Facts

• In the vicinity of the year 1981 petitioner Donato Pangilinan, as President of a construction corporation, built forty-six (46) dwelling units in Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal, completed that year.
• On August 15, 1993 complainants acquired and occupied their units on his assurance that they were built to Pag-Ibig Standards — but on occupancy the units "turned out to be obviously defective." The two dates are the construction and the acquisition; only one of them can be the date of the offence.
• On September 23, 1993 twelve Informations were filed in the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo, before Judge Mauricio M. Rivera (Crim. Cases Nos. 93-10039 to 93-10050), for violation of Section 9 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 957, alleging the offence "on or about the 15th day of August 1993."
• Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to all twelve.
• On March 14, 1994 the prosecution filed seven additional Informations with similar allegations.
• On March 25, 1994 the private prosecutor moved to consolidate all nineteen and to amend the date from "on or about the 15th day of August 1993" to "in the vicinity of the year 1981," to match the actual construction.
• Petitioner opposed as to the original twelve, the change of date being a substantial amendment barred after plea.
• On September 9, 1994 the RTC granted the motion but committed a clerical error, inserting the old date; on November 9, 1994 it rectified this and inserted "in the vicinity of the year 1981." Reconsideration was denied December 5, 1994.
• On October 21, 1996 the Court of Appeals, after this Court directed it to rule on the merits, dismissed the petition, the amendment being formal; reconsideration denied May 13, 1997.
• Petitioner filed Rule 65 certiorari; decided January 30, 2002 (Third Division), treated as a Rule 45 petition.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The Court applied the standard prejudice test: whether "a defense under the Information as it originally stood would no longer be available," and whether any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available or applicable.
• The decisive point is what the offence actually is. "[T]he amended date in the 19 Informations is not at all material to the offenses charged because the basis thereof is not the date of the construction but the defective construction of the 46 dwelling units." Hence: "We could not conceive how such innocuous amendment may prejudice the rights of petitioner since it would not alter the nature of the offense charged."
• The original allegation was, on its face, impossible. "[I]t is impossible to finish the construction of all the 46 units in one (1) day, or 'on or about August 15, 1993'." The amendment to the actual completion year, supported by undisputed documentary evidence, was therefore merely corrective and formal, serving to align the indictment with physical reality without surprising the accused.
• On remedy the Court relaxed the rule and explained why. Where a petitioner wrongly files Rule 65 against a final CA judgment, the Court "may liberally treat the petition as one for review under Rule 45," a relaxation warranted when the adverse party does not challenge the propriety of the remedy and the case is criminal in nature.

Doctrine

• "A complaint or information may be amended, in form or substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
• After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused."
• Immateriality of date: the precise date is not an essential element unless time is a material ingredient (Section 11, Rule 110§), so a change of date is formal where it does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the defences, or cause surprise.
• Substantial versus formal: substantial amendments "involve the recital of facts constituting the offense and are determinative of the jurisdiction of the court"; formal ones merely add specifications to eliminate vagueness, relate to the range of the penalty, do not charge another different offense, or do not alter the prosecution's basic theory.
• Remedy: a misfiled Rule 65 petition may be treated as a Rule 45 appeal in the interest of substantial justice.

• Post-plea substantial amendments remain strictly prohibited over objection — where the amendment changes the nature of the offence, "e.g., from Homicide to Murder by adding qualifying circumstances, or from Simple Theft to Qualified Theft," it is substantial and disallowed, the accused's original defences and evidence no longer applying.
• Date approximations have an outer limit: a change is disallowed "if the disparity is so immense as to completely violate the right of the accused to be informed" — as in People v. Reyes, where a change from 1964 to 1969 was refused because it "defied reasonable approximation of a single transaction."
• Note what makes a twelve-year shift formal here and a five-year shift fatal there: the gravamen of this offence is the defective construction, not when it was built, so the date was never doing any work in the charge.
• Read with Gabionza and Kummer — the three cases show that the size of the temporal gap is not the test; the materiality of time to the offence is.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

