Llenares v. Court of Appeals

Cadastral Registration Proceedings — Concept · Purpose

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Case DigestWeek 3–4 — The Registries of Deeds and Original Registration

Llenares v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 98709 · May 13, 1993 · Supreme Court — Third Division

Cadastral Registration Proceedings — Concept · Purpose

Gist

The relationship of Magdalena Llenares v. Court of Appeals and Apolinar Zabella, G.R. No. 98709, May 13, 1993, to the assigned topic of "Cadastral Registration Proceedings — Concept and Purpose" is DIRECT. Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half share of a Lucena lot in 1929 and died in 1931; the buyer's family never filed an answer when the lot went through cadastral proceedings, and in 1937 the cadastral court awarded it to Anastacio and his co-owner and OCT No. 43073 issued in their names. Forty years later the buyer's son took possession, filed an adverse claim, and persuaded the Court of Appeals that Anastacio's daughter had slept on her rights. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court. Cadastral proceedings under Act No. 2259 are judicial and in rem and bind the whole world; the Government is the plaintiff and every claimant a defendant; and the final judgment settles the status of the land, so any claim not noted in it — including the 1929 deed — is barred by res judicata and the deed is functus officio.

Core Doctrine

Proceedings under the Cadastral Act are judicial and in rem, and as such they bind the whole world. In a cadastral proceeding the Government is the plaintiff and all claimants are the defendants: every person claiming an interest in the land or any part of it, whether named in the notice or not, must appear and file an answer, and all conflicting interests are adjudicated in one decree. The final judgment is therefore deemed to have settled the status of the land, and any claim over it not noted therein by other parties is barred under the principle of res judicata — a prior deed of sale never presented to the cadastral court loses its efficacy and becomes functus officio.

Facts

Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-owners in equal shares of a parcel in barrio Silangang Mayao, Lucena, designated in the cadastral survey as Cadastral Lot No. 4804-D and later renumbered Lot No. 5015.
On December 21, 1929 Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half share to Ariston Zabella, father of the private respondent. Ariston died on March 21, 1930, and Anastacio on March 27, 1931, leaving as his sole heir his only child Magdalena Llenares — then four years old. (She was two when the deed was signed and four when her father died. Those two ages are what the Supreme Court later used to demolish the Court of Appeals' "suspicion" that she had known of the sale all along.)
In the cadastral proceedings that followed, the cadastral court awarded Lot No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal shares. Decree No. 54398 issued, and on July 28, 1937 OCT No. 43073 was entered in their names. Ariston Zabella filed no answer and advanced no claim in those proceedings, and his 1929 deed was never presented to the cadastral court. (That silence is the fact the case turns on. Everything the private respondent later did — the possession, the irrigation charges, the adverse claim — was an attempt to assert outside the cadastral case a claim that had to be made inside it.)
On February 5, 1960 Rosario and her niece Irene Catapat adjudicated to themselves Juan Zabella's one-half share, and the adjudication was annotated on OCT No. 43073. Rosario died on June 5, 1962, leaving as heirs her children Godofredo, Noemi, Natividad, Olimpio and Numeriana Zaracena. (Note: the printed text drops a clause here — the sentence beginning "On the other hand, Juan Zabella and niece Irene Catapat" is incomplete on LawPhil, so how Rosario stood to Juan Zabella cannot be read off the decision itself.)
On June 22, 1976 Magdalena, as sole heir of Anastacio, adjudicated his one-half share to herself by a Salaysay ng Pagmamana ng Nag-iisang Tagapagmana (Exhibit "A"), annotated on OCT No. 43073. On August 26, 1976 that OCT was cancelled and TCT No. T-27166 issued for the entire lot.
On February 17, 1977 — over thirty-nine years after OCT No. 43073 issued — private respondent Apolinar Zabella caused an affidavit of adverse claim to be annotated, recorded as Entry No. 35285. It was his and his family's first legal step of any kind since the 1929 deed.
By a Kasunduan ng Pagsusukat (Exhibit "I") between Irene Catapat and Rosario's heirs, Lot No. 5015 was subdivided into Lots 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C; Lot 5015-A, the half corresponding to Anastacio's share, went to Magdalena, and TCT No. 28170 was issued in her name over its 12,501 square meters.
On possession, Magdalena proved that her cousin Rosario administered the land until 1959, when she installed Rufo Orig as tenant; he delivered her share of the harvest until 1976, when the private respondent told him to stop and claimed ownership. She had been paying the land taxes until the case was filed. Apolinar's version was that he and his siblings took possession after Ariston's death in 1930, converted the land to riceland, had it irrigated in 1955 and had paid the irrigation charges since 1960.
On July 12, 1977 Magdalena sued for recovery of possession and quieting of title. On April 4, 1986 the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 57 ruled for her, ordering surrender of possession, an accounting of fruits from August 1976, cancellation of Entry No. 35285, and P2,500.00 attorney's fees and P1,000.00 litigation expenses. On April 24, 1990 the Court of Appeals reversed in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853, declaring Apolinar the true and lawful owner of the 12,501 square meters, ordering a deed of conveyance, ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. T-28170, and awarding P10,000.00 attorney's fees against Magdalena. The Third Division decided on May 13, 1993.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner. Magdalena Llenares argued that an alleged sale by an instrument never registered under Act No. 3344 and never submitted to the cadastral court cannot deprive an adjudicated owner of possession and the improvements; that a title vested by judgment and decree in a judicial proceeding in rem binds the whole world, so that whoever claims thereafter is barred by res judicata; and that property covered by a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Private respondent. Apolinar Zabella defended the appellate judgment on the ground that his family had possessed the land since 1930 in the concept of owner, converting it to riceland and paying irrigation charges since 1960, and that it was Magdalena who had slept on her rights — taking no step from 1937 until she executed her affidavit of self-adjudication in 1976 — while he had promptly registered his adverse claim once TCT No. T-27166 issued.

Common Ground / Stipulations (if any). Both accepted that Anastacio Llenares executed a deed of sale of his one-half share to Ariston Zabella on 21 December 1929; that the cadastral court nevertheless awarded Lot No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal shares, with OCT No. 43073 issuing in 1937; that Magdalena was Anastacio's only child and sole heir; and that the adverse claim was registered on 17 February 1977.

Issue

MAIN ISSUE (Cadastral-centered). Whether a deed of sale executed before the cadastral proceedings and never presented to the cadastral court can prevail over the final cadastral judgment and the OCT issued on its decree — or whether it is barred by res judicata and rendered functus officio.

SECONDARY ISSUES. Whether an adverse claim may be founded on a transaction predating the original registration; whether prescription and laches ran against the registered owner's sole heir or against the possessor; and whether the Court of Appeals' findings on possession were binding on this Court.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). Whether a sole heir must execute an affidavit of adjudication and secure a new certificate to protect her rights in registered land.

Ruling

On the MAIN ISSUE: it cannot; the deed is barred. Proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) "are judicial and in rem. As such, they bind the whole world." The final judgment rendered in them "is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof; any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is therefore deemed barred under the principle of res judicata." Ariston Zabella, the vendee, "did not file any answer in the cadastral proceedings or advance any claims on the said lot", and the 1929 deed accordingly "had lost its efficacy after the judgment in the cadastral proceedings … became final." On the adverse claim: it produced no legal effect. Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), "the governing law at that time," reaches a claim "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration," whereas Zabella's rests "on a transaction which had occurred long before the rendition of the decision in the cadastral proceedings and the issuance of OCT No. 43073." On prescription and laches: the Court of Appeals applied them against the wrong party. OCT No. 43073 issued on 28 July 1937, and it was only on 17 February 1977, "after the lapse of over thirty-nine (39) years," that Zabella took his first legal step; and the rule the trial court applied and this Court restored is that no title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner's may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, a rule that protects the owner's hereditary successors equally, and where "prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available." On the factual findings: they were "conjectural and speculative" and so not binding — credibility being primarily for the trial court, which found Zabella's evidence unconvincing, one witness placing Ariston in possession in 1918, eleven years before he bought, and another admitting on cross-examination that he had been coached. On the ancillary point: no law requires a sole heir to execute an affidavit of adjudication and cause a new certificate to issue in order to protect her rights, "the transfer in her favor took place, ipso jure, upon the death of Anastacio Llenares." The dispositive portion reads verbatim: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition, ANNULING the challenged decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals of 24 April 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853 and REINSTATING the decision of the trial court subject of the appeal in the latter case. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED."

