Ronquillo v. Roco

a. Modes of Acquiring Easements — Continuous non-apparent and discontinuous easements (Art. 622)

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Case DigestChapter VII — Easement or Servitudes

Ronquillo v. Roco

G.R. No. L-10619 · February 28, 1958 · Supreme Court

a. Modes of Acquiring Easements — Continuous non-apparent and discontinuous easements (Art. 622)

Gist

Neighbours in Naga City had crossed the Rocos' land for over twenty years to reach Igualdad Street and the public market. When the Rocos built a chapel across the path and then fenced it off with barbed wire, the neighbours sued, claiming they had acquired a right of way by prescription. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal: an easement of right of way is discontinuous, and a discontinuous easement can be acquired only by title, never by prescription — however long or peaceful the use.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is that the easement of right of way is discontinuous, its use depending on acts of man and being physically incapable of being incessant, so that under Article 622 it "may be acquired only by virtue of a title." Only continuous and apparent easements can be acquired by prescription of ten years under Article 620. Hence "under the present law... the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription," no matter how long, open or uninterrupted the passage has been.

Facts

Plaintiffs alleged that they had been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way traversing the defendants' land, going to Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years. (Twenty years is more than double the ten-year prescriptive period in Article 620 — and still irrelevant, because Article 620 is the wrong article.)
They alleged that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the defendants' predecessor-in-interest, "have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs." This allegation is the case's quiet weakness: recognition and respect are not a title, and toleration by the servient owner is the opposite of the adverse possession prescription would require.
On May 12, 1953, defendant Jose Roco, through his co-defendants Raymundo Martinez and their men, "with malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement," began constructing a chapel in the middle of the right of way, which "impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise" of the plaintiffs' rights.
On July 10, 1954, defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr., with Jose Roco's approval and with the help of their men and labourers, "by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermetically the road passage way," preventing the plaintiffs from reaching Igualdad Street and the public market.
The plaintiffs' claim, as the trial court read their amended and supplemental complaint, was that they had acquired the easement of right of way through prescription, by continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of the defendants' land as a passage. This characterisation is what decides everything. The complaint pleads no deed, no will, no contract and no legal easement of necessity — only long use, which is the single mode Article 622 forecloses.
On March 6, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissed the complaint on the defendants' motion for failure to state a cause of action, holding that an easement of right of way, "though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title." (Because the dismissal was on the pleadings, the appeal involved "only a question of law" and went directly to the Supreme Court — so no evidence about the road was ever taken.)

Issue

Whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription.

Ruling

Main issue. NO — a right of way may not be acquired by prescription, and the dismissal was correct. Under both the old and the new Civil Code, easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being "those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man"; and while continuous and apparent easements "are acquired either by title or prescription", "continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title". Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman class a right of way as discontinuous, and for a physical reason: "la servidumbre de paso es discontinua, porque no es posible que el hombre este pasando continuamente por el camino, vereda o senda de que se trate" — it is physically impossible for the use to be incessant. Even Article 1959 of the old Code, which provided for prescription of ownership and other real rights, "excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way" (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 867). And Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781, had already held that "[u]nder that Code (Article 539) [n]o discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event." A minority of the Court — including the writer of the opinion — would have held that Act No. 190, section 41, making "no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription," changed this, and Professor Tolentino takes the same view; Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 545, points the same way. "However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription."

"In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs."

Ratio

The appeal presented "only a question of law": whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription. The trial court had dismissed on the ground that such an easement, "though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title."
The Court began from the statutory classification. Under both Codes, easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, "discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man" (Arts. 532 old, 615 new).
The modes of acquisition follow the classification: "Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription", while "continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title" (Arts. 537 and 539 old; 620 and 622 new).
Manresa and Sanchez Roman both class a right of way as discontinuous, on a physical rather than a doctrinal ground: discontinuous servitudes "se ejercitan por un hecho del hombre, y precisamente por eso son y tienen que ser discontinuas, porque es imposible fisicamente que su uso sea incesante," so that "la servidumbre de paso es discontinua"; Sanchez Roman likewise contrasts easements "cuyo uso es o puede ser incesante, sin la intervencion de ningun hecho del hombre" with those "que se usan [a] intervalos, mas o menos largos, y dependen de actos del hombre, como las de senda, carrera."
The old Code's prescription article confirms the result: Article 1959, on prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, "excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way" — Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 867.
Precedent was to the same effect. In Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781, on whether vested rights in a right of way could be acquired by user from time immemorial, the Court said: "It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (Article 539) [n]o discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event."
The Court acknowledged the contrary authorities squarely. Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 545, had held that the public's continued use of a path beside a church gave rise to an easement of right of way by prescription in favour of both the church and the public. And a minority, including the writer of the opinion, believed that Act No. 190 — the old Code of Civil Procedure — had changed the law, its section 41 making "no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription": there seemed "no valid reason... why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right." On this view "[t]he uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use." Professor Tolentino agreed, submitting that under Act No. 190 "even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants."
Even Cuaycong itself had assumed, without deciding, that the rule might have been changed by the Code of Civil Procedure — and held it would not have helped those plaintiffs anyway, since the defendants had interrupted the use by building a toll gate in February 1911, before ten years from the Code's effectivity on October 1, 1901 had run.
"However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription."

