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National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of Labor and Employment

Certification and Consent Election — Eligible Voters; Supervisory Employees; the Double Majority Rule
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Title

National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of Labor and Employment

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 181531 July 31, 2009

HIMPHLU took 169 votes to NUWHRAIN's 151 at a hotel certification election, with 22 ballots segregated — cast by dismissed employees, by employees since promoted to supervisor, and by probationary employees whom the CBA barred from voting. The Supreme Court held the probationary employees eligible from the first day of service, the six supervisors ineligible because their promotions predated the election, and the number of valid votes therefore 337. Because a majority of 337 is 170 and HIMPHLU had only 169, no choice obtained the required majority, and the Court ordered a run-off election.

Core Doctrine

Under the double majority rule, "for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast." Probationary employees vote: "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization," and a CBA clause disqualifying them "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization." Where an appeal was taken from the Med-Arbiter's order, the cut-off for the voters' list is the date the Secretary's order becomes final and executory, not the date of the Med-Arbiter's order.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 181531)

Case DigestWeek 5 - The Right to Self-Organization

National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of Labor and Employment

G.R. No. 181531 · July 31, 2009 · Second Division

Certification and Consent Election — Eligible Voters; Supervisory Employees; the Double Majority Rule

Petitioner: National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPHC)Respondent: Secretary of Labor and Employment, Bureau of Labor Relations, Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), and Acesite Philippines Hotel Corporation
Gist

HIMPHLU took 169 votes to NUWHRAIN's 151 at a hotel certification election, with 22 ballots segregated — cast by dismissed employees, by employees since promoted to supervisor, and by probationary employees whom the CBA barred from voting. The Supreme Court held the probationary employees eligible from the first day of service, the six supervisors ineligible because their promotions predated the election, and the number of valid votes therefore 337. Because a majority of 337 is 170 and HIMPHLU had only 169, no choice obtained the required majority, and the Court ordered a run-off election.

Core Doctrine

Under the double majority rule, "for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast." Probationary employees vote: "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization," and a CBA clause disqualifying them "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization." Where an appeal was taken from the Med-Arbiter's order, the cut-off for the voters' list is the date the Secretary's order becomes final and executory, not the date of the Med-Arbiter's order.

Note: The workbook gives this case no date; the published decision is dated July 31, 2009. Several defects in the published text are reproduced rather than corrected. The Court refers to "the March 10, 2002 Order of the SOLE" where the date used everywhere else is March 10, 2006; and to "the Med-Arbiter's August 22, 2005 Order" becoming final, where the order granting the certification election is elsewhere dated August 9, 2005 and the order on the segregated votes August 22, 2006. The caption spells the petitioner NUWHRAIN-MPHC while the dispositive portion writes NUWHRAIN-MPC, and the body once prints NUHWHRAIN-MPHC and Pavillion. On numbering: Articles 255 and 256, cited in the decision, are now Articles 267 and 268 under DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, s. 2015.

Facts

  • On August 9, 2005, Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal granted the petition for a certification election among the rank and file of the Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel, operated by Acesite Philippines Hotel Corporation. An appeal was taken, and a March 10, 2006 Order of the SOLE affirmed. Because the appeal stayed the election, nothing could be done meanwhile — including calling for the voters' list.
  • On May 25, 2006 the Hotel submitted the list of employees in the bargaining unit "in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration ha[d] been denied." The probationary employees were on that list.
  • On June 16, 2006 the election was held. Of 353 on the voters' list, 346 voted: NUWHRAIN-MPHC 151, HIMPHLU 169, No Union 1, spoiled 3, segregated 22.
  • The 22 segregated ballots fell into three groups: 11 cast by dismissed employees, "albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending"; 6 by employees "already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election"; and 5 by probationary employees, segregated because "pursuant to the existing CBA, such employees cannot vote."
  • The vote of one Jose Gatbonton, a probationary employee, was counted — because "during the pre-election conferences, there was no disagreement as to his inclusion" and it was not "timely challenged." One probationary vote in, five out — the anomaly that drives the equal-protection argument.
  • By Order of August 22, 2006 the Med-Arbiter opened 17 of the 22 — the dismissed and the supposedly supervisory — leaving the 5 probationary votes sealed.
  • By Resolution of January 22, 2007 the SOLE affirmed: the probationary employees could not vote because when the August 9, 2005 Order issued they "were not yet hired"; the dismissed employees' votes counted; the six supervisors' votes counted, "their promotion took effect months after" that Order; Gatbonton's stood because never timely challenged; and in any event the 17 "would not suffice to overturn the 169 votes."
  • On November 8, 2007 the Court of Appeals affirmed, confining Airtime Specialists to probationary employees "already employed as of the date of filing of the petition," while conceding that the "majority" means "the majority of valid votes cast." Reconsideration denied January 25, 2008; decided July 31, 2009.

Issue

Should employees on probationary status at the time of the election be allowed to vote — and where a timely appeal was taken from the Med-Arbiter's order, is the reckoning date§ for the voters' list the Med-Arbiter's order or the finality of the Secretary's? And what of the six employees promoted to supervisory positions before the election?
Secondary issue. Whether HIMPHLU obtained the majority required under the double majority rule§, once the number of valid votes cast is correctly determined.
Ancillary issues. Whether a CBA clause disqualifying probationary employees is effective; and whether counting Gatbonton's unchallenged vote required, as equal protection, counting the others.

