Cainta Catholic School v. Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (CCSEU)

Ineligibility of Managerial Employees; Right of Supervisory Employees (Art. 255, Labor Code)

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Case DigestWeek 5 - The Right to Self-Organization

Cainta Catholic School v. Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (CCSEU)

G.R. No. 151021 · May 4, 2006 · Third Division

Ineligibility of Managerial Employees; Right of Supervisory Employees (Art. 255, Labor Code)

Gist

Core Doctrine

"[T]he exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice," so a CBA clause permitting retirement at the employer's option may be invoked even against sitting union officers. On eligibility, classification follows actual duties — "such job descriptions or appellations are meaningless should it be established that the actual duties performed by the employees concerned are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature" — and the bar reaches union office, not merely membership: a managerial employee "is proscribed from joining a labor union, more so being elected as union officer," while a supervisory employee "may join a labor union composed only of supervisory employees."

Note: Renumbering under DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, s. 2015: the decision's Art. 212(m) (definitions of managerial and supervisory employee) is now Art. 219(m); Art. 287 (retirement) is now Art. 302; Arts. 282-283 are now Arts. 297-298; Art. 263(g) is now Art. 278(g); and the rule on ineligibility of managerial employees, which the Court applies by citation, is now Art. 255 — the provision this syllabus topic assigns.

Facts

On March 6, 1986 the School and the Union executed a CBA effective to May 31, 1989, providing that on expiry without a new agreement "all the provisions of this Agreement shall remain full force and in effect."
Msgr. Mariano Balbago became School Director in April 1987, and from that time the Union became inactive.
Only on September 10, 1993 did the Union elect officers: Rosalina Llagas, then Dean of Student Affairs, President; Paz Javier, Subject Area Coordinator, Vice-President; Fe Villegas Treasurer and Maria Luisa Santos Secretary, both Year-Level Chairmen.
On October 15, 1993 — five weeks later — the School retired Llagas and Javier, both with more than twenty years' service, under Section 2, Article X of the CBA: "An employee may be retired, either upon application by the employee himself or by the decision of the Director of the School, upon reaching the age of sixty (60) or after having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service."
Three days later the Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB; on November 8, 1993 it struck and picketed the School's entrances.
On November 11, 1993, Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confesor certified the dispute to the NLRC under Article 263(g), ordered the strikers back within twenty-four hours, and suspended the effects of the two terminations.
On January 31, 1997 the NLRC ruled for the School on all three issues — the retirements were a legal CBA option, the ULP charge failed for insufficiency of evidence, and the November 8–12, 1993 strike was illegal, so all union officers lost their employment status.
On August 20, 2001 the Court of Appeals annulled those resolutions, finding the retirements to be union-busting, and ordered reinstatement and separation pay with damages and attorney's fees; reconsideration was denied December 6, 2001.
The School filed this Rule 45 petition; decided May 4, 2006.

Issue

Are a school's Dean of Student Affairs and Subject Area Coordinator managerial or supervisory employees under Article 212(m) (now Art. 219[m]) — and if so, what becomes of their membership in, and election as officers of, a rank-and-file union, given that managerial employees are ineligible and supervisory employees confined to unions of their own?

Secondary issues. Whether retiring Llagas and Javier under the CBA was unfair labor practice (the Court's dominant holding); whether the strike was legal; and whether officers ordered dismissed may recover backwages.

Ruling

Llagas is MANAGERIAL and Javier SUPERVISORY. Llagas "is proscribed from joining a labor union, more so being elected as union officer"; Javier "may join a labor union composed only of supervisory employees"; and neither belonging to the rank-and-file, "their membership in the Union has become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to represent their cause."

Secondary issues. NO unfair labor practice — "the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice." The strike was illegal, and there is "neither legal nor factual justification in awarding backwages to some union officers who have lost their employment status."

Ancillary issue. The NLRC's disposition that Llagas and Javier (or her heirs) receive their retirement benefits was affirmed.