Doctrine

Classification (Art. 615): Easements are continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent — two independent axes. Continuous ones are those whose use "is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man"; discontinuous ones are "used at more or less long intervals and... depend upon acts of man."
A Right of Way Is Discontinuous: Its exercise necessarily depends on an act of man and cannot physically be incessant. It may nevertheless be perfectly apparent — a visible, worn, fenced path — which changes nothing, since Article 622 catches discontinuous easements "whether apparent or not."
Modes of Acquisition (Arts. 620 and 622): Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by title or by prescription of ten years; continuous non-apparent and all discontinuous easements may be acquired only by title.
Consequence: "[T]he easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription" — however long, open, or unobjected-to the passage. Twenty years of use is legally the same as none.
Recognition Is Not Title: That the servient owner and his tenants "long recognized and respected" the passage does not create the easement; toleration is not adverse possession, and in any case possession is the wrong route.

Note the dissenting current in the case. A minority of the Court, the ponente among them, and Professor Tolentino, took the view that Act No. 190, section 41 had made even discontinuous servitudes prescriptible; Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro had so held for a church path. The majority declined to follow them "unless and until the [law] is changed or clarified." Justice J.B.L. Reyes, concurring, answered the minority directly: section 41 required possession "uninterruptedly continued for ten years," which is "the same condition of continuity that is exacted by the Civil Code," so the procedural statute changed nothing.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Plaintiffs had for more than twenty years crossed the Rocos' land in Naga City to reach Igualdad Street and the public market. After the defendants built a chapel across the path in 1953 and fenced it off with barbed wire in 1954, the plaintiffs sued, claiming a right of way acquired by prescription. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The central doctrine is that an easement of right of way is discontinuous — its use depends on acts of man and cannot physically be incessant — so that under Article 622 it "may be acquired only by virtue of a title," prescription of ten years under Article 620 being available only for continuous and apparent easements.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Plaintiffs alleged that they "have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years."
They alleged that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the defendants' predecessor-in-interest, "have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs."
On May 12, 1953, defendant Jose Roco, through his co-defendants Raymundo Martinez and their men, "with malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way," which "impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way."
On July 10, 1954, the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr., with the approval of Jose Roco and with the help of their men and labourers, "by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermetically the road passage way and their right of way in question against their protests and opposition," preventing them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.
The trial court read the amended and supplemental complaint as claiming that the plaintiffs "acquired the easement of right of way over the land of the defendants and the latter's predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way or road."
On March 6, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissed the amended and supplemental complaint on the defendants' motion that it did not state a cause of action, holding that an easement of right of way "though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title."
Involving "only a question of law," the appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court, which on February 28, 1958 affirmed.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Plaintiffs-Appellants (Ronquillo, et al.)

Plaintiffs contended that more than twenty years of continuous and uninterrupted use of the passage, recognised and respected by the servient owners and their tenants, had ripened into an easement of right of way by prescription, which the defendants' chapel and barbed-wire fence unlawfully obstructed.

B. Defendants-Appellees (Roco, et al.)

Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action: an easement of right of way is discontinuous and therefore, under the Civil Code, acquirable only by title — so no length of use could give the plaintiffs the right they claimed.

C. Common Ground

The case was decided on the pleadings; the facts as alleged were taken as stated, and the appeal "[i]nvolv[ed] as it does only a question of law."