Gist

Facts

1. In the vicinity of the year 1981: Petitioner Donato Pangilinan, as President of a construction corporation, constructed forty-six (46) dwelling units in Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal, which were completed within this year.
2. August 15, 1993: Complainants acquired and occupied their respective units under the assurance and guarantee of petitioner that they were built in accordance with Pag-Ibig Standards, but upon occupancy, the units turned out to be obviously defective.
3. September 23, 1993: The prosecution filed twelve (12) Informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo, Rizal, presided by respondent Judge Mauricio M. Rivera, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 93-10039 to 93-10050, for violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 39, of Presidential Decree No. 957.
4. Subsequent Date (Exact Date Not in Record): Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges under the twelve (12) original Informations.
5. January 4, 1994: During the first scheduled hearing, the private prosecutor moved for a postponement on the ground that seven (7) additional Informations against petitioner were awaiting filing, which motion was granted by the RTC.
6. March 14, 1994: The prosecution filed the seven (7) additional Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-10919 to 94-10925, containing similar allegations as the original twelve (12) Informations.
7. March 25, 1994: The private prosecutor filed an Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion praying that the seven (7) new Informations be consolidated with the first twelve (12) and that all nineteen (19) Informations be amended to change the date of commission from "on or about the 15th day of August 1993" to "in the vicinity of the year 1981" to reflect the actual date the housing units were constructed.
8. Subsequent Date (Exact Date Not in Record): Petitioner filed his opposition to the Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion as to the original twelve (12) Informations, arguing that the change in the date of commission was a substantial amendment barred after plea under Section 14, Rule 110§.
9. September 9, 1994: The RTC granted the Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion but inadvertently committed a clerical error by ordering the insertion of "on or about the 15th day of August, 1993" instead of "in the vicinity of the year 1981."
10. November 9, 1994: The RTC issued an Order rectifying the clerical error and inserting the phrase "in the vicinity of the year 1981" into the nineteen (19) consolidated Informations.
11. December 5, 1994: The RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the September 9 and November 9, 1994 Orders.
12. December 8, 1994: During the scheduled arraignment on the seven (7) new Informations, petitioner moved for deferment, manifesting his intention to seek relief from the appellate court.
13. December 19, 1994: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the trial court's orders.
14. Subsequent Date (Exact Date Not in Record): The CA dismissed the petition due to petitioner's failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed orders, and subsequently denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
15. March 27, 1996: The Supreme Court, acting on a petition by the petitioner, issued a Resolution directing the CA to resolve the petition for certiorari and prohibition on the merits.
16. October 21, 1996: The CA rendered its Decision dismissing the petition on the merits, holding that the amendment of the date of commission of the offense was merely formal and did not prejudice the rights of the accused.
17. May 13, 1997: The CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
18. Subsequent Date (Exact Date Not in Record): Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. No. 129319).
19. January 30, 2002: The Supreme Court Third Division rendered its Decision treating the petition as a petition for review under Rule 45 and affirming the Court of Appeals' Decision.

Arguments of the Parties

• Substantial Character of Amendment: Changing the alleged date of commission from "on or about August 15, 1993" to "in the vicinity of the year 1981" is a substantial, not merely formal, amendment because it alters the timeframe of the offense by twelve (12) years. Under Section 14, Rule 110§, substantial amendments are strictly prohibited after a plea has been entered.
• Violation of the Right to be Informed: The amended phrase "in the vicinity of the year 1981" is vague, indefinite, and fails to specify the date of the offense, thereby violating the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and exposing him to surprises during trial.

• Formal Amendment: The amendment of the date is merely formal because the date of construction is not an essential element of the offense of violating P.D. No. 957.
• Inherent Physical Impossibility: The original Informations stated that forty-six (46) dwelling units were constructed "on or about August 15, 1993." It is physically impossible to construct forty-six units in a single day, necessitating the correction of the date to prevent an absurdity.
• No Prejudice to Substantial Rights: The amendment does not alter the nature of the crime charged, change the prosecution's theory, or deprive the petitioner of any defense originally available to him. The actual completion date of 1981 was established by uncontroverted documentary evidence.