Note on two dates in the decision itself. The opening paragraph gives the Court of Appeals decision as "promulgated on 24 April 1990," while the dispositive portion annuls the decision "of 24 April 1991." The docket number (CA-G.R. CV No. 09853) is the same in both, so this is a slip in the text and not two decisions. The spelling "ANNULING" is likewise the original's.

Ratio

A cadastral proceeding is a compulsory joinder of everyone with a claim. The Government, through the Solicitor General, "institutes the proceedings by a petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants" of the land, and those claiming an interest "whether named in the notice or not, are required to appear before the court and file an answer." The Government is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants.
Because it is judicial and in rem, its judgment binds the whole world. All conflicting interests are adjudicated, the decree is awarded to the party entitled, and on finality it becomes the basis for an original certificate of title having "the same effect as a certificate of title granted under the Land Registration Act."
What was not raised is barred. The final judgment "settled the status of the land," so a claim not noted in it is barred by res judicata. The 1929 deed, never put before the cadastral court by the vendee or his heirs, was spent — functus officio in the trial court's phrase.
An adverse claim cannot resurrect a pre-registration transaction. Section 110 speaks of interests "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration"; a 1929 sale is not such an interest, and its registration in 1977 "did not produce any legal effect."
Prescription and laches were run against the wrong party. No title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner's may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession — and the protection extends to hereditary successors, who "merely step into the shoes of the decedent." Where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available.
Non-declaration for taxation is not abandonment. Until the title was transferred, the land remained covered by OCT No. 43073 in the names of the original co-owners, and taxes paid by others for and in behalf of the registered owners benefit the registered owners and their successors. Meanwhile Zabella "neither had the property declared in his name for taxation purposes nor paid the real estate taxes thereon" — only irrigation charges, and only from 1960. Resolving the issue in his favour on that record "defies all logic."
A suspicion is not a finding. The inference that Magdalena's inaction showed she knew of the 1929 sale "has no basis at all": she was two when the deed was executed and four when her father died, "very much below the age of reason," and nothing showed she was ever told of the sale before the 1977 adverse claim.
Succession needs no paperwork to operate. No law requires a sole heir to execute an affidavit of adjudication or to have a new certificate issued; the transfer takes place ipso jure on the decedent's death, and the continued existence of the OCT in the registered owners' names "fully protected her rights."

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

The Concept of a Cadastral Proceeding: proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) are judicial and in rem, and as such bind the whole world. The Government is actually the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants: the Solicitor General institutes the proceeding by petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants of the land, and those claiming an interest in the whole or any part, whether named in the notice or not, must appear and answer.
The Purpose and Effect of the Cadastral Decree: all conflicting interests are adjudicated in the proceeding, the decree is awarded to the party entitled, and once final it is the basis for an original certificate of title with the same effect as a certificate granted under the Land Registration Act. The final judgment "is deemed to have settled the status of the land," so that any claim over it not noted therein by other parties is barred under res judicata.
The Llenares Rule on Pre-Registration Deeds: a deed of sale executed before the cadastral proceedings and never presented to the cadastral court, by a vendee who filed no answer and advanced no claim, loses its efficacy on the finality of the cadastral judgment and becomes functus officio. It cannot afterwards be used to defeat the title the proceeding produced.
The Limits of an Adverse Claim: an adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496 — and under its successor, Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 — is confined to a right or interest "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration." A claim founded on a transaction predating the registration cannot be registered as an adverse claim and produces no legal effect.
The Remedies After a Cadastral Decree, and Their Periods: a party fraudulently deprived of property in a cadastral proceeding may file a petition for review within one year from the entry of the decree; after that period, and if the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance may still be brought, founded on the implied trust of Article 1456 of the Civil Code, and prescribing in ten years.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

Prescription and laches run against the claimant, not the registered owner. The statutory bar protects the registered owner and his hereditary successors, who "merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor in interest"; and "where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available."
A defence not pleaded is waived. The trial court refused to entertain laches because it "was never interposed or pleaded in the answer," defences and objections not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer being deemed waived.
Tax declarations and payments are evidence, not title. Payments made by third persons for and in behalf of the registered owners benefit the owners and their successors, so a registered owner's failure to declare the land in her own name does not prejudice her — while a possessor who pays no realty tax at all cannot make irrigation charges do the work of ownership.
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not conclusive when conjectural. Where the appellate court's rejection of the trial court's findings rests on speculation and an avowed "suspicion," and the underlying question is one of witness credibility, the trial court's appraisal stands.
Succession is not a matter of registration. The transfer to a sole heir occurs ipso jure at death; no affidavit of adjudication or new certificate is required to protect the heir's rights while the OCT subsists.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification of Relationship: DIRECT.
Integration: the case is one of the two entries the Course Outline assigns for the concept and purpose of cadastral registration proceedings, and it supplies both halves in a single paragraph. The concept is structural: a proceeding judicial and in rem, with the Government as plaintiff and every claimant a defendant, in which all conflicting interests are adjudicated at once and the decree becomes an original certificate of title of ordinary Torrens force under Section 38. The purpose is what that structure is for — to settle and adjudicate the titles to an entire area finally, which is why Section 36 sues everyone and Section 37 commands every claimant to answer "whether named in the notice or not."
The case supplies the sanction that makes the purpose real. A proceeding designed to settle titles once and for all can only do so if failing to appear costs something. Here it cost Ariston Zabella's successors the land: the deed was good in 1929, worthless after 1937, and the forty years of possession and irrigation charges that followed could not repair the omission. Read with Tamin v. Court of Appeals, assigned under the same heading, the pair states the rule from both ends — Tamin holds that a pending cadastral proceeding must be allowed to run its course before anyone is dispossessed, and Llenares holds that a concluded one is final against every claim that could have been made in it.

Separate Opinions

None. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. wrote for the Third Division, with Justices Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo concurring.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Facts

Originally: Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-owners, in equal shares, of a parcel of land situated in barrio Silangang Mayao of the then Municipality, now City, of Lucena. In the cadastral survey of the municipality the lot was designated Cadastral Lot No. 4804-D, a designation later changed to Lot No. 5015.
On December 21, 1929: Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half share in the lot to Ariston Zabella, the private respondent's father.
On March 21, 1930: Ariston Zabella died.
On March 27, 1931: Anastacio Llenares died, leaving the petitioner Magdalena Llenares, his only child, as his sole heir. She was two years old when the deed of sale was executed and four years old when her father died.
After due proceedings: The cadastral court awarded Lot No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal shares. Decree No. 54398 was issued to both of them and, on the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title No. 43073 was issued in their names in July 1937 — the Court elsewhere fixing the date as 28 July 1937.
In the cadastral proceedings: Ariston Zabella, the vendee under the 1929 deed, did not file any answer and advanced no claim over the lot, and the deed of sale was never presented to the cadastral court.
On February 5, 1960: Rosario and her niece Irene Catapat adjudicated to themselves Juan Zabella's one-half share in the lot, and the adjudication was annotated in OCT No. 43073. (The printed text of the decision drops a clause at this point, so the relationship of Rosario to Juan Zabella cannot be read off the decision itself.)
On June 5, 1962: Rosario died, leaving as her only heirs her children Godofredo, Noemi, Natividad, Olimpio and Numeriana, all surnamed Zaracena.
On June 22, 1976: The petitioner, as sole heir of Anastacio Llenares, adjudicated to herself by way of a Salaysay ng Pagmamana ng Nag-iisang Tagapagmana (Exhibit "A") the one-half share in the property belonging to her father. This was likewise annotated in OCT No. 43073.
On August 26, 1976: OCT No. 43073 was cancelled and in its place TCT No. T-27166 was issued for the entire lot.
On February 16–17, 1977: The private respondent Apolinar Zabella filed an affidavit of adverse claim, which was duly annotated; the trial court's decree identifies it as Entry No. 35285, inscribed February 17, 1977. This was the first legal step taken by the Zabella side since the 1929 deed — over thirty-nine years after OCT No. 43073 issued.
Thereafter: As a consequence of a Kasunduan ng Pagsusukat (Exhibit "I") executed by and between Irene Catapat and the heirs of Rosario Zabella Zaracena, Lot No. 5015 was subdivided into Lots Nos. 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C. Lot No. 5015-A, comprising the one-half of Lot No. 5015 corresponding to Anastacio's share, was allotted to the petitioner; TCT No. T-27166 was cancelled and separate certificates issued for each subdivided lot, with TCT No. 28170 issued in the petitioner's name over 12,501 square meters.
On the issue of possession — the petitioner's evidence: Since she was only four years old when her father died, her cousin Rosario Zabella administered the land until 1959, when the petitioner placed Rufo Orig as tenant. Orig delivered to her her share of the harvest until 1976, when he stopped because the private respondent ordered him not to give her share anymore, the private respondent claiming ownership. The petitioner further proved that she had been paying the land taxes on the property until the filing of the case.
On the issue of possession — the private respondent's version: He and his siblings took possession of the portion sold by Anastacio after Ariston Zabella's death on 21 March 1930; he converted it into riceland; it was irrigated in 1955; he has been paying the irrigation charges since 1960; and he and his co-heirs have been in possession without interference "until the present."
On July 12, 1977: The petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and quieting of title, after allegedly being dispossessed by the private respondent in 1976 and after the annotation of the affidavit of adverse claim, praying that she be restored to possession and that the adverse claim be cancelled.
On April 4, 1986: Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City rendered judgment for the petitioner, declaring her the true and absolute owner of the land covered by TCT No. 28170 and ordering (1) the defendant to surrender and transfer possession; (2) an accounting of the fruits received from August 1976 until possession is transferred; (3) the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to cancel Entry No. 35285 in TCT No. 28170; and (4) payment of P2,500.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
On April 24, 1990: The Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853, reversed — declaring the defendant-appellant the true and lawful owner of the 12,501 square meters covered by TCT No. T-28170; ordering the plaintiff-appellee to execute the proper deed of conveyance; ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. T-28170 and issue a new one to the defendant-appellant should she fail or refuse; and ordering her to pay P10,000.00 attorney's fees, with costs.
On May 13, 1993: The Supreme Court, Third Division, promulgated the Decision granting the petition, annulling the Court of Appeals decision and reinstating the trial court's judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Magdalena Llenares).