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

NO. "[U]nder the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription." A right of way is discontinuous, being used "at more or less long intervals" and depending "upon acts of man"; and while "Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription", "continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title." Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman so classify it, and Article 1959 of the old Code expressly excepted discontinuous easements from prescription (Bargayo v. Camumot), as Cuaycong v. Benedicto had held.

"In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The classification. "Under old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous [or] discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively)."
The modes of acquisition. "Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and disc[o]ntinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively)."
Right of way is discontinuous — Manresa. "En cambio, las servidumbres discontinu[a]s se ejercitan por un hecho del hombre, y precisamente por eso son y tienen que ser discontinuas, porque es imposible fisicamente que su uso sea incesante. Asi, la servidumbre de paso es discontinua, porque no es posible que el hombre este pasando continuamente por el camino, vereda o senda de que se trate."
Right of way is discontinuous — Sanchez Roman. Continuous easements are "aquellas cuyo uso es o puede ser incesante, sin la intervencion de ningun hecho del hombre"; discontinuous ones "las que se usan [a] intervalos, mas o menos largos, y dependen de actos del hombre, como las de senda, carrera y otras de esta clase."
The old prescription article agrees. "Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way" — Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 867.
Precedent. Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781: "It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (Article 539) [n]o discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event."
The contrary line, acknowledged. Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 545, held that the public's continued use of a path beside the Catholic church "has given the church the right to such use by prescription," an easement acquired by prescription "not only by the church, but also by the public."
The minority view. A minority, "of which the writer of this opinion is a part," believed the easement "may now be acquired through prescription, at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190," whose section 41 "makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription," and saw "no valid reason... why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right." On this view "[t]he uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use." Professor Tolentino agreed: "It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants."
Cuaycong's reservation. That case had "insinuated" that the rule might have been changed by the Code of Civil Procedure, but held that "this would not [avail] plaintiffs" in any event, since the defendants interrupted the use in February 1911 by building and maintaining a toll gate — before ten years had run from the Code's effectivity on October 1, 1901.
The holding. "However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Two Independent Axes (Art. 615): Continuity concerns whether the use can be incessant without an act of man; apparency concerns whether the easement is visible by exterior signs. An easement may be apparent yet discontinuous.
Right of Way Is Discontinuous: Because a person cannot be passing continuously along a path, its use "is and has to be" intermittent — a physical fact, not a legal characterisation, which is why it holds regardless of how heavily the road is used.
Modes of Acquisition (Art. 620 / Art. 622): Prescription of ten years is available only for continuous and apparent easements; continuous non-apparent and all discontinuous easements require a title.
No Prescription for Right of Way: However long and uninterrupted the passage, it cannot ripen into an easement. The plaintiffs' twenty years availed them nothing.
Title Means a Juridical Act: Deed, will, contract, judgment, or the law itself creating a legal easement — not a certificate of title, and not use.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The holding concerns the voluntary easement claimed by long use. It says nothing about a legal easement of right of way in favour of an enclosed estate, which arises by operation of law on proof of the statutory requisites and on payment of indemnity.
The Court expressly left the door ajar — the rule stands "unless and until the [law] is changed or clarified" — and recorded both the Municipality of Dumangas line and the minority's reading of Act No. 190.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
This is the leading Philippine authority for "Modes of Acquiring Easements — Continuous non-apparent and discontinuous easements (Art. 622)," and the case to cite for the proposition that a right of way cannot be prescribed into existence.
The method it models is worth carrying into recitation: classify the easement first on both axes, then read off the mode of acquisition. Answering "how long did they use it?" before "what kind of easement is it?" is answering the wrong question — which is exactly why this case could be decided on a motion to dismiss, with no evidence at all about the road.
It also shows the limits of pleading. The complaint alleged that the servient owners "recognized and respected" the way; had that recognition taken the form of a title — a deed or a contract — the plaintiffs would have won on the same facts.

VII. Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring. He elaborated his reasons for holding a right of way not acquirable by prescription. The essence of the servidumbre de paso "lies in the power of the dominant owner to cross or traverse the servient tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner." As a servitude it limits the servient owner's ownership by restricting his right to exclude — "[b]ut such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosse[s], or passes over the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient owner's right of exclusion is perfect and undisturbed." Since the dominant owner "can not be continually and uninterruptedly crossing the servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is necessarily of an intermittent or discontinuous nature." And because "possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right" and "to enjoy a right is to exercise it," the possession of a right of way is itself intermittent — from which "it is inevitable to conclude, with Manresa and Sanchez Roman, that such easement can not be acquired by acquisitive prescription (adverse possession) because the latter requires that the possession be continuous or uninterrupted" (old Art. 1941; new Article 1118). He added that "[t]he Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) did not change the situation": its section 41, in conferring prescriptive title upon "ten years adverse possession," qualifies it with "uninterruptedly continued for ten years," "which is the same condition of continuity that is exacted by the Civil Code."