Ruling

Probationary employees vote; the six supervisors do not. "[T]he inclusion of Gatbonton's vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted." The reckoning date, "in cases where a timely appeal has been filed …, [is] the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and executory." But "the votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months before the election."
Secondary issue. NO, HIMPHLU did not obtain the majority. Valid votes rise "from 321 to 337"; "[t]his majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170," and "HIMPHLU obtained 169 … Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote."
Ancillary issues. The CBA clause is ineffective — it "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization," a law being "read into, and form[ing] part of, a contract."
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 8, 2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Resolutions dated January 22, 2007 and March 22, 2007, respectively, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in OS-A-9-52-05 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau of Labor Relations is DIRECTED to cause the holding of a run-off election between petitioner, National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPC), and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU).
SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  • The Court disposed of the Gatbonton anomaly by deciding the merits rather than the waiver — his vote was proper "not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote."
  • That right rests on Airtime Specialists§: the CBA "binds all employees in the bargaining unit," so "all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative," and "[t]he Code makes no distinction as to their employment status." It is confirmed by Section 2, Rule II of D.O. No. 40-03§: "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization."
  • The CBA clause could not stand against it, because "[a] law is read into, and forms part of, a contract"§ and stipulations are "valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy."
  • On the reckoning date, Section 5§ "should not be read in isolation and must be harmonized with the other provisions." Section 21§ provides that an appeal "stays the holding of any certification election," and Section 13 requires the granting order to direct the employer to submit the certified list — so "rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal."
  • The consequences of the contrary rule are what justify it. "[E]xperience shows that it sometimes takes months"; "[d]uring the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional employees"; and excluding them "would violate the guarantee that every employee has the right to be part of a labor organization from the first day of their service" and "would render inutile the remedy of appeal." The record bore this out: the probationary employees appeared on the list the Hotel filed after the appeal was denied.
  • The same reasoning excluded the promoted employees — at the time of the balloting "they had ceased to be part of the rank and file."
  • On the result the Court applied the double majority rule§ — "majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast" — and recomputed: 337 valid votes, majority 170, HIMPHLU 169.
  • It rejected the lower tribunals' materiality reasoning as "untenable," and explained why: "the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections." A segregated ballot raises the threshold as well as a total.
  • No choice having reached the majority, "it follows that a run-off election§ must be held" — three choices on the ballot, none reaching 170, and the unions' combined 320 far exceeding 50% of the 346 cast.

Doctrine

Double majority. "[F]or there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast"; that majority "is 50% + 1" of the valid votes. "[T]he true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won." Two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain majority representation, "if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone." Probationary employees vote — "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization" — and a CBA clause disqualifying them "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization." Reckoning date: where a timely appeal was filed, the cut-off for the voters' list is the finality of the SOLE's order, because the appeal "stays the holding of any certification election." Employees promoted to supervisory positions before the election "had ceased to be part of the rank and file" and may not vote. Where no choice obtains the required majority, a run-off is held between the two highest.
Limits. The reckoning rule is expressly conditional — it applies "in cases where a timely appeal has been filed"; absent an appeal, Section 5's ordinary reference to the Med-Arbiter's order governs. Eligibility is tested at two different moments for two different groups, and the case turns on the difference: probationary employees are measured against the finality of the SOLE's order, the promoted supervisors by their status "at the time the certification elections was conducted." The Court flags the fact-specific character of the supervisory exclusion — "under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it took for the appeal to be decided." On the dismissed employees the decision applies without controversy the rule examined in Yokohama Tire Philippines. The run-off carries its own conditions — three or more choices, no majority, and combined union votes of at least 50% of those cast — all satisfied here, but each capable of failing in another case. Renumbering: Articles 255 and 256 are now 267 and 268.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

At a certification election among the rank and file of the Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel on 16 June 2006, HIMPHLU took 169 votes and NUWHRAIN-MPHC 151, with 1 for No Union, 3 spoiled and 22 segregated out of 346 cast from a list of 353. The segregated ballots were of three kinds: 11 cast by dismissed employees whose cases were pending, 6 by employees promoted to supervisory positions before the election, and 5 by probationary employees whom the CBA barred from voting. The SOLE and the Court of Appeals counted the dismissed and the supervisory employees' votes, excluded the probationary employees', and certified HIMPHLU. The Supreme Court reversed on both eligibility points and on the result. Probationary employees vote, since every employee is eligible for union membership "beginning on the first day of his/her service"§ and a CBA cannot override that right§; where an appeal was taken, the cut-off for the voters' list§ is the finality of the Secretary's order, not the Med-Arbiter's; but the six supervisors are out, "their promotion having taken effect two months before the election." Valid votes therefore total 337, so under the double majority rule§ the required majority is 170 — and HIMPHLU's 169 is one short. The Court ordered a run-off election§.

