Policarpio v. Asuncion

d. Extinguishment of the Usufruct — Usufruct in favor of several persons (Art. 611)

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Case DigestChapter VI — Usufruct

Policarpio v. Asuncion

G.R. No. L-21809 · January 31, 1966 · Supreme Court

d. Extinguishment of the Usufruct — Usufruct in favor of several persons (Art. 611)

Gist

A testatrix left the naked ownership of a Bulacan fishpond to her sister and its usufruct to the fourteen children of three cousins. Three usufructuaries died during the term of a lease, and both the naked owner's successor and the eleven survivors claimed the withheld rentals. The lessees interpleaded. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and awarded the shares to the survivors: a usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at its constitution is not extinguished — not even partially — until the death of the last survivor.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is that under Article 611, a usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor, so the share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime accrues to the surviving usufructuaries rather than consolidating with the naked ownership. Reading Article 603(1) to consolidate each share on each death would both work a partial extinguishment that Article 611 forbids and render Article 611 superfluous, since Article 603 already covers the death of a usufructuary.

Facts

In her duly probated last will and testament, Damasa Crisostomo gave the naked ownership of a fishpond she owned to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz, and its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. (The fishpond is in a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan. Splitting naked ownership from usufruct in the same will is what sets up the contest — the two interests are held by different families from the outset.)
Those children turned out to be fourteen: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria, Teodora and Juan, all surnamed Perez; Apolonio Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez. This is the fact that makes Article 611 applicable rather than Article 603(1) — all fourteen were living when the usufruct was constituted and were instituted simultaneously, so the usufruct is collective, not fourteen separate lifetime usufructs.
Teodorica de la Cruz, the naked owner, in turn bequeathed all her rights to the fishpond by will to respondent Jose V. Salamat. (He therefore claims as her successor-in-interest, and takes exactly the naked ownership she had — nothing more.)
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to Gil P. Policarpio, who used to give them the usufruct proportionately.
During the term of that lease three of the usufructuaries died — Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez — and both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to them, amounting to ₱10,714.26, so the lessee withheld the money. (The trial court's dispositive states the figure as ₱10,714.25; the decision's own narration gives ₱10,714.26.)
On May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to Batas Riego de Dios, who on learning of the conflicting claims likewise withheld the corresponding part of the usufruct.
On November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action — one of interpleader — against both the naked owner and the surviving usufructuaries, to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims. (The suit was brought by the lessees, not by either set of claimants; the stakeholders were simply caught between two demands for the same rentals.)
The parties agreed to submit the case on memoranda, the issue being "purely legal in nature," and on March 29, 1963 the trial court declared Jose V. Salamat entitled to the ₱10,714.25 representing the three deceased usufructuaries' shares from Policarpio, and entitled to share with the eleven survivors in the proceeds of the De Dios lease to the extent of those shares. The surviving usufructuaries appealed. The trial court thus accepted the merger theory outright — which is the ruling the Supreme Court reverses on January 31, 1966.

Issue

Whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries or the naked owner are entitled to the fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased usufructuaries — that is, whether the death of some among several simultaneously instituted usufructuaries works a partial extinguishment of the usufruct and consolidates their shares with the naked ownership under Article 603(1), or whether the usufruct continues entire under Article 611.

Secondary issues. Whether the right of accretion operates among usufructuaries instituted simultaneously in a last will and testament.

Ruling

Main issue. NO — there is no partial extinguishment, and the eleven survivors take the shares. Article 611 provides that "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor," and the appellee's contrary theory fails twice over. First, it would make the article pointless: "If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating their rights with that of the naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears." Second, it collides with the article's own words: the theory "would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." Article 603(1) governs the sole usufructuary and in terms yields where "a contrary intention clearly appears"; Article 611 governs the group.

Secondary issues. YES — accretion applies, and the vacated shares pass to the survivors. The Spanish commentators on the counterpart of Article 611 are unanimous that "there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct," Manresa reasoning from the rule that the right of accretion is applicable to usufructuaries to the non-extinction of a simultaneous usufruct "hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que sobreviva," and Del Viso and Colin and Capitant agreeing. "The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none." On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favour of the children of her three cousins "with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones." "These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation."

