Week 5 Coverage Table
The table below mirrors the workbook's assigned cases for Week 5 and links each item to its digest page.
All 28 digests are written. Every citation in the table below has been checked against the published text on LawPhil; corrections to the workbook's citations are noted after the table.
Class. records how the case actually stands to the subtopic it was assigned under — DIRECT (the Court squarely applies the doctrine), ANALOGOUS (it decides the point under a different provision or doctrine), REJECTED (the Court found the doctrine not established), INCIDENTAL (the doctrine is mentioned but the disposition rests elsewhere). Reciting a REJECTED case as if it were DIRECT inverts the holding.
Item 24 is resolved. The workbook reads "Kampil Katipunan v. Trajano (please see previous)," and there is no previous entry in the Week 5 list. The case is Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75810, September 9, 1991, First Division, penned by Justice Narvasa — a Resolution, not a full Decision. Bring the citation to class.
Citation corrections. Eight of the workbook's entries do not match the published text, and every one has been verified on LawPhil.
- Item 19 and 26 — National Federation of Labor v. Secretary of Labor is dated March 19, 1998, not March 9, 1998. This is the correction most likely to matter in a recitation.
- Item 21 — NUWHRAIN-Manila Pavilion v. SOLE carries no date in the workbook; it is July 31, 2009.
- Item 28 — Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. Noriel carries no date in the workbook; it is September 21, 1982.
- Item 16 — Belyca Corporation is G.R. No. L-77395, with the "L-" prefix.
- Item 7 — Filoil is one word in the published caption, both for the corporation and for the association, not "Fil-oil / Fil Oil."
- Item 20 — Yokohama is spelled with an "a," not "Yokohoma."
- Item 22 — Foamtex is "Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS," not "Foamtex Labo Union."
- Item 23 is Capitol Medical Center, not "Capital" — and note that the petitioner is the challenging union, the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-UFSW, not the hospital, which is a respondent. The published caption is itself defective, reading "Capitol Medical Center of Concerned Employees" where the body of the decision says "Alliance of Concerned Employees."
Three cases carry two subtopics this week. ISAE v. Quisumbing (items 14 and 15 — Globe doctrine, then collective bargaining history) and National Federation of Labor (items 19 and 26 — nature of the election, then its process) each have two digest pages, one per assigned subtopic, cross-linked to each other. De La Salle University Medical Center (item 3) was already assigned in Week 2 under Art. 82; that digest classifies it INCIDENTAL, and this one — assigned to the case's actual holding — classifies it DIRECT.
Read the four non-DIRECT classifications carefully. Kampil-Katipunan (item 24) is REJECTED: the Court held the bargaining deadlock bar not established, so reciting it as authority for the bar inverts the holding. Filoil (item 7) is ANALOGOUS: decided in 1972 under the Industrial Peace Act, it includes confidential employees in a supervisors' unit on an identity-of-interest rationale, and predates the doctrine of necessary implication entirely — it is the surviving exception, not the rule. St. James (item 13) is ANALOGOUS: it decides the unit point under the Omnibus Rules on voter qualification rather than by running the commonality test. Arizala (item 9) is INCIDENTAL: its disposition rests on the effect of a decriminalising repeal, and its value to the subtopic is the survey of how the government-sector right to self-organize was granted, withdrawn and restored.
Recitation Map
One line per case — what it is for, and the categorical holding.
