Facts

• On or about January 5, 1956, in Piat, Cagayan, Maximino Valdepeñas "by means of force … abduct[ed] the complaining witness Ester Ulsano, a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age," detaining her in a vacant house where he had "sexual intercourse with [her] against her will."
• On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat a complaint duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging forcible abduction with rape (Crim. Case No. 195).
• After preliminary investigation — the second stage of which Valdepeñas waived — probable cause was found and the case forwarded to the CFI of Cagayan, where the information under Articles 342 and 335 was filed on May 31, 1956 (Crim. Case No. 1539). The waiver is the first of many steps by which he engaged the courts' processes.
• On December 3, 1956 the CFI convicted him as charged, imposing ten (10) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor to eighteen (18) years of reclusión temporal, with indemnity of P500.00 and the duty to acknowledge and support any offspring.
• On May 21, 1958 the Court of Appeals modified the judgment to abduction with consent, imposing three (3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prisión correccional and P1,000 indemnity.
• On his motion, the Court of Appeals set aside that decision on September 20, 1958 and remanded for further evidence on the complainant's age. After retrial the CFI reiterated the finding and the conviction on June 14, 1960, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on June 11, 1962.
• On July 2, 1962 — "for the first time," six years and five proceedings later — he moved for reconsideration on the ground that "the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over the subject matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with consent," no complaint having been filed for that crime.
• The motion was denied November 23, 1962; he appealed by certiorari. Decided En Banc, April 30, 1966 (Concepcion, J.).

Issue

Ruling

"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepe'as. It is so ordered."

Ratio

• The rule for the person limb is stated in one sentence and sourced to Banco Español v. Palanca, Infante v. Toledo and Nilo v. Romero: apprehension or submission.
• The Court then notes what the petitioner never even alleged — that he had not been apprehended or had not submitted. The requisite was satisfied in fact; waiver is an additional and independent ground.
• Waiver is established by tracing the procedural history as a course of conduct — three courts, five proceedings, six years, not one objection.
• The Court goes further than waiver by silence: his conduct was affirmative. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation, appealed twice, and successfully moved for reconsideration and a new trial — each an invocation of the very authority he later denied.
• The subject-matter limb is then addressed and the source rule stated: conferred only by law, and not by the parties.
• Article 344§ is quoted and assigned its true function — a condition precedent to prosecution, not a grant of jurisdiction, because jurisdiction comes from the Judiciary Act, the Revised Penal Code dealing "primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits."
• The purpose of the requirement (Samilin) is identified and then shown to be served on these facts, which also answers the lesser-offence objection: "the assent of Ester Ulsano and her mother to undergo the scandal of a public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to face the scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent."

Doctrine

• How jurisdiction over the person is acquired: "upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court."
• Waiver: an accused who litigates through successive courts over years without questioning their authority "is deemed … to have waived whatever objection he might have had," and filing motions implies "not merely a submission … but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person."
• Subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred only by law and may not be conferred … by the parties involved in the offense.
• The Article 344§ complaint is a condition precedent, not a jurisdictional requirement — jurisdiction "is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code."
• Included offences: conviction of abduction with consent may follow an information for forcible abduction, and assent to a public trial for the graver offence carries assent as to the lesser.
• Virginity under Article 343 is not material virginity but a virtuous woman of good reputation, the essence being "the outrage to the family."

• The two limbs behave in opposite ways, and this case states both — that is why it earns its place. Jurisdiction over the person is a personal defense, waivable by silence and conduct; over the subject matter it is conferred by law and cannot be supplied by the parties. Reason from one to the other and the answer comes out backwards.
• What was waived was the objection, not the requisite — the Court found he had in fact been apprehended and had submitted.
• The condition-precedent holding is confined to what Article 344§ does: a private crime still cannot be prosecuted without a complaint; the point is only that its absence is not a defect of jurisdiction, so it is waivable and cannot be raised for the first time after judgment.
• The provision has since been overtaken in part — rape was reclassified as a crime against persons by R.A. No. 8353 (1997) and is prosecuted de oficio; Section 5, Rule 110 now carries the complaint requirement for the remaining private crimes. The doctrine is unaffected.
• Sensibilities of the era: the reasoning on virginity, patria potestas and "the outrage to the family" is 1966 doctrine on crimes against chastity, reproduced because it is the Court's own, not as a statement of current values.
• Caption: the coverage sheet spells it "Valdapeñas"; the Decision captions Valdepeñas — cite Valdepeñas v. People, G.R. No. L-20687, April 30, 1966.
• Verbatim caveat: lawphil renders ñ as an apostrophe throughout and prints "in this lease" for case.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