"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary, appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs."

Ratio

The appellants rested on Article 611: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." The appellee rested on Article 603, arguing that the most a usufruct can endure when constituted in favour of a natural person is that person's lifetime, so that on each death the corresponding rights reverted to the naked owner.
The Court rejected the appellee's reading first on the ground of non-superfluity: "If the theory of appellee... were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears." A specific provision must be given work to do that the general one does not already perform.
It rejected it second on the text: the theory "would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." The article bars extinguishment before the last death, and a fractional falling-in is still an extinguishment.
Having held the usufruct undiminished, the Court turned to who enjoys the vacated shares, and found the Spanish commentators unanimous. Manresa reasons from the rule that the right of accretion applies to usufructuaries — "el derecho de acrecer es aplicable a los usufructuarios" — that there is no doubt about "la no extincion del usufructo simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que sobreviva."
Del Viso states the same rule and its qualification: where many are called to the usufruct simultaneously, on the death of one "su porcion acrece a los demas," unless the testator expresses the contrary or it is inferred from the title constituting the usufruct. Colin and Capitant add that the Spanish Supreme Court sanctioned the result in its judgment of 29 March 1905, resting it on the testator's presumed will.
The Court therefore concluded that "the Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct," subject to a single exception: "if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision."
No such provision existed here. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favour of the children of her three cousins "with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones." "These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation."

Doctrine

The Rule on Multiple Usufructuaries (Art. 611): "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." The bar is against extinguishment of any degree — partial extinguishment is extinguishment.
Accretion Among Usufructuaries: The share of a usufructuary who dies during the term "inures to the benefit of the surviving usufructuaries," their shares expanding rather than the naked owner's interest consolidating.
The Non-Superfluity Principle: A specific provision (Art. 611) must be given effect over a general one (Art. 603), or the specific rule becomes meaningless in the very situation it was written for.
Specific Over General in Usufruct: Article 603(1) governs the sole usufructuary; Article 611 governs the group. Consolidation with the naked ownership waits until the last of the group dies.

The rule yields to a contrary intention: accretion is displaced "if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision." Here the will not only lacked such a provision, its injunction that the named kin alone enjoy the fishpond "as long as they live" pointed the same way as the default.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Damasa Crisostomo, by a duly probated will, gave the naked ownership of a Hagonoy, Bulacan fishpond to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz and its usufruct to the fourteen children of three of her cousins. Teodorica in turn bequeathed her rights to Jose V. Salamat. Three usufructuaries died during the term of a lease, and both the naked owner's successor and the eleven survivors claimed the corresponding rentals, so the lessees withheld the money and brought interpleader. The trial court awarded the shares to the naked owner. The Supreme Court reversed. The central doctrine is that under Article 611, a usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution is not extinguished — not even partially — until the death of the last survivor, so the share of one who dies in the meantime accrues to the survivors by the right of accretion, which the law makes applicable to usufructuaries.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

In a duly probated last will and testament, Damasa Crisostomo gave the naked ownership of a fishpond in a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz, and its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo.
Those children turned out to be fourteen: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria, Teodora and Juan, all surnamed Perez; Apolonio Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez.
Teodorica de la Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her own will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond to Gil P. Policarpio, who used to give them proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them.
During the term of the lease, three usufructuaries died — Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez — and both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed their shares, amounting to ₱10,714.26, so the lessee withheld that sum.
On May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to Batas Riego de Dios, who, learning after execution of the conflicting claims and not knowing to whom to pay, likewise withheld the corresponding part of the usufruct.
On November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action for interpleader against both the naked owner and the surviving usufructuaries, to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on memoranda, "considering that the issue involved was purely legal in nature."
On March 29, 1963, the trial court declared Jose V. Salamat entitled to ₱10,714.25 representing the three deceased usufructuaries' shares in the rental due from Policarpio, and entitled to share with the eleven usufructuaries in the proceeds of the De Dios lease to the extent of those shares, each party bearing its own costs.
The surviving usufructuaries appealed, and on January 31, 1966 the Supreme Court reversed.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Appellants (the eleven surviving usufructuaries)

Appellants argued that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares of the deceased, by virtue of Article 611, which provides that "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." Since all fourteen were instituted simultaneously by the testatrix, the deaths of three did not extinguish the usufruct, and the usufruct continues until the death of the last usufructuary.

