Facts

• The property in dispute is 340 square metres in the San Jose District, Pasay City, originally belonging to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr., under TCT No. (17345) 2460.
• On October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with her husband's consent, executed three separate deeds of sale conveying 113.34 square metres to Severo, Jr. and 113.33 square metres each to Crisostomo and Jose — "[t]he three deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in metes and bounds." This is the decisive fact. The Court calls it "what we call extrajudicial partition" — the community ended in 1954, twenty-five years before the sale that provoked the suit.
• The deeds were registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay City on September 18, 1970, and TCT No. 16007 issued in the names of the three sons in the proportions 113.34 / 113.33 / 113.33. (Only one title issued because "the Armada brothers failed to submit the necessary subdivision plan" — an administrative omission, not a legal reunion of the shares.)
• Every portion "has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970." Separate tax declarations are the Court's corroboration that the division was real and acted on, not merely recited in a deed.
• On February 22, 1979, Jose wrote to his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza." This letter destroys the plaintiffs' second line of attack. It shows actual notice of the impending sale, which makes the written notice required by Article 1623 "superfluous."
• On March 27, 1979, Crisostomo, through his attorney-in-fact and wife Cresenciana V. Alejo, sold his 113.34 square metres to Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si, for ₱75,000.00; the deed was registered, TCT No. 16007 cancelled and TCT No. 24751 issued. (The deed described the subject as the "undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100 square metres" — the word the Court of Appeals fastened on, and which the Supreme Court holds is contradicted by the 1954 deeds.)
• On April 15, 1980, spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor sued the Si spouses and Conrado Isada, Cresenciana's brother-in-law who brokered the sale, for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of title with damages, claiming a right of redemption. They alleged that Isada made it appear Cresenciana was a Filipino residing in Cubao when she and Crisostomo "had migrated and were already citizens of the United States of America"; that the petitioners inserted into the registered deed the phrase "and that the co-owners are not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to them"; and that Jose and Severo, Jr. had no written notice of the sale.
• The RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113, dismissed the complaint on August 29, 1989, finding the land "not part of an undivided estate," the three deeds technically describing each portion, and Jose's testimony that the land was undivided contradicted by his own wife, who said they had been receiving rent from the portion specifically allotted to Jose.
• On March 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals reversed, annulling the registration, cancelling TCT No. 24751, reviving TCT No. 16007, allowing redemption within thirty days of written notice, and awarding ₱10,000 moral damages and ₱10,000 attorney's fees. It reasoned that TCT No. 16007 does not show the portions sold by the 1954 deeds, that no evidence showed the title issued on the basis of those deeds, and that the 1979 deed itself described an "undivided" 113.34 square metres, so "what was sold to defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable."
• Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed out of time (counsel received the decision on August 29, 1994 and moved on October 14, 1994) and their motion for new trial of December 5, 1994 — offering TCT No. (17345) 2460 with its annotation of the three deeds — was denied on March 24, 1995 as filed after finality. (The Supreme Court reaches the merits anyway, and so never has to resolve these procedural points.)
• On January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT No. 24751 and issued three new titles — TCT 134594 to Severo, Jr., TCT 134595 to Anita Bonode Si, and TCT 134596 to Jose Armada. (All on record, and confirming on paper the division the 1954 deeds had already made.)

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995 and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on August 29, 1989, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court reviews the facts because the courts below disagreed. "In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion."
• The partition happened in 1954. "Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed[s] of sale in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada... Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical description. In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition."
• Corroborated by conduct. "[E]very portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable." The trial court also noted that Jose's testimony that the land was undivided "was contradicted by his wife when she said they had been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to Jose."
• One title over three portions proves nothing. "The fact that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners exists."
• The legal consequence. "After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer available."
• The governing definition. Under Article 484§ "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described." That "makes inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a co-owner" in Article 1623§.
• Actual notice dispenses with written notice. Jose's own letter of February 22, 1979 shows he was "well informed of the impending sale." "Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary."
• The remaining assignments fall away. The procedural questions "need not be delved into," and the damages go with them, since "[p]etitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we cannot put a premium on the right to litigate."

Doctrine

1. Definition and Its Corollary (Art. 484§): Co-ownership exists over an undivided thing. "There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described."
2. Extrajudicial Partition by Separate Deeds: Where the owner conveys to each transferee a portion "definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical description," that is a partition, and the community ends on its execution.
3. A Single Title Does Not Recreate the Community: Embracing three portions in one certificate "does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable... nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive." The absence of a subdivision plan is an administrative gap, not a legal one.
4. Redemption Presupposes Co-Ownership (Art. 1620§, Art. 1623§): "After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer available."
5. Actual Notice Suffices: "Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice"; the writing is "a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice," and "[t]he statute does not demand what is unnecessary."
6. Good Faith Litigation: Damages and fees do not follow from losing — "we cannot put a premium on the right to litigate."

