Gomez v. People

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

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Title

Gomez v. People

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 216824 November 10, 2020

On the assigned subtopic, the decision is the current, authoritative restatement. It sets out the aspects of jurisdiction, gives the three requisites in criminal cases, and then draws the contrast that decides the case: jurisdiction over the subject matter "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise," whereas the objection to jurisdiction over the person is waivable "by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea," and also by "fil[ing] any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person." From that asymmetry the Court reasons a fortiori: "if a serious ground such as jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived, so can the authority of the handling prosecutor, which does not have any constitutional underpinning." Hence the En Banc abandonment of the contrary line of cases.

Core Doctrine

"Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It allows the court to render a decision that is binding on the accused." Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is a waivable requisite: "the right to challenge or object to a trial court's jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment," and "such right may also be waived by the accused when he or she files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person." Because the court's power over the person "is merely passive and is solely hinged on the conduct of either the accused or the arresting officers," it does not depend on the prosecutor's authority to sign the Information — and a defect in that authority is itself waivable if not raised in a motion to quash before plea.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 216824)

Case DigestWeek 2 - Jurisdiction

Gomez v. People

G.R. No. 216824 · November 10, 2020 · En Banc

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Petitioner: Gina A. Villa GomezRespondent: People of the Philippines

Gist

Core Doctrine

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_216824_2020.html

ℹ️ The contrast this case exists to draw

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be conferred by the accused "through an express waiver or otherwise." Jurisdiction over the person is the opposite: it is acquired by arrest or voluntary appearance, and the objection to it may be waived — by silence or inaction before plea, or by filing any pleading seeking affirmative relief. That asymmetry is the reasoning engine of the whole decision.

⚠️ An *En Banc* decision that abandons prior doctrine

"Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned." Any older case or reviewer stating the contrary is superseded as of November 10, 2020.

Facts

On September 17, 2010 police operatives of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Makati City arrested Gina A. Villa Gomez.
On September 19, 2010 a Complaint for corruption of public officials under Article 212 was received for inquest by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati.
On September 21, 2010 the OCP found probable cause that she "may have offered ₱10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque and PO2 Renie E. Aseboque in exchange for the release of her companion Reynaldo Morales y Cabillo @ 'Anoy'," and recommended the attached Information for approval and filing. The investigating prosecutor's Resolution bore the required approval; what was missing was the signature and approval on the face of the Information itself.
The Information was filed with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 57 without the signature and authority of the City Prosecutor.
Trial proceeded and the case was submitted for decision. This posture is what makes the dismissal so striking — the defect surfaced at the very end, not before plea.
On February 13, 2013 the RTC motu proprio dismissed the charge on that ground; reconsideration was denied April 29, 2013.
On October 9, 2014 the Court of Appeals annulled both Orders and reinstated the case, holding that the RTC "committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the charge … even after the case had already been submitted for decision."
Decided En Banc on November 10, 2020 through Justice Gesmundo, with Concurring Opinions by Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Delos Santos.

Issue

Whether a trial court is divested of jurisdiction over the person of the accused — and over the subject matter — by the handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority or approval in filing the Information; and whether such a defect, if characterised as jurisdictional, may be raised at any time or is waived by failure to raise it in a motion to quash before plea.

Secondary issues. Whether the motu proprio dismissal after submission was grave abuse of discretion, and whether an order so tainted can constitute a first jeopardy.

Ancillary issue. What is required for the validity of an Information as regards prosecutorial approval.

Ruling

Main issue. NO. "[T]he handling prosecutor's authority, particularly as it does not appear on the face of the Information, has no connection to the trial court's power to hear and decide a case." Jurisdiction over the person "is acquired upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court," and the objection "may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment," or by "fil[ing] any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person."

Because that power is "merely passive and is solely hinged on the conduct of either the accused or the arresting officers — not on the authority of the handling prosecutor," and because "if a serious ground such as jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived, so can the authority of the handling prosecutor, which does not have any constitutional underpinning," the defect "may be waived by the accused if not raised as a ground in a motion to quash before entering a plea." "If, at all, such deficiency is merely formal and can be cured at any stage."

Secondary issues. YES, grave abuse. "[B]oth the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due process … A denial of such guarantee against any of the parties … amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."

Ancillary issue. "It is sufficient for the validity of the Information … that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor … bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 and is adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112."

