Jimenez v. Sorongon

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

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Case DigestWeek 2 - Jurisdiction

Jimenez v. Sorongon

G.R. No. 178607 · December 5, 2012 · Second Division

IV.c — Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Petitioner: Dante La. Jimenez, in his capacity as President and representative of Unlad Shipping & Management CorporationRespondent: Hon. Edwin Sorongon (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza and Markos Avgoustis

Gist

On the assigned subtopic the holding is compact and unqualified: "by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail." That disposes of Jimenez's repeated objection that a fugitive has no standing to seek relief. The Decision's other half holds that Jimenez himself had no personality to assail the dismissal, because "the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause," and "[t]his involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG."

Core Doctrine

"As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court." The submission is worked by the act of asking, not by the accused's physical situation: "custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail." An accused who has never been arrested — even one the adverse party calls a fugitive — therefore stands before the court as a party the moment he moves for relief on the merits, and the court may act on his motion. The corollary, which the same Decision supplies from the other side, is that the People remains the real party in interest in the criminal aspect of every criminal case, so that the private complainant cannot appeal a dismissal that goes to the criminal aspect; only the OSG may.

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/dec2012/gr_178607_2012.html

ℹ️ Two holdings; the assigned one is the second

The Decision has two captioned parts. The first — "The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case" — is the case's own dominant issue and the reason it is usually cited. The second — "Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction" — is the assigned Topic, and is digested here as the MAIN issue. The coverage sheet's gist for this row describes only the standing holding, so it does not track the subtopic the row is filed under.

⚠️ Alamil was called a fugitive, and it made no difference

The petitioner's recurring objection was that respondent Alamil, "being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief." The Court's answer is the doctrinal point: she had submitted to the court's jurisdiction by her own motions, and "custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail." Being at large did not disqualify her from being heard on anything but bail.

Facts

Dante La. Jimenez is president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency; respondents Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza and Markos Avgoustis are "some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency." The parties are business competitors — a fact that later defeats his claim to be an offended party.
On August 19, 2003 Jimenez filed a complaint-affidavit for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment, alleging that respondents "falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI's articles of incorporation to secure a license … from the POEA."
An information was filed with the RTC of Mandaluyong City (Crim. Case No. MC04-8514). In a December 14, 2004 resolution the City Prosecutor reconsidered and moved to withdraw it; on August 1, 2005 the RTC denied the motion, found probable cause, and ordered warrants of arrest.
On September 26, 2005 respondent Alamil — who had never been arrested — filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants. This is the first of the motions held to have submitted her person. Jimenez opposed, "contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief," and repeated the objection when she moved for reconsideration and for the judge's inhibition.
Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited and the case was re-raffled to Judge Edwin D. Sorongon. In its March 8, 2006 order the RTC granted Alamil's motion for reconsideration, treated her motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, found no evidence of false information given to the POEA, held that "respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief," dismissed the case and set aside the warrants.
Jimenez's motion for reconsideration was expunged for want of the public prosecutor's conformity (May 10, 2006), and his notice of appeal denied and expunged for want of the Solicitor General's conformity (August 7, 2006).
On November 23, 2006 the Court of Appeals dismissed his Rule 65 petition outright for lack of legal personality, only the OSG being able to represent the People, and Jimenez being "not … a victim of the crime charged … but a mere competitor in their recruitment business." Decided December 5, 2012.

Issue

Whether respondent Alamil, never arrested and branded a fugitive, submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing motions seeking the dismissal of the criminal case — and whether custody of the law was a precondition to the court's acting on them.

Secondary issue. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright the petitioner's Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file it on behalf of the People.

Ruling

Main issue. YES, she voluntarily submitted. "As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail."

Secondary issue. NO reversible error. "The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine." Jimenez "has no legal personality … since the main issue raised … involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest … but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People."

Ancillary. The exception exists but does not apply: "[w]hile there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply."

"WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED."

Reproduced exactly as published; "CoUJt" and "CAG. R." are typographical errors for "Court" and "CA-G.R."

