ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic
8. Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor and its Review
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2016/jan2016/gr_216920_2016.html
Facts
- On 28 December 2012 the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati issued a Pasiya — a Resolution finding probable cause against Girlie M. Quisay for violation of Section 10, R.A. No. 7610. It was penned by ACP Estefano H. De La Cruz and approved by SACP Edgardo G. Hirang.
- On 11 January 2013 a Pabatid Sakdal — the Information — was filed in the RTC of Makati, Branch 144. It was penned and signed by ACP De La Cruz alone, with no signature of approval from any higher authority, but carried a Certification that its filing was "may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" — with the prior written authority and approval of the City Prosecutor. Approval on the resolution; a bare assertion on the Information.
- On 12 April 2013 Quisay moved to quash, arguing neither document showed that De La Cruz or Hirang actually held prior written authority to file, an incurable jurisdictional defect. The OCP opposed, citing Office Order No. 32 and the Certification itself.
- On 8 May 2013 the RTC denied the motion, finding the Certification sufficient compliance with Section 4, Rule 112; reconsideration was denied 10 July 2013.
- On 10 October 2014 the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that under Section 9, R.A. No. 10071 and Office Order No. 32 the City Prosecutor had validly delegated to SACP Hirang the authority to approve resolutions and Informations, and that the Certification enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent convincing contrary evidence. Reconsideration was denied 30 January 2015.
- On 13 January 2016 the First Division, through Justice Perlas-Bernabe, granted the petition, quashed the Information and dismissed the case.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals correctly hold that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion to quash for want of the prior written authority or approval required by Section 4, Rule 112?
Secondary issue. Whether a bare certification by the filing prosecutor, unsupported by record evidence, establishes compliance and enjoys the presumption of regularity.
Ruling
NO — the motion should have been granted. "[T]he CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity — that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner."
Secondary issue. NO on both counts. "[A]side from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so." So "the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record" of actual authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
Ratio
- The rule's text sets a condition, not a formality. A resolution and the resulting Information may proceed only with "the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy" — a requirement independent of and additional to the investigating prosecutor's own certification of probable cause.
- The two documents fared differently. The Pasiya was validly approved, SACP Hirang being a properly designated review prosecutor under Office Order No. 32, issued pursuant to Section 9, R.A. No. 10071.
- The Pabatid Sakdal bore no such signature at all — only De La Cruz's own uncorroborated Certification. The Court found it "simply baffling" that he obtained actual approval for the Pasiya but not for the Information, through the same or any other authorised officer.
- And the defect is jurisdictional. Since Section 4 makes prior written authority a condition of filing, and People v. Garfin already held such a defect jurisdictional, the absence of proof — as opposed to a bare assertion — voided the Information, warranting quashal under Section 3(d), Rule 117.
Doctrine
Prior written authority is a condition of filing. "No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy." Its absence is a jurisdictional infirmity which "cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even express consent" and may be raised at any stage (Garfin). Approval of the resolution and authority to file the Information are analytically distinct — a review prosecutor's valid approval of the former does not establish that the officer who signs and files the latter had authority. A bare, self-serving certification does not enjoy the presumption of regularity and cannot substitute for independent record evidence of actual authority — the same conclusion reached on "similarly-worded certifications" in Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin and Tolentino v. Paqueo. And the Rules bind the State most of all: "[f]or the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government."
Limits. A certification is not categorically worthless — what failed here was an unsubstantiated one, contradicted by the absence of any corroborating record and made conspicuous by the fact that proper approval was obtainable and was in fact obtained for the companion Pasiya. Had the record shown an actual written designation of De La Cruz to file Informations, or an actual approving signature on the Pabatid Sakdal, the result would presumably differ. And the case is confined to the authority to file under Section 4 — it says nothing about the sufficiency of probable cause, which was never contested. Read with Maximo v. Villapando, which applies and extends this holding to an office order never placed in the record, and with Section 5, Rule 110's vesting of direction and control in the public prosecutor — who signs is a question of jurisdiction, not of housekeeping.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
Gist
Classification: DIRECT. Petitioner Girlie Quisay was charged with violation of Section 10, R.A. No. 7610 (child abuse). The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati's Resolution finding probable cause (the Pasiya) bore the approval of a validly designated review prosecutor, but the Information actually filed in court (the Pabatid Sakdal) bore no such approval — only a bare certification by the assistant prosecutor who signed it, asserting without record support that he had obtained the City Prosecutor's prior written authority. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that this unsubstantiated certification did not satisfy Section 4, Rule 112's prior-written-authority requirement, rendering the Information void for a jurisdictional infirmity that required its quashal.
Facts
- On 28 December 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya (Resolution) finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10, R.A. No. 7610. The Pasiya was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang).
- On 11 January 2013, a Pabatid Sakdal (Information) was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144, charging petitioner with the offense. The Pabatid Sakdal was penned and signed by ACP De La Cruz alone, with no signature of approval from any higher authority, but carried a Certification stating that its filing was "may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" (with the prior written authority and approval of the City Prosecutor).
- On 12 April 2013, petitioner moved to quash the Information, arguing that neither the Pasiya nor the Pabatid Sakdal showed that ACP De La Cruz or SACP Hirang actually possessed prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file the Information, rendering it void for an incurable jurisdictional defect. The OCP-Makati opposed, arguing SACP Hirang was authorized to approve the Pasiya under OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, and that the Pabatid Sakdal's Certification itself showed the City Prosecutor's prior approval.