Abandonment. "Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned."

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Gina A. Villa Gomez and AFFIRMS the October 9, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 130290 for absence of any reversible error. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is hereby ORDERED to RESUME its proceedings […]"

Ratio

"Semantically, 'jurisdiction' is derived from the Latin words 'juris' and 'dico' which means 'I speak by the law'" — "the power and authority of a court … to hear, try, and decide a case." "[A] judgment rendered without such power and authority is void … [and] a void judgment may be attacked anytime."
Criminal cases require three requisites: jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the territory where the offence was committed, and over the person of the accused.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the non-waivable pole: "conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court — … only by law and in the manner prescribed by law," "the power to hear and determine the general class," and it "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise." It is "determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information and not by the result of proof."
The prosecutor's authority is then shown to be unrelated to that pole: it "has nothing to do with the ultimate facts which describe the charges … The nature and cause of the accusation remains the same with or without such required authority." Since a fatally defective Information may be amended, "it is with more reason that the handling prosecutor shall also be afforded with the chance to first secure the necessary authority."
Jurisdiction over the person is then defined and immediately contrasted as to waivability — the second sentence of that contrast carrying Miranda v. Tuliao's special-appearance rule forward, now stated En Banc as settled doctrine.
The passivity of the court's power over the person is the bridge: "Voluntary appearance entirely depends on the volition of the accused, while the validity of an arrest strictly depends on the apprehending officers' compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards."
The a fortiori step completes the argument, and due process running in both directions defeats the double-jeopardy objection.

Doctrine

How jurisdiction over the person is acquired: "upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court," which "allows the court to render a decision that is binding on the accused."
It is waivable, and subject-matter jurisdiction is not: the objection "may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment," and by "fil[ing] any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except … when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person" — whereas subject-matter jurisdiction "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise."
The three requisites in criminal cases are subject matter, territory, and the person.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is fixed by the allegations, "not by the result of proof."
The abandoned doctrine and its replacement: a missing prosecutorial signature is no longer jurisdictional but a waivable, formal defect, and it suffices that the investigating prosecutor's Resolution bears the superior's imprimatur.
Due process is bilateral — a dismissal "tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."

Limits.

The waiver rule for the person has an exception, and this Decision restates rather than removes it — the "special jurisdiction" clause preserves Miranda v. Tuliao's special appearance, so an accused who moves to quash the warrant, or to quash for want of jurisdiction over his person, still does not submit.
What was abandoned is precise: only the doctrine that a missing prosecutorial signature is jurisdictional; the requirement itself survives as a ground for a motion to quash under Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 — it is simply waivable and must be raised before plea.
The abandonment is expressed prospectively ("Henceforth") and carries En Banc authority as of November 10, 2020, superseding earlier Division cases and reviewers.
This is not authority that a court may proceed against someone never arrested and never appearing: what is waivable is the objection, not the requisite.
And the double-jeopardy holding is narrow — a dismissal amounting to acquittal bars re-prosecution unless void for grave abuse of discretion.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. Gina A. Villa Gomez was charged with corruption of public officials for allegedly offering ₱10,000.00 to two police officers to release her companion. The Information had been filed without the signature and authority of the City Prosecutor. After the case had already been submitted for decision, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 57, motu proprio dismissed it on that ground. The Court of Appeals annulled the dismissal and reinstated the case, and the Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, denied the petition and affirmed, ordering the trial court to resume proceedings.

Facts

On September 17, 2010, police operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Makati City arrested the petitioner, Gina A. Villa Gomez.
On September 19, 2010, a Complaint was filed against her for corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, and was received for inquest by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City.
On September 21, 2010, the OCP of Makati City issued a Resolution finding probable cause that the petitioner "may have offered ₱10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque and PO2 Renie E. Aseboque in exchange for the release of her companion Reynaldo Morales y Cabillo @ 'Anoy'." The Resolution recommended prosecution "for violation of THE REVISED PENAL CODE art. 212 in rel. to art. 211-A" and recommended the attached Information for approval and filing. The investigating prosecutor's Resolution bore the required approval; what was missing was the signature and approval on the face of the Information itself.
The Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 without the signature and authority of the City Prosecutor.
Trial proceeded, and the case was submitted for decision. This is the procedural posture that makes the dismissal so striking — the defect was raised at the very end, not before plea.
On February 13, 2013, the RTC issued an Order motu proprio dismissing the charge of corruption of public officials on the ground that the Information filed was without the signature and authority of the City Prosecutor.
On April 29, 2013, the RTC denied reconsideration.
The People, through a petition for certiorari, went to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 130290.
On October 9, 2014, the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered its Decision issuing a writ of certiorari (1) annulling the February 13, 2013 and April 29, 2013 Orders of the RTC, and (2) reinstating the criminal case. It held "that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the charge … even after the case had already been submitted for decision."
The petitioner, through the Public Attorney's Office, filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 10, 2020, the Court En Banc promulgated this Decision through Justice Gesmundo, denying the petition. Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Delos Santos each filed a Concurring Opinion.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Gina A. Villa Gomez).