Petitioner argues that an alleged sale by virtue of an instrument not filed or registered under Act No. 3344 and not submitted before the cadastral court during its hearing cannot deprive an adjudicated and declared owner of the enjoyment of possession and of the improvements on the land.
Petitioner argues that a party whose title was vested by the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree of registration in a judicial proceeding in rem, which as such binds the whole world, is protected, and whoever claims thereafter is barred under the principle of res judicata.
Petitioner argues that property covered by a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Private respondent (Apolinar Zabella).

Private respondent maintains that he and his siblings took possession of the portion sold by Anastacio Llenares after Ariston Zabella's death on 21 March 1930, converted it into riceland, had it irrigated in 1955, and have been paying the irrigation charges since 1960, possessing it without interference by any party.
Private respondent maintains, and the Court of Appeals accepted, that it was the petitioner who slept on her rights — allowing twenty-eight years to pass from the time she attained majority before taking affirmative action, and moving to change the registered ownership only in 1976 — from which "suspicion then is not altogether unjustified that the inaction was because the appellee knew of the sale by her father."
Private respondent maintains that neither prescription nor laches applies against him because, promptly after TCT No. T-27166 was issued on 26 August 1976, he filed his adverse claim, thereby making his interest a matter of record.

Common Ground.

It is not disputed that Anastacio Llenares executed a deed of sale of his one-half share to Ariston Zabella on 21 December 1929, nor that the cadastral court nonetheless awarded Lot No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal pro indiviso shares, with OCT No. 43073 issuing on 28 July 1937.
It is not disputed that the petitioner is Anastacio Llenares's sole heir, that she was four years old at his death, and that the affidavit of adverse claim was registered on 17 February 1977.

Issue

MAIN ISSUE. Whether a deed of absolute sale executed in 1929, never registered and never presented to the cadastral court, may prevail over the final cadastral judgment and the Original Certificate of Title issued on its decree in 1937 — or whether all claims prior to that judgment are barred by res judicata, leaving the deed functus officio.

SECONDARY ISSUES.

Whether an affidavit of adverse claim may validly be founded on a transaction that antedates the original registration.
Whether prescription and laches operated against the registered owner's sole heir or against the possessor claiming under the unregistered deed.
Whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals on possession — which reversed those of the trial court — are conclusive on this Court.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES.

Whether a sole heir is required by law to execute an affidavit of adjudication and cause the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance of a new certificate in order to transfer ownership to herself or protect her rights.

Ruling

Ruling on the MAIN ISSUE. IT MAY NOT; THE DEED IS BARRED. The so-called deed of sale executed by Anastacio Llenares in 1929 had lost its efficacy after the judgment in the cadastral proceedings adjudicating Lot No. 5015 to him and Juan Zabella became final. Ariston Zabella, the vendee in the said sale, did not file any answer in the cadastral proceedings or advance any claims on the said lot.

The Court then states the concept and purpose of the proceeding. "It is to be noted that the proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) are judicial and in rem. As such, they bind the whole world. The final judgment rendered therein is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof; any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is therefore deemed barred under the principle of res judicata." Further: "In a cadastral proceeding, the Government is actually the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants. This is because the former, represented by the Solicitor General, institutes the proceedings by a petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants of such lands or any part thereof while the latter, or those claiming interest in the entire land or any part of it, whether named in the notice or not, are required to appear before the court and file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated therein and the decree awarded in favor of the party entitled to the land; when it has become final, the decree shall serve as the basis for an original certificate of title in favor of the said party. This shall have the same effect as a certificate of title granted under the Land Registration Act."

The Court sets out what remained available to a party genuinely aggrieved: one fraudulently deprived of his property in a cadastral proceeding may nevertheless file, within one year from the entry of the decree, a petition for review; and after the lapse of that period, if the property has not yet passed on to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance may still be filed. Such an action "could have only been based on an implied trust in Article 1456 of the Civil Code" — "If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes" — and "it is now settled that an action for the conveyance of property based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years."

Ruling on SECONDARY ISSUE 1. NO. The private respondent's move on 17 February 1977 "did not produce any legal effect." An adverse claim under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), "the governing law at that time," referred to a claim of "any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration." In this case the private respondent's adverse claim "is one based on a transaction which had occurred long before the rendition of the decision in the cadastral proceedings and the issuance of OCT No. 43073." This escaped the attention of the appellate court, which instead concluded that it was the petitioner who took no legal action from 1937 to 1976 — a conclusion with no basis, since the continued existence of OCT No. 43073 protected her as Anastacio's sole heir.

Ruling on SECONDARY ISSUE 2. AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. "The respondent Court erroneously applied the rule on prescription against the petitioner and not against the private respondent." The evidence conclusively established that at an appropriate cadastral proceeding Lot No. 5015 was awarded to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal pro indiviso shares, the decision became final, and OCT No. 43073 issued on 28 July 1937. "It was only on 17 February 1977, or after the lapse of over thirty-nine (39) years, that the private respondent, as a successor-in-interest of Ariston Zabella, took the first legal step … to protect and preserve his supposed right acquired under the deed of sale."

The trial court's reasoning, which this Court reinstated, is that the land "has been registered and titled in the name of plaintiff's father Anastacio Llenares since July 28, 1937," that he became the registered owner "by virtue of a cadastral proceedings, a proceedings in rem that is binding and conclusive against the whole world," that no irregularity or fraud in the issuance of the title was shown and any intrinsic fraud could no longer be ventilated after one year, and that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession" — a bar "unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor in interest." On laches the trial court held, first, that the defence was never pleaded and so was waived under the rules; second, that the plaintiff had not slept on her rights, having complained to the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems in 1977 and filed suit on 12 July 1977; and third, that "a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession," so that "where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available."

Ruling on SECONDARY ISSUE 3. NOT CONCLUSIVE. The appellate court's factual findings on possession "are conjectural and speculative," so this Court is not bound by them. The trial court gave credence to the petitioner's account and categorically ruled that the private respondent's "evidence does not convincingly establish that he possessed the property publicly, exclusively and peacefully in the concept of owner" — noting that he paid no realty tax and had not declared the property for taxation, that witness Sergio Dalida placed Ariston Zabella in possession in 1918, eleven years before Ariston bought it, and that witness Cosme Ranillo admitted on cross-examination that he had been coached by the defendant. Credibility of witnesses "is primarily addressed to the trial court since it is in a better position to decide such a question, having seen and heard the witnesses," and its findings on credibility "carry great weight and respect."