| Case | What it is for | Categorical holding |
|---|---|---|
| Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v. Calleja | Who may be excluded from the bargaining unit, and by what instrument | Only managerial employees are ineligible, judged by work actually performed — and the right "cannot be curtailed by a collective bargaining agreement" |
| Paper Industries Corporation v. Laguesma | Reclassification by job title on the eve of a certification election | "The mere fact that an employee is designated 'manager' does not ipso facto make him one" — the job description controls, and recommendatory authority is supervisory |
| De La Salle University Medical Center v. Laguesma | Whether a supervisory union may affiliate with the rank-and-file's federation | It may — the Atlas Lithographic prohibition bites only where two conditions concur: direct authority over the rank-and-file, and an actively involved federation |
| Cainta Catholic School v. CCSEU | Managerial and supervisory status applied to sitting union officers | The President was managerial and barred from the union; the Vice-President supervisory and eligible only for a supervisors' union — though the case turns on a valid CBA retirement prerogative |
| San Miguel Corp Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma | The definition of a confidential employee and its limiting principle | Two cumulative criteria — a confidential capacity, and to persons who formulate policy in the field of labor relations; business confidentiality is not enough |
| Sugbuanon Rural Bank v. Laguesma | The confidential-employee rule when the employer proves only the first criterion | Cashiers and accountants with recommendatory powers are not managerial, and an employer that never shows "who among the employees has access to information specifically relating to its labor relations policies" fails — even for the Cashier who was Board secretary |
| Filoil Refinery Corp v. Filoil Supervisory Employees Assn | Whether confidential employees may be placed in a supervisors' unit | They may, where they are few in number and by practice and tradition identified with the supervisors — the identity-of-interest exception; and a supervisor's dual status makes him an employee toward his own employer |
| San Miguel Foods v. SMC Supervisors and Exempt Union | The confidential-employee test applied to three job descriptions | Payroll Master is in — salary data is not labor relations data; HR Assistant and Personnel Assistant are out — they record CBA negotiations and grievance meetings |
| Arizala v. Court of Appeals | The government-sector right to self-organize, traced through eight statutes | Supervisors already in a rank-and-file union when R.A. No. 6715 took effect may "remain therein," so the conduct once punished "is not only not a crime, but is explicitly allowed" — and a decriminalising repeal ends the court's power to punish |
| Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Calleja | Whether a cooperative's member-employees may unionise | No — "an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners," and it is ownership, not managerial participation, that disqualifies; non-member employees keep the right |
| ICMC v. Calleja | Whether diplomatic immunity reaches a certification election | It does — "[a] certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process," and the executive's recognition of immunity is a political question binding on the courts |
| San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma | The four-factor framework for drawing a bargaining unit | Bargaining history is "neither decisive nor conclusive"; "the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests," and the employer's convenience is not the determinative factor |
| St. James School of Quezon City v. Samahang Manggagawa | What the quorum in a certification election is computed on | On the bargaining unit sought to be represented — 149 motor pool and construction workers at one campus, not the school's 179 or its 570 across five campuses |
| ISAE v. Quisumbing (Globe doctrine) | The will of the employees as the first unit factor | Foreign-hires stay in their own unit — they never "indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires" — but the 25% salary differential is an invalid classification contravening public policy |
| ISAE v. Quisumbing (bargaining history) | Prior bargaining history as the third unit factor | "[T]hese groups were always treated separately" — two salary schedules written into the parties' own CBA — but history confirms; it does not decide |
| Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja | Employment status as the fourth unit factor | Seasonal and casual farm workers "have very little in common with the employees of the supermarts and cinemas"; and post-filing withdrawals are presumed procured by duress |
| TUPAS/FSM v. Laguesma | What exclusivity means for the CBA's whole term | Certification means the union "shall remain as such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations" — and late filing under Art. 231 does not defeat it |
| Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corp | The limit of the individual-grievance exception to exclusivity | "The right... to present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration"; and the NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency |
| NFL v. Secretary of Labor (nature) | What a certification election is, and the employer's place in it | It is "the most conclusive way of choosing" a representative, and doubts are resolved in favour of holding one; the employer may not interfere "for the purpose of influencing its outcome" but has "an abiding interest" in a clean election |
| Yokohama Tire Philippines v. Yokohama Employees Union | Whether a dismissed employee may vote | Yes, while his challenge is pending — "without a final judgment declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or qualified voters," whatever the ground of dismissal |
| NUWHRAIN-Manila Pavilion v. SOLE | Probationary voters, promoted supervisors, and the double majority | Probationary employees vote from the first day of service and a CBA cannot bar them; promoted supervisors do not; and 169 of 337 valid votes is one short of the majority, so a run-off follows |
| Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS v. Noriel | What kind of contract raises the contract bar | Only a certified CBA bars an election — and no contract bars where "as a result of a schism in the union, the contract can no longer serve to promote industrial stability" |
| Capitol Medical Center v. Laguesma | The deadlock bar where the employer refused to bargain at all | There was no deadlock in the strict sense, but "what happened in this case is worse than a bargaining deadlock"; the rule is read liberally to protect a union that charged ULP and struck |
| Kampil-Katipunan v. Trajano | The deadlock bar where the incumbent did nothing for four years | Not established — "[i]t could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike...; but it did not" |
| Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries v. Torres | When the five-day protest clock starts | "Close of election proceedings" runs "from the closing of the polls to the counting and tabulation of the votes," not to the resolution of challenged ballots; a one-day posting shortfall is insignificant where 291 of 322 voted |
| NFL v. Secretary of Labor (process) | When the protest requirements yield | Workers who "were not properly notified of the date" of the election "could not therefore have filed their protests within five (5) days" — the five-day rule is "a mere technicality" against the workers' welfare |
| Algire v. De Mesa | The consequence of not objecting at the canvass | Failure to object "seasonably during the canvass of votes" is "a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election" — and a fresh election, not a ruling on one ballot, is the proper forum |
| Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. Noriel | What voids a run-off, and what follows | Disfranchisement, lost secrecy, supervisors "remiss in their duties," and unions "overzealous in wooing" voters — another run-off, inside the employer's premises, with management ordered to assist |
Study Notes
Designation never decides eligibility, and neither does importance. Southern Philippines Federation of Labor fixes the base rule twice over: only managerial employees are ineligible, and eligibility turns on the nature of the work actually performed rather than on title. Paper Industries is that rule under pressure — the employer renamed its section heads "section managers" to keep them off the voters' list, and the Court held that authority "in effect recommendatory in character... subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads" is supervisory. Sugbuanon adds the other half: a bank's argument that its cashiers and loan officers do work at "the very core of the bank's business" proves the wrong thing, because Art. 219(m) asks about powers over employees and over management policy, not about commercial centrality.
The confidential-employee exclusion is judge-made, and its second criterion is where cases are won. Art. 255 excludes managerial employees; confidential employees are excluded only by necessary implication, which is why San Miguel Corp Supervisors insists the two criteria are cumulative — a confidential capacity, and to persons who formulate policy in the field of labor relations. Almost every employer proves the first and stops. Sugbuanon is the paradigm failure ("does not state who among the employees has access to information specifically relating to its labor relations policies"), and even the Cashier who served as secretary of the Board of Directors was not excluded. San Miguel Foods is the same test with the answers shown: Payroll Master in, HR Assistant and Personnel Assistant out, decided by reading the actual job descriptions. Learn the three positions as a set — they are the fastest way to state the rule in a recitation.
Read Filoil against the grain of the subtopic it sits in. It is the one case in the group that lets confidential employees into a unit, and it does so under the Industrial Peace Act in 1972 — before the Labor Code, before Bulletin Publishing and Golden Farms, before the doctrine of necessary implication existed. Its rule is the identity of interest exception: where confidential employees "are very few in number and are by practice and tradition identified with the supervisors," they may share the supervisors' unit, because the divided-loyalty rationale has nothing to work on. Note the one man still excluded — Marcelo Bernardo, who "handles personnel matters for the employer." That is the boundary from the other side.
Items 9 to 11 exclude by reference to who the employer is, not what the employee does. A cooperative's member-employee is out because he owns the enterprise — "certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners," and BENECO is emphatic that it is ownership, not managerial participation, that disqualifies. An international organization's employees are out because the employer is beyond Philippine process — and ICMC rejects the argument that a certification election is too innocuous to engage immunity, because "[a] certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process." Arizala completes the set with the State itself, and is worth reading for its decade-by-decade map: the right granted to proprietary-function employees under R.A. No. 875, withdrawn wholesale by the Labor Code, restored in part by E.O. No. 111, constitutionalised by Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(5), then delimited by E.O. No. 180 as a right "for the furtherance and protection of their interests" rather than for collective bargaining.
The four bargaining-unit tests are one list, and San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma states it. Will of the employees (Globe), affinity and unity of interest (substantial mutual interests), prior bargaining history, and similarity of employment status — with the closing rule that "the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests." ISAE is the case to study, because all four operate at once and they conflict: three point against putting foreign-hires with local-hires (no expressed wish, always treated separately, different tenure) while the second points the other way (identical work and conditions). The tie-breaker is the sentence to memorise — "whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights." Note the trap in ISAE: the foreign-hires lose their place in the unit and the local-hires still win parity in salary, because unit membership and equal treatment are separate questions.
