ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic
8. Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor and its Review
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/apr2017/gr_214925_2017.html
ℹ️ Consolidated petitions; Party-Role Hygiene
This Decision resolves two consolidated Rule 45 petitions arising from the same Amended Information: G.R. No. 214925 (Maximo and Panganiban, the private complainants, seeking to reinstate the Information) and G.R. No. 214965 (Villapando, the accused, separately seeking a ruling that P.D. No. 957 violations are "continuing offenses"). This digest is anchored to the syllabus-assigned lead docket, G.R. No. 214925, whose core issue is squarely Topic 8. G.R. No. 214965's substantive P.D. No. 957 question is summarized only briefly under the Materiality Rule, as the Court itself declined to resolve it for lack of an actual case or controversy.
Facts
- On 23 November 2010 Villapando, assignee of a Legazpi Place condominium unit developed by ASB Realty Corporation, complained to the OCP-Makati against ASB directors Maximo and Panganiban for violating Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957. The complaint was dismissed on 12 July 2011 on a finding of ASB's good faith amid liquidity problems.
- Maximo (24 February 2011) and Panganiban (10 October 2011) then charged him with Perjury, alleging he had falsely claimed they were ASB officers when a 1997 deed of sale was executed — when in fact they were minors and not yet ASB employees.
- On 3 August 2011 ACP Evangeline Viudez-Canobas found probable cause, approved by SACP Christopher Garvida, and on 15 August 2011 an Information was filed in Branch 67, MeTC-Makati, signed by ACP Canobas and sworn before ACP Vermug. A warrant issued.
- Villapando moved for partial reconsideration and then to quash, urging that the Information lacked the City Prosecutor's prior written authority under Section 4, Rule 112, and supplementally that P.D. No. 957 violations are continuing crimes. On 11 November 2011 the MeTC denied both, invoking the presumption of regularity and finding the certification of prior authority sufficient. No copy of the office order was ever in the record — that absence is the case.
- On 13 January 2012 ACP Vermug likewise found probable cause on Panganiban's complaint and recommended an Amended Information. Villapando's motions were denied on 21 February and 20 March 2012, both approved by City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi himself, citing Office Order No. 32 of 29 July 2011. The DOJ denied his petitions for review on 28 November 2013 on procedural grounds.
- On 11 February 2013 the MeTC allowed the amendment, and the Amended Information was filed, again signed by ACP Canobas. On 30 May 2013 the RTC of Makati denied his Rule 65 petition.
- On 13 June 2014 the Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the case without prejudice, no copy of Office Order No. 32 appearing anywhere in the record and such an order not being a matter of judicial notice. Both parties' motions were denied 16 October 2014.
- On 26 April 2017 the Second Division, through Justice Peralta, affirmed.
Issue
Was the Amended Information invalid for having been filed without proof of the City Prosecutor's prior written authority under Section 4, Rule 112 — notwithstanding the certification on its face and the City Prosecutor's own later Orders affirming the resolutions?
Secondary issues. Whether Rule 65 was a proper remedy against the interlocutory denial of a motion to quash; and whether simultaneous DOJ review and CA certiorari was forum shopping.
Ancillary issue. Whether the Court should decide the continuing-offence question under P.D. No. 957.
Ruling
YES — INVALID. "[T]here must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was given by the city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information," and applying Quisay v. People, "if indeed there was no proof of valid delegation of authority as found by the CA, We are constrained not to accord the presumption of regularity." Since "the said Office Order No. 32 is not a matter of judicial notice, hence, a copy of the same must be presented," and none was, "there was no valid delegation." Hence "the inescapable result is that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information," and "there is no point in compelling petitioner to undergo trial under a defective information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction." Nor did the City Prosecutor's later Order cure it — People v. Garfin "firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent."
Secondary issues. CERTIORARI PROPER; NO FORUM SHOPPING. Ordinarily "the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course," but exceptions apply "when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion" or when it is "patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief" — and here "the issue raised in this Petition goes into the very authority of the court over the case." As to forum shopping, "the filing of an appeal with the DOJ as well as the filing of the petition with the CA would not constitute forum shopping," the DOJ's finding "would not be binding upon the courts" and "would merely be advisory."
Ancillary issue. DECLINED. "[U]nless and until the City Prosecutor files a new information for perjury against Villapando, there would be no actual case to speak of," and deciding it now "would necessarily pre-empt the outcome of the trial" — the more so with an identical question pending in G.R. No. 216546.
Ratio
- The authority must be shown, not certified. A certification of prior authority on the Information's face is not proof; the office order itself must be in the record, since it is not a matter of judicial notice.
- And the presumption of regularity does not fill the gap. Where the record affirmatively lacks the delegation, the Court is "constrained not to accord the presumption."