Facts

  • On August 9, 2005, Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal issued the Order granting the petition for the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel, operated by Acesite Philippines Hotel Corporation.
  • An appeal was taken to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and a March 10, 2006 Order of the SOLE affirmed the Med-Arbiter's Order. Because the appeal stayed the election, nothing could be done in the meantime — including calling for the voters' list.
  • On May 25, 2006, the Hotel submitted the list of employees in the bargaining unit "in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration ha[d] been denied." The probationary employees, including Jose Gatbonton, were on that list.
  • On June 16, 2006, the certification election was held. Of 353 employees on the voters' list, 346 voted: NUWHRAIN-MPHC 151, HIMPHLU 169, No Union 1, spoiled 3, segregated 22.
  • The 22 segregated ballots fell into three groups: 11 cast by dismissed employees, "albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals"; 6 cast by employees "already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election"; and 5 cast by probationary employees, segregated because "pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote."
  • The vote of one Jose Gatbonton, a probationary employee, was counted. One probationary vote in, five out — the anomaly that drives the equal-protection argument. The reason was procedural: "during the pre-election conferences, there was no disagreement as to his inclusion in the voters' list, and neither was it timely challenged when he voted on election day."
  • By Order of August 22, 2006, Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 of the 22 segregated votes — those of the 11 dismissed and the 6 supposedly supervisory employees — leaving the 5 probationary votes sealed.
  • NUWHRAIN appealed to the SOLE, arguing that the probationary votes should be opened since Gatbonton's had been counted, and that HIMPHLU should not be certified because opening the 17 would raise the valid votes to 338, making the majority 170 and leaving HIMPHLU "one vote short."
  • By Resolution of January 22, 2007, the SOLE, through Acting Secretary Luzviminda Padilla, affirmed. It held under Section 5, Rule IX that the probationary employees could not vote because "at the time the Med-Arbiter issued on August 9, 2005 the Order granting the petition..., the six probationary employees were not yet hired"; that the dismissed employees' votes counted, their dismissal being on appeal; that the six supervisory employees' votes counted, "their promotion took effect months after the issuance of the... August 9, 2005 Order"; that Gatbonton's vote stood because it was never timely challenged and so could not be the basis for including the others; and that "even if the 17 votes... were to be counted and presumed to be in favor of petitioner, still, the same would not suffice to overturn the 169 votes garnered by HIMPHLU."
  • Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of March 22, 2007.
  • On November 8, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja inapplicable because the six probationary employees "were not yet employed by the Hotel at the time the August 9, 2005 Order... was issued," and that Airtime Specialists "applies only to situations wherein the probationary employees were already employed as of the date of filing of the petition for certification election." It also held that the "majority" contemplated "refers to the majority of valid votes cast, not the simple majority of votes cast," but concluded that even so the 17 votes could not change the outcome.
  • Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of January 25, 2008, and NUWHRAIN brought this petition, decided July 31, 2009.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner NUWHRAIN-MPHC. Three contentions. First, counting Gatbonton's vote while excluding the six other probationary employees' "violated the principle of equal protection and is not in accord with the ruling in Airtime Specialists"; it explained its failure to challenge Gatbonton by saying "it was precisely its position that probationary employees should be allowed to vote," so "justice and equity dictate" that the rest be counted too. Second, the reckoning date is not August 9, 2005 — the Med-Arbiter's Order — but the date the SOLE's affirming Order became final, "order" in Section 5 meaning "an order which has already become final and executory." Third, on the count: opening the 17 ballots would raise valid votes from 321 to 338, making the majority 170, so "the votes garnered by HIMPHLU is one vote short of the majority for it to be certified."
B. Respondents SOLE, Bureau of Labor Relations, HIMPHLU and Acesite. Their position, sustained below, was that eligibility is fixed at the Med-Arbiter's order of August 9, 2005, when the six probationary employees "were not yet hired"; that Gatbonton's vote stood only because it was never timely challenged and could not be made the basis for including the others; that the promoted employees' votes counted because their promotion post-dated that Order; and that in any event "even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win," so opening the ballots was immaterial.
C. Common Ground. The tally was undisputed — 353 on the list, 346 cast, 151 for NUWHRAIN, 169 for HIMPHLU, 1 No Union, 3 spoiled, 22 segregated. It was also common ground that the 11 dismissed employees' cases were pending before the Court of Appeals, that the six promoted employees held supervisory positions on election day, that the CBA barred probationary employees from voting, and that Gatbonton's vote had been counted.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Should employees on probationary status at the time of the certification election be allowed to vote — and where a timely appeal was taken from the Med-Arbiter's order, is the reckoning date§ for the voters' list the Med-Arbiter's order or the finality of the Secretary's? And what of the six employees promoted to supervisory positions before the election?
B. Secondary Issues. Whether HIMPHLU obtained the majority required for certification under the double majority rule§, once the number of valid votes cast is correctly determined.
C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues. Whether a CBA provision disqualifying probationary employees from voting is effective; and whether the inclusion of Gatbonton's unchallenged vote required, as a matter of equal protection, the inclusion of the other probationary votes.