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

• The disputed property is 340 square metres in the San Jose District, Pasay City, originally belonging to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr., under TCT No. (17345) 2460.
• On October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with her husband's consent, executed three separate deeds of sale conveying 113.34 square metres to Severo, Jr. and 113.33 square metres each to Crisostomo and Jose; "[t]he three deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in metes and bounds."
• The deeds "purport[] to have been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007 was issued" in the names of the three sons in their respective proportions.
• On September 21, 1970, "every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City."
• Separate titles did not issue only "because the Armada brothers failed to submit the necessary subdivision plan to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City."
• On February 22, 1979, Jose Armada wrote his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza."
• On March 27, 1979, Crisostomo, through his attorney-in-fact Cresenciana V. Alejo, sold 113.34 square metres to Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si, for ₱75,000.00; the deed was registered as P.E. 77952/T-24751 and TCT No. 24751 issued.
• On April 15, 1980, spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor sued Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada — Cresenciana's brother-in-law, who brokered the sale — for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, alleging misrepresentation of Cresenciana's citizenship and residence (she and Crisostomo "had migrated and were already citizens of the United States of America"), the insertion into the registered deed of the phrase "and that the co-owners are not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to them," and the absence of written notice to Jose and Severo, Jr.
• Petitioners answered that the 1954 deeds had already divided the property in metes and bounds, so "since the property was already three distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among the brothers."
• On August 29, 1989, the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113 dismissed the complaint with costs, finding the land "not part of an undivided estate" and noting that Jose's testimony of an undivided land "was contradicted by his wife when she said they had been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to Jose."
• On March 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals reversed in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727, annulling the registration of the 1979 deed, ordering TCT No. 24751 cancelled and TCT No. 16007 revived, allowing redemption within thirty days of written notice, and awarding ₱10,000 moral damages and ₱10,000 attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. It reasoned that the 1954 portions "do not appear in the said title," that no evidence showed TCT No. 16007 issued on the basis of those deeds, and that the 1979 deed conveyed an "undivided" 113.34 square metres, so that "what was sold to defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable."
• Counsel received the CA decision on August 29, 1994 and moved for reconsideration on October 14, 1994, which was denied on November 21, 1994 for being filed out of time. A motion for new trial filed December 5, 1994, offering TCT No. (17345) 2460 with its annotation of the three deeds, was denied on March 24, 1995 because the decision had become final; reconsideration of that resolution was denied September 6, 1995.
• On January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT No. 24751 and issued TCT 134594 to Severo Armada, Jr., TCT 134595 to Anita Bonode Si, and TCT 134596 to Jose Armada.
• On October 12, 2000, the Supreme Court granted the petition.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Spouses Serafin and Anita Si)

B. Private Respondents (Spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor)

C. Common Ground

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

• Standard of review. "In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion."
• The 1954 partition. "Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed[s] of sale in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo... Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical description. In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition."
• The corroboration. "Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the portion sold... was concretely determined and identifiable."
• One title, three exclusive dominions. "The fact that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners exists."
• Termination of the community. "After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer available."
• The codal basis. Under Article 484§, "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described. This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a co-owner" in Article 1623§.
• Actual notice. "Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land," having written: "Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza." "Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary."
• The rest is moot. The procedural assignments "need not be delved into," and as to the awards, "[p]etitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we cannot put a premium on the right to litigate."

B. Doctrines/Rules

1. Co-Ownership Requires an Undivided Thing (Art. 484§): "There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described."
2. Extrajudicial Partition: Separate deeds describing each portion in metes and bounds effect a partition; the community ends then, whatever the registry later shows.
3. A Common Certificate Is Not a Common Ownership: Portions "embraced in one certificate of title" remain distinguishable and exclusively owned.
4. No Community, No Redemption (Arts. 1620§, 1623§): Legal pre-emption and redemption are incidents of co-ownership and end with it.
5. Actual Notice Substitutes for Written Notice: The writing exists to produce actual knowledge; where the co-owner already has it, the notice "would be superfluous."
6. No Premium on the Right to Litigate: Moral damages and attorney's fees do not follow merely because a good-faith claim fails.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

• The holding turns on concrete determination, not on formal titling: portions may be identifiable "even if not yet technically described," and conversely a deed reciting an "undivided" share does not restore a community that the parties have already ended in fact.
• The Court reached the merits only because the findings below were at variance; the ordinary rule is that the Court of Appeals' facts bind.
• The procedural rulings on the late motion for reconsideration and the motion for new trial were left undisturbed and undecided.

D. Topic Integration

• The relationship is DIRECT.
• This is the leading case for the sub-topic "Disputed portion/portions already concretely determined," and its function in the syllabus is to mark where co-ownership stops.
• The method it teaches is to look past the certificate to the conduct: technically described conveyances, separate tax declarations, rents collected on one's own portion, and a letter telling a brother to sell "your share." A joint title is a registry fact; co-ownership is a property fact.
• Pair it with the redemption articles it disables. Article 1620 answers who may redeem and Article 1623 when; both presuppose a status that this case shows can quietly have ended decades before the sale that triggers the claim.

VII. Separate Opinions