a legal relation, acquired by arrest or by voluntary appearance.

Full entry below ↓

Section 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 114 (Bail)

Why it is cited here

The rule that the accused may contest his arrest without thereby submitting.

The reason is fairness. If challenging an unlawful arrest were itself a submission, no one could ever test an unlawful arrest — the challenge would supply what the arrest failed to confer.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

Why the ordinary submission rule does not reach this motion.

That is the line the case draws, and it is worth holding precisely: relief directed at the case submits; relief directed at the custody does not.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_158763_2006.html

ℹ️ The distinction the whole subtopic turns on

⚠️ This case is not about trial in absentia

Facts

On 8 March 1996 two burnt cadavers were found in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, identified as Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of respondent Virgilio Tuliao. Two murder informations were filed against six police officers; venue was transferred to Manila, where all were convicted on 22 April 1999 — and acquitted on reasonable doubt by this Court on 9 October 2001.
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, at large during that trial, was arrested in September 1999 and on 27 April 2001 executed a sworn confession naming petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio as those responsible.
On 25 June 2001 Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest. From this point the petitioners are wanted men who have never been taken into custody — the fact the case turns on.
On 29 June 2001 they filed an "urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest." At the hearing on 6 July 2001 Judge Tumaliuan noted their absence and denied the motion "on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard."
On 17 August 2001 the new Judge Anastacio D. Anghad reversed him and cancelled the warrant as to Miranda, extending the order to Ocon and Dalmacio on 21 September 2001; he denied reconsideration and a prayer for his inhibition in October.
Tuliao petitioned this Court, which resolved to grant a TRO on 12 November 2001 — and shortly after that resolution Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two informations. The Court issued the TRO, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, and also referred a motion to cite the judge in contempt.
On 18 December 2002 the Court of Appeals ordered the cases reinstated and warrants issued, and denied reconsideration on 12 June 2003. Decided 31 March 2006.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila… 6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners… The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court identifies the conflation in the ruling under review: the Court of Appeals had held that an accused "must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs," citing Pico v. Combong.
The two concepts are prised apart, with Santiago v. Vasquez as the hinge: "Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance."
Two crossing illustrations make it concrete: "One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced." Custody "signifies restraint on the person," and "is literally custody over the body."
Pico is confined to its facts — it concerned "the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law" — and the general rule is stated the other way.
The bail rule is explained rather than asserted: "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free," the rationale being that it "discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail."
The exception is enumerated exhaustively: "(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant…; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest" — the third because "it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue."
The Court then recapitulates the whole rule — the passage to memorise: jurisdiction over the person "is deemed waived … when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person."
A policy comparison justifies treating warrants differently from bail: allowing quashal to persons not in custody risks little, since "it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution," while a warrant "continues in force and effect until it is quashed" and "the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause."
Then the principle: "as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after."

Doctrine

The governing distinction: "Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance." Custody "is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs."
The general rule: seeking affirmative relief "constitutes voluntary appearance."
The special-appearance exception, exhaustively enumerated: civil motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person; criminal motions to quash a complaint on that ground; and motions to quash a warrant of arrest — in which "an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law."
The bail proviso: one invoking that special jurisdiction who "applies for bail … must first submit himself to the custody of the law." A warrant "continues in force and effect until it is quashed," and "the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash" it.

Limits.

The exception is a closed list, not a principle of convenience — only the three enumerated pleadings produce a special appearance.
A motion for reinvestigation, a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, or a motion to defer arraignment is not on the list, and filing one does submit the movant, which is exactly what happened in Jimenez v. Sorongon.
The petitioners here filed a composite motion, and a movant who bundles a special-appearance prayer with affirmative reliefs risks being held to have appeared generally — say expressly that the appearance is special.
Custody remains indispensable for bail. And note that the petitioners lost: the Court accepted their legal premise on jurisdiction but affirmed, because Judge Anghad's quashal and dismissal were themselves grave abuse — warrants were ordered issued and the venue moved.
Finally, distinguish Antiporda v. Garchitorena, where a motion to quash submitted the accused because it impugned jurisdiction over the offense: the label on the motion does not decide; the object of the prayer does.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of respondent Virgilio Tuliao, "who is now under the witness protection program."
Two informations for murder were filed in the RTC of Santiago City against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez. These are the first-round accused — none of the present petitioners.
The venue was transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua, except SPO2 Maderal, who was "yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large."
On 9 October 2001, on automatic review, the Supreme Court acquitted those accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested.
On 27 April 2001, Maderal executed a sworn confession identifying petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, together with "a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe," as the persons responsible for the two deaths.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners, dela Cruz and Amado Doe, submitting Maderal's sworn confession.
On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. From this point the petitioners are wanted men who have not been taken into custody — the fact the case turns on.
On 29 June 2001, the petitioners filed an "urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest."
At the hearing on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying the urgent motion "on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court." In the meantime, the petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over and issued a Joint Order reversing Judge Tumaliuan, cancelling the warrant of arrest against petitioner Miranda; he applied the same Order to Ocon and Dalmacio by Order dated 21 September 2001.
State Prosecutor Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for reconsideration and prayed for Judge Anghad's inhibition. The motion for reconsideration was denied on 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition denied on 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, Tuliao filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a TRO, to enjoin Judge Anghad and nullify his Orders of 17 August, 21 September, 16 October and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, the Supreme Court resolved to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order. Shortly after that resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two informations for murder.
On 19 November 2001, the Court noted the respondent's cash bond (O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001), issued the TRO, and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Tuliao moved to cite Judge Anghad in contempt, alleging he "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001." On 21 November 2001 the Court referred that motion to the Court of Appeals as well.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City and the issuance of warrants of arrest. On 12 June 2003 it denied reconsideration.
On 4 August 2003, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order in the present proceedings.
On 31 March 2006, the First Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Chico-Nazario, denying the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Miranda, Dalmacio and Ocon).