PADILLA, J., concurred in the result. Justices Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix concurred in the majority opinion of Justice Montemayor.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 615, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VII (Easements of Servitudes), Chapter 1 (Easements in General), Section 1 (Different Kinds of Easements)

Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man.

Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.

Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.

Nonapparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence. (532)

Why it is cited here

The classification the whole case turns on. Easements are "continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent." Continuous ones are "those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man"; discontinuous ones are used "at more or less long intervals and depend upon acts of man."

A right of way falls on the discontinuous side, and the reason is physical rather than legal. Manresa: "la servidumbre de paso es discontinua, porque no es posible que el hombre este pasando continuamente por el camino" — it is not possible for a man to be passing continuously along the path. Sanchez Roman classes the paths he calls senda and carrera the same way.

Note the trap in the word "apparent." A path can be perfectly visible — worn, fenced, used daily — and still be discontinuous, because apparency and continuity are two independent axes. Article 622 catches discontinuous easements "whether apparent or not."

Civil Code

Article 622, Civil Code

Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title. (539)

Why it is cited here

The rule that decides the appeal: "Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title." (Old Civil Code, Art. 539.)

"Title" here does not mean a certificate of title. It means a juridical act that creates the easement — a deed, a will, a contract, a judgment, or the operation of law in the case of a legal easement. What it excludes is acquisition by use, however long.

That is why the plaintiffs' twenty years of passage bought them nothing. They pleaded the one mode the article shuts off, and pleaded no title at all — which is why the case was dismissed on a motion attacking the complaint, without any trial on how long or how openly they had used the road.

Article 1959 of the old Code, on prescription of real rights, expressly excepted discontinuous easements, and the Court cites Bargayo v. Camumot for the point.

Civil Code

Article 620, Civil Code

Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years. (537a)

Why it is cited here

The other half of the pair, and the reason Article 622 has any bite: "Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years."

So prescription is available in the Code — just not here. An easement of light and view, or of aqueduct, is continuous: it operates without a fresh act of man each time, so possession of it can be genuinely uninterrupted, which is what acquisitive prescription demands.

Justice J.B.L. Reyes, concurring, makes the link explicit: possession of a right "consists in the enjoyment of that right," to enjoy a right is to exercise it, and since a right of way can only be exercised at intervals, its possession is intermittent — so it can never satisfy the requirement that possession be continuous (old Art. 1941; new Article 1118).

Civil Code

Article 1118, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (1941)

Why it is cited here

The prescription requirement that a right of way structurally cannot meet: possession must be "in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted."

This is the pivot of J.B.L. Reyes's concurrence. A servitude limits the servient owner's right to exclude — but "such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosses, or passes over the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient owner's right of exclusion is perfect and undisturbed." Between crossings there is no adverse possession at all, only the owner's full dominion.

He also disposes of the minority's escape route. Act No. 190, section 41 conferred title by "ten years adverse possession," but qualified it with "uninterruptedly continued for ten years" — "the same condition of continuity that is exacted by the Civil Code." So the Code of Civil Procedure changed nothing.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 615, Civil Code

Civil Code

Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man.

Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.

Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.

Nonapparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence. (532)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 622, Civil Code

Civil Code

Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title. (539)

Why it is cited here

The rule that decides the appeal: "Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title." (Old Civil Code, Art. 539.)

Article 1959 of the old Code, on prescription of real rights, expressly excepted discontinuous easements, and the Court cites Bargayo v. Camumot for the point.

Full entry below ↓

Article 620, Civil Code

Civil Code

Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years. (537a)

Why it is cited here

The other half of the pair, and the reason Article 622 has any bite: "Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years."

Full entry below ↓

Article 1118, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (1941)

Why it is cited here

The prescription requirement that a right of way structurally cannot meet: possession must be "in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted."

