Hans Case Digest Repo
Hans Case Digest Repo — Study Smart, Pass the Bar
Home/Criminal Procedure/Week 3 - Rule 110 - Prosecution of Offenses/Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency
Subject Home
16px
←Previous: People v. SandiganbayanPrevious case
Primary source ↗Next: Quimel v. PeopleNext case→

On this page

  • Gist
  • Facts
  • Issue
  • Ruling
  • Ratio
  • Doctrine
  • Provisions
Primary source ↗

Title

Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 180122 March 13, 2009

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic/Subtopic is DIRECT.

Core Doctrine

The test of an Information's sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offence charged. Only ultimate facts need be alleged: the individual participation of each co-conspirator is an evidentiary matter for the defence to meet at trial, and its omission does not make the Information defective. Where the ground of the motion to quash is that the facts charged do not constitute an offence, the court resolves it solely on the allegations of the Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted, so matters aliunde and evidentiary defences cannot be considered.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 180122)

Case DigestWeek 3 - Rule 110 - Prosecution of Offenses

Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 180122 · March 13, 2009

IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency

Petitioner: Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. (petitioner)Respondent: Sandiganbayan (First Division) (public/nominal respondent) and People of the Philippines (respondent)
Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic/Subtopic is DIRECT.

Core Doctrine

The test of an Information's sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offence charged. Only ultimate facts need be alleged: the individual participation of each co-conspirator is an evidentiary matter for the defence to meet at trial, and its omission does not make the Information defective. Where the ground of the motion to quash is that the facts charged do not constitute an offence, the court resolves it solely on the allegations of the Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted, so matters aliunde and evidentiary defences cannot be considered.

ℹ️ Assigned Topic/Subtopic
IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/mar2009/gr_180122_2009.html

Facts

  • On August 12, 1991 Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr., Department Manager of the National Housing Authority and Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), signed the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda despite not attending the actual physical inspection — allegedly because "he allegedly saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed," and he chose to rely on the field engineers and the Project Office.
  • A COA Special Audit of the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City revealed that no excavation and roadfilling works were actually undertaken by the contractor, A.C. Cruz Construction.
  • The Ombudsman filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan, Criminal Case No. 26583, charging Lazarte, Espinosa (Project Management Officer A) and Lobrido (Supervising Engineer) — in conspiracy with Arceo C. Cruz, a private individual and General Manager of the contractor — with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019§, over the payment of ₱232,628.35 in public funds for works never done.
  • A prosecution Memorandum of July 27, 2004 detailed the accused's participation; a second Memorandum of May 30, 2006 failed to specify the individual participation of co-accused Balao, Angsico and Dacalos.
  • Lazarte moved to quash, asserting that the facts charged do not constitute an offence, that the Information failed to conform to the prescribed form, and that his right to be informed was violated for want of any statement of his individual participation in the conspiracy.
  • On March 2, 2007 the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion, his claims of reliance on field reports and non-attendance being "matters of defense which he can address in the course of the trial" — but quashed the Information as to Balao, Angsico and Dacalos, whose participation the second Memorandum had not specified. The same order that saved the Information against him killed it against three others.
  • Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbayan finding the two Memoranda showed Lazarte's participation with sufficient particularity.
  • He brought Rule 65 certiorari. Decided En Banc, March 13, 2009.

Issue

Whether an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019§ is sufficient under Sections 6 and 9, Rule 110§ where it alleges the ultimate facts — public officers, acting in conspiracy with a private individual, causing payment of public funds for works never undertaken — but does not detail the specific individual participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
Secondary issues. Whether the Sandiganbayan lost jurisdiction over petitioner (below Salary Grade 27) when the charges against his high-ranking co-accused were dismissed; and whether it erred in referring to the prosecution's reinvestigation Memoranda.

Ruling

YES, the Information is valid and sufficient. It "particularly alleged the ultimate facts constituting the essential elements of the offense," and [t]he specific individual participation of each co-conspirator is an evidentiary detail that is a matter of defense to be threshed out during the trial proper.
Secondary issues. NO on both. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the Information at the time of filing, and once it attaches it is not lost by the subsequent dismissal of charges against high-ranking co-accused. And the Sandiganbayan did not use the Memoranda to cure a defective Information, but to verify that Lazarte's own role was sufficiently detailed.
"The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan."
The formal "SO ORDERED" and costs declaration are NOT IN RECORD.

