Facts

• On September 24, 1990 the Municipality of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, through Mayor Domiciano E. Real, sued Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon in the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, Molave, presided by petitioner Judge Camilo E. Tamin, in a complaint denominated "Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and Damages."
• The complaint alleged that the municipality owns a 5,894-square-meter residential parcel in Poblacion, Dumingag, reserved for a public plaza under Presidential Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968; that in 1958, under the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr., it leased 1,350 square meters to the defendants on condition that they vacate when the land was needed for public purposes; that they paid rentals until 1967 and refused thereafter; that "the incumbent mayor discovered that the defendants filed a 'Cadastral Answer' over said lot"; and that a municipal gymnasium funded by a national appropriation had been started inside the plaza but could not continue, so that the appropriation might revert to the national government. (That one clause about the Cadastral Answer is the fact the case turns on. It converts the defendants from squatters into claimants in the very proceeding the law provides for settling who owns the land.)
• On the same day the judge set the preliminary hearing on the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of possession for October 10, 1990.
• Instead of answering, the respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction — the action being one for illegal detainer cognizable by the municipal court — and for the pendency of a cadastral case between the parties over the same land: Cadastral Case No. N-10, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-108, Lot 9481 [Pls-61] TS-218.
• On October 10, 1990 the judge issued two orders: the first denied the motion to dismiss, characterising the suit as an accion de reivindicacion and holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction over land covered by the Proclamation; the second granted a writ of possession "with the ancillary writ of demolition" so "that the public construction thereon will not be jeopardized." He justified it by applying Rule 67 on eminent domain by analogy — the pleading calls it Rule 68 — reasoning that a complainant is given possession there so that public projects are not delayed, and that the need was greater here.
• On October 19, 1990 the omnibus motion for reconsideration was denied, and the municipality implemented both writs the same day — dispossessing the respondents and demolishing their buildings. (The demolition preceded any answer, any trial and any finding on ownership; by the time the Supreme Court ruled it was, in the Court's word, a fait accompli.)
• On October 23, 1990 the respondents finally answered: Medina had owned, occupied and possessed the parcel since 1947, when he bought it from a Subanan native; Rosellon leased a portion from Medina; they were never lessees of the municipality; Proclamation No. 365 recognised "private rights"; and the cadastral case between Medina and the municipality was pending.
• The respondents went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. On November 14, 1990 the petition was given due course with a TRO. On January 21, 1991 the appellate court annulled the October 10 and 19 orders and the writs, and on February 20, 1991 denied reconsideration. It upheld the RTC's jurisdiction — the allegations, not the title, control the cause of action, and under Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas a lease of a public plaza is void so the municipality could recover possession — but held that no statute authorised the writs, listing in Mabale v. Apalisok the four situations in which a writ of possession issues, and that Rule 67 was misapplied for want of statutory authority and a deposit.
• The En Banc decided on May 8, 1992.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

Ruling

Ratio

• What a cadastral proceeding is, and what it is for. The government, through the Director of Lands, initiates it by petition; all owners or claimants are compelled to act and present their answers, otherwise they lose their right to their own property; and its purpose is to serve the public interest by requiring that the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated." It is a proceeding in rem "somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree."
• A forum designed to settle ownership cannot be pre-empted by a suit that assumes it. Because that is what the proceeding is for, its outcome "becomes a prejudicial question which must be addressed in the resolution of the instant case," and the trial court should have held the ejectment case in abeyance.
• The label "prejudicial question" is borrowed, and the Court says so. Strictly the doctrine operates between a civil and a criminal action; here both are civil, so "technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of." What justifies the analogy is the intimate correlation of the two proceedings, identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort, and the need to settle the right of possession before the ejectment case can properly be decided.
• A reservation "subject to private rights" is not a finding of title. Proclamation No. 365 withdraws the land from sale or settlement "subject to private rights, if any there be" — and the cadastral case predated it. The Proclamation therefore cannot itself supply the fact that the land is a public plaza free of private claims.
• A public plaza may be cleared summarily — but only when its status is not in question. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, outside the commerce of man, and "cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties." If the allegations were true, no writ of possession would even be necessary, occupation of such land being incapable of legal recognition; a writ of demolition would suffice.
• Choosing the judicial remedy means accepting its sequence. Article 699§ offers prosecution, civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. The municipality took the civil action, knowing that summary abatement under B.P. Blg. 337 would have required an ordinance first — and having gone to court, it could not have the fruits of a trial before the trial.
• An analogy carries the safeguards of the rule it borrows. Expropriation permits pre-judgment possession only because there is clear statutory authority and a deposit that answers for the taking; without them the taking is deprivation of property without due process. No deposit was required here, so even on the judge's own theory the writ was void — Rule 67 "can not be made a subterfuge."
• Where the wrong is already done, the remedy shifts to security. The demolition being a fait accompli, and the respondents' entitlement to compensation depending on an ownership question still pending, the Court ordered the municipality to put up a bond fixed by the trial court after hearing to answer for just compensation should the demolition be adjudged illegal.