Ratio

The general rule is stated without qualification: seeking affirmative relief "constitutes voluntary appearance."
Applied to the specific pleadings — her motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer the warrants, her motion for reconsideration, and her motion for inhibition — all reliefs on the merits or the conduct of the case, none of them a challenge to the court's power over her person.
The custody objection is answered in one sentence: "Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail." That answers the repeated contention that a fugitive "had no standing to seek any relief."
On standing, the Court starts from the real-party-in-interest rule: one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment"; "[i]nterest means material interest … as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved"; and "[b]y real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy."
The rule is located in criminal procedure — "[a]ll criminal actions … shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor" — and in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, under which the OSG shall "Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings."
The disqualifying feature of the appeal is identified precisely: it raised the criminal aspect, not a pecuniary interest. The dividing line is the aspect appealed from, not the label the appellant gives himself: a private complainant may still appeal the civil aspect.

Doctrine

Voluntary appearance by seeking affirmative relief: "one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court… Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance."
Custody is required only for bail: "[c]ustody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail."
The People is the real party in interest in the criminal aspect, and "only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court"; the right to prosecute "pertains exclusively to the People."
Real party in interest, defined: one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment," with a "present substantial interest."
The narrow exception: in "rare occasions … as when there is a denial of due process," the offended party may pursue the criminal action himself.

Limits.

The rule stated here is the general rule, and it has an exception this Decision does not mention.
Miranda v. Tuliao holds that pleadings "whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court" — a motion to quash a warrant of arrest, or one attacking jurisdiction over the person — produce only a special appearance.
Alamil's motions attacked probable cause, which is relief on the merits. Read the two together, or the rule here will be overstated.
"Custody of the law is not required" is not "custody is never required" — the clause carries its own carve-out for bail.
The standing holding is confined to the criminal aspect: a private offended party retains personality as to the civil aspect, and the due-process exception remains available.
Note too that Jimenez was not the offended party in any event, being "a mere competitor." And the conformity requirements are distinct: the public prosecutor's for the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General's for the notice of appeal.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Classification: DIRECT. Dante Jimenez, president of a manning agency, charged the incorporators of a rival agency with syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment, alleging they had falsely stated their stockholdings to obtain a POEA licence. An information was filed, the City Prosecutor later moved to withdraw it, the RTC refused and ordered warrants of arrest — and then respondent Carmen Alamil, who had never been arrested, filed a succession of motions culminating in the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. Jimenez appealed and then took a Rule 65 petition to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it outright for want of legal personality. The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed.

Facts

The petitioner, Dante La. Jimenez, is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency. Respondents Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza and Markos Avgoustis "are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency." The parties are business competitors — a fact that later defeats the petitioner's claim to be an offended party.
On August 19, 2003, Jimenez filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment, alleging "that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI's articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)."
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed a joint counter-affidavit denying the allegations. Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information; the City Prosecutor approved the recommendation and filed the criminal information with the RTC of Mandaluyong City, docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212, presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
In a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. Jimenez opposed; Antzoulatos and Gaza commented on the opposition.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the motion to withdraw, finding probable cause to hold the respondents for trial, and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest.
On August 26, 2005, Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest. In a September 2, 2005 order, the RTC denied it, "reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not."
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest. This is the first of the motions that will be held to have submitted her person.
On September 29, 2005, Jimenez filed an opposition with motion to expunge, "contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief."
In a September 30, 2005 order, the RTC denied Alamil's motion for being moot and academic, having already found probable cause.
On October 10, 2005, Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial. On October 25, 2005, Jimenez filed an opposition with motion to expunge, again urging that Alamil had no standing.
In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself and did not resolve the pending motions. The case was re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted Alamil's motion for reconsideration. It treated her motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, and found "(1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief." It dismissed the case and set aside the warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, Jimenez moved for reconsideration. On April 26, 2006, Alamil moved to expunge the motion "for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutor's conformity."
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied Jimenez's motion for reconsideration and ordered it expunged for want of the public prosecutor's conformity.
On May 19, 2006, Jimenez filed a notice of appeal. On May 30, 2006, Alamil moved to expunge it, "since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case." On June 27, 2006, Jimenez commented, "claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal."
In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the notice of appeal for want of the Solicitor General's conformity and ordered it expunged.
On October 18, 2006, Jimenez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC's March 8, May 10 and August 7, 2006 orders, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96584.
In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed the petition outright for lack of legal personality to file on behalf of the People, noting that only the OSG may represent the People under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, and that Jimenez "was not the real party in interest … him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business." On June 28, 2007 it denied reconsideration.
On December 5, 2012, the Second Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Brion, denying the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Dante La. Jimenez).