Full entry below ↓

Facts

Plaintiffs alleged that they had been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way traversing the defendants' land, going to Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years. (Twenty years is more than double the ten-year prescriptive period in Article 620 — and still irrelevant, because Article 620 is the wrong article.)
They alleged that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the defendants' predecessor-in-interest, "have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs." This allegation is the case's quiet weakness: recognition and respect are not a title, and toleration by the servient owner is the opposite of the adverse possession prescription would require.
On May 12, 1953, defendant Jose Roco, through his co-defendants Raymundo Martinez and their men, "with malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement," began constructing a chapel in the middle of the right of way, which "impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise" of the plaintiffs' rights.
On July 10, 1954, defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr., with Jose Roco's approval and with the help of their men and labourers, "by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermetically the road passage way," preventing the plaintiffs from reaching Igualdad Street and the public market.
The plaintiffs' claim, as the trial court read their amended and supplemental complaint, was that they had acquired the easement of right of way through prescription, by continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of the defendants' land as a passage. This characterisation is what decides everything. The complaint pleads no deed, no will, no contract and no legal easement of necessity — only long use, which is the single mode Article 622 forecloses.
On March 6, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissed the complaint on the defendants' motion for failure to state a cause of action, holding that an easement of right of way, "though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title." (Because the dismissal was on the pleadings, the appeal involved "only a question of law" and went directly to the Supreme Court — so no evidence about the road was ever taken.)

Issue

Whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription.

Ruling

"In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs."

Ratio

The appeal presented "only a question of law": whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription. The trial court had dismissed on the ground that such an easement, "though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title."
The Court began from the statutory classification. Under both Codes, easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, "discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man" (Arts. 532 old, 615 new).
The modes of acquisition follow the classification: "Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription", while "continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title" (Arts. 537 and 539 old; 620 and 622 new).
Manresa and Sanchez Roman both class a right of way as discontinuous, on a physical rather than a doctrinal ground: discontinuous servitudes "se ejercitan por un hecho del hombre, y precisamente por eso son y tienen que ser discontinuas, porque es imposible fisicamente que su uso sea incesante," so that "la servidumbre de paso es discontinua"; Sanchez Roman likewise contrasts easements "cuyo uso es o puede ser incesante, sin la intervencion de ningun hecho del hombre" with those "que se usan [a] intervalos, mas o menos largos, y dependen de actos del hombre, como las de senda, carrera."
The old Code's prescription article confirms the result: Article 1959, on prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, "excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way" — Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 867.
Precedent was to the same effect. In Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781, on whether vested rights in a right of way could be acquired by user from time immemorial, the Court said: "It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (Article 539) [n]o discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event."
The Court acknowledged the contrary authorities squarely. Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 545, had held that the public's continued use of a path beside a church gave rise to an easement of right of way by prescription in favour of both the church and the public. And a minority, including the writer of the opinion, believed that Act No. 190 — the old Code of Civil Procedure — had changed the law, its section 41 making "no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription": there seemed "no valid reason... why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right." On this view "[t]he uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use." Professor Tolentino agreed, submitting that under Act No. 190 "even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants."
Even Cuaycong itself had assumed, without deciding, that the rule might have been changed by the Code of Civil Procedure — and held it would not have helped those plaintiffs anyway, since the defendants had interrupted the use by building a toll gate in February 1911, before ten years from the Code's effectivity on October 1, 1901 had run.
"However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription."

Doctrine

Classification (Art. 615): Easements are continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent — two independent axes. Continuous ones are those whose use "is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man"; discontinuous ones are "used at more or less long intervals and... depend upon acts of man."
A Right of Way Is Discontinuous: Its exercise necessarily depends on an act of man and cannot physically be incessant. It may nevertheless be perfectly apparent — a visible, worn, fenced path — which changes nothing, since Article 622 catches discontinuous easements "whether apparent or not."
Modes of Acquisition (Arts. 620 and 622): Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by title or by prescription of ten years; continuous non-apparent and all discontinuous easements may be acquired only by title.
Consequence: "[T]he easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription" — however long, open, or unobjected-to the passage. Twenty years of use is legally the same as none.
Recognition Is Not Title: That the servient owner and his tenants "long recognized and respected" the passage does not create the easement; toleration is not adverse possession, and in any case possession is the wrong route.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Plaintiffs alleged that they "have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years."
They alleged that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the defendants' predecessor-in-interest, "have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs."
On May 12, 1953, defendant Jose Roco, through his co-defendants Raymundo Martinez and their men, "with malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way," which "impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way."
On July 10, 1954, the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr., with the approval of Jose Roco and with the help of their men and labourers, "by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermetically the road passage way and their right of way in question against their protests and opposition," preventing them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.
The trial court read the amended and supplemental complaint as claiming that the plaintiffs "acquired the easement of right of way over the land of the defendants and the latter's predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way or road."
On March 6, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissed the amended and supplemental complaint on the defendants' motion that it did not state a cause of action, holding that an easement of right of way "though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title."
Involving "only a question of law," the appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court, which on February 28, 1958 affirmed.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Plaintiffs-Appellants (Ronquillo, et al.)