Exclusivity runs in two directions, and Week 5 gives you one case for each. Outward, against a rival: TUPAS/FSM holds that certification "means it shall remain as such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations," for the whole five-year representation term under Art. 265. Inward, against the union's own members: Tabigue holds that the Art. 267 right of "an individual employee or group of employees... to present grievances to their employer" is a right of access, not of machinery — it "does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration," because the grievance procedure and the arbitrators belong to the union and the company by agreement.
The bars are exceptions to a default, and each protects a bargaining relationship that actually exists. The default is that "a petition for certification election may be filed at any time." The contract bar protects a certified CBA — Foamtex turns on that single adjective, and adds the schism exception: a contract signed while the union is splitting in two "is no longer a stabilizing force." The certification year protects a fresh mandate for the year in which the union is expected to negotiate. The deadlock bar protects an impasse formally joined. Learn Capitol Medical and Kampil-Katipunan strictly as a pair: both incumbents had a year (or four) with no CBA and blamed the employer, and the difference is that CMCEA-AFW charged unfair labor practice and struck while NAFLU did neither. Kampil is where the Court listed the remedies a union should use; Capitol Medical is where a union used them and was protected, the Court reading the rule liberally so that "no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous employers."
Voter eligibility is a question of validity, not housekeeping. BENECO shows why: 83 people voted against a finding of 37 eligibles, and although BELU took 49, "it cannot be determined whether or not respondent union was duly elected." NUWHRAIN shows the same arithmetic from the other end — once the probationary employees' votes were held valid and the promoted supervisors' invalid, the denominator became 337, the required majority 170, and the winner's 169 one vote short. The sentence to carry is that "the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won." Four cases fix who votes: dismissed employees contesting their dismissal (Yokohama, Philippine Fruits), strikers before any final ruling (BENECO), probationary employees from the first day of service (NUWHRAIN), and no one whose promotion out of the rank and file preceded the election (NUWHRAIN again).
Protests: two gates, and one recognised excuse. Philippine Fruits states both requirements — raise it with the representation officer before the close of the proceedings, on pain of waiver, and formalise it before the Med-Arbiter within five days, on pain of its being dropped — and defines the phrase everything turns on: "close of election proceedings" runs "from the closing of the polls to the counting and tabulation of the votes," not to the resolution of challenged ballots. Algire applies the waiver to a party that watched the ruling being made and said nothing. NFL supplies the only excuse: workers who "were not properly notified of the date" of the election "could not therefore have filed their protests within five (5) days." Note that in Tabigue the same "labor cases are never decided on technicality" argument failed, because the petitioners "have not proffered any reason to call for a relaxation" — liberality must be asked for with a reason.
When an election fails, the remedy is another election. NFL orders a fresh certification election where 913 of 1,692 workers were kept from voting; CCLU orders another run-off, expressly inside the employer's premises, with management ordered to allow all employees to participate; NUWHRAIN orders a run-off where no choice reached the majority; Algire affirms an order for a new officers' election after a 133-133 tie. The reasoning is constant: the object is not to adjudicate a ballot but to ascertain a majority, so "[i]n case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the holding of a certification election."
The bystander rule appears four times, and the versions differ. Belyca, Philippine Fruits and San Miguel Foods state it flatly — the employer is "nothing more than a bystander with no right to interfere at all," and must take "a strict, hands-off stance." NFL draws the line more carefully, by purpose: what is forbidden is interference "for the purpose of influencing its outcome," while "an employer has an abiding interest in seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible." Reconcile them on the facts — in NFL the employer was the conduit for 784 workers' affidavits that they had been shut out; in Belyca and Philippine Fruits the employer was contesting its own employees' right to vote. The single textual exception in every version is Art. 270: an employer requested to bargain collectively may itself petition for an election.
Where the published texts are unreliable. Every digest in this week reproduces the decision as printed and flags the defect rather than silently correcting it. The ones worth knowing: Belyca prints "Glove Doctrine" for the Globe Doctrine and dates E.O. No. 111 to 1980 when it issued 24 December 1986; TUPAS/FSM calls the freedom period "fifty-day" while quoting the article that fixes it at sixty; ICMC gives the Senate resolution concurring in the Convention three different numbers (91, 19 and 21) and two ratification dates; Foamtex cites the Labor Code as "P.D. No. 422"; Sugbuanon dates the Resolution under review 27 April 1994 in one paragraph and 22 April 1994 in another; and San Miguel Foods duplicates a whole clause inside its quotation of Art. 245. Read the primary text before quoting any of them in a pleading.