Ruling

Main Issue: Probationary employees vote; the six supervisors do not. "[T]he inclusion of Gatbonton's vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted." The reckoning date, "in cases where a timely appeal has been filed from the Order of the Med-Arbiter, [is] the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and executory." But "the votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months before the election." Secondary Issue: NO, HIMPHLU did not obtain the majority. Valid votes rise "from 321 to 337"; "[t]his majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170," and "HIMPHLU obtained 169... Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote," so a run-off election must be held. Ancillary Issue: the CBA clause is ineffective — it "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization," a law being "read into, and form[ing] part of, a contract."
Dispositive portion (verbatim):
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 8, 2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Resolutions dated January 22, 2007 and March 22, 2007, respectively, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in OS-A-9-52-05 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau of Labor Relations is DIRECTED to cause the holding of a run-off election between petitioner, National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPC), and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU).
SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  • The Court disposed of the Gatbonton anomaly by deciding the merits rather than the waiver: "[t]he inclusion of Gatbonton's vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election."
  • That right rests on Airtime Specialists and on the reasoning it supplies§: the CBA "binds all employees in the bargaining unit," so "all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative," and "[t]he Code makes no distinction as to their employment status."
  • It is confirmed by Section 2, Rule II of D.O. No. 40-03§: "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization."
  • The CBA clause could not stand against it. It "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules," because "[a] law is read into, and forms part of, a contract"§ and stipulations are "valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy."
  • On the reckoning date, the Court held that Section 5§ "should not be read in isolation and must be harmonized with the other provisions." Section 21§ provides that an appeal "stays the holding of any certification election," and Section 13 requires the order granting an election to direct the employer to submit the certified list of employees — so "rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal."
  • The rule follows: "the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has been filed..., the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and executory."
  • The consequences of the contrary rule are what justify it. "Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the appeal..., experience shows that it sometimes takes months"; "[d]uring the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional employees"; and to exclude them "would violate the guarantee that every employee has the right to be part of a labor organization from the first day of their service" and "would render inutile the remedy of appeal to the SOLE."
  • The record bore this out: the probationary employees "were included in the list of employees in the bargaining unit submitted by the Hotel on May 25, 2006 in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration ha[d] been denied."
  • The Court emphasised what is at stake: "[a] certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent... The significance of an employee's right to vote in a certification election cannot thus be overemphasized. For he has considerable interest in the determination of who shall represent him in negotiating the terms and conditions of his employment."
  • But the same reasoning excluded the promoted employees: "the votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months before the election."
  • On the result, the Court applied the double majority rule§ — "majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast" — and recomputed: valid votes rise "from 321 to 337"; "[t]his majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170." HIMPHLU had 169.
  • It rejected the lower tribunals' materiality reasoning as "untenable," and explained why: "the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections." A segregated ballot raises the threshold as well as a total.
  • The Court restated the purpose of the exercise: "the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone... whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them."
  • No choice having obtained the required majority, "it follows that a run-off election§ must be held" — the conditions being satisfied with three choices on the ballot, none reaching 170, and the contending unions' combined 320 votes far exceeding 50% of the 346 cast.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles. Under the double majority rule, "for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast"; that majority "is 50% + 1" of the valid votes. "[T]he true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won." A certification election has a two-fold objective — to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain majority representation, "if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone." Probationary employees vote: "all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent[,] are entitled to vote," and "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization." A CBA provision disqualifying them "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization," since "[a] law is read into, and forms part of, a contract." Where a timely appeal was filed from the Med-Arbiter's order, the cut-off for the voters' list is "the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and executory," because the appeal "stays the holding of any certification election." Employees promoted to supervisory positions before the election "had ceased to be part of the rank and file" and may not vote. Where no choice obtains the required majority, a run-off election is held between the two unions with the highest totals.
C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications. The reckoning rule is expressly conditional — it applies "in cases where a timely appeal has been filed." Absent an appeal, Section 5's ordinary reference to the Med-Arbiter's order governs. Note that eligibility is tested at two different moments for two different groups, and the case turns on the difference: probationary employees are measured against the finality of the SOLE's order, while the promoted supervisors are excluded by reference to their status "at the time the certification elections was conducted." The Court also flags the fact-specific character of the supervisory exclusion — "under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it took for the appeal to be decided" — the promotions having taken effect two months before the balloting. On the dismissed employees, this decision applies without controversy the rule examined in Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Yokohama Employees Union. Finally, the run-off carries its own conditions — three or more choices, no majority, and combined union votes of at least 50% of the votes cast — all satisfied here, but each capable of failing in another case.
D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory). Classified DIRECT. The syllabus assigns this case at item 21 under item 7.c for supervisory employees in a certification election, and the Court squarely excludes the six whose promotions took effect before the balloting. But the decision reaches three further items of the same syllabus and is best read as the week's synthesis of the certification-election machinery: eligible voters (item 20, with Yokohama Tire), the double majority rule (item 7.e), and the run-off election (item 7.h, with Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. Noriel). Its holding on the CBA clause connects back to Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v. Calleja — the right to self-organization "cannot be curtailed by a collective bargaining agreement" — and its recomputation of the majority is the sharpest illustration in the week of why voter-eligibility questions are questions of validity, not of housekeeping, a point Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Calleja makes from the opposite direction.