B. Appellee (Jose V. Salamat, the naked owner's successor)

Appellee averred as special defence that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica de la Cruz and is entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries, because the usufruct in their favour "was automatically extinguished by death and became merged with the naked owner." He contended that the most a usufruct can endure when constituted in favour of a natural person is that person's lifetime, since Article 603 extinguishes a usufruct by the death of the usufructuary "unless a contrary intention clearly appears."

C. Common Ground

The parties agreed to submit the case on their respective memoranda, the issue being purely legal; the terms of the will, the identities of the fourteen usufructuaries, and the fact and effect of the three deaths were not in dispute.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond are the ones entitled to the fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased usufructuaries, or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether the right of accretion applies among usufructuaries instituted simultaneously in a last will and testament.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

NO partial extinguishment — the eleven survivors are entitled. "If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating their rights with that of the naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears. Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be entertained."

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

YES — accretion applies. The Spanish commentators "are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none." On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favour of the children of her three cousins "with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation."

"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary, appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The competing texts. Appellants invoked Article 611 — "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor"; appellee invoked Article 603, under which a usufruct is extinguished by the death of the usufructuary "unless a contrary intention clearly appears."
Non-superfluity. "If the theory of appellee... were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears."
No partial extinction. "Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be entertained."
Manresa. Commenting on the counterpart article, he reasons that since the right of accretion is applicable to usufructuaries, there is no doubt as to "la no extincion del usufructo simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que sobreviva," and that Article 521 (now Art. 611), though it appears to speak of simultaneous usufruct, covers the successive kind as well.
Del Viso. Where several are called to the usufruct simultaneously, on the death of one "su porcion acrece a los demas" — unless the testator expresses the contrary or it is inferred from the title constituting the usufruct — citing the Digest's treatment of the right of accretion in usufruct.
Colin and Capitant. The Spanish Supreme Court admitted and sanctioned the result in its judgment of 29 March 1905, resting it not on accretion strictly but on the presumed will of the testator: where a life usufruct of the remainder is left in equal parts to two sisters, whichever survives is to enjoy the whole, the separation into parts being only the testator's arrangement for the usufruct during both their lives.
The conclusion and its exception. "[T]he Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none."
The will points the same way. The testatrix constituted the usufruct in favour of the children of her three cousins "with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones."

B. Doctrines/Rules

The Rule on Multiple Usufructs: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor."
Accretion in Usufruct: "[T]he share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the surviving usufructuaries."
Non-Superfluity Principle: A specific provision (Art. 611) must be given effect over a general provision (Art. 603) to prevent the specific rule from becoming meaningless in the context for which it was created.
Partial Extinguishment Is Extinguishment: Article 611's bar operates against fractional falling-in as much as against total termination; the naked ownership consolidates only on the last death.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The rule yields to a contrary provision by the testator in the will constituting the usufruct. The naked owner failed to show any such instruction in Damasa Crisostomo's will, and its terms in fact implied the opposite.
Manresa notes the article reaches successive as well as simultaneous usufructs: in a successive usufruct the second usufructuary does not enter into enjoyment, absent contrary expression, until the first dies, and the usufruct ends when the last person called dies.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
This case is the definitive Philippine authority on "Usufruct in favor of several persons (Art. 611)," and it is best learned as the pairing of two articles: Article 603(1) for the sole usufructuary, Article 611 for the group.
It teaches that a grant to a group creates a single, indivisible real right that does not disintegrate share by share. Until the last of the designated persons dies, the naked owner receives nothing back, and accretion is the automatic mechanism that reallocates a deceased member's share among the living.
It also models a method of statutory construction worth carrying into recitation: where two articles seem to cover the same ground, read the specific one so that it is not superfluous, and check whether the general one carries an escape clause ("unless a contrary intention clearly appears") that the specific one fills.

