Facts

• The subject is two undivided parcels used as a fishpond at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, of about 79,220 square metres, registered under TCT No. 6358 in the names of Primitiva Lejano (½) and Lorenza Araniego, married to Juan Abejo (½). The title itself records two ideal halves and no metes and bounds — which is why no determinate portion can be delivered.
• On 30 July 1974, the heirs of Primitiva Lejano, "with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo," executed a "Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan" in favour of Aniano Victa and petitioner Manuel T. De Guia, over the entire fishpond, for ₱100,000, effective until 30 November 1979. The critical fact for the rent holding: the whole property had been leased out by agreement, so De Guia's continued occupation after expiry is not the "silent tolerance" case in which no rent is due.
• Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo, acquired her ½ undivided share by intestate succession and on 22 November 1983 sold it to his son, respondent Jose B. Abejo. (Abejo's entitlement to rent runs from this date, not from the lease's expiry.)
• The lease expired and De Guia neither surrendered the fishpond nor paid; written demands followed, "the last of which was on November 27, 1983." This demand letter fixes the start of the 6% interest under Article 2209.
• "In anticipation... that defendant will vacate the fishpond," Abejo entered on 21 December 1983 into a two-year "Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for ₱50,000 — a contract that "had to be cancelled and the amount of ₱50,000.00 returned" when De Guia would not leave. (That notarised lease, at ₱25,000 a year for the ½ share, becomes the measure of the reasonable rent, and the Court of Appeals held it "carries more evidentiary weight than the testimonies of DE GUIA's witnesses.")
• On 12 May 1986, Abejo sued De Guia for recovery of possession with damages in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16 (Civil Case No. 8796-M), alleging that De Guia "continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent."
• De Guia, a lawyer appearing for himself, answered on 12 January 1990 that the complaint states no cause of action and has prescribed; that the fishpond was originally owned by Maxima Termulo, whose only heir was Primitiva Lejano; that Abejo is not the owner of the ½ share, which he assailed as void; and that he himself owned an undivided half, seeking reimbursement as a builder in good faith. The Court later notes the professional edge: "DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take exclusive possession of a common property."
• His pre-trial brief of 31 July 1990 "raised as the only issue in the case the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO," and he submitted an Offer to Compromise for ₱300,000 plus a lease of the whole fishpond to anyone of Abejo's choosing. This narrowing is decisive: he "implicitly recognized ABEJO's ½ undivided share," and at trial "neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire FISHPOND."
• De Guia's claim to the other half rested on a February 1986 acquisition from the Lejano Heirs, pursued in Civil Case No. 86-27-M to annul a Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan of 10 November 1979 as signed under duress. That suit was dismissed on 28 February 1992, the documents declared valid and foreclosure ordered; the Court of Appeals affirmed on 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. (Still pending on reconsideration when this case was decided — hence the Court's careful reservation "without prejudice to the outcome of CA–G.R. CV No. 38031.")
• On 8 June 1992 the trial court ordered De Guia to turn over the ½ undivided portion, to share benefits equally pending partition, and to pay ₱262,500 compensatory damages and ₱20,000 attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed on 22 August 1994 and, on reconsideration (27 June 1995), reduced the damages to ₱212,500 — being ₱25,000 × 8½ years, the trial court having wrongly added the ₱50,000 returned to Villarico, which the 8½-year period already covered.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution dated 27 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory damages of ₱212,500 and attorney's fees of ₱20,000, and MODIFIED as follows: 1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo over the entire FISHPOND covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds is recognized without prejudice to the outcome of CA–G.R. CV No. 38031 pending before the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the same property; 2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy possession and use of the entire FISHPOND prior to partition; 3. The compensatory damages of ₱25,000 per annum representing rent from 27 November 1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until full payment; 4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of ₱25,000 from June 1992 until finality of this decision, with interest at 6% per annum during the same period, and thereafter at 12% interest per annum until full payment; 5. After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de Guia exclusively possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental of ₱25,000 for the latter's ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo secures from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in view of possible changed circumstances. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