Jimenez advanced two propositions, and lost on both. First, that "he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents' illegal acts" — his theory being that the respondents' fraudulent formation of TMSI had injured him and his company. Second, and pressed repeatedly below in his oppositions of September 29 and October 25, 2005, that "respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice." The premise of that objection is the rule the Court of Appeals had applied in Miranda vs. Tuliao and that this Court had already corrected there: that an accused not in the custody of the law may not invoke the processes of the court.

B. Respondents (Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis).

The respondents "submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case." Alamil, for her part, had moved below to expunge both Jimenez's motion for reconsideration and his notice of appeal precisely for want of the public prosecutor's and the Solicitor General's conformity — the same objection in procedural form.

C. Common Ground.

It was not disputed that Alamil had never been arrested and was not in the custody of the law at any point when she filed her motions; nor that she had filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause, a motion for reconsideration, and a motion for the judge's inhibition. Neither was it disputed that the public prosecutor did not join in Jimenez's motion for reconsideration or in his notice of appeal, or that the OSG did not authorise the Rule 65 petition. The parties' status as competing manning agencies is likewise a matter of record and was the basis of the CA's real-party-in-interest ruling.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

Whether respondent Alamil, who had never been arrested and whom the petitioner branded a fugitive from justice, submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing motions seeking the dismissal of the criminal case — and whether custody of the law was a precondition to the court's acting on those motions.

B. Secondary Issues.

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner's Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file it on behalf of the People of the Philippines — the issue as the Court itself framed it.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Whether a private complainant may ever pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, and whether this case falls within that exception.

Ruling

Main Issue: YES, Alamil voluntarily submitted. Under the Decision's own sub-heading, "Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction": "As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail."

Secondary Issue: NO reversible error. "The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine." Jimenez "has no legal personality to assail the dismissal … since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG."

Ancillary Issue: the exception exists but does not apply. "While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case."

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Reproduced exactly as published; "CoUJt" and "CAG. R." are typographical errors in the reported text for "Court" and "CA-G.R."

Ratio

On the assigned subtopic the Court states the general rule without qualification. "As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court."
It is applied to the specific pleadings Alamil filed. "Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC." Those motions were her motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer the warrants, her motion for reconsideration, and her motion for the judge's inhibition — all reliefs on the merits or the conduct of the case, none of them a challenge to the court's power over her person.
The custody objection is answered in one sentence. "Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail." That is the answer to Jimenez's repeated contention that a fugitive from justice "had no standing to seek any relief" — the trial court had already so held in its March 8, 2006 order, finding "that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief," and this Court affirms it.
On the dominant issue, the Court starts from the real-party-in-interest rule. "[E]very action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,] who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." "Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved." "By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest." "When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible."
The rule is then located in criminal procedure and in the Administrative Code. "Procedural law basically mandates that '[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.'" And on appeal, "the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code," which provides that the OSG shall "Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings."
The conclusion follows, with the controlling-doctrine label attached. "The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine."
The exception is acknowledged and then closed off on the facts. "While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case."
The disqualifying feature of Jimenez's appeal is identified precisely. "[T]he main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG." The dividing line is the aspect appealed from, not the label the appellant gives himself: a private complainant may still appeal the civil aspect.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

Voluntary appearance by seeking affirmative relief. "As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court."

Custody is required only for bail. "Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail."

The People is the real party in interest in the criminal aspect, and "only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court." A private complainant appealing the criminal aspect — the existence of probable cause, the reinstatement of the action — has no legal personality; the right to prosecute "pertains exclusively to the People."

Real party in interest, defined. One "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit"; the interest must be "material interest … as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved," and "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest."

The narrow exception. In "rare occasions … as when there is a denial of due process," the offended party may pursue the criminal action on his own behalf.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The rule stated here is the general rule, and it has an exception this Decision does not mention. Miranda vs. Tuliao holds that pleadings "whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court" — a motion to quash a warrant of arrest, or a motion to quash a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person — produce only a special appearance. Alamil's motions were not of that kind: they attacked probable cause, which is relief on the merits. Read the two cases together, or the general rule here will be overstated.
"Custody of the law is not required" is not "custody is never required." The clause carries its own carve-out: other than an application for bail. An accused at large who wants provisional liberty must still surrender.
The standing holding is confined to the criminal aspect. The Court's reasoning turns on the fact that Jimenez sought reinstatement of the prosecution rather than protection of a pecuniary interest. A private offended party retains personality as to the civil aspect, and the due-process exception remains available.
Jimenez was not the offended party in any event. The CA had found him "not … a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business" — a finding this Court did not disturb. The standing ruling would therefore have followed even had he framed his appeal differently.
The conformity requirements are distinct and both were fatal below. The public prosecutor's conformity was wanting for the motion for reconsideration; the Solicitor General's was wanting for the notice of appeal. They are different officers at different stages.
Verbatim caveat: the published fallo contains the typographical errors "CoUJt of Appeals" and "CAG. R. SP No. 96584."