VII. Separate Opinions

BARRERA, J., took no part. The decision was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo, with Chief Justice Bengzon and Justices Concepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon and Zaldivar concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 611, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VI (Usufruct), Chapter 4 (Extinguishment of Usufruct)

A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. (521)

Why it is cited here

The provision that decides the case: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor."

Read closely, it does two things. It fixes the endpoint of a collective usufruct at the last death — and, because it says the usufruct "shall not be extinguished" before then, it forbids partial extinguishment along the way. That second effect is what the naked owner's theory ran into: taking 3/14 out of the usufruct on three deaths is an extinguishment, even if only a fractional one.

What happens to the vacated share is not spelled out, and the Court fills the gap with accretion: since the usufruct survives whole and only the survivors are left to enjoy it, their shares expand. The Spanish commentators — Manresa, Del Viso, Colin and Capitant — are unanimous that "the share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the surviving usufructuaries."

Civil Code

Article 603, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VI (Usufruct), Chapter 4 (Extinguishment of Usufruct)

Usufruct is extinguished:

(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;

(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;

(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;

(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;

(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;

(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;

(7) By prescription. (513a)

Why it is cited here

The general rule the naked owner relied on: usufruct is extinguished "(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears."

Standing alone the argument is natural — usufruct is a lifetime right, three usufructuaries died, so three shares should fall in and merge with the naked ownership.

The Court's answer is an argument from non-superfluity. If death always consolidated a share with the naked owner, "Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears." Article 611 must therefore be doing something Article 603 does not — and the only work left for it is to keep a collective usufruct alive, and undivided, until the ranks are exhausted.

So the relation is specific over general: Article 603(1) governs the sole usufructuary, Article 611 governs the group. And Article 603(1)'s own escape clause — "unless a contrary intention clearly appears" — points the same way, because here the will supplies exactly such an intention.

Civil Code

Article 1023, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Section 1 (Right of Accretion)

Accretion shall also take place among devisees, legatees and usufructuaries under the same conditions established for heirs. (987a)

Why it is cited here

The bridge to accretion. Manresa's commentary reasons from the succession article making the right of accretion applicable to usufructuaries — in his words, "el derecho de acrecer es aplicable a los usufructuarios" — to the conclusion that a simultaneous usufruct is not extinguished until the death of the last person surviving.

Accretion is the mechanism by which a vacated share is absorbed by the co-heirs, co-devisees or co-legatees instituted with the deceased. Applied to usufructuaries instituted at the same time over the same thing, it means a dying usufructuary's portion swells the portions of those still living, instead of returning to the estate or to the naked owner.

It is a default, not a command: it yields where the testator says otherwise. Here the will not only failed to say otherwise but pointed the same way, so the default and the testatrix's intent coincided.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 611, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VI (Usufruct), Chapter 4 (Extinguishment of Usufruct)

A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. (521)

Why it is cited here

The provision that decides the case: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor."

Full entry below ↓

Article 603, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VI (Usufruct), Chapter 4 (Extinguishment of Usufruct)

Usufruct is extinguished:

(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;

(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;

(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;

(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;

(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;

(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;

(7) By prescription. (513a)

Why it is cited here

The general rule the naked owner relied on: usufruct is extinguished "(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears."

Standing alone the argument is natural — usufruct is a lifetime right, three usufructuaries died, so three shares should fall in and merge with the naked ownership.