The petitioner's position rested on the settled reading of Section 3(d), Rule 117 at the time: that an Information filed by an officer without the required prior written authority or approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor is fatally defective, and that this defect is jurisdictional — divesting the trial court of jurisdiction both over her person and over the subject matter. On that premise a dismissal was not merely proper but compulsory, and could be ordered at any time, including motu proprio and after submission for decision, because a jurisdictional objection is not waivable and a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void. She sought to set aside the Court of Appeals decision that had annulled the dismissal and reinstated the case against her.

B. Respondent (People of the Philippines).

The People's position, sustained by the Court of Appeals, was that the trial court had gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case motu proprio on this ground after the case had already been submitted for decision. The defect in the handling prosecutor's authority — which "does not appear on the face of the Information" — has no bearing on the court's power to hear and decide; the Resolution recommending the filing did bear the imprimatur of the City Prosecutor; and the objection, if any, was one the accused had to raise in a motion to quash before entering her plea, failing which it was waived. The People also invoked the State's own entitlement to due process on jurisdictional questions.

C. Common Ground.

It was not disputed that the Information lacked the signature and approval of the City Prosecutor on its face, nor that the OCP Resolution of September 21, 2010 recommending the filing did carry the required approval. Neither was it disputed that the petitioner had been arrested on September 17, 2010, that she had been arraigned and had entered a plea, that trial had run its course, and that the case had been submitted for decision before the dismissal was ordered. The identity of the charge — Article 212 in relation to Article 211-A of the Revised Penal Code — was likewise not in issue.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

As the Court frames it, "[t]he crux of the entire controversy is whether, in a criminal case, a trial court is divested of its jurisdiction over the person of the accused — and over the subject matter — by the handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor in the filing of the Information; and whether such a defect, being characterised as jurisdictional, may be raised at any time or is instead waived by failure to raise it in a motion to quash before plea.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether the trial court's motu proprio dismissal, made after the case had been submitted for decision, amounted to grave abuse of discretion; and whether an order of dismissal so tainted can constitute a first jeopardy barring further proceedings.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

What is required for the validity of an Information as regards prosecutorial approval, given Section 4, Rule 112 and Section 1 of R.A. No. 5180.

Ruling

Main Issue: NO — the trial court is not divested of jurisdiction. "[T]he handling prosecutor's authority, particularly as it does not appear on the face of the Information, has no connection to the trial court's power to hear and decide a case." Jurisdiction over the person "is acquired upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court," and the objection to it "may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment," or by "fil[ing] any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person." Because the court's power over the person "is merely passive and is solely hinged on the conduct of either the accused or the arresting officers — not on the authority of the handling prosecutor," and because "if a serious ground such as jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived, so can the authority of the handling prosecutor which does not have any constitutional underpinning," the defect "may be waived by the accused if not raised as a ground in a motion to quash before entering a plea." "If, at all, such deficiency is merely formal and can be cured at any stage of the proceedings."

Secondary Issues: YES, grave abuse. "[B]oth the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due process — especially when the most contentious of issues involve jurisdictional matters. A denial of such guarantee against any of the parties of the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."

Ancillary Issue: "It is sufficient for the validity of the Information or Complaint … that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending for the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 and is adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court."

Abandonment of prior doctrine: "Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned."

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Gina A. Villa Gomez and AFFIRMS the October 9, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 130290 for absence of any reversible error. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is hereby ORDERED to RESUME its proceedings […]"

The Decision's closing directive is reproduced as far as the published text carries it in continuous form; the operative holdings are the denial of the petition, the affirmance of the CA, and the order to resume proceedings.