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 31 January 1997 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CC No. L-000028-93 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

On the assigned Topic, the Court quoted Article 212(m): a managerial employee is "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions," while supervisory employees are "those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment."
Each officer was then measured against her actual functions, from the Faculty Manual. The Dean of Student Affairs "[m]anages the High School Department … in the absence of the Director or Principal," "[e]nforces the school rules and regulations governing students to maintain discipline," "[i]mplements and supervises activities and projects," and "[r]ecommends to the Principal policies and rules" — so "[i]t is fairly obvious from a perusal of the list that the Dean of Student Affairs exercises managerial functions."
Javier "[r]ecommends to the principal's consideration the appointment of faculty members in the department, their promotion, discipline and even termination," recommends curricular changes and purchases, and "serves as channel between teachers … and/or director" — so she "made recommendations as to what actions to take in hiring, termination, disciplinary actions, and management policies."
The Court accepted the qualification that titles do not govern — "such job descriptions or appellations are meaningless should it be established that the actual duties performed … are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature" — but "defer[red] to the factual finding of the NLRC, the proximate trier of facts."
On the dominant holding, retirement "is a different specie of termination of employment from dismissal for just or authorized causes," being "the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement." Under Article 287, and following Pantranco, Progressive Development and PAL v. ALPAP, "a CBA may validly accord management the prerogative to optionally retire an employee … even if such agreement allows for retirement at an age lower than the optional or compulsory retirement age."
The Court rejected the appellate court's reliance on NLRB v. Ace Comb, Co. as "grossly inapropos," reasoning that retirement is "less susceptible to dubitability" than just-cause dismissal because "[t]he only factual matter to consider then is whether the employee concerned had attained the requisite age or number of years in service" — so "management would anyway have the right to retire an employee, no matter the degree of involvement of said employee in union activities."
The closing caution is the reasoning's real point: a contrary rule "would imply that an active union member or officer may be, by reason of his/her importance to the union, somehow exempted from the normal standards of retirement," since "our law's protection of the right to organize labor does not translate into perpetual job security for union leaders by reason of their leadership role alone."

Doctrine

Managerial and supervisory employees in a rank-and-file union. A managerial employee "is proscribed from joining a labor union, more so being elected as union officer"; a supervisory employee "may join a labor union composed only of supervisory employees." Where union officers are "employees not belonging to the rank-and-file, their membership in the Union has become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to represent their cause." Classification follows actual duties: "such job descriptions or appellations are meaningless should it be established that the actual duties performed … are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature." On the dominant doctrine: "the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice," and a CBA may set an optional retirement threshold below the statutory ages.

Limits. The eligibility holding is expressly subordinate — the Court prefaced it with "[t]here are other arguments raised by petitioners. We need to discuss them only in brief, as they are no longer central to the resolution of this case" — and it rests on deference to the NLRC's factual findings, not on independent fact-finding. The Court stopped short of declaring the Union's representation void, saying only that the two officers' membership "has become questionable." Contrast SPFL v. Calleja and PICOP v. Laguesma, where the same functional test produced the opposite result because the recommendatory authority there was subject to review by superiors; here Javier's recommendations required independent judgment and Llagas managed the department in the Director's absence. CBA retirement clauses are not immune from review: the Court cautioned that they are not "absolutely beyond the ambit of judicial review and nullification" — a clause allowing retirement after a month, or benefits below Article 287's floor, would be void. Renumbering: Art. 212(m) → 219(m); Art. 287 → 302; Arts. 282–283 → 297–298; Art. 263(g) → 278(g); and the ineligibility rule applied by citation is now Art. 255.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

After a long-dormant union reactivated and elected new officers, Cainta Catholic School retired its newly elected President, Rosalina Llagas (Dean of Student Affairs), and Vice-President, Paz Javier (Subject Area Coordinator), both with more than twenty years of service, under a CBA clause permitting retirement at the School's option; the Union struck, and the Court of Appeals found unfair labor practice and union-busting. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the NLRC, holding the retirements a valid exercise of a CBA-granted management prerogative and the strike consequently illegal. The Court's dominant doctrine is therefore that "the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice." On the assigned Topic/Subtopic, the Court reached the eligibility question only in the portion it introduced by saying "[w]e need to discuss them only in brief, as they are no longer central to the resolution of this case" — but there it did apply the codal definitions to hold Llagas a managerial employee "proscribed from joining a labor union, more so being elected as union officer," and Javier a supervisory employee who "may join a labor union composed only of supervisory employees," concluding that "[f]inding both union officers to be employees not belonging to the rank-and-file, their membership in the Union has become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to represent their cause."