Ratio

  • The Court first restated the procedural rule about the remedy. "[T]he denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari"; when such a motion is denied "the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash." Remedial measures against interlocutory orders "are frowned upon and often dismissed," to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.
  • It then applied the Section 6 checklist — name of the accused, designation of the offence by statute, the acts or omissions constituting it, name of the offended party, approximate date, and place — read with Section 9's requirement of ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged.
  • Two tests, and the decision states both. On a motion to quash for failure to charge an offence: "The fundamental test … is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not be considered." On the sufficiency of the Information itself: "The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense." The digest previously added "strictly" and a clause about the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts; neither is in this decision.
  • The ultimate-facts / evidentiary-details line does the work (Domingo v. Sandiganbayan): The specific individual acts of the petitioner (such as how he signed the report, his reliance on field engineers, and his failure to personally inspect the … site) are purely evidentiary details and matters of defense. To require them would force the premature disclosure of its evidence prior to trial.
  • The Court then verified the elements were all charged: that the three were public officers of the NHA; that they acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith in conspiracy with a private individual; and that they caused damage to the government and gave unwarranted benefits to the contractor by paying ₱232,628.35 for works never undertaken.
  • The residual-validity point closes it: the dismissal as to three co-accused did not render the Information unintelligible, since it sufficiently alleged the elements of the crime and the conspiracy between the remaining accused.

Doctrine

The sufficiency test.
  • The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged.
  • Ultimate facts, not evidentiary details: the individual participation of each co-conspirator is an evidentiary matter of defence, not an ultimate fact, and its omission does not make the Information defective.
  • The hypothetical admission rule: where the ground is that the facts charged do not constitute an offence under Section 3(a), Rule 117§, the question is "whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law." "Matters aliunde will not be considered."
  • Jurisdiction attaches at filing and is not lost by the later dismissal of charges against higher-ranking co-accused.
Limits.
  • Certiorari does lie against such a denial in one situation — "[i]f the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies"; otherwise the accused must go to trial and appeal.
  • The hypothetical-admission rule is ground-specific: it governs a motion to quash for failure to charge an offence, and does not displace the rule that facts aliunde may be shown where the ground is prescription or double jeopardy — see Garcia v. CA.
  • Note the internal contrast the same order supplies: the Sandiganbayan quashed as to Balao, Angsico and Dacalos precisely because the record did not particularise their participation, while sustaining the charge against Lazarte — so the holding is not that conspiracy allegations never need specificity, but that the Information's ultimate facts sufficed as to him.
  • And a defendant cannot quash by pleading his defences — reliance on subordinates, absence from the inspection, lack of knowledge of the falsity — all of which are subject to the evaluation of evidence during the trial proper.
  • Read with Bacasmas and Gallego: three Section 3(e) cases, one test, and the same refusal to quash graft indictments on pleading technicalities.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

The relationship of this case to the requested Topic/Subtopic is DIRECT.
The controversy arose from a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019§ against petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr., a Department Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), who allegedly signed an Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC) Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991, which falsely declared that excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City had been completed, thereby causing the government to pay public funds in the amount of ₱232,628.35 to the private contractor despite the fact that no such works were actually undertaken. Lazarte moved to quash the Information, claiming it was fatally defective and violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation because it failed to specify his individual participation in the conspiracy. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, holding that his assertions were evidentiary matters of defense proper only for trial. On a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Supreme Court En Banc dismissed the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions.
The central doctrine established in this decision dictates that under Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an Information is sufficient if it alleges the ultimate facts constituting the essential elements of the offense in ordinary and concise language. The definitive test for the sufficiency of an Information is "whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged". The specific individual participation of each co-conspirator in a conspiracy constitutes an evidentiary detail rather than an ultimate fact, and is a matter of defense that must be threshed out during the trial proper on the merits rather than detailed within the four corners of the Information.

