Note: The Week 5 workbook lists this case as "Kampil Katipunan v. Trajano (please see previous)," and the week file records that no previous entry exists — the citation had to come from the professor. It is Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75810, September 9, 1991, First Division, penned by Justice Narvasa. The gap in the workbook is now closed. Note that the ruling is a Resolution, not a full Decision. On numbering: Article 231 of the Labor Code, referred to twice in the quoted rule, is now Article 237 under DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, s. 2015. The published text carries "R E S O LU T I O N" with a stray space and truncates two footnote references ("EE Sec. 1, Rule 3"; "omment filed by public respondent"); reproduced as printed.
Facts
- By a BLR Resolution dated February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) "was declared the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON)."
- More than four years thereafter, on April 11, 1985, KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN petitioned for a certification election, "allegedly count[ing] with the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the workers." NAFLU opposed.
- On June 14, 1985 the Med-Arbiter ordered an election, having ascertained that KAMPIL complied with all requirements and that "since the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been executed." Four years of certification and no agreement — the fact that frames everything.
- NAFLU appealed, contending that at the filing it "was in process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock … which had prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances constituted a bar" under Section 3, Rule V, Book V.
- On April 30, 1986 the Director of Labor Relations set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and dismissed the petition, reasoning that although "the one-year period … has long run its course," "it could not be said, however, that NAFLU slept on its right to bargain collectively," the delay being attributable to prior representation litigation and to "management who had been resisting the representations of NAFLU" — so "[t]he one-year period … should not be applied literally."
- The record held assertions that VIRON's "recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises" had frustrated bargaining and that representation challenges had delayed it, "but there is no adequate substantiation thereof."
- On October 26, 1986 NAFLU struck "for refusal of VIRON to bargain," settled by agreement; and on December 6, 1986 it struck again over an alleged breach of that agreement. Both strikes post-date KAMPIL's petition by well over a year.
- Reconsideration denied, KAMPIL brought certiorari. Decided September 9, 1991 — by Resolution, not a full Decision.
Issue
Is KAMPIL's petition barred by the bargaining deadlock bar — that is, was there, before the filing of the petition, "a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party [that] had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout"?
Secondary issue. Whether the certification year bar may be extended beyond its terms where the incumbent's failure to conclude a CBA is blamed on the employer's resistance and on prior representation litigation.
Ancillary issue. Whether strikes staged after the filing of the petition may be treated as precluding the election it sought.
Ruling
NO, the petition is not barred. "[P]rior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was no such 'bargaining deadlock… (which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.'" There were assertions of the employer's recalcitrance, "but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON" — "[i]t could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike…; but it did not."
Secondary issue. NO extension. The certification year "can have no application to the case at bar" and "has long since expired."
Ancillary issue. NO. The 1986 strikes "took place after the initiation of the certification election case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as precluding the holding of the certification election."
"WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise, the contested Resolution of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30, 1986 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- The Court disposed of the certification year first and briefly: the one-year prohibition, running from February 27, 1981, "can have no application," that period being "the 'certification year' during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the employer," and it "has long since expired."
- The real question was therefore the deadlock bar — whether a deadlock "had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout" before the petition. On the record, there was none.
- NAFLU's assertions did not supply the deficiency. There were claims of "recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty."
- The Court then named the unused remedies — the passage the case is remembered for: "It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not."
- The second excuse fared no better: the claim that representation challenges caused delay lacked "adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process."
- Against the excuses the Court set the record: "[t]he stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981 … to April 11, 1985 — or a period of more than four (4) years — no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose from negotiations."
- The strikes were disposed of on timing. The rule requires the deadlock and its submission "before the filing of a petition."
- The disposition states the governing frame: "it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise."
Doctrine
The default and the bars. "In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement…, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time," subject only to the bars the rule sets out. The certification year bar covers one year from the final certification result — the year "during which the certified union is required to negotiate" — and is not extended by the incumbent's difficulties once expired. The deadlock bar requires that, before the filing of the petition, a deadlock "had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout"; assertions of the employer's recalcitrance do not establish it, and an incumbent that neither charged unfair labor practice nor struck has taken "no action to legally coerce" the employer. Events after the petition cannot bar it. The contract bar applies only to a CBA "duly registered," and then limits petitions to the sixty days before expiry. Where "none of the proscriptions … exists," refusing an election is grave abuse of discretion.
