Note: The workbook assigns this case, with Trade Unions of the Philippines/February Six Movement v. Laguesma, to item 7.a on the concept and exclusivity of the sole and exclusive bargaining agent and its exceptions. Its contribution is to the exception in the second sentence of Article 255 — the individual and group right to present grievances — which it construes narrowly. Note that the decision was reached on two independent grounds, either sufficient: the procedural defects under Rule 43, and the merits. On numbering: Articles 255 and 260, cited in the decision, are now Articles 267 and 273 under DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, s. 2015.
Facts
- Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners are employees of International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO) and members of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers' Union.
- They filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the NCMB, Regional Branch No. XI, Davao City, "for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting," and on failing to settle "requested to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration."
- Before the parties could meet to choose an arbitrator, the company produced a letter from union president Genaro Tan stating that petitioners "are not duly authorized by [the] board or the officers to represent the union, [hence] … all actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the management will not be honored or recognized by the union." The union disowned its own members' initiative — the fact the whole case turns on.
- The company moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners served a Notice to Arbitrate invoking the Revised Guidelines and Section 3, Article XII of the CBA; the company opposed.
- NCMB Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote both sides of "the lack of willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite"; that "under the CBA … the union is an indispensable party"; and that since the union had disavowed them, "it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration." He concluded the demand "CAN NOT BE GRANTED" and advised petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process instead. A remedy was pointed out, not withheld.
- By letter of April 11, 2007 he added that the NCMB "has no rule-making power to decide on issues [as it] only facilitates settlement among the parties."
- By Resolution of October 24, 2007 the Court of Appeals dismissed their Rule 43 petition: the NCMB "is not a quasi-judicial agency … but merely a conciliatory body," so its decisions "cannot be appealed either through a petition for review under Rule 43 or under Rule 65."
- It listed three further infirmities: docket fees "short by One Thousand Pesos (Php 1,000.00)"; the copy of the NCMB decision "not … properly certified"; and "[n]ot all of the petitioners … signed the verification and non-forum shopping."
- Decided December 23, 2009.
Issue
Does the exception in Article 255 — that "an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer" — entitle union members not authorized by their union to compel the employer into voluntary arbitration under the CBA, notwithstanding the union's exclusive representative role?
Secondary issue. Whether the NCMB is a quasi-judicial agency whose decisions are appealable under Rule 43, given Section 22 of E.O. No. 126 and the definition of quasi-judicial function.
Ancillary issue. Whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed for the deficiency in docket fees and the other defects.
Ruling
NO. "The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration." Under Article 260, as construed in Atlas Farms, the parties designate their grievance representatives and arbitrators in advance, so "only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators" — and "[p]etitioners have not … been duly authorized to represent the union."
Secondary issue. NO, the NCMB is not quasi-judicial. Given its functions under Section 22 of E.O. No. 126, "it can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency," and Rule 43 reaches such an agency only "in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions."
Ancillary issue. The dismissal was proper. Under Section 7, Rule 43 failure to pay the fees "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal," and petitioners "have not proffered any reason to call for a relaxation of the … rule," so "[o]n this score alone, the dismissal … is in order."
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- The Court took the procedural ground first and treated it as independently sufficient — Section 7 of Rule 43 makes non-payment of fees a ground for dismissal, and although the Court has relaxed it "in the interest of justice," petitioners offered no reason to.
- It then addressed the merits anyway: "even if the above-quoted rule were relaxed, the appellate court's dismissal would just the same be sustained."
- On the forum, Rule 43 "applies to awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions," and the Court supplied the test: quasi-judicial function belongs to bodies "required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
- Measured against the eight functions in Section 22 of E.O. No. 126 — formulating mediation policy, performing preventive mediation and conciliation, coordinating linkages, promoting non-adversarial schemes, administering the voluntary arbitration programme, counselling, monitoring, and other assigned functions — the NCMB "can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency."