B. Respondent (Virgilio M. Tuliao).

C. Common Ground.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

B. Secondary Issues.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Whether the order of dismissal had become final and executory so as to bar reinstatement of the criminal cases; and whether Judge Anghad should be disqualified and the venue transferred.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;

The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;

The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and

The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.

Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Court identifies the conflation in the ruling under review. The Court of Appeals had held that "an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court," and that "an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs," citing Pico v. Combong. On that premise it ruled the petitioners could seek nothing, not having been arrested when they filed their Urgent Motion.
The two concepts are then prised apart, with Santiago v. Vasquez as the hinge. "Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance."
The distinction is made concrete by two crossing illustrations. "One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced." And custody is defined: "Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law"; it "is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention."
Pico is confined to its facts. "The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr. … should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law." Read whole, Pico says: "A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty…" The Court stands by it "insofar as it concerns bail," and then states the general rule the other way: "as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court… seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance."
The special rule for bail is explained rather than merely asserted. Quoting Feliciano v. Pasicolan: "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.'" Its rationale "is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein."
The exception — special appearance — is then carved out and enumerated exhaustively. "There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance… This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant…; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest." The first two "are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person"; the third, "a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest."
The Court then recapitulates the whole rule in one paragraph — the passage to memorise: "in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law."
Three authorities show the general rule in operation. In Allado v. Diokno, on the accused's prayer in a certiorari petition for lack of probable cause, the Court issued a TRO enjoining enforcement of the warrant; in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, it directed the judge to cease proceeding and defer issuance of warrants; in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, it directed transfer of the cases to the RTC "even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest." The Court notes what these have in common: "none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest."
A policy comparison justifies treating warrants differently from bail. "[T]he circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large… On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free — because "it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause."
Two practical safeguards are noted, and then the principle. "[P]ursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time"; and "the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt." Then: "In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after."
On the secondary issue, the quashal is condemned on two independent grounds. Quashing the warrant because an appeal to the Secretary of Justice had been filed is grave abuse: "It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest … just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal"; and in any event "the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest," following Webb v. de Leon.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

The bail proviso. "[I]f a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law."

On quashal. "[T]he pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest."

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The exception is a closed list, not a principle of convenience. Only the three enumerated pleadings produce a special appearance. A motion for reinvestigation, a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, or a motion to defer arraignment is not on the list, and filing one does submit the movant's person — which is exactly what happened in Jimenez vs. Sorongon, where Alamil's motions seeking dismissal on the merits of probable cause were held to be voluntary submission.
The petitioners here filed a composite motion. Their Urgent Motion sought to complete the preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrants. The Court's holding addresses the quashal prayer; a movant who bundles a special-appearance prayer with affirmative reliefs risks being held to have appeared generally, and should say expressly that the appearance is special.
Custody is still indispensable for bail, and the Court is emphatic that it is not relaxing that requirement: it "stand[s] by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail."
The petitioners lost. It is easy to remember this case as a win for accused not in custody; it is not. The Court accepted their legal premise on jurisdiction — Judge Tumaliuan's stated ground for denying the motion was wrong — but affirmed the Court of Appeals because Judge Anghad's quashal and dismissal were themselves grave abuse of discretion. Warrants were ordered issued and the venue moved.
Not a trial-in-absentia case, and not about waiver by flight. The observation that "flight is indicative of guilt" goes to the probable cause determination, not to any forfeiture of the right to be heard.
Distinguish the sibling doctrine in Antiporda vs. Garchitorena: there the accused's motion to quash was treated as voluntary submission, because what they impugned was the court's jurisdiction over the offense, not over their persons. The label on the motion does not decide; the object of the prayer does.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Separate Opinions

None reported in the published text. The Decision was penned by Justice Chico-Nazario for the First Division.