Full entry below ↓

Article 1023, Civil Code

Civil Code

Accretion shall also take place among devisees, legatees and usufructuaries under the same conditions established for heirs. (987a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Facts

In her duly probated last will and testament, Damasa Crisostomo gave the naked ownership of a fishpond she owned to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz, and its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. (The fishpond is in a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan. Splitting naked ownership from usufruct in the same will is what sets up the contest — the two interests are held by different families from the outset.)
Those children turned out to be fourteen: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria, Teodora and Juan, all surnamed Perez; Apolonio Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez. This is the fact that makes Article 611 applicable rather than Article 603(1) — all fourteen were living when the usufruct was constituted and were instituted simultaneously, so the usufruct is collective, not fourteen separate lifetime usufructs.
Teodorica de la Cruz, the naked owner, in turn bequeathed all her rights to the fishpond by will to respondent Jose V. Salamat. (He therefore claims as her successor-in-interest, and takes exactly the naked ownership she had — nothing more.)
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to Gil P. Policarpio, who used to give them the usufruct proportionately.
During the term of that lease three of the usufructuaries died — Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez — and both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to them, amounting to ₱10,714.26, so the lessee withheld the money. (The trial court's dispositive states the figure as ₱10,714.25; the decision's own narration gives ₱10,714.26.)
On May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to Batas Riego de Dios, who on learning of the conflicting claims likewise withheld the corresponding part of the usufruct.
On November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action — one of interpleader — against both the naked owner and the surviving usufructuaries, to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims. (The suit was brought by the lessees, not by either set of claimants; the stakeholders were simply caught between two demands for the same rentals.)
The parties agreed to submit the case on memoranda, the issue being "purely legal in nature," and on March 29, 1963 the trial court declared Jose V. Salamat entitled to the ₱10,714.25 representing the three deceased usufructuaries' shares from Policarpio, and entitled to share with the eleven survivors in the proceeds of the De Dios lease to the extent of those shares. The surviving usufructuaries appealed. The trial court thus accepted the merger theory outright — which is the ruling the Supreme Court reverses on January 31, 1966.

Issue

Secondary issues. Whether the right of accretion operates among usufructuaries instituted simultaneously in a last will and testament.

Ruling

"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary, appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs."

Ratio

The appellants rested on Article 611: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." The appellee rested on Article 603, arguing that the most a usufruct can endure when constituted in favour of a natural person is that person's lifetime, so that on each death the corresponding rights reverted to the naked owner.
The Court rejected the appellee's reading first on the ground of non-superfluity: "If the theory of appellee... were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears." A specific provision must be given work to do that the general one does not already perform.
It rejected it second on the text: the theory "would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." The article bars extinguishment before the last death, and a fractional falling-in is still an extinguishment.
Having held the usufruct undiminished, the Court turned to who enjoys the vacated shares, and found the Spanish commentators unanimous. Manresa reasons from the rule that the right of accretion applies to usufructuaries — "el derecho de acrecer es aplicable a los usufructuarios" — that there is no doubt about "la no extincion del usufructo simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que sobreviva."
Del Viso states the same rule and its qualification: where many are called to the usufruct simultaneously, on the death of one "su porcion acrece a los demas," unless the testator expresses the contrary or it is inferred from the title constituting the usufruct. Colin and Capitant add that the Spanish Supreme Court sanctioned the result in its judgment of 29 March 1905, resting it on the testator's presumed will.
The Court therefore concluded that "the Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct," subject to a single exception: "if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision."
No such provision existed here. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favour of the children of her three cousins "with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones." "These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation."

Doctrine

The Rule on Multiple Usufructuaries (Art. 611): "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." The bar is against extinguishment of any degree — partial extinguishment is extinguishment.
Accretion Among Usufructuaries: The share of a usufructuary who dies during the term "inures to the benefit of the surviving usufructuaries," their shares expanding rather than the naked owner's interest consolidating.
The Non-Superfluity Principle: A specific provision (Art. 611) must be given effect over a general one (Art. 603), or the specific rule becomes meaningless in the very situation it was written for.
Specific Over General in Usufruct: Article 603(1) governs the sole usufructuary; Article 611 governs the group. Consolidation with the naked ownership waits until the last of the group dies.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