Facts

  • August 12, 1991: Petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr., acting in his capacity as Department Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA) and Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda despite his inability to attend the actual physical inspection. Lazarte allegedly signed the report because he saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed, and he chose to rely on the reports of the field engineers and the Project Office.
  • Subsequent to August 12, 1991 (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a Special Audit on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City, which revealed that no excavation and roadfilling works were actually undertaken by the contractor, A.C. Cruz Construction.
  • Subsequent to the Special Audit (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26583, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et al.", charging petitioner Lazarte, Espinosa (Project Management Officer A), and Lobrido (Supervising Engineer) of the NHA, in conspiracy with Arceo C. Cruz (private individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction), with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019§.
  • July 27, 2004: During the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation process, the prosecution prepared a Memorandum detailing the participation of the accused.
  • May 30, 2006: The prosecution issued a second Memorandum. This memorandum failed to specify the individual participation of co-accused Robert P. Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos in the alleged conspiracy, rendering the conspiracy allegation against them inadequate.
  • Subsequent to May 30, 2006 (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Lazarte filed a Motion to Quash the Information before the Sandiganbayan, asserting that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, that the Information failed to conform to the prescribed form, and that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated.
  • March 2, 2007: The First Division of the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed Resolution denying Lazarte's Motion to Quash, holding that his claims of reliance on field reports and lack of personal attendance at the inspection were matters of defense which he can address in the course of the trial. The Sandiganbayan, however, quashed the Information as to co-accused Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos because the May 30, 2006 Memorandum failed to specify their participation to show conspiracy.
  • Subsequent to March 2, 2007 (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Lazarte filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan.
  • Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): The Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed Resolution denying Lazarte's Motion for Reconsideration, reaffirming the sufficiency of the Information and finding that the July 27, 2004 and May 30, 2006 Memoranda showed Lazarte's participation with sufficient particularity.
  • Subsequent Date (Exact Date NOT IN RECORD): Lazarte filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Supreme Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan.
  • March 13, 2009: The Supreme Court En Banc promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Certiorari and affirming the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.
  • Insufficiency of the Information: Petitioner argued that the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan failed to sufficiently aver the essential elements of the crime charged because it did not specify the individual, specific participation of each of the accused in the alleged conspiracy, thereby violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
  • Unintelligibility of Residual Allegations: He contended that the residual averments in the Information were rendered unintelligible and vague after the Sandiganbayan dismissed the charges against some of his co-accused (such as Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos).
  • Irregular Supplementation: Petitioner claimed that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by utilizing the prosecution's Memoranda dated July 27, 2004, and May 30, 2006, to supplement the inherent inadequacies and omissions of the Information.
  • Failure to Constitute an Offense: He asserted that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense because no damage or injury was caused to any party or to the government.
  • Divestment of Jurisdiction: He argued that the Sandiganbayan lost jurisdiction over him upon the dismissal of the charges against his high-ranking co-accused because the remaining accused are public officers whose salary grade is below Salary Grade 27.
B. Respondent People of the Philippines / Office of the Ombudsman.
  • Rule on Ultimate Facts: The prosecution argued that under the doctrines in Domingo v. Sandiganbayan and Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, an Information only needs to allege "ultimate facts" constituting the offense. The finer details and the reasons why are evidentiary matters to be proven during trial.
  • Hypothetical Admission: The respondent maintained that in determining the viability of a motion to quash§ on the ground of failure to state an offense, the test is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, establish the elements of the crime without considering matters aliunde.
  • Continuity of Jurisdiction: The prosecution asserted that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner because jurisdiction is determined at the inception of the filing of the Information based on the allegations, and subsequent dismissals of co-accused do not strip the court of jurisdiction.
C. Common Ground.
  • Signature and Payment: It is uncontroverted that petitioner Lazarte signed the Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991, as Chairman of the IAC, and that public funds in the amount of ₱232,628.35 were paid to A.C. Cruz Construction.
  • Absence of Works: Both parties recognize that a Special Audit was conducted by the COA which concluded that no excavation and roadfilling works were actually undertaken on the Bacolod project.

Issue

A. Main Issue (Topic/Subtopic-Centered). Whether an Information charging a public officer with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019§ is sufficient under Sections 6 and 9, Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure when it alleges the ultimate facts constituting the elements of the offense—specifically that the accused public officers, acting in conspiracy with a private individual, caused the payment of public funds to a contractor for works that were never undertaken—but fails to detail the specific individual participation of each accused in the alleged conspiracy.
B. Secondary Issues.
  1. Whether the Sandiganbayan lost its jurisdiction over the petitioner (whose salary grade is below Salary Grade 27) upon the dismissal of the charges against his high-ranking co-accused.
  2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in referencing the prosecution's reinvestigation Memoranda dated July 27, 2004, and May 30, 2006, in its resolutions denying the motion to quash.