Ratio

The Court begins with the word and its consequence. "Semantically, 'jurisdiction' is derived from the Latin words 'juris' and 'dico' which means 'I speak by the law.'" In a refined sense it is "the power and authority of a court [or quasi-judicial tribunal] to hear, try, and decide a case." "Indeed, a judgment rendered without such power and authority is void thereby creating no rights and imposing no duties on the parties. As a consequence, a void judgment may be attacked anytime."
The aspects of jurisdiction are then enumerated. "[T]he concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res… Additionally, a court must also acquire jurisdiction over the remedy." And for criminal cases specifically: "there are three (3) important requisites… (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused."
Subject-matter jurisdiction is set out as the non-waivable pole. It "is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court — it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." In criminal cases it "is vested by law upon a particular court and may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense," and "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise." It is "determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information and not by the result of proof" — allegations of "ultimate facts constituting elements of the crime charged," which "apprise[] the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation."
The prosecutor's authority is then shown to be unrelated to that pole. "[T]he authority of the officer in filing an Information has nothing to do with the ultimate facts which describe the charges against the accused… The nature and cause of the accusation remains the same with or without such required authority." Indeed, existing rules let the prosecution amend a fatally defective Information to align it with the accusation, "[a]s such, it is with more reason that the handling prosecutor shall also be afforded with the chance to first secure the necessary authority." Hence "the law conferring a court with jurisdiction over a specific offense does not cease to operate in cases where there is lack of authority on the part of the officer … filing an Information."
Jurisdiction over the person is then defined — the assigned holding. "Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It allows the court to render a decision that is binding on the accused."
And immediately contrasted with subject matter as to waivability. "However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter, the right to challenge or object to a trial court's jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment. Moreover, such right may also be waived by the accused when he or she files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person." That second sentence is Miranda vs. Tuliao's rule, carried forward and now stated as settled doctrine by the Court sitting En Banc.
The passivity of the court's power over the person is the bridge to the holding. "[T]he authority of an officer or handling prosecutor in the filing of an Information also has nothing to do with the voluntary appearance or validity of the arrest of the accused. Voluntary appearance entirely depends on the volition of the accused, while the validity of an arrest strictly depends on the apprehending officers' compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards in its execution. Here, the trial court's power to make binding pronouncements concerning and affecting the person of the accused is merely passive and is solely hinged on the conduct of either the accused or the arresting officers — not on the authority of the handling prosecutor."
The a fortiori step completes the argument. "Moreover, if a serious ground such as jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived, so can the authority of the handling prosecutor which does not have any constitutional underpinning. Therefore, a handling prosecutor's lack of prior authority or approval … may be waived by the accused if not raised as a ground in a motion to quash before entering a plea."
Due process is held to run in both directions, which defeats the double-jeopardy objection. "[B]oth the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due process… A denial of such guarantee against any of the parties of the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."
The prior line of authority is expressly abandoned, and a workable substitute rule supplied. "Henceforth, all previous doctrines … holding that the lack of signature and approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned. It is sufficient … that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending for the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 and is adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

How jurisdiction over the person is acquired. "[U]pon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court." Its effect: "It allows the court to render a decision that is binding on the accused."

It is waivable, and subject-matter jurisdiction is not. The objection "may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment," and "may also be waived … when he or she files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person." By contrast, jurisdiction over the subject matter "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise."

The three requisites in criminal cases: jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the territory where the offence was committed, and over the person of the accused.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is fixed by the allegations. It is "determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information and not by the result of proof."

The abandoned doctrine and its replacement. Lack of the prosecutor's signature and approval on the face of the Information no longer divests the court of jurisdiction; it is a waivable, formal defect, "cured at any stage," and it suffices that the investigating prosecutor's Resolution bears the superior's imprimatur.