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).

Consistent with the DIRECT classification, the Court gives the assigned requisite its own captioned section and decides it in terms: filing pleadings that seek affirmative relief is voluntary appearance, and custody of the law is not required for anything but bail. For the subtopic, the value of the case is that it shows the rule doing real work against an accused at large — the objection "she is a fugitive from justice," pressed twice below, is answered not by excusing her absence but by pointing out that she had already made herself a party by asking the court for something.

Placed beside the week's other IV.c cases, the three form a sequence. Antiporda vs. Garchitorena (1999) establishes that a motion to quash is voluntary submission and enumerates the Arula requisites. Miranda vs. Tuliao (2006) separates custody of the law from jurisdiction over the person, and carves out the special appearance. Jimenez (2012) is the settled modern restatement of the general rule together with Miranda's custody proposition, applied without further qualification. The Decision's other half also connects to the week's Sandiganbayan and prosecution-control material: the People is the real party in interest, and the criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

Separate Opinions

None. The Decision was penned by Justice Brion for the Second Division, with Acting Chief Justice Carpio (Chairperson), Justice Del Castillo and Justice Perez among those concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The general rule, stated without qualification.

"Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense" — the first of the two ways jurisdiction over the person is acquired.

The second is voluntary appearance, and the Court states it flatly: "As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court."

Note that the submission is a consequence, not an intention. It does not matter that the pleading also protests jurisdiction; what matters is that it asks the court to act.

Implementing Rules

Section 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 114 (Bail)

An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)

Why it is cited here

The only relief that does not submit.

"An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation … provided that he raises them before entering his plea."

This is the exception to the general rule, and it is deliberately confined to relief directed at the custody and the process by which it was obtained.

Miranda v. Tuliao generalises it: relief aimed at the case submits; relief aimed at the custody does not. A motion to quash a warrant of arrest therefore requires neither custody nor jurisdiction over the person.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

The paradigm of affirmative relief that submits.

A motion to quash raises grounds going to the information and the court's authority — the facts charged, jurisdiction over the offense, double jeopardy.

It is the classic example of a pleading seeking affirmative relief, which is why Antiporda holds that filing one is "tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority" — even where the motion itself argues the court has none.

The irony is the lesson: objecting to jurisdiction over the person is one of the few things you cannot do by motion in the case, because the motion itself confers what it disputes.

An accused who genuinely wants to preserve the objection must raise it specially, and before seeking anything else.

Related notes:

Miranda v. Tuliao — the source of the custody-of-the-law proposition applied here, and of the special-appearance exception this Decision does not restate.
Antiporda v. Garchitorena — the earlier statement of the same general rule, with the three Arula requisites.
Gomez v. People — jurisdiction over the person of an accused who has not been arrested.
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, 1987 Administrative Code — the OSG as appellate counsel of the People.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/dec2012/gr_178607_2012.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Definition of arrest

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 113 (Arrest)

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

Why it is cited here

The general rule, stated without qualification.

Note that the submission is a consequence, not an intention. It does not matter that the pleading also protests jurisdiction; what matters is that it asks the court to act.

Full entry below ↓

Section 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 114 (Bail)

Why it is cited here

The only relief that does not submit.

This is the exception to the general rule, and it is deliberately confined to relief directed at the custody and the process by which it was obtained.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Why it is cited here

The paradigm of affirmative relief that submits.

A motion to quash raises grounds going to the information and the court's authority — the facts charged, jurisdiction over the offense, double jeopardy.

The irony is the lesson: objecting to jurisdiction over the person is one of the few things you cannot do by motion in the case, because the motion itself confers what it disputes.

An accused who genuinely wants to preserve the objection must raise it specially, and before seeking anything else.