- On the substantive claim the Court quoted the grievance and arbitration clause in full, in which every step is taken by "the UNION and the COMPANY," and then held simply: "Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to represent the union."
- The governing authority is Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC: under Article 260 the parties "shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery," and unsettled grievances go "to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred."
- Petitioners' last argument — described by the Court as "[c]lutching at straws" — was the second sentence of Article 255, read as "an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role."
- The Court rejected it in a single sentence that is the holding for this subtopic. The right to be heard survives exclusivity; the right to invoke the machinery does not.
Doctrine
Exclusivity and the narrow exception. The majority union "shall be the exclusive representative … for the purpose of collective bargaining," and although "an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer," that right "does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration." Article 260: the parties designate their grievance representatives and arbitrators in advance, so "only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators." Voluntary arbitration requires the willingness of both parties as a prerequisite, and where the CBA makes the union an indispensable party, members it has disavowed cannot invoke it. The NCMB "can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency," its functions being conciliatory and administrative, so its decisions are not appealable under Rule 43. A body is quasi-judicial where it is "required to investigate facts … hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them … and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Under Section 7, Rule 43, failure to pay docket fees "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal," and liberality must be asked for with a reason.
Limits. The holding closes one forum, not all of them. The NCMB Director expressly "advised petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights" — a Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, where an individual complainant has standing in his own name. Nor does the case say a union member is at his union's mercy: what he cannot do is appropriate machinery constituted by the union and the company, over the union's objection. The disavowal here was formal and unequivocal, coming from the union president in writing before the arbitrator was chosen; a case in which the union had authorised the members, or had itself refused to act in bad faith, would raise different questions the Court did not reach. The ruling on the NCMB's status is about the body, not the merits: nothing suggests the underlying CBA-violation complaint was unfounded — it was brought in the wrong way, in the wrong forum, by parties without authority. The decision rests on two independent grounds, either sufficient. Renumbering: Articles 255 and 260 are now 267 and 273.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
Gist
Juanito Tabigue and nineteen co-employees of International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO), all members of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers' Union, filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the NCMB in Davao City for violation of the CBA and the company's failure to sit at the grievance conference, and asked that the case be elevated to voluntary arbitration. Before an arbitrator could be agreed on, the company produced a letter from union president Genaro Tan stating that petitioners "are not duly authorized by [the] board or the officers to represent the union." The NCMB Director refused to proceed — willingness of both parties being a prerequisite, and the union being an indispensable party under the CBA's grievance clause — and advised petitioners to use compulsory arbitration instead. The Court of Appeals dismissed their Rule 43 petition, and the Supreme Court denied review on two grounds. Procedurally, the docket fees were short by P1,000.00 and no reason was offered for relaxing the rule. Substantively, the NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency, so Rule 43 does not reach it; under Article 260 "only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators"; and the Article 255 right of an individual or group to present grievances "does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration."
Facts
- Petitioner Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners are all employees of respondent International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO) and all members of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers' Union.
- They filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the DOLE-National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Branch No. XI, Davao City, against the company "for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting."
- The parties having failed to settle before the NCMB, petitioners "requested to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration," and the NCMB set a date for the parties to agree on a Voluntary Arbitrator.
- Before the parties could finally meet, the company presented to the NCMB a letter of Genaro Tan, president of the union, addressed to plant manager Engr. Paterno C. Tangente, stating that petitioners "are not duly authorized by [the] board or the officers to represent the union, [hence]... all actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the management will not be honored or recognized by the union." The union disowned its own members' initiative — which is the fact the whole case turns on.
- The company then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
- Petitioners sent union president Tan and plant manager Tangente a Notice to Arbitrate, invoking the "Revised Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Procedure" together with Section 3, Article XII of the CBA, and furnished the NCMB a copy. The company opposed it.