Due process is bilateral. A dismissal or acquittal "tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The waiver rule for the person has an exception, and this Decision restates it rather than removing it. The clause "except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person" preserves Miranda vs. Tuliao's special appearance. An accused who moves to quash the warrant of arrest, or to quash the complaint for want of jurisdiction over his person, still does not thereby submit.
What was abandoned is precise. Only the doctrine that a missing prosecutorial signature/approval is jurisdictional. The requirement itself survives — Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 remains a ground for a motion to quash — it is simply waivable and must be raised before plea.
The abandonment is prospective in expression ("Henceforth") and En Banc in authority. Division cases and pre-2020 reviewers stating that such an Information is void for want of jurisdiction are superseded. Note the date: November 10, 2020.
This is not authority that a court may proceed against someone never arrested and never appearing. The requisite still has to be satisfied; what is waivable is the objection to it, not the requisite in the abstract.
The double-jeopardy holding is narrow. A dismissal amounting to acquittal bars re-prosecution unless it is void for grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner here had been through trial to submission, so the point was live and had to be met.
Verbatim caveats in the reported text. The petitioner's name appears variously as "Gina A. Villa Gomez," "Gina Villa Gomes y Andayan" and "Gina Villa Gomez y Anduyan" in the quoted OCP resolutions; and one quoted resolution renders the code as "THE REVIDED PENAL CODE." These are reporting artefacts.
Two Concurring Opinions were filed (Perlas-Bernabe, J. and Delos Santos, J.); the ponencia is the controlling text.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Court gives the assigned requisite its own captioned section — "D. Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Accused" — defines it, states the two modes of acquiring it, and makes its waivability the load-bearing premise of the entire disposition. The Topic asks what jurisdiction over the person is and how it is acquired and lost; this Decision answers all three, and does so En Banc in 2020, which makes it the current controlling statement.

Read against the week's other IV.c cases, Gomez is the synthesis. Antiporda vs. Garchitorena supplied the two modes (warrant or voluntary submission) and the estoppel corollary; Miranda vs. Tuliao separated custody of the law from jurisdiction over the person and carved out the special appearance; Jimenez vs. Sorongon restated the affirmative-relief rule and the custody proviso. Gomez gathers those into a single formulation, adds waiver by silence or inaction before plea, and then uses the contrast with subject-matter jurisdiction — non-waivable, conferred only by law, measured by the allegations, the very propositions De la Cruz vs. Moya and Bilag vs. Ay-Ay supply — to decide a question neither line had squarely answered.

Separate Opinions

Two Concurring Opinions were filed: by Justice Perlas-Bernabe and by Justice Delos Santos. The Decision was penned by Justice Gesmundo for the Court sitting En Banc.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Constitution

Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution

Judicial Department

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article VIII (Judicial Department)

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Why it is cited here

What jurisdiction is, taken back to the word itself.

"The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."

"Semantically, 'jurisdiction' is derived from the Latin words 'juris' and 'dico' which means 'I speak by the law.'" In its refined sense it is "the power and authority of a court [or quasi-judicial tribunal] to hear, try, and decide a case."

"I speak by the law" is the whole idea in three words. A court's pronouncements bind because the law authorises them — not because of the court's standing, its expertise, or the parties' agreement.

From that everything in this topic follows: jurisdiction over the offense comes only from statute, and a tribunal speaking outside it is not speaking by the law at all.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The other jurisdiction, and how it is acquired.

"Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by arrest or voluntary appearance, and unlike subject-matter jurisdiction it may be supplied by the party's own conduct.

The reason for the difference is in the definition above. Subject-matter jurisdiction is the court's power to speak by the law, which no litigant can grant. Jurisdiction over the person is about who is bound, and a person may agree to be bound.

That is why one is unwaivable and the other is waived by a single pleading seeking relief.

Special Law

Section 20, B.P. Blg. 129

Jurisdiction in criminal cases

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.

AMENDED. Section 20 gives Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in criminal cases "not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body", so it is read together with Section 32 (first-level courts) and with P.D. No. 1606, Section 4 (Sandiganbayan). What falls to the RTC is therefore a residue, and the residue moves whenever the other two move.

LawPhil posts the 1981 text. The jurisdictional amounts and several grants of jurisdiction have been amended since — most consequentially by R.A. No. 7691 (1994), which raised the thresholds in Sections 19, 32, 33 and 34, and by R.A. No. 11576 (2021), which raised them again. The court names are also original: the "Intermediate Appellate Court" of Sections 3-12 is now the Court of Appeals. Check the date of the decision against the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Where the power to speak by the law actually comes from.

"Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan."

This is the residual grant, and reading it requires checking the express grants first — the first-level courts under Section 32, the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, Section 4.

For corruption of public officials under the Revised Penal Code, the answer turns on the accused's position: an enumerated official or Grade 27 and above goes to the Sandiganbayan, and everyone else falls into this residue.