Doctrine

• The Tamin Statement of the Cadastral Concept and Purpose: "Under the cadastral system, the government through the Director of Lands initiates the proceedings by filing a petition in court after which all owners or claimants are compelled to act and present their answers otherwise they lose their right to their own property. The purpose is to serve the public interests by requiring that the titles to any lands 'be settled and adjudicated.'" It is "a proceeding in rem somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree."
• The Cadastral Prejudicial-Question Rule: considering the nature and purpose of cadastral proceedings, the outcome of a pending cadastral case over the same land becomes a prejudicial question in an ejectment or possessory suit between the same parties, and the court must hold the possessory case in abeyance until ownership is settled. A writ of possession or demolition issued before that outcome is premature.
• The Rule on Public Plazas: a public plaza is property of public dominion, outside the commerce of man, cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties, and constructions on it constitute a nuisance subject to summary abatement. Where the land is indisputably a plaza, no writ of possession is needed because the occupant's possession cannot be recognised by law; a writ of demolition alone would suffice.
• The Rule Against Borrowing Rule 67: the rule on eminent domain cannot be made a subterfuge to justify a pre-trial writ of possession in an ordinary possessory action. Even where it applies, possession passes only upon a deposit of the amount the law prescribes; without the deposit the writ is illegal, because pre-judgment taking without statutory authority and without security is deprivation of property without due process of law.

• The prejudicial question here is an analogy, not the doctrine itself. Strictly, a prejudicial question arises where a civil and a criminal action are pending and the civil issue must be resolved first. Both proceedings here were civil, so "technically, there is no prejudicial question"; the doctrine was applied by analogy on the strength of identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort, and the need to resolve possession first, following Quiambao v. Osorio.
• A Proclamation "subject to private rights" settles nothing about private rights. The reservation of land for a public purpose does not itself extinguish claims that existed before it, and here the cadastral proceeding was already pending when the Proclamation issued.
• Summary abatement had its own precondition. Under the then Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), the Sangguniang Bayan had first to pass an ordinance before the municipality could summarily abate a public nuisance. Having passed none and having elected a civil action under Article 699§, the municipality could not take the summary route through a judicial writ instead.
• Estate of Gregoria Francisco distinguished. There, just compensation was awarded for a building demolished by a municipality before any tribunal had ruled it a nuisance, because the owner was in lawful possession under a permit from the authorised government agency. Here the legality of the occupation is itself the pending question, so compensation could not be awarded outright — only secured by a bond.
• Jurisdiction is read from the allegations, not the caption. Though styled "Ejectment," the complaint alleged recovery of possession of land claimed to be for public use, which places it within the Regional Trial Court; "the allegations and not the title control the cause of action."