In a duly probated last will and testament, Damasa Crisostomo gave the naked ownership of a fishpond in a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz, and its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo.
Those children turned out to be fourteen: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria, Teodora and Juan, all surnamed Perez; Apolonio Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez.
Teodorica de la Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her own will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond to Gil P. Policarpio, who used to give them proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them.
During the term of the lease, three usufructuaries died — Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez — and both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed their shares, amounting to ₱10,714.26, so the lessee withheld that sum.
On May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to Batas Riego de Dios, who, learning after execution of the conflicting claims and not knowing to whom to pay, likewise withheld the corresponding part of the usufruct.
On November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action for interpleader against both the naked owner and the surviving usufructuaries, to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on memoranda, "considering that the issue involved was purely legal in nature."
On March 29, 1963, the trial court declared Jose V. Salamat entitled to ₱10,714.25 representing the three deceased usufructuaries' shares in the rental due from Policarpio, and entitled to share with the eleven usufructuaries in the proceeds of the De Dios lease to the extent of those shares, each party bearing its own costs.
The surviving usufructuaries appealed, and on January 31, 1966 the Supreme Court reversed.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Appellants (the eleven surviving usufructuaries)

B. Appellee (Jose V. Salamat, the naked owner's successor)

C. Common Ground

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether the right of accretion applies among usufructuaries instituted simultaneously in a last will and testament.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The competing texts. Appellants invoked Article 611 — "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor"; appellee invoked Article 603, under which a usufruct is extinguished by the death of the usufructuary "unless a contrary intention clearly appears."
Non-superfluity. "If the theory of appellee... were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears."
No partial extinction. "Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be entertained."
Manresa. Commenting on the counterpart article, he reasons that since the right of accretion is applicable to usufructuaries, there is no doubt as to "la no extincion del usufructo simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que sobreviva," and that Article 521 (now Art. 611), though it appears to speak of simultaneous usufruct, covers the successive kind as well.
Del Viso. Where several are called to the usufruct simultaneously, on the death of one "su porcion acrece a los demas" — unless the testator expresses the contrary or it is inferred from the title constituting the usufruct — citing the Digest's treatment of the right of accretion in usufruct.
Colin and Capitant. The Spanish Supreme Court admitted and sanctioned the result in its judgment of 29 March 1905, resting it not on accretion strictly but on the presumed will of the testator: where a life usufruct of the remainder is left in equal parts to two sisters, whichever survives is to enjoy the whole, the separation into parts being only the testator's arrangement for the usufruct during both their lives.
The conclusion and its exception. "[T]he Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none."
The will points the same way. The testatrix constituted the usufruct in favour of the children of her three cousins "with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones."

B. Doctrines/Rules

The Rule on Multiple Usufructs: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor."
Accretion in Usufruct: "[T]he share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the surviving usufructuaries."
Non-Superfluity Principle: A specific provision (Art. 611) must be given effect over a general provision (Art. 603) to prevent the specific rule from becoming meaningless in the context for which it was created.
Partial Extinguishment Is Extinguishment: Article 611's bar operates against fractional falling-in as much as against total termination; the naked ownership consolidates only on the last death.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The rule yields to a contrary provision by the testator in the will constituting the usufruct. The naked owner failed to show any such instruction in Damasa Crisostomo's will, and its terms in fact implied the opposite.
Manresa notes the article reaches successive as well as simultaneous usufructs: in a successive usufruct the second usufructuary does not enter into enjoyment, absent contrary expression, until the first dies, and the usufruct ends when the last person called dies.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
This case is the definitive Philippine authority on "Usufruct in favor of several persons (Art. 611)," and it is best learned as the pairing of two articles: Article 603(1) for the sole usufructuary, Article 611 for the group.
It teaches that a grant to a group creates a single, indivisible real right that does not disintegrate share by share. Until the last of the designated persons dies, the naked owner receives nothing back, and accretion is the automatic mechanism that reallocates a deceased member's share among the living.
It also models a method of statutory construction worth carrying into recitation: where two articles seem to cover the same ground, read the specific one so that it is not superfluous, and check whether the general one carries an escape clause ("unless a contrary intention clearly appears") that the specific one fills.