The routine to carry: name the statute, name the class of cases, and check the exclusive grants in order.

Related notes:

Miranda v. Tuliao — the source of the special-appearance exception this Decision preserves.
Antiporda v. Garchitorena — the two modes of acquiring jurisdiction over the person, and estoppel.
Jimenez v. Sorongon — waiver by seeking affirmative relief; custody required only for bail.
Bilag v. Ay-Ay — the non-waivable counterpart: subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, never by consent.
Section 3(d), Rule 117, Rules of Court — motion to quash for want of authority in the officer who filed the information.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_216824_2020.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution

Constitution

Judicial Department

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article VIII (Judicial Department)

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Why it is cited here

What jurisdiction is, taken back to the word itself.

"The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."

From that everything in this topic follows: jurisdiction over the offense comes only from statute, and a tribunal speaking outside it is not speaking by the law at all.

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

Why it is cited here

The other jurisdiction, and how it is acquired.

"Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by arrest or voluntary appearance, and unlike subject-matter jurisdiction it may be supplied by the party's own conduct.

That is why one is unwaivable and the other is waived by a single pleading seeking relief.

Full entry below ↓

Section 20, B.P. Blg. 129

Special Law

Jurisdiction in criminal cases

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)

Why it is cited here

Where the power to speak by the law actually comes from.

This is the residual grant, and reading it requires checking the express grants first — the first-level courts under Section 32, the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, Section 4.

The routine to carry: name the statute, name the class of cases, and check the exclusive grants in order.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_216824_2020.html

ℹ️ The contrast this case exists to draw

⚠️ An *En Banc* decision that abandons prior doctrine

Facts

On September 17, 2010 police operatives of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Makati City arrested Gina A. Villa Gomez.
On September 19, 2010 a Complaint for corruption of public officials under Article 212 was received for inquest by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati.
On September 21, 2010 the OCP found probable cause that she "may have offered ₱10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque and PO2 Renie E. Aseboque in exchange for the release of her companion Reynaldo Morales y Cabillo @ 'Anoy'," and recommended the attached Information for approval and filing. The investigating prosecutor's Resolution bore the required approval; what was missing was the signature and approval on the face of the Information itself.
The Information was filed with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 57 without the signature and authority of the City Prosecutor.
Trial proceeded and the case was submitted for decision. This posture is what makes the dismissal so striking — the defect surfaced at the very end, not before plea.
On February 13, 2013 the RTC motu proprio dismissed the charge on that ground; reconsideration was denied April 29, 2013.
On October 9, 2014 the Court of Appeals annulled both Orders and reinstated the case, holding that the RTC "committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the charge … even after the case had already been submitted for decision."
Decided En Banc on November 10, 2020 through Justice Gesmundo, with Concurring Opinions by Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Delos Santos.

Issue

Secondary issues. Whether the motu proprio dismissal after submission was grave abuse of discretion, and whether an order so tainted can constitute a first jeopardy.

Ancillary issue. What is required for the validity of an Information as regards prosecutorial approval.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Gina A. Villa Gomez and AFFIRMS the October 9, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 130290 for absence of any reversible error. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is hereby ORDERED to RESUME its proceedings […]"

Ratio

"Semantically, 'jurisdiction' is derived from the Latin words 'juris' and 'dico' which means 'I speak by the law'" — "the power and authority of a court … to hear, try, and decide a case." "[A] judgment rendered without such power and authority is void … [and] a void judgment may be attacked anytime."
Criminal cases require three requisites: jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the territory where the offence was committed, and over the person of the accused.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the non-waivable pole: "conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court — … only by law and in the manner prescribed by law," "the power to hear and determine the general class," and it "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise." It is "determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information and not by the result of proof."
The prosecutor's authority is then shown to be unrelated to that pole: it "has nothing to do with the ultimate facts which describe the charges … The nature and cause of the accusation remains the same with or without such required authority." Since a fatally defective Information may be amended, "it is with more reason that the handling prosecutor shall also be afforded with the chance to first secure the necessary authority."
Jurisdiction over the person is then defined and immediately contrasted as to waivability — the second sentence of that contrast carrying Miranda v. Tuliao's special-appearance rule forward, now stated En Banc as settled doctrine.
The passivity of the court's power over the person is the bridge: "Voluntary appearance entirely depends on the volition of the accused, while the validity of an arrest strictly depends on the apprehending officers' compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards."
The a fortiori step completes the argument, and due process running in both directions defeats the double-jeopardy objection.

