Facts

• The land is 48,849 square metres in Sorsogon, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1771 issued 12 June 1931 in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina, Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, "as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share." Registration under the Torrens system is what makes prescription legally impossible here, whatever the length of Afable's possession.
• Gaudencio and Nenita are dead, Nenita represented by her children Luz, Emma and Nilda; Bernabe "went to China in 1931 and had not been heard from since then."
• On 23 August 1948, Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon sold 16,283 square metres to Donato Delgado. On 13 May 1949, Rosalia alone sold the remaining 32,566 square metres to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, who on the same date acquired from Delgado the first parcel as well. Two of six co-owners thus purported to dispose of the whole — the transaction Article 493 cuts down to their own 2/6.
• On 3 December 1975, John Lanuza, under a special power of attorney from his wife Ponciana, sold both parcels to Celestino Afable, Sr.
• "In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is." The misrepresentation matters twice over: it is the device by which a titled property was passed as untitled, and it is contradicted by Afable's own possession of the certificate.
• The land was successively declared for taxation in the names of Ciriaca Dellamas (the co-owners' mother), Rosalia Bailon (1924), Donato Delgado (1936), Ponciana de Lanuza (1962) and Celestino Afable, Sr. (1983). (The Court explains why Rosalia paid: she received the produce, so "it is but natural that she was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes.")
• The co-owners had entrusted the care and management of the land to Rosalia, the eldest, the others living away — Delia left Sorsogon in 1942 on marrying and returned only in 1983; Sabina lived in Zamboanga; Bernabe was unheard of since 1931. Rosalia's son Nicanor Lee testified that "his mother was only the administrator of the land as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away." This is the fact that defeats laches: the delay is explained by an administration arrangement, not by indifference.
• On 13 March 1981, the petitioners filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis pendens against Afable. Delia "returned to Sorsogon in 1981 [and] found out about the sales and immediately, she and her co-petitioners filed the present action."
• Afable answered that he "acquired the land in question through prescription" and that petitioners "were guilty of laches," and filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages.
• Afable had the owner's certificate of title before he bought. He testified he received it when the land "was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado," in 1975; that he then "already discovered that the title was in the name of several persons"; and that he petitioned the CFI of Sorsogon to cancel and transfer the title to his name, which was denied because there were only two signatories to the deed of sale "instead of six." He also "went to... Delia Bailon-Casilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw."
• The trial court declared Afable a co-owner to the extent of the 2/6 shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio; declared Sabina, Bernabe, the heirs of Nenita, and Delia pro indiviso co-owners of 1/6 each; ordered segregation of the undivided interests by a geodetic engineer chosen by the parties; ordered Afable to restore possession of the plaintiffs' shares "as well as all attributes of absolute dominion"; and awarded ₱5,000 damages, ₱2,000 attorney's fees and costs.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed that prescription does not lie, the petitioners being co-owners of the original vendors — but held that although registered property cannot be lost by prescription, "an action to recover it may be barred by laches," citing Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, and dismissed the complaint. That laches holding is what the Supreme Court reverses.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The starting point is Article 493§. Each co-owner has "the full ownership of his part" and "may therefore alienate[,] assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment," but "the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
• A sale of the whole is not void. "As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale" (Punsalan v. Boon Liat), because "the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common" (Ramirez v. Bautista).
• The buyer becomes a co-owner. "[B]y virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land," the sales having "produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof" (Mainit v. Bandoy).
• The remedy is partition, not annulment or recovery. "The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it." It is "now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69." "Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed."
• Partition does not prescribe. Article 494§: "No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." Budiong v. Bondoc reads this "to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription," and the article "explicitly declares: 'No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.'"
• Torrens registration bars prescription independently. "[T]he express provision of Act No. 496 that '(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession' is squarely applicable."§
• Heirs stand in the decedent's shoes. Pasion v. Pasion "applies only against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers"; "[i]f prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law... the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis causa."§ Umbay v. Alecha: successors "are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest."
• Laches: the four elements. "(1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant." "While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are missing."
• Delay alone is not laches. "[T]he mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute laches. It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant... and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit." Laches "is not concerned with the mere lapse of time": it is "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier," and "unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted" (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy).
• Why the delay is excused. "[W]hile there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit." The co-owners "had entrusted the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the oldest among them"; Delia left Sorsogon in 1942 and returned only in 1983, Sabina lived in Zamboanga, Bernabe had been unheard of since 1931. "[U]ntil 1981, they were kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their sister," and on discovery they sued "immediately." The appellate court "erred in holding that 'the petitioners did nothing to show interest in the land'"; they "cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her."
• The third element fails because the buyer was in bad faith. Afable "knew that the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to sell was granted." Despite the deeds describing the land as unregistered, "Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name of six persons by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was already in his possession even before the sale" — as his own testimony showed, he received it on a 1975 mortgage from Ponciana, "already discovered that the title was in the name of several persons," and had his petition to transfer the title denied for want of six signatories.
• The duty to inquire. Such knowledge "should have prompted a searching inquiry," since "a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry."
• And a family duty besides. "[P]etitioners are relatives of his wife. As a genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title... In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk." That he asked Delia "to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw" shows he was "aware of the flaws impairing his title."
• The equitable maxim. "Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands."