That the petitioner neither declared the property in her name nor paid taxes on it until 1977 is not fatal: until the transfer the property remained covered by OCT No. 43073 in the names of Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares, the private respondent's claim was not annotated on it, and there was no evidence of any earlier extrajudicial or judicial demand by him. Since the petitioner is Anastacio's sole heir, "the continued existence of OCT No. 43073 fully protected her rights," and payments of real estate taxes by others "for and in behalf of the registered owners — benefited the registered owners themselves and their successors-in-interest." Meanwhile the private respondent "neither had the property declared in his name for taxation purposes nor paid the real estate taxes thereon," paying only irrigation charges and only from 1960; resolving the issue in his favour on that record "defies all logic." The appellate court's inference that the petitioner's inaction showed knowledge of the 1929 sale was "plain speculation" and, in its own word, a mere "suspicion" with "no basis at all" — she was two when the deed was executed and four when her father died, "very much below the age of reason," and nothing showed she was informed of the sale before the 1977 adverse claim.

Ruling on the ANCILLARY ISSUE. NO. "There is no law which requires her, as a sole heir, to execute an affidavit of adjudication and cause both the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance of a new one in her name … in order to transfer the ownership of the property to her, or protect her rights and interests therein. The transfer in her favor took place, ipso jure, upon the death of Anastacio Llenares."

Dispositive portion (verbatim). The final dispositive portion of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 98709, dated May 13, 1993, is quoted verbatim as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition, ANNULING the challenged decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals of 24 April 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853 and REINSTATING the decision of the trial court subject of the appeal in the latter case.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED."

A discrepancy in the text of the decision. The opening paragraph describes the challenged Court of Appeals decision as "promulgated on 24 April 1990," while the dispositive portion annuls the decision "of 24 April 1991." Both refer to CA-G.R. CV No. 09853, so only one decision is involved; the variance is an error in the text. The spelling "ANNULING" is likewise as printed.

Ratio

The Cadastral Proceeding Is Judicial and In Rem: proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) "are judicial and in rem. As such, they bind the whole world." Every person with an interest is before the court, whether he appears or not, and the judgment speaks to everyone.
The Government Is the Plaintiff and All Claimants Are Defendants: the Solicitor General institutes the proceeding by a petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants of the lands, and those claiming an interest in the whole or any part, "whether named in the notice or not," are required to appear and file an answer on or before the return day. That structure — one plaintiff, all the world as defendants — is what allows the proceeding to settle every competing claim in a single decree.
The Decree Settles the Status of the Land: "All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated therein and the decree awarded in favor of the party entitled to the land"; when final, the decree is the basis for an original certificate of title having "the same effect as a certificate of title granted under the Land Registration Act." The final judgment "is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof."
Res Judicata Bars What Was Not Raised: "any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is therefore deemed barred under the principle of res judicata." A prior deed of sale that the vendee never brought before the cadastral court is thereby spent — the trial court's phrase is that it "has lost its efficacy being functus oficio."
An Adverse Claim Reaches Only Post-Registration Interests: Section 110 of Act No. 496 speaks of an interest "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration." A claim resting on a 1929 transaction, filed in 1977 against a title registered in 1937, is not such an interest and "did not produce any legal effect."
Registered Land Is Not Lost by Possession or Delay: no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, the bar running in favour of the owner and his hereditary successors; and "where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available." A defence of laches not pleaded in the answer is, besides, waived.
The Remedial Ladder After a Cadastral Decree: review within one year from entry of the decree for actual fraud; thereafter, if no innocent purchaser for value has intervened, an action for conveyance on the implied trust of Article 1456, prescribing in ten years. Both had long expired.
Speculation Cannot Displace a Trial Court's Credibility Findings: appellate findings that rest on "suspicion" and inference, in a case turning on the credibility of witnesses the trial judge saw and heard, are conjectural and do not bind this Court.
Succession Operates by Law, Not by Registration: no law requires a sole heir to execute an affidavit of adjudication or to obtain a new certificate; the transfer takes place ipso jure upon the decedent's death, and the subsisting OCT protects the heir in the meantime.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

The Llenares Statement of the Cadastral Concept: proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) are judicial and in rem and bind the whole world. The Government, through the Solicitor General, is the plaintiff, and all claimants are defendants; every person claiming an interest in the land or any part of it, whether named in the notice or not, must appear and file an answer. All conflicting interests are adjudicated in the proceeding, the decree is awarded to the party entitled, and upon finality it is the basis for an original certificate of title with the same effect as one issued in ordinary registration proceedings.
The Llenares Rule of Cadastral Res Judicata: the final judgment in a cadastral case is deemed to have settled the status of the land, and any claim over it not noted therein by other parties is barred under res judicata. A deed of sale executed before the proceeding and never presented to the cadastral court, by a vendee who filed no answer, loses its efficacy upon finality of the judgment and is functus officio.
The Rule on the Scope of an Adverse Claim: an adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496 — carried forward by Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 — covers only a right or interest arising subsequent to the date of the original registration. One founded on a pre-registration transaction is not registrable as an adverse claim and produces no legal effect.
The Rule on Post-Decree Remedies: a party fraudulently deprived of property in a cadastral proceeding may file a petition for review within one year from entry of the decree; thereafter, and provided the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance lies on the implied trust of Article 1456, which prescribes in ten years.
The Rule on Succession and Registration: the transfer of registered land to a sole heir takes place ipso jure upon the death of the decedent; no law requires the heir to execute an affidavit of adjudication or to have a new certificate issued in order to acquire ownership or to protect her rights, and the subsisting original certificate protects her in the meantime.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

Prescription and laches operate against the unregistered claimant, not against the registered owner or his heirs. The bar on acquiring registered land by prescription or adverse possession is "unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors," who "merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law"; and "where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available." Laches not pleaded in the answer is waived under the rules of procedure.
Tax declarations do not make or unmake title. Payments by third persons "for and in behalf of the registered owners" benefit the owners and their successors, so a registered owner's failure to declare the land in her own name does not prejudice her; conversely, a possessor who pays no realty tax cannot substitute irrigation charges for the incidents of ownership.
Appellate findings of fact yield when conjectural. Findings of the Court of Appeals are ordinarily conclusive, but not where they are "conjectural and speculative," rest on an avowed "suspicion," and displace a trial court's assessment of witness credibility.
Age matters to inference. No inference of knowledge could be drawn against a claimant who was two years old when the impugned deed was signed and four when her father died — "very much below the age of reason" — where the record shows no one ever informed her of the sale.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification of Relationship: DIRECT.
Integration: Llenares v. Court of Appeals is one of the two cases the Course Outline assigns for the concept and purpose of cadastral registration proceedings, and it supplies both in one passage. The concept is the structure of the proceeding: judicial and in rem, binding the whole world, with the Government as plaintiff and all claimants as defendants, in which the court adjudicates all conflicting interests and issues a decree that becomes an original certificate of title with the force of any other Torrens title — the modern statutory expression of which is Section 36, Section 37 and Section 38 of P.D. No. 1529, the decision's own footnotes tracing them to Sections 5, 9 and 11 of the Cadastral Act. The purpose is what the structure serves: to require, in the public interest, that the titles to any lands be settled and adjudicated — finally, and against everyone at once.
The sanction is what makes the purpose operative. A proceeding meant to settle titles once and for all works only if staying away costs something, and here it cost the buyer's family the land. Their deed was valid in 1929 and worthless after 1937, and neither forty years of possession, nor the conversion of the land to riceland, nor irrigation charges paid since 1960, nor an adverse claim filed in 1977 could repair the single omission of failing to answer.
Read with Tamin v. Court of Appeals, assigned under the same heading, the two state the doctrine from opposite ends: Tamin holds that a pending cadastral proceeding must be allowed to settle ownership before anyone is dispossessed, and Llenares holds that a concluded one is conclusive against every claim that could have been raised in it.