Facts

On March 6, 1986, the School and the Union executed a CBA effective January 1, 1986 to May 31, 1989, providing in Article IX that if no new agreement were reached on expiry, "all the provisions of this Agreement shall remain full force and in effect, up to the time a new Agreement shall be executed."
Msgr. Mariano Balbago was appointed School Director in April 1987, and from that time the Union became inactive.
Only on September 10, 1993 did the Union hold an election of officers, with Rosalina Llagas — then Dean of Student Affairs — elected President, Paz Javier Vice-President, Fe Villegas Treasurer, and Maria Luisa Santos Secretary, Villegas and Santos being Year-Level Chairmen.
On October 15, 1993, the School retired Llagas and Javier, both having rendered more than twenty years of continuous service, under Section 2, Article X of the CBA: "An employee may be retired, either upon application by the employee himself or by the decision of the Director of the School, upon reaching the age of sixty (60) or after having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service to the School the last three (3) years of which must be continuous."
Three days later the Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB, and on November 8, 1993 it struck and picketed the School's entrances.
On November 11, 1993, Secretary of Labor Ma. Nieves R. Confesor certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration under Article 263(g), directing the strikers back to work within twenty-four hours, suspending the effects of Llagas's and Javier's termination, and ordering their reinstatement pending determination of validity.
On December 20, 1993, the School petitioned the NLRC directly to declare the strike illegal.
On July 27, 1994 the Union filed an unfair labor practice complaint, later consolidated with the certified case.
On January 31, 1997, the NLRC ruled for the School on all three issues — the retirements were legal as a CBA option, the ULP charge failed for insufficiency of evidence, and the November 8-12, 1993 strike was illegal, so that all union officers lost their employment status; reconsideration was denied April 30, 1997.
The Union filed a petition for certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 129548), which issued a TRO effective July 23, 1997.
The School moved for clarification, having already enforced the NLRC resolution.
When ten regular teachers reported back on July 28, 1997 and were refused, the Union filed a contempt petition (G.R. No. 130004), consolidated with the first.
Pursuant to St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 50851.
On August 20, 2001, the appellate court annulled the NLRC resolutions, found the retirements to be union-busting, ordered reinstatement and separation pay with damages and attorney's fees, and dismissed the contempt petition.
Reconsideration was denied December 6, 2001, with modification granting separation pay instead of reinstatement to officers who had since retired or died.
The School filed this Rule 45 petition, decided May 4, 2006.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners Cainta Catholic School and Msgr. Balbago argued that the retirement of Llagas and Javier "was clearly in accordance with a specific right granted under the CBA," invoking Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC and Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez for the proposition that no unfair labor practice is committed where retirement is made in accord with management prerogative. On the point tied to this Topic/Subtopic, the School "insisted that Llagas and Javier were actually managerial employees, and it was illegal for the Union to have called a strike on behalf of two employees who were not legally qualified to be members of the Union in the first place."

B. Respondent Union argued, relying on the Court of Appeals' findings, that "the retirement of the two union officers is a mere subterfuge to bust the union," the two being its most vocal and influential leaders, and maintained on the eligibility question that Llagas and Javier "are rank-and-file employees."

C. Common Ground. The parties did not dispute the terms of the CBA retirement clause, that neither Llagas nor Javier had reached sixty, that both had rendered at least twenty years of service with the last three continuous, the dates of the union election and of the retirements, or the contents of the Faculty Manual's description of the Dean of Student Affairs and of the Subject Area Coordinator's duties.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Are a school's Dean of Student Affairs and Subject Area Coordinator managerial or supervisory employees under Article 212(m) (now Art. 219[m]) — and if so, what becomes of their membership in, and their election as officers of, a rank-and-file union, given the statutory ineligibility of managerial employees and the confinement of supervisory employees to unions of their own?

B. Secondary Issues. Whether the School's decision to retire Llagas and Javier under the CBA constituted unfair labor practice (the Court's dominant holding); whether the strike was legal; whether union officers ordered dismissed are entitled to backwages.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues. Entitlement of Llagas and Javier (or her heirs) to retirement benefits.

Ruling

Main Issue: Llagas is MANAGERIAL and Javier SUPERVISORY — Llagas "is proscribed from joining a labor union, more so being elected as union officer"; Javier "may join a labor union composed only of supervisory employees"; and neither belonging to the rank-and-file, "their membership in the Union has become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to represent their cause." Secondary Issues: NO unfair labor practice — "the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice"; the strike was illegal; and there is "neither legal nor factual justification in awarding backwages to some union officers who have lost their employment status." Ancillary Issue: the NLRC's disposition that Llagas and Javier (or her heirs) receive their retirement benefits was affirmed.