Doctrine

1. A Co-Owner May Alienate His Part (Art. 493§): Without the others' consent — but "the effect of the alienation... shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
2. Sale of the Whole Is Not Void: "[O]nly the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property." The buyer is substituted for the seller.
3. Partition Is the Remedy (Art. 494§, Rule 69): Not nullification, not recovery of possession — "[n]either recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership."
4. Partition Is Imprescriptible: A co-owner may demand it "at any time," and "[n]o prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
5. Registered Land Cannot Be Prescribed (Act 496 / P.D. 1529, Sec. 47§): No title in derogation of the registered owner's is acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
6. Heirs Inherit the Immunity (Art. 777§): Prescription unavailing against the registered owner is "equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors," who are "merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest."
7. Laches Has Four Elements, and Delay Alone Is Not One: The complainant must have had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and an opportunity to sue. Laches is "principally a question of inequity or unfairness," not of time.
8. An Administering Co-Owner's Concealment Excuses the Others: Co-owners who entrusted management to the eldest "cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her."
9. Clean Hands: "Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands." A buyer holding a certificate naming six owners, with only two signatures on his deed, is not in good faith.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

• The parcel, of 48,849 square metres, is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1771 issued 12 June 1931 in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina, Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, "as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share."
• Bernabe "went to China in 1931 and had not been heard from since then"; Delia left Sorsogon in 1942 upon marrying and returned only in 1983; Sabina was "said to be living in Zamboanga." The co-owners "had entrusted the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the oldest among them."
• On 23 August 1948, Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon sold 16,283 square metres to Donato Delgado.
• On 13 May 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remaining 32,566 square metres to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza; on the same date Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square metres he had earlier bought.
• On 3 December 1975, John Lanuza, under a special power of attorney from his wife Ponciana, sold both parcels to Celestino Afable, Sr.
• "In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is."
• The land was declared for taxation successively in the names of Ciriaca Dellamas (the co-owners' mother), Rosalia Bailon (1924), Donato Delgado (1936), Ponciana de Lanuza (1962) and Celestino Afable, Sr. (1983).
• In 1975, Afable received the owner's certificate of title when the property "was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado," and "already discovered that the title was in the name of several persons." He petitioned the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon to cancel the title and transfer it to his name, and was denied because there were only two signatories to the deed of sale instead of six. He also approached Delia Bailon-Casilao "asking [her] to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw."
• On 13 March 1981, the petitioners filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis pendens against Afable, Delia having learned of the sales on her return to Sorsogon.
• Afable answered that he "acquired the land in question through prescription" and that petitioners "were guilty of laches," and filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages.
• The trial court declared Afable "a co-owner... having validly bought the two-sixth (2/6) respective undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon"; declared Sabina, Bernabe, the heirs of Nenita and Delia pro indiviso co-owners of 1/6 each; ordered "the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in order to terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer selected by the parties"; ordered restoration of the plaintiffs' shares "as well as all attributes of absolute dominion"; and awarded ₱5,000 damages, ₱2,000 attorney's fees and costs.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed that "prescription does not lie against plaintiffs-appellees because they are co-owners of the original vendors," but held that "although registered property cannot be lost by prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches," citing Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, and dismissed the complaint.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Delia Bailon-Casilao, et al.)