Separate Opinions

NOT APPLICABLE / NOT IN RECORD. The Decision was rendered by the Third Division through Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. as ponente, with Associate Justices Florentino P. Feliciano, Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Jose C. Melo concurring. No separate concurring or dissenting opinion was filed.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Special Law

Section 36, P.D. No. 1529

Petition for registration

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

When the lands have been surveyed or plotted, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, shall institute original registration proceedings by filing the necessary petition in the Court of First Instance of the place where the land is situated against the holders, claimants, possessors, or occupants of such lands or any part thereof, stating in substance that public interest requires that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated and praying that such titles be so settled and adjudicated:

The petition shall contain a description of the lands and shall be accompanied by a plan thereof, and may contain such other data as may serve to furnish full notice to the occupants of the lands and to all persons who may claim any right or interest therein.

Where the land consists of two or more parcels held or occupied by different persons, the plan shall indicate the boundaries or limits of the various parcels as accurately as possible. The parcels shall be known as "lots" and shall on the plan filed in the case be given separate numbers by the Director of Lands, which numbers shall be known as "cadastral lot numbers". The lots situated within each municipality shall, as far as practicable, be numbered consecutively beginning with number "one", and only one series of numbers shall be used for that purpose in each municipality. However in cities or townsites, a designation of the landholdings by blocks and lot numbers may be employed instead of the designation by cadastral lot numbers.

The cadastral number of a lot shall not be changed after final decision has been entered decreasing the registration thereof, except by order of court. Future subdivisions of any lot shall be designated by a letter or letters of the alphabet added to the cadastral number of the lot to which the respective subdivisions pertain. The letter with which a subdivision is designated shall be known as its "cadastral letter": Provided, however, that the subdivisions of cities or townsites may be designated by blocks and lot numbers.

C. ANSWER

This is the successor provision. The decision applies Sections 5 and 9 of the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259) — its own footnote cross-references them to "Sections 36 and 37, P.D. No. 1529" — and notes that cadastral proceedings are now governed by the Property Registration Decree.

Why it is cited here

Who sues whom in a cadastral case, and why the answer to that question decides this one.

"The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, shall institute original registration proceedings by filing the necessary petition … against the holders, claimants, possessors, or occupants of such lands or any part thereof, stating in substance that public interest requires that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated."

The Court states the same structure in a single line: "In a cadastral proceeding, the Government is actually the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants."

That is what makes the omission fatal. Ariston Zabella, who bought Anastacio Llenares's half in 1929, was a claimant the petition ran against whether or not anyone served him personally. He was a defendant in a suit the Government had filed about his land, and he never answered it.

Special Law

Section 37, P.D. No. 1529

Answer to petition in cadastral proceedings

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

Any claimant in cadastral proceedings, whether named in the notice or not, shall appear before the court by himself or by some other authorized person in his behalf, and shall file an answer on or before the date of initial hearing or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall be signed and sworn to by the claimant or by some other authorized person in his behalf, and shall state whether the claimant is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the spouse and the date of marriage, his nationality, residence and postal address, and shall also contain:

(a) The age of the claimant;

(b) The cadastral number of the lot or lots claimed, as appearing on the plan filed in the case by the Director of Lands, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be;

(d) The names and addresses of the owners of the adjoining lots so far as known to the claimant;

(e) If the claimant is in possession of the lots claimed and can show no express grant of the land by the government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer shall state the length of time he has held such possession and the manner in which it has been acquired, and shall also state the length of time, as far as known, during which the predecessors, if any, held possession;

(f) If the claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall fully set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of his acquisition;

(g) if the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and

(h) The encumbrances, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants, as far as known.

D. HEARING; JUDGMENT; DECREE

Why it is cited here

The duty Ariston Zabella did not perform, and the words that make personal notice beside the point.

"Any claimant in cadastral proceedings, whether named in the notice or not, shall appear before the court … and shall file an answer on or before the date of initial hearing or within such further time as may be allowed."

Read against Section 36, the section describes a compulsory joinder of everyone with a claim to the land. The Court puts it as: those "claiming interest in the entire land or any part of it, whether named in the notice or not, are required to appear before the court and file an answer on or before the return day."

Ariston Zabella filed no answer and advanced no claim. Neither did his heirs. The deed they held was never put before the cadastral court, which is why forty years later it could no longer be used to unseat the title that proceeding produced.

This is the practical content of the topic's word purpose. A cadastral proceeding is not an invitation; it is a summons to everyone at once, and the price of ignoring it is the claim itself.

Special Law

Section 38, P.D. No. 1529

Hearing, Judgment, Decree

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the province in which the lands are situated and shall be conducted, and orders for default and confessions entered, in the same manner as in ordinary land registration proceedings and shall be governed by the same rules. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or to parts thereof and such decrees shall be the basis for issuance of original certificates of title in favor of said persons and shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under ordinary land registration proceedings.

CHAPTER IV CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Why it is cited here

What the cadastral judgment does, and the source of its res judicata effect.

"All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands … and such decrees shall be the basis for issuance of original certificates of title in favor of said persons and shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under ordinary land registration proceedings."

Three things in that sentence decide the case. The adjudication is of all conflicting interests, so nothing about the land is left open. The decree is the basis of the OCT, so Decree No. 54398 and OCT No. 43073 (1937) are the cadastral judgment made permanent. And the resulting title has the same effect as an ordinary Torrens title, so it carries the same indefeasibility.

Hence the Court's holding: the final judgment "is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof; any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is therefore deemed barred under the principle of res judicata." The trial court said the same in plainer words — after finality, "the Deed of Sale has lost its efficacy — functus officio."

Special Law

Section 110, Act No. 496

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

Whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and bow or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall, grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be canceled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its discretion.

SURRENDER OF DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES.

The Court applies this section because it was "the governing law at that time." Its successor, Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529, keeps the same "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration" limitation and adds that the annotation is effective for only thirty days — a point the decision notes in passing.

Why it is cited here

The provision that made Apolinar Zabella's adverse claim a nullity, and the one word in it that did the work.

An adverse claim may be filed by "whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration."

Zabella registered his affidavit of adverse claim on 17 February 1977 — over thirty-nine years after OCT No. 43073 issued on 28 July 1937. But his claim rested on a deed of sale executed by Anastacio Llenares in 1929, "a transaction which had occurred long before the rendition of the decision in the cadastral proceedings and the issuance of OCT No. 43073."

The claim was therefore not of the kind the section allows to be registered at all: it did not arise after the original registration, it arose before it, and was extinguished by it. "This move did not produce any legal effect."

The point generalises. An adverse claim is a device for interests that come into being under an existing title; it is not a way to revive a claim the registration itself cut off.

Special Law

Section 46, Act No. 496

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Superseded but correctly quoted. The successor is Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, which reads "in derogation of the title of the registered owner." The trial court quoted the Act No. 496 wording, which was the law when the title issued and is what appears in the decision.

Why it is cited here

The rule the trial court applied and this Court restored — quoted here in the wording of the statute that governed when OCT No. 43073 issued in 1937.

"No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."

Apolinar Zabella's whole case was possession: he and his siblings entered after his father's death in 1930, converted the land to riceland, irrigated it in 1955 and paid the irrigation charges from 1960. None of it could ripen into title, because the land had been registered since 1937.

The trial court's extension of the rule is worth memorising, and the Supreme Court reinstated it whole: prescription "is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors," who "merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law"; and "laches, too, may not be considered a valid defense for claiming ownership of registered land. Where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available."

The Court of Appeals had inverted the rule, counting the years against the registered owner's heir. The Supreme Court counted them the other way: it was Zabella who let thirty-nine years pass before taking a single legal step.

Civil Code

Article 1456, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title V (Trusts (N)), Chapter 3 (Implied Trusts)

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

Why it is cited here

The remedy the Court sets out for the party who really was defrauded — and, by contrast, the measure of how far outside it Zabella stood.

"If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

The closing passage maps the whole remedial ladder after a cadastral decree. A party fraudulently deprived may petition for review within one year from entry of the decree. After that year, "if the property has not yet passed on to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance may still be filed" — and that action "could have only been based on an implied trust in Article 1456 of the Civil Code." It prescribes in ten years.

Set the calendar against it. The decree was entered in 1937; the first legal step of any kind came in 1977. One year, ten years, thirty-nine years: every door the law leaves open after a cadastral judgment had closed long before Zabella knocked.