Doctrine

How jurisdiction over the person is acquired: "upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court," which "allows the court to render a decision that is binding on the accused."
It is waivable, and subject-matter jurisdiction is not: the objection "may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment," and by "fil[ing] any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except … when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person" — whereas subject-matter jurisdiction "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise."
The three requisites in criminal cases are subject matter, territory, and the person.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is fixed by the allegations, "not by the result of proof."
The abandoned doctrine and its replacement: a missing prosecutorial signature is no longer jurisdictional but a waivable, formal defect, and it suffices that the investigating prosecutor's Resolution bears the superior's imprimatur.
Due process is bilateral — a dismissal "tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."

Limits.

The waiver rule for the person has an exception, and this Decision restates rather than removes it — the "special jurisdiction" clause preserves Miranda v. Tuliao's special appearance, so an accused who moves to quash the warrant, or to quash for want of jurisdiction over his person, still does not submit.
What was abandoned is precise: only the doctrine that a missing prosecutorial signature is jurisdictional; the requirement itself survives as a ground for a motion to quash under Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 — it is simply waivable and must be raised before plea.
The abandonment is expressed prospectively ("Henceforth") and carries En Banc authority as of November 10, 2020, superseding earlier Division cases and reviewers.
This is not authority that a court may proceed against someone never arrested and never appearing: what is waivable is the objection, not the requisite.
And the double-jeopardy holding is narrow — a dismissal amounting to acquittal bars re-prosecution unless void for grave abuse of discretion.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

On September 17, 2010, police operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Makati City arrested the petitioner, Gina A. Villa Gomez.
On September 19, 2010, a Complaint was filed against her for corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, and was received for inquest by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City.
On September 21, 2010, the OCP of Makati City issued a Resolution finding probable cause that the petitioner "may have offered ₱10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque and PO2 Renie E. Aseboque in exchange for the release of her companion Reynaldo Morales y Cabillo @ 'Anoy'." The Resolution recommended prosecution "for violation of THE REVISED PENAL CODE art. 212 in rel. to art. 211-A" and recommended the attached Information for approval and filing. The investigating prosecutor's Resolution bore the required approval; what was missing was the signature and approval on the face of the Information itself.
The Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 without the signature and authority of the City Prosecutor.
Trial proceeded, and the case was submitted for decision. This is the procedural posture that makes the dismissal so striking — the defect was raised at the very end, not before plea.
On February 13, 2013, the RTC issued an Order motu proprio dismissing the charge of corruption of public officials on the ground that the Information filed was without the signature and authority of the City Prosecutor.
On April 29, 2013, the RTC denied reconsideration.
The People, through a petition for certiorari, went to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 130290.
On October 9, 2014, the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered its Decision issuing a writ of certiorari (1) annulling the February 13, 2013 and April 29, 2013 Orders of the RTC, and (2) reinstating the criminal case. It held "that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the charge … even after the case had already been submitted for decision."
The petitioner, through the Public Attorney's Office, filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 10, 2020, the Court En Banc promulgated this Decision through Justice Gesmundo, denying the petition. Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Delos Santos each filed a Concurring Opinion.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Gina A. Villa Gomez).

B. Respondent (People of the Philippines).

C. Common Ground.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

B. Secondary Issues.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

What is required for the validity of an Information as regards prosecutorial approval, given Section 4, Rule 112 and Section 1 of R.A. No. 5180.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Gina A. Villa Gomez and AFFIRMS the October 9, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 130290 for absence of any reversible error. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is hereby ORDERED to RESUME its proceedings […]"