• Classification of Relationship: DIRECT.
• Integration: the passage the Course Outline assigns this case for is a definition. Everything the topic asks — who begins a cadastral proceeding, what it obliges claimants to do, what it is for, and what kind of proceeding it is — is answered in four lines: the Director of Lands files the petition; all owners or claimants are compelled to answer or lose their right to their own property; the purpose is to have titles settled and adjudicated in the public interest; and it is a proceeding in rem "akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree." The statutory form of that description is Section 36§ and Section 37§ of P.D. No. 1529.
• What lifts it above a definition is that the Court then decided a live case on the strength of the purpose alone. Because a cadastral proceeding exists to settle titles, a pending one must be allowed to do so before anyone is turned out of the land — even a municipality asserting a Presidential Proclamation, an unfinished gymnasium and a lapsing appropriation. Urgency, public purpose and a plausible legal theory were all present, and none of them was enough.
• Read with Llenares v. Court of Appeals, assigned under the same heading, the two state the same rule from opposite ends. Llenares is the penalty side of Section 37§ — a claimant who never answered lost his deed to res judicata. Tamin is the protection side — a claimant who did answer cannot be dispossessed until his answer is ruled on. Both follow from the single proposition that the cadastral proceeding is the forum for settling titles to the land it covers.

Separate Opinions

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Facts

• On September 24, 1990: The petitioner Municipality of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, represented by its mayor Domiciano E. Real, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, Molave, presided over by the petitioner Judge Camilo E. Tamin, a complaint denominated "Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and Damages" against respondents Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon.
• The complaint alleged: that the plaintiff municipality is the owner of a parcel of residential land at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, with an area of 5,894 square meters more or less; that the parcel was reserved for a public plaza under Presidential Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968; that during the incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr., or in 1958, the municipality leased an area of 1,350 square meters to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes; that the defendants religiously paid the rentals until 1967 and thereafter refused to pay; that the incumbent mayor discovered that the defendants filed a "Cadastral Answer" over said lot; that the defendants refused to vacate despite the municipality's efforts; that the national government had allotted an appropriation for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza but the construction, already started, could not continue because of the buildings the defendants had constructed; and that the appropriation might be reverted to the national government, resulting in "irreparable damage, injury and prejudice" to the municipality and its people.
• The complaint prayed for an immediate restraining order; for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction after notice and hearing, "and/or that a Writ of Possession be immediately issued to preserve the rights of the herein plaintiff"; and for judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the leased portion.
• On the same day, September 24, 1990: The petitioner Judge issued an order setting the preliminary hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of possession on October 10, 1990.
• Instead of filing an answer: The respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, the complaint being for illegal detainer within the original jurisdiction of the municipal court, and the pendency of a cadastral case between the parties over the ownership of the same parcel — Cadastral Case No. N-10, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-108, Lot 9481 [Pls-61] TS-218.
• On October 10, 1990: The petitioner Judge issued two orders. The first denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that since the complaint alleges the defendant is claiming ownership over land previously rented to him, "this action is, therefore, clearly an accion de reivindicacion, a real action within the jurisdiction of this court"; that as the complaint is for recovery of ownership and not to enforce the contract, the Statute of Frauds does not apply; and that the land being covered by the Proclamation withdrawing it from sale or settlement and reserving it for school site and public plaza purposes, "the Cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the land involved in this case." The second granted the municipality's motion for a writ of possession "with the ancillary writ of demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of this case, to the end that the public construction thereon will not be jeopardized."
• The Judge's justification: He applied the rule on eminent domain — Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, erroneously referred to as Rule 68 — by analogy, on the view that under that Rule the complainant is given the right to a writ of possession so that public construction and projects will not be delayed, and that the necessity was greater here because the parcel is covered by a Presidential Proclamation and the on-going construction was in danger of being left unfinished, with the appropriation possibly reverting to the national treasury.
• On October 19, 1990: The respondents' omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to set aside the order and to quash the writs was denied; and on the same date the municipality implemented the writ of possession and the ancillary writ of demolition, resulting in the dispossession of the respondents and the demolition of the structures and buildings they owned.
• On October 23, 1990: The respondents filed their answer, alleging that the parcel has been owned, occupied and possessed by respondent Vicente Medina since 1947, when he bought it from a Subanan native; that respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased a portion from Medina; that the respondents were never lessees of the petitioner municipality; that Proclamation No. 365 recognized "private rights"; and that a case was pending before the cadastral court between Medina and the municipality as to ownership.
• Before the Judge could act further: The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the October 10 and October 19, 1990 orders. On November 14, 1990 the petition was given due course and a temporary restraining order issued, enjoining the Judge from proceeding with the hearing and from enforcing the orders.
• On January 21, 1991: The Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision, and on February 20, 1991 denied reconsideration. Hence this petition, which the Supreme Court gave due course by resolution dated November 26, 1991.
• The Court of Appeals held: that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction, since "the allegations and not the title control the cause of action of the complaint," and that on the complaint's own theory the action "may really be considered one for recovery of possession," a lease of a public plaza being null and void under Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas (30 Phil. 602 [1915]) because land for public use is outside the commerce of man; but that the trial court had no authority to issue a writ of possession and a writ of demolition, citing Mabale v. Apalisok (88 SCRA 234 [1979]) for the four situations in which a writ of possession is available — (1) in a land registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem; (2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage; (3) in a judicial foreclosure, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided the mortgagor is in possession and no third person not party to the suit has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. It further held that Rule 67 was misapplied, since expropriation permits the taking of possession only where "(i) There is clear statutory authority … and (ii) The authority is premised on the government depositing the value of the land to be taken," absent which "the taking would constitute deprivation of property without due process of law." In the case at bar "there is neither statutory authority for the trial court's action nor bond given to compensate the petitioners for the deprivation of their possession and the destruction of their houses if it turns out that the land belongs to them."
• On May 8, 1992: The Supreme Court En Banc promulgated the Decision dismissing the petition and affirming the Court of Appeals, while ordering the trial court to require the municipality to put up a bond.