This is why the topic's concept and purpose are not academic. The finality of a cadastral decree is severe, and the law compensates for that severity with these graduated remedies — but each of them runs from the decree, and none of them waits.

Source: Llenares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98709, May 13, 1993

Cited laws & provisions

Section 36, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Petition for registration

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

C. ANSWER

Why it is cited here

Who sues whom in a cadastral case, and why the answer to that question decides this one.

The Court states the same structure in a single line: "In a cadastral proceeding, the Government is actually the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants."

Full entry below ↓

Section 37, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Answer to petition in cadastral proceedings

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

(a) The age of the claimant;

(b) The cadastral number of the lot or lots claimed, as appearing on the plan filed in the case by the Director of Lands, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be;

(d) The names and addresses of the owners of the adjoining lots so far as known to the claimant;

(f) If the claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall fully set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of his acquisition;

(g) if the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and

(h) The encumbrances, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants, as far as known.

D. HEARING; JUDGMENT; DECREE

Why it is cited here

The duty Ariston Zabella did not perform, and the words that make personal notice beside the point.

This is the practical content of the topic's word purpose. A cadastral proceeding is not an invitation; it is a summons to everyone at once, and the price of ignoring it is the claim itself.

Full entry below ↓

Section 38, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Hearing, Judgment, Decree

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

CHAPTER IV CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Why it is cited here

What the cadastral judgment does, and the source of its res judicata effect.

Full entry below ↓

Section 110, Act No. 496

Special Law

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

SURRENDER OF DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES.

Why it is cited here

The provision that made Apolinar Zabella's adverse claim a nullity, and the one word in it that did the work.

An adverse claim may be filed by "whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration."

The point generalises. An adverse claim is a device for interests that come into being under an existing title; it is not a way to revive a claim the registration itself cut off.

Full entry below ↓

Section 46, Act No. 496

Special Law

Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902)

No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Why it is cited here

The rule the trial court applied and this Court restored — quoted here in the wording of the statute that governed when OCT No. 43073 issued in 1937.

"No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."

Full entry below ↓

Article 1456, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title V (Trusts (N)), Chapter 3 (Implied Trusts)

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

Why it is cited here

The remedy the Court sets out for the party who really was defrauded — and, by contrast, the measure of how far outside it Zabella stood.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-owners in equal shares of a parcel in barrio Silangang Mayao, Lucena, designated in the cadastral survey as Cadastral Lot No. 4804-D and later renumbered Lot No. 5015.
On December 21, 1929 Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half share to Ariston Zabella, father of the private respondent. Ariston died on March 21, 1930, and Anastacio on March 27, 1931, leaving as his sole heir his only child Magdalena Llenares — then four years old. (She was two when the deed was signed and four when her father died. Those two ages are what the Supreme Court later used to demolish the Court of Appeals' "suspicion" that she had known of the sale all along.)
In the cadastral proceedings that followed, the cadastral court awarded Lot No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal shares. Decree No. 54398 issued, and on July 28, 1937 OCT No. 43073 was entered in their names. Ariston Zabella filed no answer and advanced no claim in those proceedings, and his 1929 deed was never presented to the cadastral court. (That silence is the fact the case turns on. Everything the private respondent later did — the possession, the irrigation charges, the adverse claim — was an attempt to assert outside the cadastral case a claim that had to be made inside it.)
On February 5, 1960 Rosario and her niece Irene Catapat adjudicated to themselves Juan Zabella's one-half share, and the adjudication was annotated on OCT No. 43073. Rosario died on June 5, 1962, leaving as heirs her children Godofredo, Noemi, Natividad, Olimpio and Numeriana Zaracena. (Note: the printed text drops a clause here — the sentence beginning "On the other hand, Juan Zabella and niece Irene Catapat" is incomplete on LawPhil, so how Rosario stood to Juan Zabella cannot be read off the decision itself.)
On June 22, 1976 Magdalena, as sole heir of Anastacio, adjudicated his one-half share to herself by a Salaysay ng Pagmamana ng Nag-iisang Tagapagmana (Exhibit "A"), annotated on OCT No. 43073. On August 26, 1976 that OCT was cancelled and TCT No. T-27166 issued for the entire lot.
On February 17, 1977 — over thirty-nine years after OCT No. 43073 issued — private respondent Apolinar Zabella caused an affidavit of adverse claim to be annotated, recorded as Entry No. 35285. It was his and his family's first legal step of any kind since the 1929 deed.
By a Kasunduan ng Pagsusukat (Exhibit "I") between Irene Catapat and Rosario's heirs, Lot No. 5015 was subdivided into Lots 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C; Lot 5015-A, the half corresponding to Anastacio's share, went to Magdalena, and TCT No. 28170 was issued in her name over its 12,501 square meters.
On possession, Magdalena proved that her cousin Rosario administered the land until 1959, when she installed Rufo Orig as tenant; he delivered her share of the harvest until 1976, when the private respondent told him to stop and claimed ownership. She had been paying the land taxes until the case was filed. Apolinar's version was that he and his siblings took possession after Ariston's death in 1930, converted the land to riceland, had it irrigated in 1955 and had paid the irrigation charges since 1960.
On July 12, 1977 Magdalena sued for recovery of possession and quieting of title. On April 4, 1986 the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 57 ruled for her, ordering surrender of possession, an accounting of fruits from August 1976, cancellation of Entry No. 35285, and P2,500.00 attorney's fees and P1,000.00 litigation expenses. On April 24, 1990 the Court of Appeals reversed in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853, declaring Apolinar the true and lawful owner of the 12,501 square meters, ordering a deed of conveyance, ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. T-28170, and awarding P10,000.00 attorney's fees against Magdalena. The Third Division decided on May 13, 1993.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES (if any). Whether a sole heir must execute an affidavit of adjudication and secure a new certificate to protect her rights in registered land.

Ruling

Note on two dates in the decision itself. The opening paragraph gives the Court of Appeals decision as "promulgated on 24 April 1990," while the dispositive portion annuls the decision "of 24 April 1991." The docket number (CA-G.R. CV No. 09853) is the same in both, so this is a slip in the text and not two decisions. The spelling "ANNULING" is likewise the original's.

Ratio

A cadastral proceeding is a compulsory joinder of everyone with a claim. The Government, through the Solicitor General, "institutes the proceedings by a petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants" of the land, and those claiming an interest "whether named in the notice or not, are required to appear before the court and file an answer." The Government is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants.
Because it is judicial and in rem, its judgment binds the whole world. All conflicting interests are adjudicated, the decree is awarded to the party entitled, and on finality it becomes the basis for an original certificate of title having "the same effect as a certificate of title granted under the Land Registration Act."
What was not raised is barred. The final judgment "settled the status of the land," so a claim not noted in it is barred by res judicata. The 1929 deed, never put before the cadastral court by the vendee or his heirs, was spent — functus officio in the trial court's phrase.
An adverse claim cannot resurrect a pre-registration transaction. Section 110 speaks of interests "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration"; a 1929 sale is not such an interest, and its registration in 1977 "did not produce any legal effect."
Prescription and laches were run against the wrong party. No title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner's may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession — and the protection extends to hereditary successors, who "merely step into the shoes of the decedent." Where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available.
Non-declaration for taxation is not abandonment. Until the title was transferred, the land remained covered by OCT No. 43073 in the names of the original co-owners, and taxes paid by others for and in behalf of the registered owners benefit the registered owners and their successors. Meanwhile Zabella "neither had the property declared in his name for taxation purposes nor paid the real estate taxes thereon" — only irrigation charges, and only from 1960. Resolving the issue in his favour on that record "defies all logic."
A suspicion is not a finding. The inference that Magdalena's inaction showed she knew of the 1929 sale "has no basis at all": she was two when the deed was executed and four when her father died, "very much below the age of reason," and nothing showed she was ever told of the sale before the 1977 adverse claim.
Succession needs no paperwork to operate. No law requires a sole heir to execute an affidavit of adjudication or to have a new certificate issued; the transfer takes place ipso jure on the decedent's death, and the continued existence of the OCT in the registered owners' names "fully protected her rights."