Ratio

The Court begins with the word and its consequence. "Semantically, 'jurisdiction' is derived from the Latin words 'juris' and 'dico' which means 'I speak by the law.'" In a refined sense it is "the power and authority of a court [or quasi-judicial tribunal] to hear, try, and decide a case." "Indeed, a judgment rendered without such power and authority is void thereby creating no rights and imposing no duties on the parties. As a consequence, a void judgment may be attacked anytime."
The aspects of jurisdiction are then enumerated. "[T]he concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res… Additionally, a court must also acquire jurisdiction over the remedy." And for criminal cases specifically: "there are three (3) important requisites… (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused."
Subject-matter jurisdiction is set out as the non-waivable pole. It "is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court — it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." In criminal cases it "is vested by law upon a particular court and may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense," and "cannot be conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise." It is "determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information and not by the result of proof" — allegations of "ultimate facts constituting elements of the crime charged," which "apprise[] the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation."
The prosecutor's authority is then shown to be unrelated to that pole. "[T]he authority of the officer in filing an Information has nothing to do with the ultimate facts which describe the charges against the accused… The nature and cause of the accusation remains the same with or without such required authority." Indeed, existing rules let the prosecution amend a fatally defective Information to align it with the accusation, "[a]s such, it is with more reason that the handling prosecutor shall also be afforded with the chance to first secure the necessary authority." Hence "the law conferring a court with jurisdiction over a specific offense does not cease to operate in cases where there is lack of authority on the part of the officer … filing an Information."
Jurisdiction over the person is then defined — the assigned holding. "Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It allows the court to render a decision that is binding on the accused."
And immediately contrasted with subject matter as to waivability. "However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter, the right to challenge or object to a trial court's jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived by silence or inaction before the entering of a plea during arraignment. Moreover, such right may also be waived by the accused when he or she files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person." That second sentence is Miranda vs. Tuliao's rule, carried forward and now stated as settled doctrine by the Court sitting En Banc.
The passivity of the court's power over the person is the bridge to the holding. "[T]he authority of an officer or handling prosecutor in the filing of an Information also has nothing to do with the voluntary appearance or validity of the arrest of the accused. Voluntary appearance entirely depends on the volition of the accused, while the validity of an arrest strictly depends on the apprehending officers' compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards in its execution. Here, the trial court's power to make binding pronouncements concerning and affecting the person of the accused is merely passive and is solely hinged on the conduct of either the accused or the arresting officers — not on the authority of the handling prosecutor."
The a fortiori step completes the argument. "Moreover, if a serious ground such as jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived, so can the authority of the handling prosecutor which does not have any constitutional underpinning. Therefore, a handling prosecutor's lack of prior authority or approval … may be waived by the accused if not raised as a ground in a motion to quash before entering a plea."
Due process is held to run in both directions, which defeats the double-jeopardy objection. "[B]oth the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due process… A denial of such guarantee against any of the parties of the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."
The prior line of authority is expressly abandoned, and a workable substitute rule supplied. "Henceforth, all previous doctrines … holding that the lack of signature and approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned. It is sufficient … that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending for the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 and is adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112."

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

The three requisites in criminal cases: jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the territory where the offence was committed, and over the person of the accused.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is fixed by the allegations. It is "determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information and not by the result of proof."

Due process is bilateral. A dismissal or acquittal "tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy."

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The waiver rule for the person has an exception, and this Decision restates it rather than removing it. The clause "except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person" preserves Miranda vs. Tuliao's special appearance. An accused who moves to quash the warrant of arrest, or to quash the complaint for want of jurisdiction over his person, still does not thereby submit.
What was abandoned is precise. Only the doctrine that a missing prosecutorial signature/approval is jurisdictional. The requirement itself survives — Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 remains a ground for a motion to quash — it is simply waivable and must be raised before plea.
The abandonment is prospective in expression ("Henceforth") and En Banc in authority. Division cases and pre-2020 reviewers stating that such an Information is void for want of jurisdiction are superseded. Note the date: November 10, 2020.
This is not authority that a court may proceed against someone never arrested and never appearing. The requisite still has to be satisfied; what is waivable is the objection to it, not the requisite in the abstract.
The double-jeopardy holding is narrow. A dismissal amounting to acquittal bars re-prosecution unless it is void for grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner here had been through trial to submission, so the point was live and had to be met.
Verbatim caveats in the reported text. The petitioner's name appears variously as "Gina A. Villa Gomez," "Gina Villa Gomes y Andayan" and "Gina Villa Gomez y Anduyan" in the quoted OCP resolutions; and one quoted resolution renders the code as "THE REVIDED PENAL CODE." These are reporting artefacts.
Two Concurring Opinions were filed (Perlas-Bernabe, J. and Delos Santos, J.); the ponencia is the controlling text.

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Separate Opinions

Two Concurring Opinions were filed: by Justice Perlas-Bernabe and by Justice Delos Santos. The Decision was penned by Justice Gesmundo for the Court sitting En Banc.