Arguments of the Parties

• Petitioners contend that the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for abatement of public nuisance under Article 694§ of the Civil Code, and that on that basis the petitioner municipality is entitled to the writ of possession and the writ of demolition.
• Petitioners contend, on the premise that the parcel forms part of a public plaza, that the Judge was justified in issuing the writs, a public plaza being outside the commerce of man and constructions thereon abatable summarily by the municipality.
• Petitioners contend that the rule on eminent domain justifies a writ of possession so that public construction and projects will not be delayed, the necessity being greater here because the land is covered by a Presidential Proclamation and the appropriation for the gymnasium might revert to the national treasury.
• Petitioners question the alleged ruling of the appellate court "that the petitioners are personally liable for damages to the private respondents for the abatement of public nuisance."

• Respondents allege that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the complaint being one for illegal detainer within the original jurisdiction of the municipal court.
• Respondents allege the pendency of a cadastral case between the parties over the ownership of the same parcel — Cadastral Case No. N-10, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-108, Lot 9481 [Pls-61] TS-218.
• Respondents allege that Vicente Medina has owned, occupied and possessed the parcel since 1947, having bought it from a Subanan native, and that Fortunata Rosellon leased a portion from Medina; that they were never lessees of the municipality; and that Proclamation No. 365, issued on March 15, 1968, recognized "private rights."
• Respondents prayed in the Court of Appeals that the petitioners be ordered to pay jointly and severally the value of the house illegally demolished, attorney's fees of P50,000.00, moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00, plus costs.

• It is not disputed that Presidential Proclamation No. 365, dated March 15, 1968, withdrew from sale or settlement certain parcels of the public domain in Dumingag and placed them under the administration of the Director of Public Schools and of the Municipal Government of Dumingag for school site, public plaza and playground purposes — expressly "subject to private rights, if any there be."
• It is not disputed that even before the Proclamation the parcel was the subject of cadastral proceedings before another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, that those proceedings were still pending when the ejectment case was filed, and that Vicente Medina is one of the claimants in them.
• It is not disputed that the writs were implemented on October 19, 1990 and that the respondents' buildings were demolished.