• The definition and its consequence. Under Article 484 "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons"§; a co-owner of an undivided parcel "is an 'owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract'." Conversely "there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described."
• Article 487's reach. "[A]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment"§ — covering accion interdictal (MTC, within one year), accion publiciana (RTC, dispossession beyond a year) and accion de reivindicacion (RTC).
• Against a co-owner too — with a limit. "Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property."
• Engreso v. De La Cruz restated. "It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion. As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property."
• The facts narrowed themselves. "Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND since July 1974"; he initially disputed Abejo's title but "[s]ubsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJO's ½ undivided share by offering to settle the case for ₱300,000 and to vacate the property," and at trial "neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire FISHPOND."
• Equal in quantity and in quality. "[W]hile ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners"; they "are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion," yet each owns "a ½ portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified."
• Partition is the remedy that divides. "Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions."§ Neither had repudiated.
• The holding, recapitulated. "[A] co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND... An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA... However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND."
• Rent is not premature. "The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership."§ If one occupies alone "without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent"; "[c]onversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house... It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property. In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent. Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net profits."
• Applied. "The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA's lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent... Since ABEJO acquired his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJO's portion beginning from that date." The ₱25,000 per year is "the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property, considering the circumstances at that time," and Abejo may either occupy or seek a new rate.
• Interest. "ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision... Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality of this decision until full payment."§
• Damages are a question of fact. The issue "involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses," and under Rule 45 the Court "is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence," the more so where the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. There is "no cogent reason to overturn" the finding, and the ₱25,000 yearly figure is "reasonable."
• Attorney's fees. Fees lie "[w]here the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate... or to incur expenses to protect his interest"§; "DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take exclusive possession of a common property," and his settlement offer came "under conditions not acceptable to ABEJO."

Doctrine

1. A Co-Owner May Sue a Co-Owner (Art. 487§): The action lies "not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership."
2. But Only Recognition Follows: "[T]he only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant... [nor] recover any material or determinate part of the property."
3. The Abstract Share (Art. 484§): Before partition a co-owner has "an ideal or abstract quota"; he is "owner of the whole" yet owner of a portion "which is truly abstract."
4. Partition Is the Dividing Remedy (Art. 494§): Imprescriptible, not subject to laches, available at any time absent repudiation — and the proper forum for accounting of profits.
5. Rent Where the Property Was Leased (Art. 486§): A co-owner "cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership." No rent is due for occupation merely tolerated in silence; rent is due where the co-owners had agreed to lease, and profits are shared where a co-owner exploits the property as an industry.
6. Rent Runs From Acquisition of the Share: Here from 22 November 1983, at the rate fixed by a comparable notarised lease.
7. Interest on Arrears (Art. 2209§): 6% per annum from extrajudicial demand to finality, then 12% until payment — the 2003 framework.
8. Attorney's Fees (Art. 2208[2]§): Proper where the defendant's conduct compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

• The property is two undivided parcels used as a fishpond at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, of about 79,220 square metres, registered under TCT No. 6358 to "PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single - ½ share; and LORENZA ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, ½ share."
• On 30 July 1974, the heirs of Primitiva Lejano, "with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo," executed a "Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan" in favour of Aniano Victa and De Guia over the entire fishpond, for ₱100,000, effective "until November 30, 1979."
• Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo, acquired her ½ undivided share by intestate succession, and on 22 November 1983 sold it to his son, Jose B. Abejo.
• The lease expired and De Guia neither surrendered the fishpond nor paid; written demands followed, "the last of which was on November 27, 1983."
• On 21 December 1983, Abejo, "[i]n anticipation... that defendant will vacate the fishpond," entered into a two-year "Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for ₱50,000, which "had to be cancelled and the amount of ₱50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico when the defendant did not heed the demand to vacate."
• On 12 May 1986, Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16 (Civil Case No. 8796-M), alleging ownership of the ½ undivided portion of about 39,611 square metres and that De Guia "continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent."
• On 12 January 1990, De Guia — "a lawyer by profession, appear[ing] on his own behalf" — answered that the complaint "does not state a cause of action and has prescribed," that the fishpond was originally owned by Maxima Termulo whose only heir was Primitiva Lejano, that Abejo's ½ share was "void," that he himself owned an undivided half, and that he was entitled to reimbursement as a builder in good faith.
• On 31 July 1990, De Guia's pre-trial brief "raised as the only issue in the case the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO," and he submitted an Offer to Compromise for ₱300,000 plus a lease of the fishpond to any party of Abejo's choice.
• Hearing began 30 July 1990; Abejo rested 4 December 1990; De Guia's last witness finished 22 November 1991. His witnesses Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Peña testified to lower rentals in the locality, but "the documentary evidence (Exhs. 1 and 2) in support of their testimony were not offered as evidence."
• De Guia's claim to the other half rested on a February 1986 acquisition from the Lejano Heirs, litigated in Civil Case No. 86-27-M (RTC Malolos, Branch 12) to annul the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan of 10 November 1979 as executed under duress and without consideration. On 28 February 1992 that suit was dismissed, the documents declared "valid for all legal intents and purposes" and extrajudicial foreclosure ordered; the Court of Appeals affirmed on 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031, noting that Primitiva Lejano's son Renato Davis witnessed the signing and "found nothing irregular," and that notary Atty. Mamerto Abaño testified the parties affirmed the documents before him. A motion for reconsideration was still pending, so "[i]n the event the Court of Appeals' Decision attains finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he claims over the FISHPOND."
• On 8 June 1992, the trial court ordered De Guia to turn over the ½ undivided portion, to share benefits equally "effective immediately until such time that partition of the property is effected," and to pay ₱262,500 in actual damages and ₱20,000 attorney's fees. It noted Abejo had presented no evidence of any partition, and computed rent from November 1983 to 1991 — eight and a half years at ₱25,000 — adding the ₱50,000 returned to Villarico.
• On 22 August 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just like accounting when necessary," and that the notarised Villarico lease "carries more evidentiary weight" than De Guia's witnesses. On 27 June 1995, on reconsideration, it reduced the damages to ₱212,500, the ₱50,000 having been double-counted within the 8½-year period.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Manuel T. De Guia)