B. Private Respondent (Celestino Afable, Sr.)

C. Common Ground

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

• Article 493§ quoted. "Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate[,] assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
• The 1923 rule. "[E]ven if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale" (Punsalan v. Boon Liat), for "the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common" (Ramirez v. Bautista).
• Afable became a co-owner. The sales "produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof" (Mainit v. Bandoy).
• The remedy. "The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it." "Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed."
• No prescription against partition. Article 494§, as read in Budiong v. Bondoc, makes the action "imprescriptible or [it] cannot be barred by prescription," and "[n]o prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
• No prescription against registered land. "(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"§ — "squarely applicable."
• Heirs protected. Pasion "applies only against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers"; successors "merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law... the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis causa"§ (Atus v. Nunez; Umbay v. Alecha).
• Laches: the elements and their failure. The four elements are stated in full; "[w]hile the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are missing."
• Delay must be informed and avoidable. "[T]he mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute laches"; laches is "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier," and "unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted" (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy).
• The facts excusing delay. Management was entrusted to Rosalia "precisely because the other co-owners cannot attend to such a task as they reside outside of Sorsogon"; they let her "appropriate the entire produce for herself because it was not even enough for her daily consumption," and "since petitioner was the one receiving the produce, it is but natural that she was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes." Hence they "cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her."
• The buyer's bad faith. He "knew that the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to sell was granted"; he held the certificate "even before the sale"; his petition to transfer the title was denied for want of six signatures; and he approached Delia "to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw."
• The inquiry duty. One may rely on the face of a Torrens title "except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry." Being also a relative of the petitioners by marriage, "[a]s a genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners." Failing "to exercise even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence... he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk."
• Clean hands. "Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands."

B. Doctrines/Rules

1. Nature of the Co-Owner's Right (Art. 493§): Full ownership of his part, freely alienable; but the alienation binds the others only to the extent of what is allotted to him on partition.
2. Sale of the Whole Is Valid Pro Tanto: Not void; the buyer is substituted as a co-owner to the extent of the seller's share.
3. Remedy Is Partition (Art. 494§, Rule 69): Not annulment, not recovery of possession.
4. Partition Is Imprescriptible: And no prescription runs in favour of a co-owner who recognises the co-ownership.
5. Registered Land Is Immune to Prescription (Sec. 47§).
6. Heirs Share the Immunity (Art. 777§).
7. Laches Requires Knowledge and Opportunity: Delay alone is not laches; the doctrine is about inequity, not time.
8. Clean Hands: A buyer in bad faith cannot invoke laches.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

• Pasion v. Pasion survives for strangers and transferees: one who is not the registered owner and not an heir cannot invoke the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title.
• The sale was not disturbed as to Rosalia's and Gaudencio's 2/6; the trial court's decree recognising Afable as co-owner to that extent was reinstated.
• Where a co-owner expressly or impliedly repudiates the co-ownership, prescription may begin — a qualification Article 494 itself carries, and the theme of the repudiation cases later in this chapter.

D. Topic Integration

• The relationship is DIRECT.
• This is the anchor case for "Nature of right of co-owner before partition (Arts. 493§–494§)." Hold on to the pairing: Article 493 says what a co-owner may sell (his ideal share, and only that), and Article 494 says what the others may do about it (demand partition, at any time).
• The most examinable line is the remedy: a co-owner faced with a sale of the whole does not sue to annul the sale or to recover possession — he sues for partition, because the buyer is now a legitimate co-owner and possessor. Pleading the wrong action is how these cases are lost.
• It also supplies the standard four-element laches analysis, and a memorable application: a family that entrusts the land to the eldest sibling is not sleeping on its rights when that sibling sells behind its back.
• Read alongside De Guia v. Court of Appeals (possession suit yields recognition only) and the repudiation line — Delima, Heirs of Restar, Heirs of Reyes — which mark when the co-ownership, and with it the imprescriptibility, comes to an end.

VII. Separate Opinions