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

The Concept of a Cadastral Proceeding: proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) are judicial and in rem, and as such bind the whole world. The Government is actually the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants: the Solicitor General institutes the proceeding by petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants of the land, and those claiming an interest in the whole or any part, whether named in the notice or not, must appear and answer.
The Purpose and Effect of the Cadastral Decree: all conflicting interests are adjudicated in the proceeding, the decree is awarded to the party entitled, and once final it is the basis for an original certificate of title with the same effect as a certificate granted under the Land Registration Act. The final judgment "is deemed to have settled the status of the land," so that any claim over it not noted therein by other parties is barred under res judicata.
The Llenares Rule on Pre-Registration Deeds: a deed of sale executed before the cadastral proceedings and never presented to the cadastral court, by a vendee who filed no answer and advanced no claim, loses its efficacy on the finality of the cadastral judgment and becomes functus officio. It cannot afterwards be used to defeat the title the proceeding produced.
The Limits of an Adverse Claim: an adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496 — and under its successor, Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 — is confined to a right or interest "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration." A claim founded on a transaction predating the registration cannot be registered as an adverse claim and produces no legal effect.
The Remedies After a Cadastral Decree, and Their Periods: a party fraudulently deprived of property in a cadastral proceeding may file a petition for review within one year from the entry of the decree; after that period, and if the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance may still be brought, founded on the implied trust of Article 1456 of the Civil Code, and prescribing in ten years.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

Prescription and laches run against the claimant, not the registered owner. The statutory bar protects the registered owner and his hereditary successors, who "merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor in interest"; and "where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available."
A defence not pleaded is waived. The trial court refused to entertain laches because it "was never interposed or pleaded in the answer," defences and objections not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer being deemed waived.
Tax declarations and payments are evidence, not title. Payments made by third persons for and in behalf of the registered owners benefit the owners and their successors, so a registered owner's failure to declare the land in her own name does not prejudice her — while a possessor who pays no realty tax at all cannot make irrigation charges do the work of ownership.
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not conclusive when conjectural. Where the appellate court's rejection of the trial court's findings rests on speculation and an avowed "suspicion," and the underlying question is one of witness credibility, the trial court's appraisal stands.
Succession is not a matter of registration. The transfer to a sole heir occurs ipso jure at death; no affidavit of adjudication or new certificate is required to protect the heir's rights while the OCT subsists.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification of Relationship: DIRECT.
Integration: the case is one of the two entries the Course Outline assigns for the concept and purpose of cadastral registration proceedings, and it supplies both halves in a single paragraph. The concept is structural: a proceeding judicial and in rem, with the Government as plaintiff and every claimant a defendant, in which all conflicting interests are adjudicated at once and the decree becomes an original certificate of title of ordinary Torrens force under Section 38. The purpose is what that structure is for — to settle and adjudicate the titles to an entire area finally, which is why Section 36 sues everyone and Section 37 commands every claimant to answer "whether named in the notice or not."
The case supplies the sanction that makes the purpose real. A proceeding designed to settle titles once and for all can only do so if failing to appear costs something. Here it cost Ariston Zabella's successors the land: the deed was good in 1929, worthless after 1937, and the forty years of possession and irrigation charges that followed could not repair the omission. Read with Tamin v. Court of Appeals, assigned under the same heading, the pair states the rule from both ends — Tamin holds that a pending cadastral proceeding must be allowed to run its course before anyone is dispossessed, and Llenares holds that a concluded one is final against every claim that could have been made in it.

Separate Opinions

None. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. wrote for the Third Division, with Justices Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo concurring.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Facts

Originally: Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-owners, in equal shares, of a parcel of land situated in barrio Silangang Mayao of the then Municipality, now City, of Lucena. In the cadastral survey of the municipality the lot was designated Cadastral Lot No. 4804-D, a designation later changed to Lot No. 5015.
On December 21, 1929: Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half share in the lot to Ariston Zabella, the private respondent's father.
On March 21, 1930: Ariston Zabella died.
On March 27, 1931: Anastacio Llenares died, leaving the petitioner Magdalena Llenares, his only child, as his sole heir. She was two years old when the deed of sale was executed and four years old when her father died.
After due proceedings: The cadastral court awarded Lot No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal shares. Decree No. 54398 was issued to both of them and, on the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title No. 43073 was issued in their names in July 1937 — the Court elsewhere fixing the date as 28 July 1937.
In the cadastral proceedings: Ariston Zabella, the vendee under the 1929 deed, did not file any answer and advanced no claim over the lot, and the deed of sale was never presented to the cadastral court.
On February 5, 1960: Rosario and her niece Irene Catapat adjudicated to themselves Juan Zabella's one-half share in the lot, and the adjudication was annotated in OCT No. 43073. (The printed text of the decision drops a clause at this point, so the relationship of Rosario to Juan Zabella cannot be read off the decision itself.)
On June 5, 1962: Rosario died, leaving as her only heirs her children Godofredo, Noemi, Natividad, Olimpio and Numeriana, all surnamed Zaracena.
On June 22, 1976: The petitioner, as sole heir of Anastacio Llenares, adjudicated to herself by way of a Salaysay ng Pagmamana ng Nag-iisang Tagapagmana (Exhibit "A") the one-half share in the property belonging to her father. This was likewise annotated in OCT No. 43073.
On August 26, 1976: OCT No. 43073 was cancelled and in its place TCT No. T-27166 was issued for the entire lot.
On February 16–17, 1977: The private respondent Apolinar Zabella filed an affidavit of adverse claim, which was duly annotated; the trial court's decree identifies it as Entry No. 35285, inscribed February 17, 1977. This was the first legal step taken by the Zabella side since the 1929 deed — over thirty-nine years after OCT No. 43073 issued.
Thereafter: As a consequence of a Kasunduan ng Pagsusukat (Exhibit "I") executed by and between Irene Catapat and the heirs of Rosario Zabella Zaracena, Lot No. 5015 was subdivided into Lots Nos. 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C. Lot No. 5015-A, comprising the one-half of Lot No. 5015 corresponding to Anastacio's share, was allotted to the petitioner; TCT No. T-27166 was cancelled and separate certificates issued for each subdivided lot, with TCT No. 28170 issued in the petitioner's name over 12,501 square meters.
On the issue of possession — the petitioner's evidence: Since she was only four years old when her father died, her cousin Rosario Zabella administered the land until 1959, when the petitioner placed Rufo Orig as tenant. Orig delivered to her her share of the harvest until 1976, when he stopped because the private respondent ordered him not to give her share anymore, the private respondent claiming ownership. The petitioner further proved that she had been paying the land taxes on the property until the filing of the case.
On the issue of possession — the private respondent's version: He and his siblings took possession of the portion sold by Anastacio after Ariston Zabella's death on 21 March 1930; he converted it into riceland; it was irrigated in 1955; he has been paying the irrigation charges since 1960; and he and his co-heirs have been in possession without interference "until the present."
On July 12, 1977: The petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and quieting of title, after allegedly being dispossessed by the private respondent in 1976 and after the annotation of the affidavit of adverse claim, praying that she be restored to possession and that the adverse claim be cancelled.
On April 4, 1986: Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City rendered judgment for the petitioner, declaring her the true and absolute owner of the land covered by TCT No. 28170 and ordering (1) the defendant to surrender and transfer possession; (2) an accounting of the fruits received from August 1976 until possession is transferred; (3) the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to cancel Entry No. 35285 in TCT No. 28170; and (4) payment of P2,500.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
On April 24, 1990: The Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853, reversed — declaring the defendant-appellant the true and lawful owner of the 12,501 square meters covered by TCT No. T-28170; ordering the plaintiff-appellee to execute the proper deed of conveyance; ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. T-28170 and issue a new one to the defendant-appellant should she fail or refuse; and ordering her to pay P10,000.00 attorney's fees, with costs.
On May 13, 1993: The Supreme Court, Third Division, promulgated the Decision granting the petition, annulling the Court of Appeals decision and reinstating the trial court's judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Magdalena Llenares).

Petitioner argues that an alleged sale by virtue of an instrument not filed or registered under Act No. 3344 and not submitted before the cadastral court during its hearing cannot deprive an adjudicated and declared owner of the enjoyment of possession and of the improvements on the land.
Petitioner argues that a party whose title was vested by the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree of registration in a judicial proceeding in rem, which as such binds the whole world, is protected, and whoever claims thereafter is barred under the principle of res judicata.
Petitioner argues that property covered by a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Private respondent (Apolinar Zabella).