B. Private Respondent (Jose B. Abejo)

C. Common Ground

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

• Co-ownership defined. Under Article 484, "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons."§ A co-owner of an undivided parcel "is an 'owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract'." Conversely, "there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described."
• Article 487's scope. "[A]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment"§ — covering accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion, with their respective courts and periods.
• Suit against a co-owner, and its ceiling. "Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property."
• Engreso v. De La Cruz. "[B]efore a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property... the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half (½) of the building in favor of private respondent."
• Quantitative and qualitative equality. "[W]hile ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners... they are at the same time individual owners of a ½ portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified."
• Partition is the remedy. "Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership."§
• Rent before partition is proper. "The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership."§ Where one occupies "without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent"; "[i]t would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property." But "[i]n case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent," and "where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net profits."
• Applied to the fishpond. "The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA's lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent... Since ABEJO acquired his ½ undivided share... on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent... beginning from that date." Abejo has "the option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial court to fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years."
• Interest. Interest runs at 6% per annum from the 27 November 1983 extrajudicial demand until finality, "thereafter... 12% per annum from finality of this decision until full payment."§
• Factual findings stand. The damages issue "involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses," and under Rule 45 "[t]he Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below," especially where the CA affirmed. "We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts' evaluation of the witnesses' testimonies."
• Attorney's fees. Under Article 2208(2)§, "DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle the case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary expense and trouble to protect his interest."

B. Doctrines/Rules

1. Co-Owner v. Co-Owner (Art. 487§): The action lies, but its only effect is recognition of the co-ownership.
2. No Determinate Part Before Partition (Art. 484§): A co-owner's right "is represented only by an ideal portion," so no material or determinate part can be recovered or ordered delivered.
3. Partition Divides (Art. 494§): Imprescriptible, immune to laches, and the proper forum for accounting of profits.
4. Recognition Carries Equal Possession: As "a necessary consequence," the plaintiff co-owner may possess, use and enjoy the entire property.
5. Rent (Art. 486§): None for occupation tolerated in silence; rent is due where the co-owners agreed to lease the property, and profits are shared where a co-owner exploits it as an industry.
6. Measure and Start of Rent: A comparable notarised lease is good evidence of fair rental value, and rent runs from the plaintiff's acquisition of his share.
7. Interest (Art. 2209§): From extrajudicial demand.
8. Attorney's Fees (Art. 2208[2]§): Where the defendant's conduct compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

• The recognition of the co-ownership was expressly "without prejudice to the outcome of CA–G.R. CV No. 38031" — De Guia's separate suit over the other half — "and other cases involving the same property."
• No rent is due where a co-owner occupies alone without opposition and with no lease agreement; the co-owners' "silence" makes it unjust to charge him.
• The rental rate is not permanent: Abejo may "secure from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in view of possible changed circumstances," or simply take up his equal right to occupy.
• The 12% post-finality interest reflects the framework in force in 2003; Nacar v. Gallery Frames (2013) later set 6% for judgments becoming final from 1 July 2013.

D. Topic Integration

• The relationship is DIRECT.
• Within "j. Ejectment," this case supplies the ceiling on Article 487§. Plasabas and Navarro answer who may sue; Adlawan answers in what capacity; De Guia answers what the judgment can actually order — recognition and equal possession, never a determinate half.
• The pairing to hold in mind is Article 487 versus Article 494§: possession suits recognise the co-ownership, partition suits end it. Asking a court to hand over "the ½ undivided portion" asks the impossible, because until division that portion does not exist on the ground.
• On the money side it is the standard authority for when a co-owner in sole possession must pay rent. The distinction — silent tolerance versus an agreed lease, or exploitation as an industry — is the part worth memorising, and it is what put De Guia on the hook from 1983 onward.

VII. Separate Opinions