Separate Opinions

None. The Decision, penned by Justice Carpio Morales, was concurred in by Justices Quisumbing (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario and Leonardo-De Castro, both designated additional members.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

DOLE Issuance

Section 5, Rule XI, D.O. No. 40-03

Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion

Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, amending Rule XI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. - All employees who are members of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at the time of the issuance of the order granting the conduct of a certification election shall be eligible to vote. An employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election.

Why it is cited here

The whole first issue is a fight over four words — "at the time of the issuance of the order" — and the Court's answer is a lesson in reading a rule in its context rather than in isolation.

The SOLE and the Court of Appeals took "the order" to mean the Med-Arbiter's order granting the election, issued 9 August 2005. On that reading the six probationary employees, not yet hired then, could not vote. NUWHRAIN argued that "order" means an order that has "already become final and executory" — here the SOLE's order on appeal.

The Court held that Section 5 "should not be read in isolation and must be harmonized with the other provisions," and two of them decide the question.

<Prov id="do-40-03-rule-11-sec-21">Section 21</Prov> provides that "[t]he filing of the memorandum of appeal from the order or decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election." So while an appeal is pending nothing happens — and, "rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal."

Section 13 requires the order granting an election to direct the employer to submit "the certified list of employees in the bargaining unit" within ten days of receipt. If the order is stayed, that directive is stayed with it — which is exactly what happened here: the Hotel submitted its list on 25 May 2006, after the appeal was resolved, and the probationary employees were on it.

Hence the rule the Court lays down: "the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has been filed from the Order of the Med-Arbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and executory."

The reason is disenfranchisement. "Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the appeal..., experience shows that it sometimes takes months," and "[d]uring the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional employees." Cutting the list off at the Med-Arbiter's order "would effectively disenfranchise employees hired during the pendency of the appeal" and "would render inutile the remedy of appeal to the SOLE."

The second sentence of the section — on dismissed employees — is the provision applied in Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Yokohama Employees Union, and it operated here without controversy: the 11 dismissed employees' votes were counted because their cases were pending before the Court of Appeals.

DOLE Issuance

Section 2, Rule II, D.O. No. 40-03

Who may join labor unions and workers' associations

Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, amending the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. - All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government owned or controlled corporations without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as well as employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining: provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-organization and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization.

All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.

Why it is cited here

The second paragraph is the sentence that decides the probationary-employee question, and it leaves no room to manoeuvre: "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization."

No probationary period, no waiting period, no minimum length of service. The right attaches on day one. That principle — "all employees are, from the first day of their employment, eligible for membership in a labor organization" — is what the Court uses to interpret the cut-off in Section 5, and it is also what defeats the CBA clause.

The rest of the section is a useful consolidation of the whole first half of Week 5 in one administrative provision. Coverage tracks Article 243, extending to non-profit religious, charitable, medical and educational institutions, and — importantly for Arizala v. Court of Appeals — to employees of government corporations without original charters established under the Corporation Code. Supervisory employees "shall not be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own," which is Article 245 restated and the ground on which the six promoted employees lose their votes here. Managerial employees are excluded entirely. And alien employees with valid working permits may organise on a reciprocity basis certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs — the one rule in this cluster that appears nowhere in the Labor Code itself.

The last paragraph is worth noticing for the distinction it preserves: workers without definite employers may form labor organizations "for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining" — the same organisation-without-bargaining formula that E.O. No. 180 applies to government employees.

Jurisprudence

Probationary employees vote

All rank and file in the unit, whether probationary or permanent

Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, quoted in the decision

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."

Why it is cited here

The reasoning is a chain worth reproducing because it explains why employment status is irrelevant to voting even though it is highly relevant to unit composition.

The CBA binds everyone in the unit — "[c]ollective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit." A probationary employee is as bound by its wage scales, hours and discipline provisions as anyone else. Therefore he "has a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative." And Article 255 speaks of "the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit" without qualification — "[t]he law refers to 'all' the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need... is to belong to the 'bargaining unit.'"

Note the elegance of the Court's disposal of the Gatbonton problem. One probationary employee, Jose Gatbonton, had his vote counted because nobody challenged it in time, while six others were segregated. The SOLE and the Court of Appeals treated this as a question of waiver — Gatbonton's vote stood because it was not properly challenged, and could not be made the basis for including the rest. NUWHRAIN framed it as equal protection.

The Court dissolved the puzzle by deciding the merits: "[t]he inclusion of Gatbonton's vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted." An anomaly disappears when the rule is applied consistently rather than when the exception is defended.

Note the limit the Court of Appeals had tried to place on Airtime Specialists — that it "applies only to situations wherein the probationary employees were already employed as of the date of filing of the petition for certification election." That qualification does not survive this decision.

Jurisprudence

A CBA cannot override the right to self-organization

Law is read into every contract

Stated in this decision

The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.

A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

Why it is cited here

Five of the twenty-two segregated ballots were set aside on the footing that "pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote." The clause was a negotiated one, agreed by a union and an employer, and it purported to fix the electorate for the very election that would decide whether that union kept its mandate.