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 31 January 1997 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CC No. L-000028-93 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

On the assigned Topic. The Court quoted Article 212(m)'s definition of a managerial employee — "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions" — and the companion definition of supervisory employees as "those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment."
It then measured each officer against her actual functions.
The Faculty Manual showed the Dean of Student Affairs "[m]anages the High School Department with the Registrar and Guidance Counselors (acting as a COLLEGIAL BODY) in the absence of the Director or Principal," "[e]nforces the school rules and regulations governing students to maintain discipline," plans student leadership training programs, studies and recommends approval of extra-curricular proposals, "[i]mplements and supervises activities and projects approved by the Principal/Director," and "[r]ecommends to the Principal policies and rules to serve as guides to effective implementation of the student activity program" — from which "[i]t is fairly obvious from a perusal of the list that the Dean of Student Affairs exercises managerial functions, thereby classifying Llagas as a managerial employee."
Javier, as Subject Area Coordinator, "[r]ecommends to the principal's consideration the appointment of faculty members in the department, their promotion, discipline and even termination," recommends advisory responsibilities, curricular changes and purchases, and "serves as channel between teachers in the department[,] the principal and/or director" — so "Javier was a supervisory employee[.] Verily, Javier made recommendations as to what actions to take in hiring, termination, disciplinary actions, and management policies, among others."
The Court accepted the qualification that "such job descriptions or appellations are meaningless should it be established that the actual duties performed by the employees concerned are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature," but "defer[red] to the factual finding of the NLRC, the proximate trier of facts, that Llagas and Javier were indeed managerial and supervisory employees, respectively."
On the dominant holding. Retirement "is a different specie of termination of employment from dismissal for just or authorized causes," being "the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement."
Under Article 287, and following Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. ALPAP, "a CBA may validly accord management the prerogative to optionally retire an employee under the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon by management and the bargaining union, even if such agreement allows for retirement at an age lower than the optional retirement age or the compulsory retirement age."
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' reliance on NLRB v. Ace Comb, Co. as "grossly inapropos," and reasoned that retirement is "less susceptible to dubitability" than just-cause dismissal because "[t]he only factual matter to consider then is whether the employee concerned had attained the requisite age or number of years in service," so "management would anyway have the right to retire an employee, no matter the degree of involvement of said employee in union activities."
It added that a contrary rule "would imply that an active union member or officer may be, by reason of his/her importance to the union, somehow exempted from the normal standards of retirement," since "our law's protection of the right to organize labor does not translate into perpetual job security for union leaders by reason of their leadership role alone."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles. A managerial employee, "[h]aving established that Llagas is a managerial employee, she is proscribed from joining a labor union, more so being elected as union officer"; a supervisory employee "may join a labor union composed only of supervisory employees." Where union officers are "employees not belonging to the rank-and-file, their membership in the Union has become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to represent their cause." Classification follows actual duties: "such job descriptions or appellations are meaningless should it be established that the actual duties performed by the employees concerned are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature." On the dominant doctrine: "the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice," and a CBA may set an optional retirement threshold below the statutory ages.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications. The eligibility holding is expressly subordinate — the Court prefaced it with "[t]here are other arguments raised by petitioners. We need to discuss them only in brief, as they are no longer central to the resolution of this case" — and it rests on deference to the NLRC's factual findings rather than on independent fact-finding. The Court also stopped short of declaring the Union's representation void, saying only that the two officers' membership "has become questionable." Note the contrast with SPFL v. Calleja and PICOP v. Laguesma, where the same functional test produced the opposite result because the recommendatory authority there was subject to review by superiors; here, Javier's recommendations were held to require independent judgment, and Llagas's duties included managing the department in the Director's absence. Finally, the Court cautioned that CBA retirement provisions "are [not] absolutely beyond the ambit of judicial review and nullification" — a clause allowing "retirement" after one month of service, or benefits below Article 287's floor, would be void.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory). As classified in Section I, this case is DIRECT but subordinate: the Court does apply the codal definitions and the resulting rule of the assigned Topic — managerial employees may not join any labor organization, supervisory employees only their own — and gives that application real consequence, since it is one reason the strike could not be justified as taken on behalf of validly represented members. Its distinctive contribution to the Topic is the demonstration that the managerial/supervisory bar reaches union office, not merely rank-and-file membership, and that an academic administrator's functions, drawn from a Faculty Manual rather than a corporate authority chart, are tested by the same Article 219(m) criteria.

Separate Opinions

None. The Decision, penned by Justice Tinga, was concurred in by Justices Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Velasco, Jr.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Labor Code

Article 287, Labor Code

Retirement

Labor Code (P.D. No. 442, as amended), Book VI (Post Employment), Title II (Retirement From the Service)

Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.

In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.

Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one-half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.

Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.

Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288 of this Code.

Renumbered as Article 302 by DOLE Department Advisory No. 1, series of 2015; decisions before that cite it as Article 287.