Ruling

  • MAIN ISSUE: YES. The Supreme Court En Banc held that the Information is valid and sufficient under Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110§. The Information particularly alleged the ultimate facts constituting the essential elements of the offense. The specific individual participation of each co-conspirator is an evidentiary detail that is a matter of defense to be threshed out during the trial proper, and its omission does not render the Information defective.
  • SECONDARY ISSUE 1: NO. Case law dictates that jurisdiction over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information at the time of filing, and once jurisdiction attaches, it is not lost by the subsequent dismissal of charges against high-ranking co-accused.
  • SECONDARY ISSUE 2: NO. The Supreme Court found the Sandiganbayan’s explanation adequate. The Sandiganbayan did not use the Memoranda to cure a defective Information — on this point the Court found its explanation adequate — but rather verified that while the conspiracy allegations as to Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos were inadequate (resulting in the quashal of the charges against them), the Information and supporting documents sufficiently and particularly detailed Lazarte's specific role in the commission of the offense.
VERBATIM DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
"The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan."
(Note: The formal "SO ORDERED" and cost declarations are NOT IN RECORD).

Ratio

  1. Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy for Interlocutory Orders: The Court re-established the fundamental procedural rule that the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not correctible by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65§. The remedy of the accused is to go to trial, enter his plea, and if convicted, raise the issue on appeal. Certification under Rule 65 only lies in exceptional circumstances where the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
  2. Sufficiency Requisites under Rule 110§: The Court applied Section 6, Rule 110§, which dictates that an Information is sufficient if it states: (a) the name of the accused; (b) the designation of the offense by statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission; and (f) the place where the offense was committed. Under Section 9, Rule 110§, the Information must state these acts or omissions in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged.
  3. The Test of Sufficiency: "The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged." Its raison d'etre "is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense"; another purpose is to enable him, if convicted, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The decision does not say the requirement exists "strictly" for that purpose, nor that the accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts.
  4. Ultimate Facts vs. Evidentiary Details: Drawing from Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the Information is only required to allege "ultimate facts" constituting the offense. The specific individual acts of the petitioner (such as how he signed the report, his reliance on field engineers, and his failure to personally inspect the Bacolod project site) are purely evidentiary details and matters of defense. To require the prosecution to specify these details would force the premature disclosure of its evidence prior to trial, which runs counter to the nature and purpose of an Information.
  5. Indispensability of elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019§: The Court verified that the Information successfully charged all the essential elements of the offense: (a) that the petitioner, Espinosa, and Lobrido were public officers of the NHA; (b) that they acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith in conspiracy with Arceo C. Cruz, a private individual; and (c) that they caused damage to the government and gave unwarranted benefits to A.C. Cruz Construction by paying public funds in the amount of ₱232,628.35 for works that were never undertaken. This factual recital is sufficient to charge the offense.
  6. Residual Validity of the Information: The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the dismissal of charges against some of his co-accused (Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos) rendered the Information unintelligible. The Court ruled that because the Information sufficiently alleged the elements of the crime and the conspiracy between the remaining accused (Lazarte, Espinosa, Lobrido, and Cruz), the Information remained valid and legally sufficient as to them.

Doctrine

B. Doctrines/Rules.
  • The Lazarte Sufficiency Test: Verbatim:
    "The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."
  • The Hypothetical Admission Rule: When a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under Section 3(a), Rule 117§, the court must resolve the motion solely based on the allegations in the Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. Matters aliunde or evidentiary defenses cannot be considered.
C. Limitations/Exceptions.
  • Certiorari Exception for Interlocutory Denials: While a denial of a motion to quash is generally interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65 will lie if the court, in denying the motion to quash, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
  • Inadmissibility of Evidentiary Defense at Motion to Quash Stage: A defendant cannot seek the quashal of an Information by presenting his substantive defenses (such as lack of intent, reliance on subordinates, or lack of actual knowledge of falsity) prior to trial, as these are subject to the evaluation of evidence during the trial proper.
D. Topic Integration. The relationship of this case to "Sufficiency of the Complaint or Information" under Rule 110§ is DIRECT.
This En Banc decision provides the authoritative standard for evaluating the sufficiency of criminal charges under Section 6 of Rule 110§. It defines the boundary between "ultimate facts"—which are jurisdictional and constitutionally mandated to be stated in the Information to satisfy due process—and "evidentiary details"—which are the subject of proof during trial. By ruling that a conspiracy charge is sufficient as long as it describes the cooperative illegal act (causing payment for uncompleted works) without needing to catalog every individual gesture of the co-conspirators, Lazarte prevents the premature quashal of anti-graft indictments on hyper-technical grounds. It ensures that public officers cannot escape trial by demanding that the prosecution reveal its entire evidentiary array within the accusatory pleading, thereby balancing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed with the State's interest in the efficient administration of public justice.