Limits. The bars are exceptions to a default, and the burden of establishing one lies on the party invoking it — here on NAFLU, which produced assertions instead of proof. The Court does not say a deadlock never existed in fact; it says none had been "submitted to conciliation or arbitration or … the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout," which is what the rule requires. The triggers are formal and verifiable precisely so that the bar cannot be established by the incumbent's own narrative. The decision does not excuse the employer: VIRON's resistance may well have been unlawful, but the remedy for a refusal to bargain is a ULP charge or a lawful strike, not the indefinite protection of the union that failed to bring one. And it says nothing against a genuine deadlock bar — an incumbent that had filed a valid strike notice over a real impasse before the rival's petition would have been protected, which is the situation Capital Medical Center v. Laguesma examines from the other side. Recite it as a REJECTED application: read as though it upheld the deadlock bar, the case teaches the opposite of what it decides. Citation: it is Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75810, September 9, 1991. Renumbering: Article 231 is now Article 237.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
Gist
NAFLU had been declared the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. by a BLR Resolution of 27 February 1981. More than four years later, on 11 April 1985, KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN petitioned for a certification election with the support of more than 30% of the workers. The Med-Arbiter granted it, noting that since NAFLU's certification "no collective bargaining agreement had been executed." NAFLU appealed, invoking the bargaining deadlock bar in Section 3, Rule V, Book V — it was, it said, in the process of bargaining, a deadlock had arisen, and it had filed a notice of strike. The Director of Labor Relations agreed, holding that NAFLU had not "slept on its right" and that the one-year period "should not be applied literally." The Supreme Court nullified that Resolution. The certification year had "long since expired"; there was no proof of any deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or made the subject of a valid strike notice before the petition; NAFLU "could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not... could have gone on a legitimate strike...; but it did not"; and the strikes it pointed to occurred in October and December 1986, long after the petition. None of the statutory bars existing, refusing the election was grave abuse of discretion.
Facts
- By a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) "was declared the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON)."
- More than four years thereafter, on April 11, 1985, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election among VIRON's employees, "allegedly count[ing] with the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the workers."
- NAFLU opposed the petition.
- On June 14, 1985, the Med-Arbiter ordered a certification election held, "after ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with all the requirements of law and that since the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been executed between it and VIRON." Four years of certification and no agreement — the fact that frames everything.
- NAFLU appealed, contending "that at the time the petition for certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances constituted a bar to the petition" under Section 3, Rule V, Book V.
- On April 30, 1986, the Director of Labor Relations found merit in the appeal, set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and dismissed the petition. He reasoned that "[w]hile it may be true that the one-year period... has long run its course since intervenor NAFLU was certified on February 27, 1981, it could not be said, however, that NAFLU slept on its right to bargain collectively"; that the delay "could be attributed first, on the exhaustion of all legal remedies in the representation question twice initiated in the company before the filing of the present petition and second, to management who had been resisting the representations of NAFLU"; and that "[t]he one-year period therefore, should not be applied literally to the present dispute, especially considering that intervenor had to undergo a strike to bring management to the negotiation table."
- The record contained "assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively," and further assertions "that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative" — but "there is no adequate substantiation thereof."
- On October 26, 1986, NAFLU declared a strike "for refusal of VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms and conditions of employment, which was settled by the parties' agreement"; and on December 6, 1986 it staged another "in connection with a claim of violation of said agreement," a dispute since certified for compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Both strikes post-date KAMPIL's petition by well over a year.
- KAMPIL's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it brought this special civil action of certiorari, decided September 9, 1991 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-85).
Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioner KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN. Its position was that the requirements for a certification election had been met — support of more than 30% of the workers, no existing CBA, and the lapse of the certification year — so that under the first sentence of Section 3 a petition "may be filed at any time," and it was grave abuse of discretion for the Director to dismiss it on grounds not established by the record.
B. Respondents NAFLU, VIRON and the Director of Labor Relations. NAFLU invoked the deadlock bar: it was in the process of collective bargaining, a deadlock had arisen, and it had filed a notice of strike, all of which barred the representation question. It supported this with assertions of VIRON's "recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively" and of "continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative." The Director accepted these, holding that NAFLU had not slept on its right and that the one-year rule "should not be applied literally." The respondents also adverted to the strikes of 26 October and 6 December 1986 as showing an active bargaining dispute.
C. Common Ground. It was undisputed that NAFLU was certified on 27 February 1981; that KAMPIL filed its petition on 11 April 1985; that in the intervening period of more than four years no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed; and that the strikes relied on took place in October and December 1986.