Full entry below ↓

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic

IV. Requisites for Valid Exercise of Jurisdiction — c. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/dec2012/gr_178607_2012.html

ℹ️ Two holdings; the assigned one is the second

⚠️ Alamil was called a fugitive, and it made no difference

Facts

Dante La. Jimenez is president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency; respondents Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza and Markos Avgoustis are "some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency." The parties are business competitors — a fact that later defeats his claim to be an offended party.
On August 19, 2003 Jimenez filed a complaint-affidavit for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment, alleging that respondents "falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI's articles of incorporation to secure a license … from the POEA."
An information was filed with the RTC of Mandaluyong City (Crim. Case No. MC04-8514). In a December 14, 2004 resolution the City Prosecutor reconsidered and moved to withdraw it; on August 1, 2005 the RTC denied the motion, found probable cause, and ordered warrants of arrest.
On September 26, 2005 respondent Alamil — who had never been arrested — filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants. This is the first of the motions held to have submitted her person. Jimenez opposed, "contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief," and repeated the objection when she moved for reconsideration and for the judge's inhibition.
Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited and the case was re-raffled to Judge Edwin D. Sorongon. In its March 8, 2006 order the RTC granted Alamil's motion for reconsideration, treated her motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, found no evidence of false information given to the POEA, held that "respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief," dismissed the case and set aside the warrants.
Jimenez's motion for reconsideration was expunged for want of the public prosecutor's conformity (May 10, 2006), and his notice of appeal denied and expunged for want of the Solicitor General's conformity (August 7, 2006).
On November 23, 2006 the Court of Appeals dismissed his Rule 65 petition outright for lack of legal personality, only the OSG being able to represent the People, and Jimenez being "not … a victim of the crime charged … but a mere competitor in their recruitment business." Decided December 5, 2012.

Issue

Secondary issue. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright the petitioner's Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file it on behalf of the People.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED."

Reproduced exactly as published; "CoUJt" and "CAG. R." are typographical errors for "Court" and "CA-G.R."

Ratio

The general rule is stated without qualification: seeking affirmative relief "constitutes voluntary appearance."
Applied to the specific pleadings — her motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer the warrants, her motion for reconsideration, and her motion for inhibition — all reliefs on the merits or the conduct of the case, none of them a challenge to the court's power over her person.
The custody objection is answered in one sentence: "Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail." That answers the repeated contention that a fugitive "had no standing to seek any relief."
On standing, the Court starts from the real-party-in-interest rule: one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment"; "[i]nterest means material interest … as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved"; and "[b]y real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy."
The rule is located in criminal procedure — "[a]ll criminal actions … shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor" — and in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, under which the OSG shall "Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings."
The disqualifying feature of the appeal is identified precisely: it raised the criminal aspect, not a pecuniary interest. The dividing line is the aspect appealed from, not the label the appellant gives himself: a private complainant may still appeal the civil aspect.

Doctrine

Voluntary appearance by seeking affirmative relief: "one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court… Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance."
Custody is required only for bail: "[c]ustody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail."
The People is the real party in interest in the criminal aspect, and "only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court"; the right to prosecute "pertains exclusively to the People."
Real party in interest, defined: one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment," with a "present substantial interest."
The narrow exception: in "rare occasions … as when there is a denial of due process," the offended party may pursue the criminal action himself.

Limits.

The rule stated here is the general rule, and it has an exception this Decision does not mention.
Miranda v. Tuliao holds that pleadings "whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court" — a motion to quash a warrant of arrest, or one attacking jurisdiction over the person — produce only a special appearance.
Alamil's motions attacked probable cause, which is relief on the merits. Read the two together, or the rule here will be overstated.
"Custody of the law is not required" is not "custody is never required" — the clause carries its own carve-out for bail.
The standing holding is confined to the criminal aspect: a private offended party retains personality as to the civil aspect, and the due-process exception remains available.
Note too that Jimenez was not the offended party in any event, being "a mere competitor." And the conformity requirements are distinct: the public prosecutor's for the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General's for the notice of appeal.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

