Facts

• Bernardo Gallego and Felix Agoncillo allegedly gave favorable ratings to the owners of Test Booklets Nos. 839 and 144, which the prosecution asserted constituted the giving of "unwarranted benefits" in the discharge of their official and/or administrative functions. The Information places the acts "on or about the period from May to September, 1979," the examinations having been held May 28–30, 1979.
• An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan, Criminal Case No. 2940, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ramon Deseo, et al., charging violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019§.
• The Information alleged the names of the parties, the time, place, manner of commission and designation of the offence — but did not state why the ratings amounted to "unwarranted" benefits. That omission is the whole of the sufficiency attack.
• It also alleged all three statutory phrases — "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence."
• Petitioners moved to quash, on the grounds that the facts alleged do not constitute an offence, or alternatively that the Information charges more than one offence; they also attacked Section 3(e) as unconstitutionally vague.
• On August 27, 1981 the Sandiganbayan sustained the prosecution and denied the motion to quash.
• Petitioners brought certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to this Court.
• On July 30, 1982 the Court En Banc denied the petition, sustaining both the constitutionality of Section 3(e) and the sufficiency of the Information.

Issue

Ruling

"ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, instant petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court drew the line between ultimate and evidentiary facts. Under Section 6, Rule 110§ an Information suffices if it contains the essential elements and the acts or omissions§ complained of, stated so as to reasonably apprise the accused and let him prepare an intelligent defence — and this Information "definitely states the names of the parties, the tune [time], place, manner of commission and designation of the offense."
• The core holding is one sentence: "The argument that failure in the information to state the reasons why the benefits bestowed are unwarranted renders it defective is without merit. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial."
• The pleading rule is the whole of it: "informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial." That requiring more would make the prosecution plead its evidence is the digest's gloss, not the decision's words.
• On duplicity, the Court identified what the three phrases actually are. the rule against duplicity is not offended where the phrases "merely describe the different modes by which the offense … may be committed." The gravamen of Section 3(e) is the giving of unwarranted benefits in the discharge of official functions; the three phrases "merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may be committed," so using all three in one information "does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses."
• On vagueness the Court stated no general test. It held simply that Section 3(e) "does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness," and adopted the Sandiganbayan's definition: "The word unwarranted is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized … or without justification or adequate reason." That the law therefore gives public officers fair warning is the digest's inference; the decision holds only that Section 3(e) is not unconstitutionally vague.

Doctrine

• "Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial."
• The statutory modes rule. "The phrases 'manifest partiality,' 'evident bad faith' and 'gross inexcusable negligence' merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses."
• Definition of "unwarranted": "The word unwarranted is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized … or without justification or adequate reason."
• The Section 6 checklist: names of the parties, time, place, manner of commission, designation of the offence.

• The non-duplicity rule is confined to true modes of a single crime. It reaches statutes whose different modes describe alternative means of executing a single crime; where the modes are in truth distinct crimes carrying different penalties, charging them together does offend the rule and renders the Information quashable under Section 3(f), Rule 117§. That boundary is the digest's reading — this decision states the holding, not its limit.
• The ultimate-facts rule is a pleading rule, not a proof rule — the prosecution still has to prove at trial why the benefits were unwarranted; it simply need not plead it.
• A typographical slip in the reported text: it prints "the tune, place, manner of commission" where the sense is plainly "the time." Quoted as published above.
• Read with Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, which applies the same two holdings thirty-one years later — alternative modes are not duplicitous, and ultimate facts suffice.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

1. On or about the period from May to September 1979, in Metro Manila: Bernardo Gallego and Felix Agoncillo (petitioners) — members of the Board for Marine Engine Officers and the Board for Marine Deck Officers respectively, each acting as Second Corrector — affirmed or gave favourable ratings on Test Papers Nos. 839 and 144 from the May 28–30, 1979 examinations, where one answer was a recital of the "Hail Mary" and the "Our Father" and another a long love letter. The prosecution asserted this was the giving of "unwarranted benefits" in the discharge of their official and/or administrative functions.
2. Date of filing not stated in the decision: Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo filed an Information before the Sandiganbayan against Ramon Deseo, Bernardo Gallego, Herminio Erorita and Felix Agoncillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2940, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ramon Deseo, et al.", for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019§).
3. Date not stated in the decision: Gallego and Agoncillo (petitioners) moved to quash the Information on two grounds — that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, or, in the alternative, that the Information charges more than one offense.
4. August 27, 1981: The respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution in Criminal Case No. 2940, sustaining the prosecution and denying the petitioners' Motion to Quash.
5. Date of filing not stated in the decision: Gallego and Agoncillo (petitioners) brought this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to set aside in toto the Sandiganbayan resolution promulgated August 27, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 2940, to restrain the Sandiganbayan from proceeding further, and to quash the Information.
6. July 30, 1982: The Supreme Court En Banc promulgated its Decision denying the petition, sustaining the Sandiganbayan, and upholding both the constitutionality of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019§ and the sufficiency of the Information.

Arguments of the Parties

1. Unconstitutional Vagueness of the Statute: The petitioners argued that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is null and void because it is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process by failing to give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Specifically, they asserted that the term "unwarranted" is a "highly imprecise and elastic term which has no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents."
2. Insufficiency of the Information: The petitioners contended that even if Section 3(e) is sustained as definite, the allegations of the Information are not sufficiently definite to charge an offense to which they may be required to plead because the Information merely concluded that the ratings given to particular examinees constituted "unwarranted benefits" without stating the factual reasons why the benefits bestowed were unwarranted.
3. Fatal Duplicity under Rule 110§: The petitioners asserted that the Information was duplicitous because it charged the accused with three (3) distinct offenses: (a) the giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) the giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence. Consequently, they argued that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated because they were left to guess which of the three offenses they were being prosecuted for.