Why it is cited here

The retirement article, and the source of the employer's prerogative that this case upholds even against sitting union officers.

Its first sentence is the whole basis: "Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract." The article defers to the CBA — so where the agreement gives the employer an option to retire an employee at a stated age, exercising that option is enforcing the contract, not evading the law.

From which the holding follows: "the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice." The union's difficulty is that the clause was one it had itself bargained for, and it applied to officers on the same terms as everyone else.

The limit is worth stating too, because it is what a ULP claim would need. The prerogative must be valid and duly established, and it must be genuinely exercised as such — a retirement clause invoked selectively against union officers, and against no one else, would be evidence of the anti-union motive the article cannot launder.

Labor Code

Article 212, Labor Code

Definitions

Labor Code (P.D. No. 442, as amended), Book V (Labor Relations), Title I (Policy and Definitions), Chapter II (Definitions)

"Commission" means the National Labor Relations Commission or any of its divisions, as the case may be, as provided under this Code.

"Bureau" means the Bureau of Labor Relations and/or the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices established under Presidential Decree No. 1, in the Department of Labor.

"Board" means the National Conciliation and Mediation Board established under Executive Order No. 126.

"Council" means the Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council established under Executive Order No. 126, as amended.

"Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.

"Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.

"Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.

"Legitimate labor organization" means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof.

"Company union" means any labor organization whose formation, function or administration has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this Code.

"Bargaining representative" means a legitimate labor organization whether or not employed by the employer.

"Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined by the Code.

"Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

"Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.

"Voluntary Arbitrator" means any person accredited by the Board as such or any person named or designated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the parties to act as their Voluntary Arbitrator, or one chosen with or without the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, pursuant to a selection procedure agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, or any official that may be authorized by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to act as Voluntary Arbitrator upon the written request and agreement of the parties to a labor dispute.

"Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

"Lockout" means any temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

"Internal union dispute" includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in this Code.

"Strike-breaker" means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by force, violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful picketing affecting wages, hours or conditions of work or in the exercise of the right of self-organization or collective bargaining.

"Strike area" means the establishment, warehouses, depots, plants or offices, including the sites or premises used as runaway shops, of the employer struck against, as well as the immediate vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in moving to and fro before all points of entrance to and exit from said establishment. (As amended by Section 4, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Renumbered as Article 219 by DOLE Department Advisory No. 1, series of 2015; decisions before that cite it as Article 212.

Why it is cited here

The definitions behind the eligibility half of the case, and the reason the employer's classifications did not settle who belonged in the unit.

A managerial employee is one "vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies"; a supervisory employee "effectively recommend[s] such managerial actions" using independent judgment. Both turn on function.

Hence the Court's formulation, which is the sharpest statement of this principle in the week's cases: "such job descriptions or appellations are meaningless should it be established that the actual duties performed are otherwise." Classification follows actual duties. An employer cannot move employees out of a bargaining unit by relabelling them, and a party disputing the unit must prove what the people concerned really do.

Labor Code

Article 263, Labor Code

Strikes, picketing and lockouts

Labor Code (P.D. No. 442, as amended), Book V (Labor Relations), Title VIII (Strikes and Lockouts and Foreign Involvement in Trade Union Activities), Chapter I (Strikes and Lockouts)

It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining.

Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.

In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)

The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the Minister of Labor and Employment may promulgate.

During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.

A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981 and further amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)

When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to-work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious efforts, not only by labor and management but government as well, be exhausted to substantially minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and health, through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by management to lockout. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately assume, within twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

Before or at any stage of the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. (As amended by Section 27, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Renumbered as Article 278 by DOLE Department Advisory No. 1, series of 2015; decisions before that cite it as Article 263.

Why it is cited here

Cited for the Secretary of Labor's assumption power in paragraph (g), which is how a dispute of this kind reaches the Secretary at all — the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labour dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest, or to certify it for compulsory arbitration.

Its relevance here is jurisdictional rather than substantive: it explains the procedural posture in which the retirement and eligibility questions came to be decided administratively rather than through a strike. Note the renumbering the digests use — Article 263(g) is now Article 278(g).

Cited laws & provisions

Article 287, Labor Code

Labor Code

Retirement

Labor Code (P.D. No. 442, as amended), Book VI (Post Employment), Title II (Retirement From the Service)

Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.

Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288 of this Code.

Renumbered as Article 302 by DOLE Department Advisory No. 1, series of 2015; decisions before that cite it as Article 287.

Why it is cited here

The retirement article, and the source of the employer's prerogative that this case upholds even against sitting union officers.

Full entry below ↓