The Court's answer works at two levels. At the level of hierarchy, a CBA "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules." At the level of contract law, "[a] law is read into, and forms part of, a contract," and stipulations are "valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy."

The structural danger the rule guards against is worth naming. The incumbent union negotiated this clause; the clause shrinks the pool of voters who might unseat it. Permitting representation rights to be traded away by the very body whose mandate is at stake would let an incumbent entrench itself by agreement — the same objection that defeated the CBA-based exclusion in Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v. Calleja, where the statutory right to self-organization "cannot be curtailed by a collective bargaining agreement."

Compare International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, where a CBA-embedded 25% salary differential was struck down because labor contracts "collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good," and contrast Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Laguesma, where the public character of a CBA operated to save it from a technical defect. The principle is constant: the public interest, not the parties' bargain alone, is the measure.

Jurisprudence

The double majority rule

Two majorities are required for a valid certification

Article 256, Labor Code, as applied in this decision

It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.

Article 256 of the Labor Code, on which the rule rests, is now Article 268 under DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, series of 2015.

Why it is cited here

This is the case that shows how much turns on the second majority, and the arithmetic is the lesson.

First majority — turnout. Of 353 employees on the voters' list, 346 voted. Comfortably satisfied, and never in issue.

Second majority — of the valid votes cast. This is where the case is decided, and everything depends on the denominator. As the votes were originally appreciated, valid votes stood at 321, and HIMPHLU's 169 was a majority of that. Once the Court held the probationary employees' votes valid and the supervisors' invalid, the total became 337 — and "[u]nder Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified... This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170." HIMPHLU had 169. One vote short.

That single vote is why the Court insists on a proposition the SOLE and the Court of Appeals had both missed. Both reasoned that opening the segregated ballots could not matter because even if all 17 went to NUWHRAIN, HIMPHLU would still lead. The Court called this "untenable": "[i]t bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections."

In other words, a segregated ballot has two effects — it may add to a union's total, and it always raises the threshold every union must clear. A tribunal that only asks "could these votes change who is ahead?" has asked half the question.

The Court then states what an election is for, and it is worth quoting whole: "the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them."

Jurisprudence

Run-off election

When a run-off is held, and between whom

Defined in this decision; see also Article 256, Labor Code, and D.O. No. 40-03, Rule IX

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.

Why it is cited here

The run-off is the remedy when the double majority's second limb fails, and its three conditions should be checked in order against these facts.

Three or more choices. The ballot carried NUWHRAIN-MPHC, HIMPHLU, and No Union — three. Satisfied.

No choice received a majority of the valid votes cast. With 337 valid votes the threshold was 170; HIMPHLU had 169, NUWHRAIN 151, No Union 1. Satisfied.

The contending unions' combined votes are at least 50% of the votes cast. 169 + 151 = 320, against 346 votes cast — over 92%. Satisfied comfortably.

The run-off is then held between the two unions with the highest totals, and "No Union" drops off the ballot. That last feature is the design choice worth understanding: the first election asked whether the employees wanted representation at all, and only 1 of 346 said no. Having answered that question, the run-off asks the remaining one — which union — and there is no reason to re-ask a question already settled.

Note how narrowly this case turned. Had the six supervisors' votes been counted along with the probationary employees', the denominator would have been higher still; had the probationary votes been excluded as the SOLE ruled, HIMPHLU would have been certified outright on 169 of 321. The Court's careful reworking of who was eligible produced a total that left the winner one vote short — and converted a certification into a run-off.

For the run-off's companion remedies see Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. Noriel at item 28, which the syllabus assigns to failure of election, run-off and re-run elections.

DOLE Issuance

Section 21, Rule XI, D.O. No. 40-03

Decision of the Secretary; effect of an appeal

Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003

Section 21. Decision of the Secretary. - The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the entire records of the petition within which to decide the appeal. The filing of the memorandum of appeal from the order or decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election.

The decision of the Secretary shall become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the parties. No motion for reconsideration of the decision shall be entertained.

Why it is cited here

This section supplies the structural reason for moving the voters'-list cut-off from the Med-Arbiter's order to the finality of the Secretary's, and it does so in one sentence: "[t]he filing of the memorandum of appeal from the order or decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election."

If the election is stayed, so is everything preparatory to it. The Court draws the inference expressly: "rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal." A list that cannot be called for cannot sensibly fix eligibility as of a date already past.

That is borne out by what actually happened. The Hotel submitted its list of employees in the bargaining unit on 25 May 2006 — "in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration ha[d] been denied by the SOLE" — and the probationary employees, Gatbonton among them, were on it. The employer itself had treated them as members of the unit.

Two further features of the section deserve notice. The fifteen-day period for deciding an appeal is the reason the Court remarks that "experience shows that it sometimes takes months" — the timetable on paper and the timetable in practice diverge, and the interpretation must work for the real one. And the flat prohibition — "[n]o motion for reconsideration of the decision shall be entertained" — sits oddly with this record, in which a motion for reconsideration of the SOLE's 22 January 2007 Resolution was in fact entertained and denied on 22 March 2007. The decision treats that denial as the event from which the ten-day finality period ran.