- The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement, NCMB Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote petitioner Alex Bibat and plant manager Tangente "of the lack of willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit the case thereto; and that under the CBA forged by the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary arbitration but that since Tan informed respondent that the union had not authorized petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration."
- The NCMB Director concluded that "the demand of [petitioners] to submit the issues... to voluntary arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED," and "advised petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights." A remedy was pointed out, not withheld.
- On petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the NCMB Director, by letter of April 11, 2007, stated that the NCMB "has no rule-making power to decide on issues [as it] only facilitates settlement among the parties to... labor disputes."
- Petitioners assailed that decision by Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, which by Resolution of October 24, 2007 dismissed it: the NCMB "is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions but merely a conciliatory body for the purpose of facilitating settlement of disputes between parties," so "its decisions or that of its authorized officer cannot be appealed either through a petition for review under Rule 43 or under Rule 65."
- The appellate court also listed three infirmities: payment of docket and other legal fees "short by One Thousand Pesos (Php 1,000.00)"; the copy of the assailed NCMB decision "not... properly certified as the name and designation of the certifying officer thereto are not indicated"; and "[n]ot all of the petitioners named in the petition signed the verification and non-forum shopping."
- Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, arguing that the case falls within the Revised Procedural Guidelines on Voluntary Arbitration, that "the NCMB, when exercising adjudicative powers, acts as a quasi-judicial agency," that decisions of quasi-judicial boards are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, and that "labor cases, as a general rule, are never resolved on the basis of technicality especially so when substantial rights of employees are affected." The case was decided December 23, 2009.
Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioners Tabigue et al. Their position had a procedural and a substantive half. Procedurally, the NCMB acts as a quasi-judicial agency when exercising adjudicative powers, so its decisions are reviewable by the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 and under Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act; and in any event labor cases should not be lost on technicalities, the fees having been completed when they moved for reconsideration. Substantively, they invoked Section 3, Article XII of the CBA and the Revised Procedural Guidelines to compel voluntary arbitration, and relied on the second sentence of Article 255 — the right of "an individual employee or group of employees... at any time to present grievances to their employer" — which to them "is meant to be an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role of the labor organization/union."
B. Respondent INTERCO. The company opposed the Notice to Arbitrate and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, relying on the letter of union president Genaro Tan disavowing petitioners' authority to represent the union and stating that nothing they did with management would be "honored or recognized by the union." Its position, adopted by the NCMB Director, was that voluntary arbitration requires the willingness of both parties and that the union is an indispensable party under the CBA.
C. Common Ground. It was not disputed that petitioners are all employees of INTERCO and members of the union; that the union's president had written disavowing their authority; that the CBA contains a grievance and voluntary arbitration clause in the terms quoted; that the NCMB had set a date for the parties to agree on an arbitrator before the disavowal surfaced; or that the docket fees paid with the Court of Appeals petition were short by P1,000.00.
Issue
A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Does the exception in Article 255 — that "an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer" — entitle union members who have not been authorized by their union to compel the employer into voluntary arbitration under the CBA, notwithstanding the union's exclusive representative role?
B. Secondary Issues. Whether the NCMB is a quasi-judicial agency whose decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, given the functions enumerated in Section 22 of E.O. No. 126 and the definition of quasi-judicial function.
C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues. Whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for the deficiency in docket fees, the improperly certified copy of the assailed decision, and the incomplete verification and certification against forum shopping.
Ruling
Main Issue: NO. "The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration." Under Article 260, as construed in Atlas Farms, the parties to a CBA designate their grievance representatives and their voluntary arbitrators in advance, so "only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators" — and "[p]etitioners have not... been duly authorized to represent the union." Secondary Issue: NO, the NCMB is not quasi-judicial. Given its functions under Section 22 of E.O. No. 126, "it can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency," and Rule 43 applies only to a quasi-judicial agency "in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions." Ancillary Issue: the dismissal was proper. Under Section 7 of Rule 43 the failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal"; petitioners "have not proffered any reason to call for a relaxation of the above-quoted rule," so "[o]n this score alone, the dismissal by the appellate court... is in order."