B. Defendants-Appellees (Roco, et al.)

C. Common Ground

The case was decided on the pleadings; the facts as alleged were taken as stated, and the appeal "[i]nvolv[ed] as it does only a question of law."

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

"In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The classification. "Under old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous [or] discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively)."
The modes of acquisition. "Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and disc[o]ntinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively)."
Right of way is discontinuous — Manresa. "En cambio, las servidumbres discontinu[a]s se ejercitan por un hecho del hombre, y precisamente por eso son y tienen que ser discontinuas, porque es imposible fisicamente que su uso sea incesante. Asi, la servidumbre de paso es discontinua, porque no es posible que el hombre este pasando continuamente por el camino, vereda o senda de que se trate."
Right of way is discontinuous — Sanchez Roman. Continuous easements are "aquellas cuyo uso es o puede ser incesante, sin la intervencion de ningun hecho del hombre"; discontinuous ones "las que se usan [a] intervalos, mas o menos largos, y dependen de actos del hombre, como las de senda, carrera y otras de esta clase."
The old prescription article agrees. "Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way" — Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 867.
Precedent. Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781: "It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (Article 539) [n]o discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event."
The contrary line, acknowledged. Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 545, held that the public's continued use of a path beside the Catholic church "has given the church the right to such use by prescription," an easement acquired by prescription "not only by the church, but also by the public."
The minority view. A minority, "of which the writer of this opinion is a part," believed the easement "may now be acquired through prescription, at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190," whose section 41 "makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription," and saw "no valid reason... why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right." On this view "[t]he uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use." Professor Tolentino agreed: "It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants."
Cuaycong's reservation. That case had "insinuated" that the rule might have been changed by the Code of Civil Procedure, but held that "this would not [avail] plaintiffs" in any event, since the defendants interrupted the use in February 1911 by building and maintaining a toll gate — before ten years had run from the Code's effectivity on October 1, 1901.
The holding. "However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Two Independent Axes (Art. 615): Continuity concerns whether the use can be incessant without an act of man; apparency concerns whether the easement is visible by exterior signs. An easement may be apparent yet discontinuous.
Right of Way Is Discontinuous: Because a person cannot be passing continuously along a path, its use "is and has to be" intermittent — a physical fact, not a legal characterisation, which is why it holds regardless of how heavily the road is used.
Modes of Acquisition (Art. 620 / Art. 622): Prescription of ten years is available only for continuous and apparent easements; continuous non-apparent and all discontinuous easements require a title.
No Prescription for Right of Way: However long and uninterrupted the passage, it cannot ripen into an easement. The plaintiffs' twenty years availed them nothing.
Title Means a Juridical Act: Deed, will, contract, judgment, or the law itself creating a legal easement — not a certificate of title, and not use.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The holding concerns the voluntary easement claimed by long use. It says nothing about a legal easement of right of way in favour of an enclosed estate, which arises by operation of law on proof of the statutory requisites and on payment of indemnity.
The Court expressly left the door ajar — the rule stands "unless and until the [law] is changed or clarified" — and recorded both the Municipality of Dumangas line and the minority's reading of Act No. 190.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
This is the leading Philippine authority for "Modes of Acquiring Easements — Continuous non-apparent and discontinuous easements (Art. 622)," and the case to cite for the proposition that a right of way cannot be prescribed into existence.
The method it models is worth carrying into recitation: classify the easement first on both axes, then read off the mode of acquisition. Answering "how long did they use it?" before "what kind of easement is it?" is answering the wrong question — which is exactly why this case could be decided on a motion to dismiss, with no evidence at all about the road.
It also shows the limits of pleading. The complaint alleged that the servient owners "recognized and respected" the way; had that recognition taken the form of a title — a deed or a contract — the plaintiffs would have won on the same facts.

VII. Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurred in the result. Justices Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix concurred in the majority opinion of Justice Montemayor.