Issue

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint constitute a cause of action for the abatement of a public nuisance, and whether that characterisation entitles the municipality to the writs.
2. Whether Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court on eminent domain may be applied by analogy to justify the issuance of a writ of possession in favour of the municipality.
3. What relief remains available where the demolition of the respondents' buildings is already a fait accompli.

1. Whether the Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioners are personally liable in damages to the private respondents.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The trial court is ordered to require the petitioner municipality to put up a bond to be determined by the court after hearing to answer, for just compensation due the private respondents in case the demolition of their buildings is adjudged to be illegal. The 'Motion to Declare in Contempt' filed by petitioner Judge is referred to the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 3156 for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The concept and purpose of the cadastral system: "Under the cadastral system, the government through the Director of Lands initiates the proceedings by filing a petition in court after which all owners or claimants are compelled to act and present their answers otherwise they lose their right to their own property. The purpose is to serve the public interests by requiring that the titles to any lands 'be settled and adjudicated.'" And it is "a proceeding in rem somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree." The whole of the assigned topic is in those two sentences.
• The purpose generates the procedural consequence: because the proceeding exists to settle ownership, "considering therefore, the nature and purpose of the Cadastral proceedings, the outcome of said proceedings becomes a prejudicial question which must be addressed in the resolution of the instant case," and the trial court should have held the ejectment case in abeyance.
• The analogy is acknowledged as an analogy: "technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of," both actions being civil. What justifies extending Quiambao v. Osorio is the intimate correlation of the two proceedings, the identity of parties and issues, the economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and the parties, and the need to resolve the right of possession before the ejectment case may properly be determined — courts having the inherent power "to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort."
• A reservation subject to private rights cannot decide the question of private rights: Proclamation No. 365 withdrew the land from sale or settlement "subject to private rights, if any there be," and the cadastral proceeding over the lot predated the Proclamation. The Proclamation therefore could not establish, by itself, that the land was a public plaza clear of private claims.
• Where the land really is a public plaza, no writ of possession is needed at all: town plazas are properties of public dominion, outside the commerce of man, and "cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties"; structures on them are nuisances subject to abatement according to law, and an occupant's possession "can not be recognized by any law," so a writ of demolition would have been sufficient.
• The election of remedies under Article 699§ has consequences: the municipality had three remedies and chose a civil action, aware that summary abatement would first have required an ordinance of the Sangguniang Bayan under B.P. Blg. 337. Having gone to court, it could not obtain before trial what only a trial could give.
• Rule 67 cannot be borrowed without its conditions: expropriation permits pre-judgment possession only because there is clear statutory authority and a deposit securing the owner; without both, the taking is deprivation of property without due process of law. The judge required no deposit, so even on his own theory the writ was illegal, and the Rule "can not be made a subterfuge."
• Where the injury is complete, the Court secures rather than compensates: the demolition being a fait accompli and the respondents' entitlement depending on an ownership question still pending, the proper order is a bond fixed by the trial court after hearing, answering for just compensation if the demolition is later adjudged illegal.

Doctrine

• The Tamin Statement of the Cadastral Concept and Purpose: under the cadastral system the government, through the Director of Lands, initiates the proceedings by filing a petition in court, after which all owners or claimants are compelled to act and present their answers, otherwise they lose their right to their own property. The purpose is to serve the public interests by requiring that the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated," and the proceeding is one in rem "somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree."
• The Cadastral Prejudicial-Question Rule: given that nature and purpose, the outcome of a pending cadastral proceeding is a prejudicial question in a possessory or ejectment action over the same land between the same parties. The court must hold the possessory action in abeyance pending the cadastral determination, and a writ of possession or demolition issued beforehand is premature — and would be null and void should the occupant be adjudged the owner.
• The Rule on Public Plazas and Summary Abatement: town plazas are property of public dominion, devoted to public use, outside the commerce of man, and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties; structures built on them are nuisances subject to abatement according to law. Where the land is indisputably such a plaza, no writ of possession is required, the occupant's possession being incapable of legal recognition, and a writ of demolition would suffice.
• The Rule Against Using Rule 67 as a Subterfuge: the rule on eminent domain cannot be invoked by analogy to justify a pre-trial writ of possession in an ordinary possessory action. Even where expropriation applies, the plaintiff may enter into possession only upon depositing the amount the law prescribes; without that deposit no writ of possession may issue, since pre-judgment taking without statutory authority and without security is deprivation of property without due process of law.
• The Rule of Security Where the Taking Is Complete: where a demolition is already a fait accompli and the occupant's entitlement to compensation depends on an ownership question still pending, the court will require the taking party to put up a bond, in an amount fixed after hearing, to answer for just compensation should the demolition be adjudged illegal.