1. On or about January 5, 1956, in the Municipality of Piat, Province of Cagayan, the accused Maximino Valdepeñas, "by means of force, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct the complaining witness Ester Ulsano, a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age, taking her away against her will and with lewd design, and detaining her in a vacant house" where he did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with [her] against her will.
2. On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan a criminal complaint, duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging Valdepeñas with forcible abduction with rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 195.
3. After due preliminary investigation — the second stage of which was waived by Valdepeñas — the justice of the peace found probable cause. Note this waiver: it is the first of many steps by which he engaged the courts' processes.
4. On May 31, 1956, the complaint was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, where the corresponding information for forcible abduction with rape under Articles 342 and 335 was filed, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1539.
5. On December 3, 1956, the Court of First Instance found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor to eighteen (18) years of reclusión temporal, with accessory penalties, to indemnify the offended party P500.00, to acknowledge and support the offspring, if any, and to pay costs.
6. On May 21, 1958, on his appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 19448-R) modified the judgment, convicting him instead of abduction with consent and imposing an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prisión correccional, with accessory penalties, to indemnify Ester Ulsano P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.
7. Valdepeñas moved for reconsideration and new trial, contesting the Court of Appeals' finding that the complainant was below 18 years of age at the time. By resolution dated September 20, 1958, the Court of Appeals granted the motion, set aside its decision, and remanded the case to the court a quo for reception of additional evidence on that issue.
8. After a retrial, the Court of First Instance, by decision dated June 13, 1960 and promulgated June 14, 1960, reiterated the age finding and the conviction for abduction with consent, with the same penalty.
9. Valdepeñas appealed again to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 01306-CR), which on June 11, 1962 affirmed, with costs.
10. On July 2, 1962, he filed a motion for reconsideration based, "for the first time," on the ground that "the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over the subject matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with consent." Six years and three courts after he was first brought to the bar of justice.
11. By resolution dated November 23, 1962, the Court of Appeals denied the motion, and Valdepeñas interposed the present appeal by certiorari.
12. On April 30, 1966, the Court En Banc promulgated this Decision through Justice Concepcion, affirming.

Arguments of the Parties

Issue

Ruling

"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepe'as. It is so ordered."

Ratio

1. The Court states the rule for the person limb in one sentence. "Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court" (Banco Español v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Infante v. Toledo, 44 Phil. 834; Nilo v. Romero, L-15195, March 29, 1961).
2. It then finds the requisite plainly satisfied, and notes what the petitioner never even alleged. "In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court."
3. Waiver is established by tracing the procedural history as a course of conduct. "Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice of the peace court of Piat, then before the court of first instance of Cagayan, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back before said court of first instance, and then, again, before the Court of Appeals, never, within the period of six (6) years that had transpired until the Court of Appeals rendered its last decision, had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3) courts over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction."
4. The Court goes further than mere waiver by silence — his conduct was affirmative. "What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by him before said courts — particularly the motions therein filed by him — implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person." He had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation, appealed twice, and successfully moved for reconsideration and a new trial — each an invocation of the very authority he later denied.
5. The subject-matter limb is then addressed, and the source rule stated. "[I]t is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action — in this [case] the crime of abduction with consent — is and may be conferred only by law (Manila Railroad v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523; Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514); that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent."
6. Article 344§ is quoted and then assigned its true function. The third paragraph provides that "the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian…" But: "The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344§ is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties."
7. The purpose of the requirement is identified, and then shown to be served. The condition "has been imposed 'out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial'" (Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304). "In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference by filing the complaint … and going through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before several courts, for the last ten (10) years."
8. The lesser-offence objection is met by reasoning from that same purpose. "Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction, not abduction with consent; but … the latter is included in the former. Referring particularly to the spirit of said provision of Article 344§ …, we believe that the assent of Ester Ulsano and her mother to undergo the scandal of a public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to face the scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent."
9. The two allegedly missing elements are disposed of. Age: "clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is 'a minor … 17 years of age …', and, hence, over 12 and below 18." Virginity: "it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article 343 … as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation, because the essence of the offense 'is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members'" (U.S. vs. Casten; U.S. vs. Alvarez; U.S. v. Reyes). And the complaint's allegations imply "that Ester is a minor living under patria potestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin … for, as Chief Justice Moran has aptly put it, the presumption of innocence includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity."

Doctrine

• The two limbs behave in opposite ways, and this case states both — that is why it earns its place. Jurisdiction over the person is a personal defense, waivable by silence and by conduct. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be supplied by the parties. A student who reasons from one to the other will get the answer backwards.
• What was waived was the objection, not the requisite. The Court's finding is that he had in fact been apprehended and had submitted — the waiver argument is an alternative and additional ground.
• The condition-precedent holding is confined to what Article 344§ does. It does not make the complaint dispensable: a private crime still cannot be prosecuted without one. The point is only that its absence is not a defect of jurisdiction, so the consequences differ — most importantly, it can be waived and cannot be raised for the first time after judgment.
• Article 344§'s list has since been overtaken in part. Rape was reclassified as a crime against persons by R.A. No. 8353 (1997) and is now prosecuted de oficio; Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court now carries the complaint requirement for the remaining private crimes. The doctrine — that such a requirement is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite — is unaffected.
• Sensibilities of the era. The reasoning on virginity, patria potestas, and "the outrage to the family" reflects 1966 doctrine on crimes against chastity and is reproduced here because it is the Court's own; it is not offered as a statement of current values, and the substantive law on these offences has moved considerably.
• Verbatim caveat: the lawphil text renders ñ as an apostrophe throughout ("Valdepe'as"), and prints "in this lease" for case and "parties involve" for involved.

Separate Opinions