1. Evidentiary Nature of "Unwarranted": The prosecution averred that there was no need to state the specific reasons why the ratings or benefits were unwarranted in the Information because these are evidentiary matters to be threshed out during trial.
2. Absence of Duplicity: The prosecution countered that the Information charges only a single offense, which is "the giving of unwarranted benefits to the owners of Test Booklets Nos. 839 and 144," while "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence are only the means of commission."

• The decision records no stipulation of facts.

Issue

• Whether or not the Information in Criminal Case No. 2940 is sufficient in form and substance under Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court to satisfy the petitioners' constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, despite its failure to state the reasons why the ratings given to the examinees constituted "unwarranted benefits."

1. Whether Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019§ is null and void for being unconstitutionally vague and violative of the due process clause.
2. Whether the Information is fatally defective on the ground of duplicity under Section 13, Rule 110§, by charging three distinct offenses in a single count through the allegation of "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross inexcusable negligence."

Ruling

1. On the MAIN ISSUE (Sufficiency under Rule 110§): YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Information is valid and sufficient. It definitely states the names of the parties, the tune [time], place, manner of commission, and designation of the offense, thereby complying with Section 6, Rule 110§. The failure to state the reasons why the benefits bestowed are unwarranted does not render the Information defective because the indictment is only required to state ultimate facts, whereas the reasons therefor are evidentiary matters that must be proved during trial.
2. On SECONDARY ISSUE 1 (Vagueness of Section 3(e)): NO. Section 3(e) does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The term "unwarranted" is not uncertain and has a well-settled definition.
3. On SECONDARY ISSUE 2 (Duplicity of the Information): NO. The Information does not charge more than one offense. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different statutory modes or means of committing the single offense penalized under Section 3(e), and alleging them all in the same Information does not charge three distinct offenses.

"ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, instant petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. The Factual Sufficiency Parameter of Rule 110§ (Ultimate Facts vs. Evidentiary Facts): The Court ruled that under Section 6 of Rule 110§, an Information is sufficient if it contains the essential elements of the offense and the acts or omissions§ complained of in a manner that reasonably apprises the accused of the charge so they can prepare an intelligent defense. The Information in this case successfully met this threshold because "the information definitely states the names of the parties, the tune [time], place, manner of commission and designation of the offense." The Court strongly rejected the petitioners' contention that the failure to explain why the examinee ratings were unwarranted made the Information fatally defective. The Court held that: "The argument that failure in the information to state the reasons why the benefits bestowed are unwarranted renders it defective is without merit. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial." Pleading the reasons why the ratings were unwarranted would violate the rules of criminal procedure by forcing the prosecution to plead its evidence within the four corners of the Information, which is a procedural error.
2. The Non-Duplicity of Charging Multiple Modes of Commission (Rule 110§, Section 13): Section 13, Rule 110§, establishes the general rule that an Information must charge only one offense. However, the Court explained that this rule is not violated when the Information alleges multiple statutory means of committing a single, unified offense. Under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019§, the gravamen of the offense is the giving of unwarranted benefits to a private party in the discharge of official, administrative, or judicial functions. The statutory phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross inexcusable negligence" do not constitute separate and distinct offenses; rather, they are merely the alternative legal means or modes of committing the same single offense. Therefore, the use of all three phrases in a single Information does not result in the fatal defect of duplicity or multiplicity of charges, and the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is fully protected.
3. Constitutionality and Definitive Clarity of "Unwarranted": The Court held that Section 3(e) is not unconstitutionally vague. To be unconstitutionally vague, a statute must be couched in terms so indefinite that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The Court found that "unwarranted" has a clear and recognized definition. Adopting the dictionary definition, the Court held that: "The word unwarranted is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized... or without justification or adequate reason." That the law thereby gives public officers fair warning is the digest's inference; the decision says only that Section 3(e) is not unconstitutionally vague.

Doctrine

1. The Ultimate Facts Rule: "Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial."
2. The Statutory Modes of Commission Rule: "The phrases 'manifest partiality,' 'evident bad faith' and 'gross inexcusable negligence' merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses."
3. Definition of "Unwarranted": "The word unwarranted is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized... or without justification or adequate reason."

• Proscription Against Duplicity: The rule that multiple statutory modes of commission do not constitute duplicity is strictly limited to statutes where the different modes describe the alternative means of executing a single crime. If the different modes actually constitute distinct, independent crimes with different penalties, charging them in a single Information would violate Section 13, Rule 110§, and render the Information quashable under Section 3(f), Rule 117§.

• DIRECT. This case is a foundational and direct authority on Rule 110§, Sections 6, 9, and 13. It establishes the procedural boundary between "ultimate facts" (the names, approximate time, place, manner of commission, and designation of the offense) and "evidentiary facts" (the supporting reasons behind the allegations). It confirms that only ultimate facts must appear on the face of the Information to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process and the right to be informed under Rule 115. Furthermore, it serves as the controlling precedent on how to charge alternative statutory modes of commission in a single count without committing duplicity under Rule 110§, Section 13.

Separate Opinions

• None. Relova, J. wrote for the En Banc; Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ. concurred. No separate concurring or dissenting opinion was filed.