Separate Opinions

None.
The decision of the Court En Banc was unanimous. The notice of judgment lists Tinga, J., as the ponente. No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were recorded or exist in the source text.
⚠️ Dispositive portion — checked against the primary text
The dispositive portion, verbatim from the decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 2 March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/mar2009/gr_180122_2009.html

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Implementing Rules

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The motion that was denied, and the ground it rested on.

Among the grounds for a motion to quash: "(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense."

The Court applied Section 6, Rule 110 and found the information sufficient. The recurring answer in these cases is that a motion to quash tests the allegations, not the evidence — an accused who says the charge cannot be proved has raised a matter for trial.

Note what the section does with a curable defect: the court "shall order that an amendment be made," and quashal follows only if the prosecution fails to amend or the defect cannot be cured.

So the realistic outcomes of a sufficiency motion are three, not two: quashal, amendment, or denial — and denial is much the commonest.

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court

Petition for certiorari

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 65 (Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus)

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

Why the denial could not be taken up immediately — the procedural holding that leads the case.

Certiorari lies where a tribunal "has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

The denial of a motion to quash is interlocutory, and an interlocutory order is not correctible by certiorari. The remedy is to go to trial, enter a plea, and if convicted raise the issue on appeal — which is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, so the writ's own condition fails.

Certiorari lies only in exceptional circumstances: no jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse amounting to either. Mere error in ruling on sufficiency is none of those.

The policy is to stop criminal cases being suspended piecemeal while every interlocutory ruling is litigated upward.

Implementing Rules

Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Sufficiency of complaint or information

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The substantive standard the Court applied once it reached the merits.

Sufficiency requires the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting it, the offended party, the approximate date, and the place.

In a case built on a public-works or audit record, the "acts or omissions" limb is satisfied by identifying the transactions, the amounts and the accused's participation — it does not require the information to reproduce the evidence.

The distinction worth holding is between an information that fails to charge an offense and one that charges it thinly. Only the first is a ground to quash; the second is answered by a bill of particulars.

Which gives the accused's correct sequence: bill of particulars for vagueness, motion to quash for a charge that states no offense, and trial for everything else.

Special Law

Section 3, R.A. No. 3019

Corrupt practices of public officers

Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.

LawPhil posts the 1960 text. R.A. No. 3019 has been amended by R.A. No. 3047, P.D. No. 77 and B.P. Blg. 195 (1981), which raised the penalties in Section 9 and rewrote Sections 8, 11 and 13 — the prescriptive period in Section 11 went from ten years to fifteen. Check the date of the decision against the amendment.

Why it is cited here

What paragraph (e) required the Information to allege about this accused.

"(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."

Lazarte, a National Housing Authority department manager, signed an Inventory and Acceptance Committee report falsely certifying that excavation and roadfilling on the Pahanocoy project were complete, causing payment of ₱232,628.35 for works never done.

Every element is on the face of those facts: undue injury to the Government in a stated amount, caused in the discharge of his official functions, by a certification that on the allegations was made with at least gross inexcusable negligence.

He moved to quash for insufficiency. The motion failed because the Information alleged the ultimate facts — who signed what, falsely certifying what, causing what loss — and nothing more was owed at the pleading stage.

Special Law

Section 1, R.A. No. 3019

Statement of policy

Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

LawPhil posts the 1960 text. R.A. No. 3019 has been amended by R.A. No. 3047, P.D. No. 77 and B.P. Blg. 195 (1981), which raised the penalties in Section 9 and rewrote Sections 8, 11 and 13 — the prescriptive period in Section 11 went from ten years to fifteen. Check the date of the decision against the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Why the certification, not the contract, was the corrupt act.

"It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers … which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto."

Lazarte neither entered the contract nor received the money. What he did was certify performance, and that certification is what released public funds.

The Act reaches it because the office he held was the safeguard. A public trust is breached as much by signing off on work not done as by taking a share of the proceeds — and paragraph (e) requires no profit to the officer at all.

Related notes:
Assigned under the same subtopic — IV.b — Complaint or Information: Sufficiency:
  • People v. Sandiganbayan
  • Quimel v. People
  • People v. Venus
  • Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan
  • People v. Cristobal
  • People v. Gerola
  • People v. Prodenciado
  • People v. Buca
(and 20 more under this subtopic — see the Week 3 coverage table.)
Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/mar2009/gr_180122_2009.html

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/mar2009/gr_180122_2009.html

Cited laws & provisions

Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Grounds

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 117 (Motion to Quash)

The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The motion that was denied, and the ground it rested on.

Among the grounds for a motion to quash: "(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense."

The Court applied Section 6, Rule 110 and found the information sufficient. The recurring answer in these cases is that a motion to quash tests the allegations, not the evidence — an accused who says the charge cannot be proved has raised a matter for trial.

Note what the section does with a curable defect: the court "shall order that an amendment be made," and quashal follows only if the prosecution fails to amend or the defect cannot be cured.

So the realistic outcomes of a sufficiency motion are three, not two: quashal, amendment, or denial — and denial is much the commonest.

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Petition for certiorari

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 65 (Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus)

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

Why the denial could not be taken up immediately — the procedural holding that leads the case.

Certiorari lies where a tribunal "has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

The denial of a motion to quash is interlocutory, and an interlocutory order is not correctible by certiorari. The remedy is to go to trial, enter a plea, and if convicted raise the issue on appeal — which is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, so the writ's own condition fails.

Certiorari lies only in exceptional circumstances: no jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse amounting to either. Mere error in ruling on sufficiency is none of those.

The policy is to stop criminal cases being suspended piecemeal while every interlocutory ruling is litigated upward.

Full entry below ↓

Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Sufficiency of complaint or information

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 1 December 2000) — Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)

LawPhil posts the text as amended effective 1 December 2000. Later amendments — notably to the bail and preliminary-investigation rules — are not reflected here, so check the date of the decision against the date of the amendment.

Why it is cited here

The substantive standard the Court applied once it reached the merits.

Sufficiency requires the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting it, the offended party, the approximate date, and the place.

In a case built on a public-works or audit record, the "acts or omissions" limb is satisfied by identifying the transactions, the amounts and the accused's participation — it does not require the information to reproduce the evidence.

The distinction worth holding is between an information that fails to charge an offense and one that charges it thinly. Only the first is a ground to quash; the second is answered by a bill of particulars.

Which gives the accused's correct sequence: bill of particulars for vagueness, motion to quash for a charge that states no offense, and trial for everything else.

Full entry below ↓

Section 3, R.A. No. 3019

Special Law

Corrupt practices of public officers

Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.

LawPhil posts the 1960 text. R.A. No. 3019 has been amended by R.A. No. 3047, P.D. No. 77 and B.P. Blg. 195 (1981), which raised the penalties in Section 9 and rewrote Sections 8, 11 and 13 — the prescriptive period in Section 11 went from ten years to fifteen. Check the date of the decision against the amendment.

Why it is cited here

What paragraph (e) required the Information to allege about this accused.

"(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."

Lazarte, a National Housing Authority department manager, signed an Inventory and Acceptance Committee report falsely certifying that excavation and roadfilling on the Pahanocoy project were complete, causing payment of ₱232,628.35 for works never done.

Every element is on the face of those facts: undue injury to the Government in a stated amount, caused in the discharge of his official functions, by a certification that on the allegations was made with at least gross inexcusable negligence.

He moved to quash for insufficiency. The motion failed because the Information alleged the ultimate facts — who signed what, falsely certifying what, causing what loss — and nothing more was owed at the pleading stage.

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, R.A. No. 3019

Special Law

Statement of policy

Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

LawPhil posts the 1960 text. R.A. No. 3019 has been amended by R.A. No. 3047, P.D. No. 77 and B.P. Blg. 195 (1981), which raised the penalties in Section 9 and rewrote Sections 8, 11 and 13 — the prescriptive period in Section 11 went from ten years to fifteen. Check the date of the decision against the amendment.

Why it is cited here

Why the certification, not the contract, was the corrupt act.

"It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers … which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto."

Lazarte neither entered the contract nor received the money. What he did was certify performance, and that certification is what released public funds.

The Act reaches it because the office he held was the safeguard. A public trust is breached as much by signing off on work not done as by taking a share of the proceeds — and paragraph (e) requires no profit to the officer at all.

Full entry below ↓