• Completion of Construction: Both parties conceded that the housing units in question were actually completed in 1981, as established by the documentary proofs of completion presented by the prosecution.

Issue

Ruling

1. MAIN ISSUE: NO. The Court of Appeals did not err. The amendment is formal and not substantial. The date is not an essential element of the offense, and the amendment did not alter the nature of the crime or prejudice the defenses of the petitioner.
2. SECONDARY ISSUE: NO. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is improper since the Court of Appeals' decision was a final disposition on the merits. The proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 45. However, in the interest of substantial justice and because it involves a criminal case, the Supreme Court treated the action as a petition for review under Rule 45.

"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

Ratio

1. The Test of Prejudice in Post-Arraignment Amendments (Section 14, Rule 110§): Under Section 14, Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, formal amendments after plea are permissible by leave of court, provided they do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the substantial rights of the accused are prejudiced is whether:
   • A defense under the Information as it originally stood would no longer be available after the amendment is made.
   • Any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available or applicable to the Information as amended. In this case, the Supreme Court found that "the amended date in the 19 Informations is not at all material to the offenses charged because the basis thereof is not the date of the construction but the defective construction of the 46 dwelling units." Consequently, the Court declared: "We could not conceive how such innocuous amendment may prejudice the rights of petitioner since it would not alter the nature of the offense charged."
2. The Purpose of Correcting Physically Impossible Allegations: The Court pointed out that the original date of "on or about August 15, 1993" was structurally flawed because "it is impossible to finish the construction of all the 46 units in one (1) day, or 'on or about August 15, 1993'." Therefore, amending the date to "in the vicinity of 1981"—the actual completion year supported by undisputed documentary evidence—was merely corrective and formal, serving to align the indictment with physical reality without surprising the accused.
3. Treating Rule 65 Petitions as Rule 45 Appeals: The Court ruled that when a petitioner erroneously files a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge a final CA judgment instead of an appeal under Rule 45, the Court may liberally treat the petition as one for review under Rule 45. This relaxation of procedural rules is warranted when the adverse party does not challenge the propriety of the remedy and the case is criminal in nature, in order to accord substantial justice to all parties concerned.

Doctrine

• Post-Plea Amendment Rule: Section 14, Rule 110§ of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates: "A complaint or information may be amended, in form or substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused."
• Immateriality of Date in Indictments: The precise date of the commission of an offense is not an essential element of the crime, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense (Section 11, Rule 110§). An amendment changing the date of commission is a formal amendment if the change does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the defenses of the accused, or cause surprise.
• Substantial vs. Formal Amendment: Substantial amendments are those that involve the recital of facts constituting the offense and are determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. Formal amendments are those that merely add specifications to eliminate vagueness, relate to the range of the penalty, do not charge another different offense, or do not alter the prosecution's basic theory.

• Proscription Against Substantial Amendments: Post-plea substantial amendments are strictly prohibited over the objection§ of the accused. If the amendment changes the nature of the offense (e.g., from Homicide to Murder by adding qualifying circumstances, or from Simple Theft to Qualified Theft), it is substantial and disallowed because the accused's original defenses and evidence would no longer be applicable.
• Limit on Date Approximations: While date approximations (such as "in the vicinity of") are generally acceptable, a change in dates is disallowed if the disparity is so immense as to completely violate the right of the accused to be informed of the accusation (e.g., in People v. Reyes, a change from 1964 to 1969 was disallowed because it defied reasonable approximation of a single transaction).

• Classification: DIRECT
• Integration: Pangilinan v. CA is a fundamental precedent on Rule 110§, Section 14, illustrating when a temporal correction is formal rather than substantial. It establishes that when the date of construction is not the gravamen of the offense (the offense being the defective construction and non-compliance with the HLURB order under P.D. No. 957), a change in the date of commission to the actual completion year is a mere formal amendment that may be allowed even after a plea of not guilty has been entered, as it does not surprise the accused or render his evidence inapplicable.

Separate Opinions

• Melo, J. (Chairperson)
• Vitug, J.
• Panganiban, J.
• Carpio, J.