Private respondent maintains that he and his siblings took possession of the portion sold by Anastacio Llenares after Ariston Zabella's death on 21 March 1930, converted it into riceland, had it irrigated in 1955, and have been paying the irrigation charges since 1960, possessing it without interference by any party.
Private respondent maintains, and the Court of Appeals accepted, that it was the petitioner who slept on her rights — allowing twenty-eight years to pass from the time she attained majority before taking affirmative action, and moving to change the registered ownership only in 1976 — from which "suspicion then is not altogether unjustified that the inaction was because the appellee knew of the sale by her father."
Private respondent maintains that neither prescription nor laches applies against him because, promptly after TCT No. T-27166 was issued on 26 August 1976, he filed his adverse claim, thereby making his interest a matter of record.

Common Ground.

It is not disputed that Anastacio Llenares executed a deed of sale of his one-half share to Ariston Zabella on 21 December 1929, nor that the cadastral court nonetheless awarded Lot No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal pro indiviso shares, with OCT No. 43073 issuing on 28 July 1937.
It is not disputed that the petitioner is Anastacio Llenares's sole heir, that she was four years old at his death, and that the affidavit of adverse claim was registered on 17 February 1977.

Issue

SECONDARY ISSUES.

Whether an affidavit of adverse claim may validly be founded on a transaction that antedates the original registration.
Whether prescription and laches operated against the registered owner's sole heir or against the possessor claiming under the unregistered deed.
Whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals on possession — which reversed those of the trial court — are conclusive on this Court.

ANCILLARY / INCIDENTAL ISSUES.

Whether a sole heir is required by law to execute an affidavit of adjudication and cause the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance of a new certificate in order to transfer ownership to herself or protect her rights.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim). The final dispositive portion of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 98709, dated May 13, 1993, is quoted verbatim as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition, ANNULING the challenged decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals of 24 April 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853 and REINSTATING the decision of the trial court subject of the appeal in the latter case.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Cadastral Proceeding Is Judicial and In Rem: proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) "are judicial and in rem. As such, they bind the whole world." Every person with an interest is before the court, whether he appears or not, and the judgment speaks to everyone.
The Government Is the Plaintiff and All Claimants Are Defendants: the Solicitor General institutes the proceeding by a petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants of the lands, and those claiming an interest in the whole or any part, "whether named in the notice or not," are required to appear and file an answer on or before the return day. That structure — one plaintiff, all the world as defendants — is what allows the proceeding to settle every competing claim in a single decree.
The Decree Settles the Status of the Land: "All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated therein and the decree awarded in favor of the party entitled to the land"; when final, the decree is the basis for an original certificate of title having "the same effect as a certificate of title granted under the Land Registration Act." The final judgment "is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof."
Res Judicata Bars What Was Not Raised: "any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is therefore deemed barred under the principle of res judicata." A prior deed of sale that the vendee never brought before the cadastral court is thereby spent — the trial court's phrase is that it "has lost its efficacy being functus oficio."
An Adverse Claim Reaches Only Post-Registration Interests: Section 110 of Act No. 496 speaks of an interest "arising subsequent to the date of the original registration." A claim resting on a 1929 transaction, filed in 1977 against a title registered in 1937, is not such an interest and "did not produce any legal effect."
Registered Land Is Not Lost by Possession or Delay: no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, the bar running in favour of the owner and his hereditary successors; and "where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available." A defence of laches not pleaded in the answer is, besides, waived.
The Remedial Ladder After a Cadastral Decree: review within one year from entry of the decree for actual fraud; thereafter, if no innocent purchaser for value has intervened, an action for conveyance on the implied trust of Article 1456, prescribing in ten years. Both had long expired.
Speculation Cannot Displace a Trial Court's Credibility Findings: appellate findings that rest on "suspicion" and inference, in a case turning on the credibility of witnesses the trial judge saw and heard, are conjectural and do not bind this Court.
Succession Operates by Law, Not by Registration: no law requires a sole heir to execute an affidavit of adjudication or to obtain a new certificate; the transfer takes place ipso jure upon the decedent's death, and the subsisting OCT protects the heir in the meantime.

Doctrine

Doctrines / Rules / Principles Laid Down.

The Llenares Statement of the Cadastral Concept: proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) are judicial and in rem and bind the whole world. The Government, through the Solicitor General, is the plaintiff, and all claimants are defendants; every person claiming an interest in the land or any part of it, whether named in the notice or not, must appear and file an answer. All conflicting interests are adjudicated in the proceeding, the decree is awarded to the party entitled, and upon finality it is the basis for an original certificate of title with the same effect as one issued in ordinary registration proceedings.
The Llenares Rule of Cadastral Res Judicata: the final judgment in a cadastral case is deemed to have settled the status of the land, and any claim over it not noted therein by other parties is barred under res judicata. A deed of sale executed before the proceeding and never presented to the cadastral court, by a vendee who filed no answer, loses its efficacy upon finality of the judgment and is functus officio.
The Rule on the Scope of an Adverse Claim: an adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496 — carried forward by Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 — covers only a right or interest arising subsequent to the date of the original registration. One founded on a pre-registration transaction is not registrable as an adverse claim and produces no legal effect.
The Rule on Post-Decree Remedies: a party fraudulently deprived of property in a cadastral proceeding may file a petition for review within one year from entry of the decree; thereafter, and provided the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance lies on the implied trust of Article 1456, which prescribes in ten years.
The Rule on Succession and Registration: the transfer of registered land to a sole heir takes place ipso jure upon the death of the decedent; no law requires the heir to execute an affidavit of adjudication or to have a new certificate issued in order to acquire ownership or to protect her rights, and the subsisting original certificate protects her in the meantime.

Distinctions / Limitations / Qualifications.

Prescription and laches operate against the unregistered claimant, not against the registered owner or his heirs. The bar on acquiring registered land by prescription or adverse possession is "unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors," who "merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law"; and "where prescription would not lie, neither would laches be available." Laches not pleaded in the answer is waived under the rules of procedure.
Tax declarations do not make or unmake title. Payments by third persons "for and in behalf of the registered owners" benefit the owners and their successors, so a registered owner's failure to declare the land in her own name does not prejudice her; conversely, a possessor who pays no realty tax cannot substitute irrigation charges for the incidents of ownership.
Appellate findings of fact yield when conjectural. Findings of the Court of Appeals are ordinarily conclusive, but not where they are "conjectural and speculative," rest on an avowed "suspicion," and displace a trial court's assessment of witness credibility.
Age matters to inference. No inference of knowledge could be drawn against a claimant who was two years old when the impugned deed was signed and four when her father died — "very much below the age of reason" — where the record shows no one ever informed her of the sale.

Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Classification of Relationship: DIRECT.
Integration: Llenares v. Court of Appeals is one of the two cases the Course Outline assigns for the concept and purpose of cadastral registration proceedings, and it supplies both in one passage. The concept is the structure of the proceeding: judicial and in rem, binding the whole world, with the Government as plaintiff and all claimants as defendants, in which the court adjudicates all conflicting interests and issues a decree that becomes an original certificate of title with the force of any other Torrens title — the modern statutory expression of which is Section 36, Section 37 and Section 38 of P.D. No. 1529, the decision's own footnotes tracing them to Sections 5, 9 and 11 of the Cadastral Act. The purpose is what the structure serves: to require, in the public interest, that the titles to any lands be settled and adjudicated — finally, and against everyone at once.
The sanction is what makes the purpose operative. A proceeding meant to settle titles once and for all works only if staying away costs something, and here it cost the buyer's family the land. Their deed was valid in 1929 and worthless after 1937, and neither forty years of possession, nor the conversion of the land to riceland, nor irrigation charges paid since 1960, nor an adverse claim filed in 1977 could repair the single omission of failing to answer.
Read with Tamin v. Court of Appeals, assigned under the same heading, the two state the doctrine from opposite ends: Tamin holds that a pending cadastral proceeding must be allowed to settle ownership before anyone is dispossessed, and Llenares holds that a concluded one is conclusive against every claim that could have been raised in it.

Separate Opinions

NOT APPLICABLE / NOT IN RECORD. The Decision was rendered by the Third Division through Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. as ponente, with Associate Justices Florentino P. Feliciano, Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Jose C. Melo concurring. No separate concurring or dissenting opinion was filed.