- The RTC denied the motion to quash (Order dated 8 May 2013), finding the Certification sufficient compliance with Section 4, Rule 112; petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on 10 July 2013. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 certiorari.
- The CA affirmed (Decision dated 10 October 2014), reasoning that under Section 9, R.A. No. 10071 and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor had validly delegated to SACP Hirang the authority to approve resolutions and Informations, and that the Pabatid Sakdal's Certification enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent convincing contrary evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on 30 January 2015.
- Petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court (Perlas-Bernabe, J., First Division) rendered the Decision under digest on 13 January 2016, granting the petition.
Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioner (Girlie M. Quisay).
Petitioner argued that the Pabatid Sakdal was fatally defective because the record contained no evidence — beyond ACP De La Cruz's own bare certification — that he had actually obtained prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor or any properly designated review prosecutor to file the Information, and that this defect was jurisdictional, incurable, and raisable at any stage under Section 3(d), Rule 117.
B. Respondent (People of the Philippines, through OCP-Makati).
The People, through the OCP-Makati, argued that the City Prosecutor had validly delegated authority to approve resolutions and Informations to review prosecutors, including SACP Hirang, under Section 9, R.A. No. 10071 and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, and that the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal was itself sufficient evidence — entitled to the presumption of regularity — that the requisite prior authority had been obtained.
C. Common Ground.
The parties did not dispute that the Pasiya bore SACP Hirang's actual signature of approval, that the Pabatid Sakdal bore no such signature and only a Certification by ACP De La Cruz, or the applicable delegation framework under R.A. No. 10071 and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; the dispute was whether the Certification alone sufficiently proved that ACP De La Cruz had the required prior written authority to file the Information.
Issue
A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).
Did the Court of Appeals correctly hold that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash the Information for lack of the investigating prosecutor's prior written authority or approval under Section 4, Rule 112?
B. Secondary Issues.
Whether a bare certification by the filing prosecutor, unsupported by independent record evidence, is sufficient to establish compliance with Section 4, Rule 112's prior-written-authority requirement, and whether such a certification enjoys the presumption of regularity.
C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.
None material to this Topic; the case turns entirely on the MAIN and SECONDARY issues above.
Ruling
MAIN ISSUE — NO, the CA erred; the RTC should have granted the motion to quash. "[T]he CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity — that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner."
SECONDARY ISSUE — NO, the bare Certification did not suffice and was not entitled to the presumption of regularity. "[A]side from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so." Consequently, "the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record" of actual authority.
Dispositive portion (verbatim):
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
Ratio
- The Court began from the plain text of Section 4, Rule 112: an investigating prosecutor's resolution and the resulting Information may proceed only with "the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy" — a requirement independent of, and additional to, the investigating prosecutor's own certification of probable cause.
- Applying this to the two distinct documents in the record, the Court found the Pasiya validly approved, since SACP Hirang — a review prosecutor properly designated under OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, itself issued pursuant to the City Prosecutor's delegation power under Section 9, R.A. No. 10071 — had actually signed it.
- The Pabatid Sakdal, by contrast, bore no such signature of approval from the City Prosecutor or any designated review prosecutor; the only evidence offered was ACP De La Cruz's own Certification asserting, without corroboration, that prior authority existed. The Court found this insufficient, noting it was "simply baffling" that ACP De La Cruz secured actual approval for the Pasiya but not for the Pabatid Sakdal through the same or any other authorized officer.
- Because Section 4, Rule 112 mandates prior written authority as a condition for filing, and because the Court in People v. Garfin had already established that a defect in this authority is jurisdictional in character, the absence of any actual proof of authority — as opposed to a bare self-serving assertion of it — rendered the Information void, warranting its quashal under Section 3(d), Rule 117.
Doctrine
B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.
- "No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy" — Section 4, Rule 112, quoted verbatim as the operative rule.
- The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even express consent, and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, citing People v. Garfin.
- Approval of the investigating prosecutor's resolution finding probable cause is analytically distinct from authority to file the resulting Information — a review prosecutor's valid approval of the former does not, by itself, establish that the officer who signs and files the latter possessed the required authority to do so.
- A bare, self-serving certification by the filing prosecutor asserting compliance with Section 4, Rule 112, unsupported by independent record evidence of actual authority (such as a written designation or delegation), does not enjoy the presumption of regularity and does not cure the absence of proof of authority, consistent with the Court's prior rejection of "similarly-worded certifications" in People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v. Paqueo.
- "[T]he Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the Philippines[; f]or the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government."
C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.
- The ruling does not hold that a certification of prior authority can never suffice; it holds only that an unsubstantiated, bare certification — contradicted by the absence of any corroborating record evidence, and notably inconsistent with the fact that proper approval was obtainable and was in fact obtained for the companion Pasiya — cannot discharge the prosecution's burden.
- Had the record shown an actual written designation of ACP De La Cruz as authorized to file Informations on his own, or an actual signature of approval from the City Prosecutor or a designated review prosecutor on the Pabatid Sakdal itself, the outcome would presumably differ.
- The case is also limited to the authority to file (or dismiss) under Section 4, Rule 112; it does not address the sufficiency of probable cause itself, which was not contested.
D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).
Classification: DIRECT.
- Quisay v. People is a direct, focused application of Section 4, Rule 112 — the very provision captioned "Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review" — illustrating precisely how the prior-written-authority requirement operates in practice, including the important distinction between approval of the investigating prosecutor's resolution and separate authority to file the resulting Information, and the jurisdictional (non-waivable) character of a defect in that authority.
Separate Opinions
None. The Decision reflects concurrence by Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.