The petitioner, Dante La. Jimenez, is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency. Respondents Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza and Markos Avgoustis "are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency." The parties are business competitors — a fact that later defeats the petitioner's claim to be an offended party.
On August 19, 2003, Jimenez filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment, alleging "that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI's articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)."
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed a joint counter-affidavit denying the allegations. Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information; the City Prosecutor approved the recommendation and filed the criminal information with the RTC of Mandaluyong City, docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212, presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
In a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. Jimenez opposed; Antzoulatos and Gaza commented on the opposition.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the motion to withdraw, finding probable cause to hold the respondents for trial, and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest.
On August 26, 2005, Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest. In a September 2, 2005 order, the RTC denied it, "reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not."
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest. This is the first of the motions that will be held to have submitted her person.
On September 29, 2005, Jimenez filed an opposition with motion to expunge, "contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief."
In a September 30, 2005 order, the RTC denied Alamil's motion for being moot and academic, having already found probable cause.
On October 10, 2005, Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial. On October 25, 2005, Jimenez filed an opposition with motion to expunge, again urging that Alamil had no standing.
In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself and did not resolve the pending motions. The case was re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted Alamil's motion for reconsideration. It treated her motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, and found "(1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief." It dismissed the case and set aside the warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, Jimenez moved for reconsideration. On April 26, 2006, Alamil moved to expunge the motion "for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutor's conformity."
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied Jimenez's motion for reconsideration and ordered it expunged for want of the public prosecutor's conformity.
On May 19, 2006, Jimenez filed a notice of appeal. On May 30, 2006, Alamil moved to expunge it, "since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case." On June 27, 2006, Jimenez commented, "claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal."
In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the notice of appeal for want of the Solicitor General's conformity and ordered it expunged.
On October 18, 2006, Jimenez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC's March 8, May 10 and August 7, 2006 orders, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96584.
In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed the petition outright for lack of legal personality to file on behalf of the People, noting that only the OSG may represent the People under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, and that Jimenez "was not the real party in interest … him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business." On June 28, 2007 it denied reconsideration.
On December 5, 2012, the Second Division promulgated this Decision through Justice Brion, denying the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Dante La. Jimenez).

B. Respondents (Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis).

C. Common Ground.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered).

B. Secondary Issues.

C. Ancillary/Incidental Issues.

Whether a private complainant may ever pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, and whether this case falls within that exception.

Ruling

Dispositive portion (verbatim):

"WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Reproduced exactly as published; "CoUJt" and "CAG. R." are typographical errors in the reported text for "Court" and "CA-G.R."

Ratio

On the assigned subtopic the Court states the general rule without qualification. "As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court."
It is applied to the specific pleadings Alamil filed. "Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC." Those motions were her motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer the warrants, her motion for reconsideration, and her motion for the judge's inhibition — all reliefs on the merits or the conduct of the case, none of them a challenge to the court's power over her person.
The custody objection is answered in one sentence. "Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail." That is the answer to Jimenez's repeated contention that a fugitive from justice "had no standing to seek any relief" — the trial court had already so held in its March 8, 2006 order, finding "that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief," and this Court affirms it.
On the dominant issue, the Court starts from the real-party-in-interest rule. "[E]very action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,] who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." "Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved." "By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest." "When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible."
The rule is then located in criminal procedure and in the Administrative Code. "Procedural law basically mandates that '[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.'" And on appeal, "the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code," which provides that the OSG shall "Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings."
The conclusion follows, with the controlling-doctrine label attached. "The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine."
The exception is acknowledged and then closed off on the facts. "While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case."
The disqualifying feature of Jimenez's appeal is identified precisely. "[T]he main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG." The dividing line is the aspect appealed from, not the label the appellant gives himself: a private complainant may still appeal the civil aspect.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules/Principles.

Custody is required only for bail. "Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail."

The narrow exception. In "rare occasions … as when there is a denial of due process," the offended party may pursue the criminal action on his own behalf.

C. Distinctions/Limitations/Qualifications.

The rule stated here is the general rule, and it has an exception this Decision does not mention. Miranda vs. Tuliao holds that pleadings "whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court" — a motion to quash a warrant of arrest, or a motion to quash a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person — produce only a special appearance. Alamil's motions were not of that kind: they attacked probable cause, which is relief on the merits. Read the two cases together, or the general rule here will be overstated.
"Custody of the law is not required" is not "custody is never required." The clause carries its own carve-out: other than an application for bail. An accused at large who wants provisional liberty must still surrender.
The standing holding is confined to the criminal aspect. The Court's reasoning turns on the fact that Jimenez sought reinstatement of the prosecution rather than protection of a pecuniary interest. A private offended party retains personality as to the civil aspect, and the due-process exception remains available.
Jimenez was not the offended party in any event. The CA had found him "not … a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business" — a finding this Court did not disturb. The standing ruling would therefore have followed even had he framed his appeal differently.
The conformity requirements are distinct and both were fatal below. The public prosecutor's conformity was wanting for the motion for reconsideration; the Solicitor General's was wanting for the notice of appeal. They are different officers at different stages.
Verbatim caveat: the published fallo contains the typographical errors "CoUJt of Appeals" and "CAG. R. SP No. 96584."

D. Topic/Subtopic Integration (Mandatory).