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_181531_2009.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 5, Rule XI, D.O. No. 40-03

DOLE Issuance

Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion

Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, amending Rule XI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. - All employees who are members of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at the time of the issuance of the order granting the conduct of a certification election shall be eligible to vote. An employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election.

Why it is cited here

The whole first issue is a fight over four words — "at the time of the issuance of the order" — and the Court's answer is a lesson in reading a rule in its context rather than in isolation.

The SOLE and the Court of Appeals took "the order" to mean the Med-Arbiter's order granting the election, issued 9 August 2005. On that reading the six probationary employees, not yet hired then, could not vote. NUWHRAIN argued that "order" means an order that has "already become final and executory" — here the SOLE's order on appeal.

The Court held that Section 5 "should not be read in isolation and must be harmonized with the other provisions," and two of them decide the question.

<Prov id="do-40-03-rule-11-sec-21">Section 21</Prov> provides that "[t]he filing of the memorandum of appeal from the order or decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election." So while an appeal is pending nothing happens — and, "rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal."

Section 13 requires the order granting an election to direct the employer to submit "the certified list of employees in the bargaining unit" within ten days of receipt. If the order is stayed, that directive is stayed with it — which is exactly what happened here: the Hotel submitted its list on 25 May 2006, after the appeal was resolved, and the probationary employees were on it.

Hence the rule the Court lays down: "the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has been filed from the Order of the Med-Arbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and executory."

The reason is disenfranchisement. "Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the appeal..., experience shows that it sometimes takes months," and "[d]uring the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional employees." Cutting the list off at the Med-Arbiter's order "would effectively disenfranchise employees hired during the pendency of the appeal" and "would render inutile the remedy of appeal to the SOLE."

The second sentence of the section — on dismissed employees — is the provision applied in Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Yokohama Employees Union, and it operated here without controversy: the 11 dismissed employees' votes were counted because their cases were pending before the Court of Appeals.

Full entry below ↓

Section 2, Rule II, D.O. No. 40-03

DOLE Issuance

Who may join labor unions and workers' associations

Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, amending the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. - All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government owned or controlled corporations without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as well as employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining: provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-organization and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization.

All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.

Why it is cited here

The second paragraph is the sentence that decides the probationary-employee question, and it leaves no room to manoeuvre: "any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization."

No probationary period, no waiting period, no minimum length of service. The right attaches on day one. That principle — "all employees are, from the first day of their employment, eligible for membership in a labor organization" — is what the Court uses to interpret the cut-off in Section 5, and it is also what defeats the CBA clause.

The rest of the section is a useful consolidation of the whole first half of Week 5 in one administrative provision. Coverage tracks Article 243, extending to non-profit religious, charitable, medical and educational institutions, and — importantly for Arizala v. Court of Appeals — to employees of government corporations without original charters established under the Corporation Code. Supervisory employees "shall not be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own," which is Article 245 restated and the ground on which the six promoted employees lose their votes here. Managerial employees are excluded entirely. And alien employees with valid working permits may organise on a reciprocity basis certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs — the one rule in this cluster that appears nowhere in the Labor Code itself.

The last paragraph is worth noticing for the distinction it preserves: workers without definite employers may form labor organizations "for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining" — the same organisation-without-bargaining formula that E.O. No. 180 applies to government employees.

Full entry below ↓

Probationary employees vote

Jurisprudence

All rank and file in the unit, whether probationary or permanent

Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, quoted in the decision

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."

Why it is cited here

The reasoning is a chain worth reproducing because it explains why employment status is irrelevant to voting even though it is highly relevant to unit composition.

The CBA binds everyone in the unit — "[c]ollective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit." A probationary employee is as bound by its wage scales, hours and discipline provisions as anyone else. Therefore he "has a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative." And Article 255 speaks of "the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit" without qualification — "[t]he law refers to 'all' the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need... is to belong to the 'bargaining unit.'"

Note the elegance of the Court's disposal of the Gatbonton problem. One probationary employee, Jose Gatbonton, had his vote counted because nobody challenged it in time, while six others were segregated. The SOLE and the Court of Appeals treated this as a question of waiver — Gatbonton's vote stood because it was not properly challenged, and could not be made the basis for including the rest. NUWHRAIN framed it as equal protection.

The Court dissolved the puzzle by deciding the merits: "[t]he inclusion of Gatbonton's vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted." An anomaly disappears when the rule is applied consistently rather than when the exception is defended.

Note the limit the Court of Appeals had tried to place on Airtime Specialists — that it "applies only to situations wherein the probationary employees were already employed as of the date of filing of the petition for certification election." That qualification does not survive this decision.

Full entry below ↓

A CBA cannot override the right to self-organization

Jurisprudence

Law is read into every contract

Stated in this decision

The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.

A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

Why it is cited here

Five of the twenty-two segregated ballots were set aside on the footing that "pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote." The clause was a negotiated one, agreed by a union and an employer, and it purported to fix the electorate for the very election that would decide whether that union kept its mandate.