Dispositive portion (verbatim):
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- The Court took the procedural ground first and treated it as independently sufficient. Section 7 of Rule 43 makes failure to pay "the docket and other lawful fees" a sufficient ground for dismissal; and while "the Court has, in the interest of justice, given due course to appeals despite the belated payment of those fees, petitioners have not proffered any reason to call for a relaxation" — so "[o]n this score alone, the dismissal... is in order."
- It then addressed the merits anyway: "even if the above-quoted rule were relaxed, the appellate court's dismissal would just the same be sustained."
- Under Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of "Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions," and Rule 43 "applies to awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions."
- The Court supplied the test: a body exercises judicial function "where [it] has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties," and quasi-judicial function belongs to officers or bodies "required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
- Measured against the eight functions in Section 22 of E.O. No. 126 — formulating policies and guidelines on mediation, performing preventive mediation and conciliation, coordinating linkages, promoting non-adversarial schemes, administering the voluntary arbitration programme, providing counseling, monitoring regional programmes, and performing other assigned functions — the NCMB "can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency."
- On the substantive claim, the Court quoted the CBA's grievance and arbitration clause in full, in which every step is taken by "the UNION and the COMPANY," and then held simply: "Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to represent the union."
- The governing authority is Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC: "[p]ursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators."
- Petitioners' last argument — described by the Court as "[c]lutching at straws" — was the second sentence of Article 255, which they read as "an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role of the labor organization/union."
- The Court rejected it in a single sentence that is the holding of the case for this subtopic: "This Court is not persuaded. The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration."
Doctrine
B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles. The union chosen by the majority in an appropriate unit "shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining," and although "an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer," that right "does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration." Under Article 260 the parties to a CBA designate their grievance representatives and voluntary arbitrators in advance, so "only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators." Voluntary arbitration requires the willingness of both parties as a prerequisite, and where the CBA makes the union an indispensable party, members it has disavowed cannot invoke it. The NCMB "can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency," its functions under Section 22 of E.O. No. 126 being conciliatory and administrative; hence its decisions are not appealable under Rule 43. A body is quasi-judicial where it is "required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Under Section 7, Rule 43, failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal," and liberality must be asked for with a reason.
C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications. The holding closes one forum, not all of them. The NCMB Director expressly "advised petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights" — a Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, where an individual complainant has standing in his own name. Nor does the case say a union member is at his union's mercy: what he cannot do is appropriate machinery constituted by the union and the company, over the union's objection. Note also that the disavowal here was formal and unequivocal, coming from the union president in writing before the arbitrator was chosen; a case in which the union had authorised the members, or had itself refused to act in bad faith, would raise different questions the Court did not reach. Finally, the ruling on the NCMB's status is about the body, not about the merits of a grievance: nothing in it suggests the underlying complaint of CBA violation was unfounded — it was simply brought in the wrong way, in the wrong forum, by parties without authority.
D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory). Classified DIRECT. The syllabus assigns this case to item 7.a, "SEBA: concept and exclusivity; exceptions," and it is the case that fixes the boundary of the exception. Read with its companion, Trade Unions of the Philippines/February Six Movement v. Laguesma, the two show exclusivity operating in both directions: outward against a rival union that would displace the incumbent during the CBA's representation term, and inward against the incumbent's own members who would bypass it. Together they explain why the exclusive bargaining agent is genuinely exclusive — the employer deals with one voice, and neither a competing union nor a dissenting faction may open a second channel. The narrowness of the Article 255 exception is the point to carry into an exam: the right to be heard survives exclusivity; the right to invoke the machinery does not.
Separate Opinions
None. The Decision, penned by Justice Carpio Morales, was concurred in by Chief Justice Puno (Chairperson) and Justices Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., with Chief Justice Puno certifying under Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.