• A prejudicial question, strictly, arises between a civil and a criminal action. Because both proceedings here were civil, "technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of"; the doctrine was applied by analogy, on the strength of the intimate correlation of the proceedings, identity of parties and issues, and judicial economy, following Quiambao v. Osorio.
• The recognition of "private rights" in a Proclamation is a real reservation. Proclamation No. 365 withdrew the land "subject to private rights, if any there be," and the cadastral case predated it, so the Proclamation could not itself settle whether private rights had vested.
• Summary abatement had a statutory precondition. Under the then Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), the Sangguniang Bayan had first to pass an ordinance before the municipality could summarily abate a public nuisance; none was passed, and the municipality elected a civil action instead.
• Estate of Gregoria Francisco distinguished. Just compensation was awarded there because the building owner was in lawful possession by virtue of a permit from the authorized government agency when the demolition took place. Here the legality of the occupation is precisely what remains to be resolved, so the Court ordered a bond rather than compensation.
• Jurisdiction follows the allegations, not the caption. Although denominated "Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and Damages," the complaint alleged recovery of possession of land claimed to be for public use, which the Court of Appeals rightly held to be within the Regional Trial Court's jurisdiction — "the allegations and not the title control the cause of action of the complaint."
• A writ of possession issues only in defined situations. Following Mabale v. Apalisok, it is available (1) in a land registration proceeding; (2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage; (3) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the mortgagor is in possession and no third person not party to the suit has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. An ordinary possessory action is not among them.

• Classification of Relationship: DIRECT.
• Integration: Tamin v. Court of Appeals is one of the two cases the Course Outline assigns for the concept and purpose of cadastral registration proceedings, and the passage it is assigned for is a compact definition of both. The concept: the government, through the Director of Lands, files the petition; all owners or claimants are compelled to answer, on pain of losing their right to their own property; and the proceeding is in rem, "akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree." The purpose: "to serve the public interests by requiring that the titles to any lands 'be settled and adjudicated.'" The statutory expression of that description is Section 36§ and Section 37§ of P.D. No. 1529, which carry forward the corresponding provisions of the Cadastral Act.
• The case does more than define, and that is why it is assigned rather than the textbook. The Court decided a live controversy out of the purpose alone. Because the cadastral proceeding exists to settle titles, a pending one must be allowed to do so before anyone is put off the land — notwithstanding a Presidential Proclamation, an unfinished municipal gymnasium, a national appropriation about to lapse, and a defensible characterisation of the occupants' houses as a public nuisance. Every element of urgency was present, and the purpose of the cadastral proceeding still outweighed them.
• Read with Llenares v. Court of Appeals, assigned under the same heading, the two show the same rule from opposite ends. In Llenares, a buyer who never filed an answer lost his deed to res judicata when the cadastral judgment became final — the penalty in Section 37§'s "compelled to act." In Tamin, an occupant who did file a Cadastral Answer could not be dispossessed until it was ruled on — the protection in the same clause. Both follow from the one proposition the topic states: the cadastral proceeding is the forum in which the titles to the land it covers are settled and adjudicated.

Separate Opinions

• NOT APPLICABLE / NOT IN RECORD. The Decision was rendered En Banc through Associate Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. as ponente, with Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justices Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon concurring. Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo was on leave. No separate concurring or dissenting opinion was filed.