The Court's answer works at two levels. At the level of hierarchy, a CBA "cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules." At the level of contract law, "[a] law is read into, and forms part of, a contract," and stipulations are "valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy."

The structural danger the rule guards against is worth naming. The incumbent union negotiated this clause; the clause shrinks the pool of voters who might unseat it. Permitting representation rights to be traded away by the very body whose mandate is at stake would let an incumbent entrench itself by agreement — the same objection that defeated the CBA-based exclusion in Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v. Calleja, where the statutory right to self-organization "cannot be curtailed by a collective bargaining agreement."

Compare International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, where a CBA-embedded 25% salary differential was struck down because labor contracts "collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good," and contrast Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Laguesma, where the public character of a CBA operated to save it from a technical defect. The principle is constant: the public interest, not the parties' bargain alone, is the measure.

Full entry below ↓

The double majority rule

Jurisprudence

Two majorities are required for a valid certification

Article 256, Labor Code, as applied in this decision

It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.

Article 256 of the Labor Code, on which the rule rests, is now Article 268 under DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, series of 2015.

Why it is cited here

This is the case that shows how much turns on the second majority, and the arithmetic is the lesson.

First majority — turnout. Of 353 employees on the voters' list, 346 voted. Comfortably satisfied, and never in issue.

Second majority — of the valid votes cast. This is where the case is decided, and everything depends on the denominator. As the votes were originally appreciated, valid votes stood at 321, and HIMPHLU's 169 was a majority of that. Once the Court held the probationary employees' votes valid and the supervisors' invalid, the total became 337 — and "[u]nder Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified... This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170." HIMPHLU had 169. One vote short.

That single vote is why the Court insists on a proposition the SOLE and the Court of Appeals had both missed. Both reasoned that opening the segregated ballots could not matter because even if all 17 went to NUWHRAIN, HIMPHLU would still lead. The Court called this "untenable": "[i]t bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections."

In other words, a segregated ballot has two effects — it may add to a union's total, and it always raises the threshold every union must clear. A tribunal that only asks "could these votes change who is ahead?" has asked half the question.

The Court then states what an election is for, and it is worth quoting whole: "the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them."

Full entry below ↓

Run-off election

Jurisprudence

When a run-off is held, and between whom

Defined in this decision; see also Article 256, Labor Code, and D.O. No. 40-03, Rule IX

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.

Why it is cited here

The run-off is the remedy when the double majority's second limb fails, and its three conditions should be checked in order against these facts.

Three or more choices. The ballot carried NUWHRAIN-MPHC, HIMPHLU, and No Union — three. Satisfied.

No choice received a majority of the valid votes cast. With 337 valid votes the threshold was 170; HIMPHLU had 169, NUWHRAIN 151, No Union 1. Satisfied.

The contending unions' combined votes are at least 50% of the votes cast. 169 + 151 = 320, against 346 votes cast — over 92%. Satisfied comfortably.

The run-off is then held between the two unions with the highest totals, and "No Union" drops off the ballot. That last feature is the design choice worth understanding: the first election asked whether the employees wanted representation at all, and only 1 of 346 said no. Having answered that question, the run-off asks the remaining one — which union — and there is no reason to re-ask a question already settled.

Note how narrowly this case turned. Had the six supervisors' votes been counted along with the probationary employees', the denominator would have been higher still; had the probationary votes been excluded as the SOLE ruled, HIMPHLU would have been certified outright on 169 of 321. The Court's careful reworking of who was eligible produced a total that left the winner one vote short — and converted a certification into a run-off.

For the run-off's companion remedies see Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. Noriel at item 28, which the syllabus assigns to failure of election, run-off and re-run elections.

Full entry below ↓

Section 21, Rule XI, D.O. No. 40-03

DOLE Issuance

Decision of the Secretary; effect of an appeal

Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003

Section 21. Decision of the Secretary. - The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the entire records of the petition within which to decide the appeal. The filing of the memorandum of appeal from the order or decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election.

The decision of the Secretary shall become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the parties. No motion for reconsideration of the decision shall be entertained.

Why it is cited here

This section supplies the structural reason for moving the voters'-list cut-off from the Med-Arbiter's order to the finality of the Secretary's, and it does so in one sentence: "[t]he filing of the memorandum of appeal from the order or decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election."

If the election is stayed, so is everything preparatory to it. The Court draws the inference expressly: "rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal." A list that cannot be called for cannot sensibly fix eligibility as of a date already past.

That is borne out by what actually happened. The Hotel submitted its list of employees in the bargaining unit on 25 May 2006 — "in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration ha[d] been denied by the SOLE" — and the probationary employees, Gatbonton among them, were on it. The employer itself had treated them as members of the unit.

Two further features of the section deserve notice. The fifteen-day period for deciding an appeal is the reason the Court remarks that "experience shows that it sometimes takes months" — the timetable on paper and the timetable in practice diverge, and the interpretation must work for the real one. And the flat prohibition — "[n]o motion for reconsideration of the decision shall be entertained" — sits oddly with this record, in which a motion for reconsideration of the SOLE's 22 January 2007 Resolution was in fact entertained and denied on 22 March 2007. The decision treats that denial as the event from which the ten-day finality period ran.

Full entry below ↓