- The defect is jurisdictional, so nothing cures it. Per Garfin, want of authority in the filing officer "cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent" — which is why the City Prosecutor's own later approval of the resolutions was irrelevant: he approved the finding, not the filing.
- That jurisdictional character also opened the certiorari route, the objection going to the court's very authority rather than to an error of judgment.
- And the mootness of the substantive question follows from the dismissal — with no Information on file, there is no case in which to decide it.
Doctrine
Prior written authority must be proved. Under Section 4, Rule 112, an Information filed by an assistant prosecutor requires a demonstrated prior written delegation from the city prosecutor; a certification on the face of the Information will not do, and the office order is not a matter of judicial notice — it must be presented. Absent proof, the presumption of regularity does not apply, and the court acquires no jurisdiction. The infirmity is jurisdictional and incurable — "not… by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent." Certiorari lies against an interlocutory denial where the objection goes to the court's authority. And DOJ review alongside court certiorari is not forum shopping, the DOJ's finding being advisory and not binding on the courts.
Limits. The dismissal is without prejudice — the defect is in the filing officer's authority, not in the charge, so a new Information by an authorised officer may follow. That is why the Court refused to reach the continuing-offence question: doing so would decide a case that does not yet exist. And note what the City Prosecutor's participation could and could not do. He approved the resolutions on reconsideration, which shows he knew of and endorsed the prosecution — and it still did not matter, because the requirement is prior written authority to file, a formal precondition that subsequent endorsement cannot supply. Read with Quisay v. People, the immediate authority this case applies and extends, and with Section 5, Rule 110's requirement that the action be prosecuted under the public prosecutor's direction — the two together make who signs a question of jurisdiction, not of housekeeping. A motion to quash was the correct vehicle below.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
Gist
Classification: DIRECT. Villapando was charged with perjury, on complaints by ASB Realty directors Maximo and Panganiban, for allegedly falsely claiming in an earlier complaint that they were ASB officers at the time a 1997 deed of sale was executed. The Information and later Amended Information were signed by an Assistant City Prosecutor, certified as filed with the City Prosecutor's prior authority, but no copy of the office order allegedly delegating that authority was ever placed in the record. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case without prejudice for want of proof of valid delegation. The Supreme Court affirmed, applying and extending its recent ruling in Quisay v. People: absent an actual, presented office order (not merely a certification, and not subject to judicial notice) establishing the delegation, the Amended Information was void for lack of authority, a jurisdictional defect neither cured by the presumption of regularity nor by the City Prosecutor's own later order affirming the finding of probable cause.
Facts
- Villapando, assignee of a Legazpi Place condominium unit developed by ASB Realty Corporation, filed a complaint with the OCP-Makati (23 November 2010) against ASB directors Maximo and Panganiban for violation of Sections 17, 20, and 25 of P.D. No. 957 (registration, completion, and title-issuance requirements). This complaint was dismissed (12 July 2011) on a finding of ASB's good faith amid liquidity problems.
- Maximo (24 February 2011) and, separately, Panganiban (10 October 2011) filed complaints for Perjury against Villapando, alleging he falsely claimed in his P.D. 957 complaint that they were ASB officers when a 1997 deed of sale was executed, when in fact they were minors and not yet ASB employees at that time. Maximo's complaint was assigned to ACP Evangeline Viudez-Canobas; Panganiban's to ACP Benjamin Vermug, Jr.
- ACP Canobas issued a Resolution ("Canobas Resolution," 3 August 2011) finding probable cause for perjury, approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher Garvida. An Information for Perjury was filed before Branch 67, METC-Makati (15 August 2011), signed by ACP Canobas and sworn before ACP Vermug. Villapando moved for partial reconsideration (31 August 2011), arguing the Information lacked the City Prosecutor's prior written authority. A warrant of arrest issued in the interim.
- Villapando filed a Motion to Quash (14 October 2011), reiterating the authority objection under Section 4, Rule 112, and a Supplemental Motion to Quash (20 October 2011), arguing the facts charged did not constitute an offense since P.D. 957 violations are continuing crimes. The METC denied both (Order dated 11 November 2011), citing the presumption of regularity and finding the certification of prior authority sufficient compliance.
- Separately, ACP Vermug issued the "Vermug Resolution" (13 January 2012, on Panganiban's complaint), also finding probable cause and — approved by SACP Garvida — recommending an Amended Information to add Panganiban as a complainant. Villapando's motions for partial reconsideration of both the Canobas and Vermug Resolutions were denied by the OCP-Makati (21 February and 20 March 2012 Orders, respectively), both approved by City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi himself, citing Office Order No. 32 (dated 29 July 2011) as the source of authority. Villapando's subsequent petitions for review of both resolutions were denied by the DOJ (Resolution of Prosecutor General Claro Arellano, 28 November 2013) on procedural grounds (failure to append proof of a motion to suspend proceedings; unverified attachments).