Issue
A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Is KAMPIL's petition for certification election barred by the bargaining deadlock bar — that is, was there, before the filing of the petition, "a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party [that] had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout"?
B. Secondary Issues. Whether the certification year bar — "no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result" — may be extended beyond its terms where the incumbent's failure to conclude a CBA is attributed to the employer's resistance and to prior representation litigation.
C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues. Whether strikes staged after the filing of the petition may be treated as precluding the certification election it sought.
Ruling
Main Issue: NO, the petition is not barred. "[P]rior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was no such 'bargaining deadlock... (which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.'" There were assertions of the employer's recalcitrance, "but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON" — "[i]t could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike...; but it did not." Secondary Issue: NO extension. The certification year "can have no application to the case at bar" and "has long since expired." Ancillary Issue: NO — the October and December 1986 strikes "took place after the initiation of the certification election case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as precluding the holding of the certification election."
Dispositive portion (verbatim):
"WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise, the contested Resolution of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30, 1986 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondent.SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- The Court disposed of the certification year first, and briefly. The prohibition on an election "within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result" — here from February 27, 1981 — "can have no application to the case at bar," that period being "the 'certification year' during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the employer, and certification election is prohibited," and it "has long since expired."
- The real question was therefore the deadlock bar: whether "before its filing, a bargaining deadlock between VIRON and NAFLU as the incumbent bargaining agent, had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout."
- On the record, there was none: "it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was no such 'bargaining deadlock.'"
- NAFLU's assertions did not supply the deficiency. There were "assertions... that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively."
- The Court then named the unused remedies, and this is the passage the case is remembered for: "It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not."
- The second excuse fared no better: assertions "that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative" were unaccompanied by "adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process."
- Against the excuses the Court set the record: "[t]he stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981... to April 11, 1985 — or a period of more than four (4) years — no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice."
- The strikes the respondents relied on were disposed of on timing: they "took place after the initiation of the certification election case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed for." The rule requires the deadlock and its submission "before the filing of a petition."
- The disposition states the governing frame: "it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise."
Doctrine
B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles. "In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement..., a petition for certification election may be filed at any time," subject only to the bars the rule sets out. The certification year bar prohibits an election "within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result" — the year "during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the employer" — and it is not extended by the incumbent's difficulties once it has expired. The bargaining deadlock bar requires that, before the filing of the petition, "a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout"; assertions of the employer's recalcitrance do not establish it, and an incumbent that neither charged unfair labor practice nor struck has taken "no action to legally coerce" the employer. Events occurring after the petition is filed cannot bar it. The contract bar applies only where a CBA "has been duly registered," and then limits petitions to the sixty days before its expiry. Where "none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law exists," refusing to hold the election is grave abuse of discretion.
C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications. The bars are exceptions to a default, and the burden of establishing one lies on the party invoking it — here on NAFLU, which produced assertions instead of proof. Note that the Court does not say a deadlock never existed in fact; it says none had been "submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout," which is what the rule requires. The triggers are formal and verifiable precisely so that the bar cannot be established by the incumbent's own narrative. Note too that the decision does not excuse the employer: VIRON's resistance may well have been unlawful, but the remedy for a refusal to bargain is an unfair labor practice charge or a lawful strike, not the indefinite protection of the union that failed to bring one. And the case says nothing against a genuine deadlock bar — an incumbent that had filed a valid strike notice over a real impasse before the rival's petition would have been protected, which is the situation Capital Medical Center v. Laguesma examines from the other side.
D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory). Classified REJECTED — and that classification is the reason to read the case. The syllabus lists it under item 7.d for the bargaining deadlock bar rule, and the Court's holding is that the bar was not established. Recited as though it upheld the deadlock bar, the case teaches the opposite of what it decides. Read it as the negative counterpart of Capital Medical Center v. Laguesma, its companion under the same subtopic, which examines what a genuine deadlock bar looks like; and against Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Laguesma and Foamtex Labor Union v. Noriel on the contract bar, where an incumbent with a registered CBA is protected for the whole of its five-year representation term. The through-line is that each bar protects a bargaining relationship that actually exists — a fresh mandate being used, an impasse formally joined, a subsisting agreement — and that four years of certification without a single CBA is none of those things.
Separate Opinions
None. The Resolution, penned by Justice Narvasa, was concurred in by Justices Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea.