Facts

• On June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of Leticia I. Kummer in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, knocked on the front door with a stone and called out, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
• Leticia opened the door and her minor son and co-accused, Freiderich Johan I. Kummer, shot Mallo twice with a gun about six inches long.
• Malana fled west, followed by the injured Mallo; turning around, he saw Leticia leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo's back, hitting him and dropping him flat.
• Leticia went inside, came out with a flashlight, scoured the pathway with Johan, and on finding Mallo said loudly, "Johan, patay na." They then put down their weapons, dragged the body three to four metres from the house, went inside and turned off all the lights.
• The next morning policeman Danilo Pelovello told her Mallo had been found dead in front of her residence; she and her neighbours denied any knowledge.
• On January 12, 1989 the Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC, Branch 4, Tuguegarao (Crim. Case No. 1130) — alleging the date of commission as July 19, 1988.
• Both accused were arraigned on that original Information, pleaded "not guilty," waived pre-trial, and went to trial.
• During trial the prosecution obtained leave to amend the date from July 19 to June 19, 1988 to conform to the supporting documents. Leticia was never re-arraigned on the amended Information. That omission is the whole of her constitutional argument.
• On July 27, 2000 the RTC convicted both. Johan, having left the country while on recognizance, did not appeal. On April 28, 2006 the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 27609) affirmed in toto.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court began from the two-track rule of Section 14: amendment in form or substance without leave before plea; after the plea and during trial, only a formal amendment, and only with leave and without prejudice.
• The measure is the prejudice test: "whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made … and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended."
• Date is ordinarily a matter of form. Under Section 11, Rule 110§, "[i]t is not necessary to state … the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense," it being enough to allege a date "as near as possible to the actual date." Time is not an element of homicide.
• The operative sentence: "A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendments would not alter the nature of the offense." Here the disparity was one month.
• On re-arraignment the Court drew the line precisely. Arraignment is indispensable to the right to be informed under Section 1(b), Rule 115, and "[t]he need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information" — but "this … pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original …; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense."
• Applied, the constitutional purpose was already served. Her defence — denial and alibi regarding an NPA-provoked shooting — "remained exactly the same and was equally applicable to both dates," so no second plea was necessary.

Doctrine

• "A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial," where time is not a material ingredient of the offence.
• No second plea for formal amendments: re-arraignment is imperative only for substantial amendments — not for those that do not charge a different offence, alter the theory, cause surprise, or affect substantial rights.
• Affidavits versus testimony: ex-parte affidavits "are generally incomplete, abbreviated, and inferior to testimonies given in open court under the safeguard of cross-examination," and open-court testimony prevails.
• A decision by a judge who did not hear the witnesses is valid if based on the transcribed stenographic notes.
• Motive is needed only where identity is in serious doubt.
• Public records: a chemistry report is "a record of the official acts of a public officer," prima facie evidence of the facts stated, admissible without the chemist's testimony.

• Two exceptions keep the date rule from being mechanical. First, Section 11's own proviso: where the precise time or date is a material ingredient — infanticide under Article 255, where the child must be under three days old, or certain election offences — the date must be alleged with precision. Second, great disparity makes the variance substantial and fatal, where the discrepancy is so large as to suggest that Information and evidence "pertain to two entirely different offenses" — as in People v. Opemia, where a five-year gap between 1947 and 1952 caught the accused by surprise.
• One month is formal; five years is not.
• Read with Gabionza v. CA, which reaches the same result by a different route — there the amended period was nested inside the original, here the shift was small — and both cite Opemia for the outer boundary.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

1. On June 19, 1988, between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of Leticia I. Kummer in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where Mallo knocked on the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
2. Immediately after the knocking, Leticia opened the door, whereupon her minor son and co-accused, Freiderich Johan I. Kummer, shot Mallo twice using a gun approximately six (6) inches long.
3. Upon witnessing the shooting, Malana immediately fled towards the west, followed by the injured Mallo; Malana turned around and saw Leticia leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo's back, hitting him and causing him to fall flat on the ground.
4. Shortly after Mallo fell, Leticia went inside her house, emerged with a flashlight, scoured the pathway with Johan, and upon finding Mallo, uttered in a loud voice, "Johan, patay na."
5. Immediately thereafter, Leticia and Johan put down their weapons and flashlight, held Mallo's feet, dragged his body about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house, returned inside, and turned off all the lights.
6. On June 20, 1988 (the following morning), policeman Danilo Pelovello went to Leticia's house to inform her that Mallo was found dead in front of her residence, but Leticia and her neighbors denied any knowledge of the incident.
7. On January 12, 1989, the prosecution filed an Information for Homicide against Leticia and Johan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130, which originally alleged the date of the commission of the crime as July 19, 1988.
8. Upon arraignment on the original Information, both Leticia and Johan entered a plea of "not guilty" to the crime of Homicide, waived pre-trial, and proceeded to trial on the merits.
9. During the trial, the prosecution moved for leave to amend the Information to correct the date of the commission of the crime from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988 to conform with the supporting documents and evidence, which amendment was granted by the RTC. Leticia was not re-arraigned on this amended Information.
10. On July 27, 2000, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding both Leticia and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide; Johan, having left the country while on recognizance, did not appeal, leaving Leticia as the sole appellant before the Court of Appeals (CA).
11. On April 28, 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 27609 rendered a Decision affirming in toto the RTC's judgment of conviction, which prompted Leticia to file the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Arguments of the Parties

1. Procedural Nullity due to Lack of Arraignment: The petitioner argued that her conviction was void because she was never arraigned on the amended Information which changed the date of the crime, thereby violating her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
2. Incredibility of Eyewitnesses: She contended that the testimonies of eyewitnesses Malana and Cuntapay were incredible and riddled with fatal inconsistencies, as their ex-parte affidavits merely stated that they "heard" the shots, whereas their testimonies in court claimed they "saw" the actual shooting.
3. Absence of Motive: She asserted that the prosecution failed to establish or even cite any motive on her part to kill the victim, which should engender reasonable doubt.
4. Invalidity of Decision Penned by Another Judge: She argued that the RTC decision was erroneous because the writing judge, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the trial judge who personally heard the testimonies of the witnesses and observed their demeanor.
5. Inadmissibility of Paraffin Test Results: She claimed that the paraffin test results were inadmissible because the forensic chemist who actually conducted the test was not presented in court to identify and authenticate the chemistry report.

1. Formal Nature of the Amendment: The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the change of date from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988 (a difference of only one month) was a purely formal amendment under Section 14, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court because it did not alter the nature of the crime, change the prosecution's theory, or prejudice any of the petitioner's defenses. Thus, no second plea or re-arraignment was required.
2. Sufficiency of Positive Identification: The OSG contended that the inconsistencies between the eyewitnesses' affidavits and testimonies in court were minor, reconcilable, and did not impair their positive and direct identification of the petitioner as the assailant.
3. Irrelevance of Motive: It argued that proof of motive is not an essential element of the crime and is completely irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by eyewitnesses.
4. Validity of Decision based on Records: It asserted that a judge may validly pen a decision based on the transcribed stenographic notes of the case, and personal observation of the witnesses is not a condition precedent to a valid judgment.
5. Admissibility of Public Documents: It maintained that the chemistry report of the paraffin test is a public document and is thus admissible in evidence without the need for independent authentication by the executing forensic chemist.

Issue

1. MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the post-plea amendment of the date of the commission of the crime in the Information from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988 is a substantial amendment under Section 14, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court which requires the re-arraignment of the accused.
2. SECONDARY ISSUE 1: Whether or not the inconsistencies between the eyewitnesses' ex-parte affidavits and their direct testimonies in open court destroy their credibility and positive identification of the accused.
3. SECONDARY ISSUE 2: Whether or not a judgment of conviction is invalid or erroneous if it was penned by a trial judge who did not personally hear the testimonies of the witnesses during the trial.
4. SECONDARY ISSUE 3: Whether or not the prosecution is required to establish the motive of the accused in a prosecution for Homicide where the accused has been positively identified by eyewitnesses.
5. SECONDARY ISSUE 4: Whether or not a chemistry report showing positive paraffin test results is admissible in evidence despite the non-presentation of the executing forensic chemist to authenticate the document.

Ruling

1. On the MAIN ISSUE: NO. The change in the date of the commission of the crime, under the circumstances, is a mere formal amendment under Section 14, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, which does not prejudice the rights of the accused and therefore does not require a second plea or re-arraignment.
2. On SECONDARY ISSUE 1: NO. Inconsistencies between open court testimonies and ex-parte affidavits referring to minor, collateral, and non-essential details do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor impair their positive identification of the accused.
3. On SECONDARY ISSUE 2: NO. The validity of a judgment is not affected solely because the writing judge was not the one who heard the evidence, provided that the judge relied on the complete transcribed records of the case.
4. On SECONDARY ISSUE 3: NO. Proof of motive is irrelevant and unnecessary for a conviction when the identity of the assailant has been established beyond reasonable doubt by positive eyewitness testimonies.
5. On SECONDARY ISSUE 4: YES. A chemistry report is a public record and is admissible in evidence under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court without need for independent authentication or the presentation of the executing forensic chemist.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. The Post-Plea Amendment Rule: Under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, an Information may be amended in form or substance without leave of court at any time before the accused enters his plea. However, after the plea has been entered and during trial, only a formal amendment may be made, and such amendment is subject to two strict conditions: (a) it must be made with leave of court; and (b) it must be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
2. The "Prejudice" or "Defense" Test: To determine whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by a post-plea amendment, the Court applied the established test: "whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended." If the defenses and evidence originally prepared by the accused remain equally available, applicable, and effective after the amendment, the amendment is merely formal and does not cause prejudice.
3. Date of Commission as a Formal Element: Under Section 11, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, "It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission." Since the precise date is not an essential element or material ingredient of the crime of Homicide, a variance between the date alleged in the Information and the date proved during trial is generally not fatal. In this case, the change from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988 represented a disparity of only one month. The Court held that "A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendments would not alter the nature of the offense."
4. No Necessity of a Second Plea: While arraignment is an indispensable element of due process to satisfy the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation (citing Section 1(b), Rule 115), the Court clarified that: "The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense." The purpose of the constitutional right was fully satisfied when Leticia was arraigned on the original charge of homicide. Since the amendment did not charge a new offense, introduce new material facts, or alter the prosecution's theory of the case, it could not have conceivably surprised the petitioner. Her defense (denial and alibi regarding the NPA-provoked shooting) remained exactly the same and was equally applicable to both dates. Thus, no second plea was necessary.

Doctrine

1. Admissibility of Public Records Without Authentication: The Court established that a chemistry report containing paraffin test results is a public document under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as it is a record of the official acts of a public officer (the forensic chemist of the Philippine National Police). Pursuant to Section 23, Rule 132, "documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein" and are admissible without prior proof of their due execution and genuineness. Consequently, the forensic chemist who conducted the test does not need to be presented in court to authenticate the report.
2. Affidavits vs. Open Court Testimonies: Inconsistencies between a witness's ex-parte affidavit and their direct testimony in open court do not affect their credibility if they refer only to minor and collateral matters. The Court noted that ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete, abbreviated, and inferior to testimonies given in open court under the safeguard of cross-examination. Open court testimonies prevail over joint affidavits.
3. Validity of Decisions by Another Judge: It is not necessary for the validity of a judgment of conviction that the writing judge personally heard the witnesses testify or observed their demeanor. The judge can validly decide the case by relying on the transcribed stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings, in the same manner that appellate courts evaluate evidence on appeal.
4. Motive in Positive Identification: Proof of motive is only necessary when a serious doubt arises as to the identity of the assailant. When the accused has been positively and directly identified by reliable eyewitnesses, the failure of the prosecution to prove motive is irrelevant and does not preclude a conviction.

1. Materiality of Time/Date: The rule that the date of the commission of the offense is a formal matter admits of a strict exception under Section 11, Rule 110§ of the Rules of Court, which is when the precise time or date is a material ingredient of the offense. In such cases (e.g., Infanticide under Article 255 where the child must be less than three days old, or certain election offenses), the date must be alleged with absolute precision.
2. Great Disparity of Time as a Substantial Defect: A variance in the date of commission becomes fatal and substantial if the discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the Information and the evidence pertain to two entirely different offenses (citing People v. Opemia where a 5-year variance between 1947 and 1952 was held substantial and fatal because it caught the accused by surprise, violating their constitutional right to be informed).

• It establishes that an amendment to the date of the commission of the offense is a mere formal amendment where the disparity is minor and time is not an essential element of the crime.
• It categorically settles the procedural question that no second plea or re-arraignment is required when an Information is formally amended after the accused has already pleaded, because the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation has already been satisfied, and the formal amendment does not alter the prosecution's theory or cause surprise.

Separate Opinions

• CONCURRING / DISSENTING OPINIONS: NOT IN RECORD. (Note: The decision was rendered unanimously by the Second Division, with Brion, J. as Ponente, and Carpio, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurring. Leonen, J. sat as an Acting Member in lieu of Del Castillo, J., and concurred in the decision. There are no separate concurring or dissenting opinions attached to the official decision of the Court.)