- The METC denied Villapando's motion for reconsideration and granted the Motion to Amend the Information (Order dated 11 February 2013); the Amended Information was filed, signed by ACP Canobas and sworn before ACP Vermug. Villapando elevated the matter to the RTC of Makati via Rule 65 certiorari and prohibition (25 April 2013), which the RTC denied (30 May 2013), finding the presumption of regularity applied and undisputed by the City Prosecutor.
- Villapando then filed a certiorari and prohibition petition before the Court of Appeals (31 July 2013). On 13 June 2014, the CA reversed, dismissing the criminal case without prejudice to the filing of a new Information by an authorized officer, on the ground that no copy of Office Order No. 32 appeared anywhere in the record, and such an order is not a matter of judicial notice. Both parties' motions for partial reconsideration were denied (16 October 2014).
- Maximo and Panganiban filed the instant petition, docketed G.R. No. 214925; Villapando filed his own petition, docketed G.R. No. 214965. The Supreme Court consolidated the two (Resolution dated 13 July 2015) and rendered the Decision under digest on 26 April 2017 (Peralta, J., Second Division).
Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioners in G.R. No. 214925 (Maximo and Panganiban).
Maximo and Panganiban argued that certiorari was the wrong remedy for Villapando to have used against an interlocutory denial of a motion to quash; that Villapando committed forum shopping by simultaneously pursuing a DOJ petition for review and a CA certiorari petition on the same issues; that the Information bore a certification of prior authority entitled to the presumption of regularity, making non-presentation of Office Order No. 32 immaterial; and that the City Prosecutor's own Order denying Villapando's motion for reconsideration effectively ratified the Information's validity.
B. Respondent (Francisco Z. Villapando, Jr.).
Villapando argued that appeal was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy given his liberty was at stake, justifying direct resort to certiorari; that no forum shopping existed since a DOJ ruling is merely advisory and not binding on the courts; that the Information and Amended Information were void for lack of any actual proof — as opposed to a bare, self-serving certification — that the City Prosecutor had delegated authority to ACP Canobas or ACP Vermug to approve their filing; and, in his own petition (G.R. No. 214965), that the CA should have additionally ruled that violations of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses, which would bear on whether he committed perjury at all.
C. Common Ground.
The parties did not dispute the sequence of resolutions and orders, that Office Order No. 32 was never actually placed in the record before the CA, or that City Prosecutor Aspi had personally signed the later Orders denying Villapando's motions for reconsideration; the dispute concerned the legal sufficiency of the certification alone, and the legal effect (if any) of the City Prosecutor's subsequent orders on the antecedent filing defect.
Issue
A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).
Was the Amended Information for Perjury against Villapando invalid for having been filed without proof of the City Prosecutor's prior written authority or approval, as required by Section 4, Rule 112, notwithstanding the certification of authority appearing on its face and the City Prosecutor's own subsequent Orders affirming the underlying resolutions?
B. Secondary Issues.
Whether a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition was a proper remedy to assail the METC's interlocutory denial of Villapando's motion to quash, and whether Villapando committed forum shopping by simultaneously seeking DOJ review and CA certiorari on the same issues.
C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.
Whether the Court should resolve, in G.R. No. 214965, the substantive question of whether violations of Sections 17, 20, and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses.
Ruling
MAIN ISSUE — YES, the Amended Information was invalid for lack of proven authority. "[T]here must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was given by the city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information," and applying Quisay v. People, "if indeed there was no proof of valid delegation of authority as found by the CA, We are constrained not to accord the presumption of regularity." Since "the said Office Order No. 32 is not a matter of judicial notice, hence, a copy of the same must be presented in order for the court to have knowledge of the contents," and none was presented, "there was no valid delegation of the authority by the City Prosecutor to its Assistant Prosecutor." Consequently, "the inescapable result is that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information," and "there is no point in compelling petitioner to undergo trial under a defective information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction." The Court also rejected the ratification argument: the City Prosecutor's Order denying Villapando's motion for reconsideration did not cure the defect, since People v. Garfin "firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent."
SECONDARY ISSUES — Certiorari was properly resorted to; no forum shopping occurred. While ordinarily "the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course," recognized exceptions apply "when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion" or "when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief." Since "the issue raised in this Petition goes into the very authority of the court over the case," a jurisdictional rather than a mere error-of-judgment question, certiorari properly lay. As for forum shopping, "the filing of an appeal with the DOJ as well as the filing of the petition with the CA would not constitute forum shopping," since "the finding of the DOJ would not be binding upon the courts" and "would merely be advisory."
ANCILLARY ISSUE — NO, the Court declined to resolve the "continuing offense" question. "[U]nless and until the City Prosecutor files a new information for perjury against Villapando, there would be no actual case to speak of," and resolving the P.D. 957 question now "would necessarily pre-empt the outcome of the trial before the proper court should an information be re-filed" — particularly since Villapando had a separate, pending petition (G.R. No. 216546) raising the identical question.
Dispositive portion (verbatim):
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 13, 2014, and Resolution dated October 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 131085 are hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
Ratio
- The Court applied Quisay v. People — decided little more than a year earlier on materially identical facts (a certification of prior authority unsupported by a produced office order) — as controlling precedent, extending its holding that a bare certification cannot substitute for actual, demonstrable proof of delegation.
- Because Office Order No. 32 was never made part of the record and is not the kind of internal administrative issuance a court may take judicial notice of, the Court had no basis to find the delegation chain (City Prosecutor to ACP Canobas/Vermug) actually existed, foreclosing the presumption of regularity urged by Maximo and Panganiban.
- The Court then closed off the most tempting escape route from that conclusion — the argument that City Prosecutor Aspi's own subsequent Orders (denying Villapando's motions for reconsideration) had, in substance, personally ratified the Assistant City Prosecutors' filings. Reasoning from People v. Garfin's characterization of the defect as jurisdictional, the Court held that a jurisdictional infirmity is by definition not curable by conduct after the fact — not silence, not acquiescence, and not even express consent — meaning subsequent ratification, however clear, cannot retroactively supply authority that did not exist at the moment of filing.
- Having resolved the authority question dispositively against the Information's validity, the Court found it unnecessary — and indeed inappropriate — to reach Villapando's separate substantive argument about P.D. 957's "continuing offense" character, since no live perjury prosecution remained pending in which that question would be outcome-determinative, and a duplicate proceeding was already pending elsewhere squarely raising it.
Doctrine
B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.
- A certification of prior written authority appearing in an Information is not self-proving; the office order or other instrument actually establishing the delegation must be part of the record, since such internal issuances are not subject to judicial notice — extending Quisay v. People by clarifying precisely what "proof" of delegation requires.
- The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even express consent, citing People v. Garfin and, through it, Villa v. Ibañez: "an infirmity in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent."
- A superior prosecuting officer's subsequent act of affirming or ratifying a subordinate's resolution does not cure an antecedent defect in the authority to file the Information — the delegation (or its absence) is assessed as of the time of filing, not as of any later ratifying act.
- The general rule is that a denial of a motion to quash — an interlocutory order — is not directly reviewable by certiorari or prohibition; the remedy is to proceed to trial and raise the denial on appeal from an adverse judgment. Recognized exceptions permit direct certiorari where:
- (a) The order issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
- (b) The order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate, expeditious relief.
- (c) The interest of more enlightened and substantial justice so requires.
- (d) Public welfare and policy are promoted.
- (e) The case has attracted nationwide attention requiring dispatch.
- Simultaneously pursuing a DOJ petition for review and a Rule 65 certiorari petition before the courts does not constitute forum shopping, since a DOJ resolution on a petition for review is merely advisory to, and not binding upon, the courts, and does not operate as res judicata, citing Flores v. Secretary Gonzales.
- Where a motion to quash is grounded on a defect curable by amendment, Section 4, Rule 117 mandates that the court order the amendment rather than proceed straight to quashal — a systemic point the Court raised on its own initiative, observing that timely awareness of this rule by the prosecutor and the METC judge could have avoided the case's protracted, unnecessary escalation to the Supreme Court.
C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.
- The ruling does not hold that delegation of filing authority can never be established by means short of physically producing the delegating instrument in every case; it holds only that, absent the instrument itself or some other competent proof, a bare certification cannot alone support a presumption of regularity once its existence is squarely put in issue and no corroborating record evidence is offered — the same limitation already recognized in Quisay.
- The non-curability-by-ratification holding is specific to defects in the authority to file; it does not address whether other, non-jurisdictional defects might be cured by a superior officer's subsequent action.
D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).
Classification: DIRECT.
- Maximo v. Villapando directly applies and meaningfully extends Quisay v. People within Topic 8, confirming that Section 4, Rule 112's prior-written-authority requirement demands actual, produced proof of delegation — not a bare certification — and adding the significant clarification that a jurisdictional authority defect cannot be cured even by the City Prosecutor's own later ratifying act.
Separate Opinions
None. The Decision reflects concurrence by Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen, and Martires, JJ.