Bicarme v. Court of Appeals

n. Right to Demand Partition — Prescription

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Case DigestChapter III — Co-ownership

Bicarme v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 51914 · June 6, 1990 · Supreme Court

n. Right to Demand Partition — Prescription

Gist

An aunt held two Abra parcels alone for decades and sold off the cornland in pieces, claiming she had bought the land from strangers before the war. Her niece sued for partition thirty-four years after the aunt first brushed her off. The Court corrected the trial court's blanket statement that a co-owner can never acquire by prescription — she can — but held that this aunt had not, because paying taxes and staying silent are not repudiation, and where there is no repudiation there is no laches either.

Core Doctrine

The imprescriptibility of partition is real but narrow. "It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked" — a co-owner who "holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period... can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners," because at that point "the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership." But adversity against a co-owner needs three things: unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster, made known to the other co-owner, proved by clear and convincing evidence. Silent possession, receipt of fruits and payment of land taxes do not supply them.

Facts

Spouses Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of two parcels in Palao, Bangued, Abra: a cornland of about 8,721 square metres assessed at ₱400.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7764, and a riceland of about 1,539 square metres assessed at ₱60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7765.
The spouses died intestate, survived by three children — Victorina, Sebastian and Maria Bicarme. Sebastian died as a little boy without issue, and Victorina later died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme — so the co-ownership narrowed to two, Maria in her own right and Cristina by representation of her mother, each to one-half.
Victorina and Maria never partitioned the two parcels, even orally, and after Victorina's death the land "remained undivided and were therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme," Cristina having left Barrio Palao at eleven for Manila, where she married and lived at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, returning only at twenty-two, by which time her grandmother Florencia was dead.
Maria denied the co-ownership entirely, claiming she "acquired these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose" and had since been "in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner"; that Cristina never contributed to the taxes; and that Cristina "was presumed already dead." (The private document of purchase was never produced, allegedly because the papers "were placed in a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese Occupation." The riceland was sold in 1945 with no written evidence either — so "[f]or all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property.")
On her return as a married woman Cristina claimed her hereditary share, and Maria ignored and repudiated her demand — a refusal Maria's own counsel dated to "ever since the Japanese occupation when she was already of age." This is the moment the petitioner said the ten-year clock started; the Court holds it never started at all, because a bare refusal, unproved and unaccompanied by acts of ouster, is not the repudiation Section 41 requires.
Maria sold the cornland in three pieces: by Deed of Absolute Sale of 27 April 1973 to Marina Pizarro (portion No. 3, about 740 sq m); by another deed of the same date to Saturnino Pacopia (portion No. 2, about 1,836 sq m); and by a deed of 16 June 1965 to Casimira Pacopia (portion No. 1, about 1,265 sq m) — 3,481 square metres in all, "without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then of legal age."
Each of those deeds recited that Maria was "the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme." The recital destroys her own defence: by calling the land inherited she conceded it was never bought from the Bidaya spouses, and the trial court read the clause as a trust provision in Cristina's favour — "By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's rights thereto as a co-heir/co-owner."
Cristina sued for partition in 1974 before the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch 1 (Civil Case No. 786), her stated grievance being that Maria "refused to share with her the yearly fruits." (Maria's refusal, the Court later notes, "stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes" — a quarrel over contribution, not a claim of exclusive dominion.)
On 22 December 1975 the trial court ruled for Cristina: the two were "the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners... entitled in equal shares"; the deeds of sale were void as to Cristina's undivided one-half; Maria was to account for and pay the value of Cristina's half of the yearly fruits from the filing of the complaint — "seventy five bundles of palay valued at ₱375.00 with legal interest"; the parties were to agree on a written partition within fifteen days and appoint a Commissioner; Maria and "her hirelings and representatives" were forever enjoined from molesting him; and Maria was to pay attorney's fees and costs. (Attorney's fees appeared only in that dispositive paragraph and nowhere in the body of the decision — the defect that cost Cristina the award on review.)
On 28 August 1979 the Court of Appeals affirmed, and on 5 October 1979 denied reconsideration. Maria, assisted by her husband Jose Balubar, brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue

Main issue. Whether Maria acquired exclusive title by acquisitive prescription under Section 41 of Act No. 190, so that Cristina's action was no longer one for partition but one of ownership, and barred.

Secondary issues. (1) Whether the trial court was correct that a co-owner, being a trustee, can never acquire the common property by prescription. (2) Whether Cristina's claim was barred by laches. (3) Whether the award of attorney's fees could stand.

Ruling

Main issue. NO — Maria did not acquire by prescription, and the partition must proceed. The governing law is the old one, because the possession is old: Maria invoked "Secs. 40 and 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1116, Civil Code) then the applicable law, where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten years," and Section 40 gives ten years from accrual to sue for real property. The question then becomes "whether or not Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive prescription in her favor. One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole world." For a co-owner that requires three concurring things: "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing." None was present. Maria "disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are the inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations in her name, there is no written evidence that these were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes." And the general rule the Court adopts: "A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners." Maria's own deeds sealed it: each recited that she was "the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme," which is "in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir" — "[b]y admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's [rights] thereto as a co-heir/co-owner." As for the riceland, sold in 1945 with no written evidence, "[f]or all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property."

Secondary issue (1) — the trial court's premise. NO, it was too broad, though the result was right. The court below had held that "[a] co-owner is a trustee for the other co-owner. No one of the co-owners may acquire exclusive ownership of the common property thru prescription for possession by one trustee alone is not deemed adverse to the rest." The Supreme Court agrees with the first half but corrects the second: "It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire the property by prescription. An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibility of an action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership." Hence "the trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-owner/trustee."

Secondary issue (2) — laches. NO, it does not apply either. The two rise and fall together: "it follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription, (i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the right of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition will therefore prosper."

Secondary issue (3) — attorney's fees. NO, the award is eliminated. There was no "specific allegation thereon in her complaint," nor any showing that the case "is covered by any of the eleven (11) exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of the New Civil Code." Even the discretionary paragraph 11 "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture." And procedurally, "the matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded" — here "the matter of such fees was touched but once and appears only in the dispositive portion."

"ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award on attorney's fees is eliminated. Costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The imprescriptibility rule, stated. "It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe."
And immediately qualified. "It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked... An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners."
The moment the case changes character. "From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership."
The trial court's error, named. "[T]he trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-owner/trustee."
Which law applies, and why. Maria invoked "Secs. 40 and 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1116, Civil Code) then the applicable law, where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten years"; Section 40 fixes ten years from accrual for actions to recover real property.
The condition that failed. The question is "whether or not Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure... One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole world."
The three-part test for adversity between co-owners. "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing."
Tax payment is not repudiation. "Payment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights."
Nor was anything made known. "Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes."
What silent possession cannot prove. "A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners."
Acts adverse to strangers may not be adverse to co-owners. "Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-owners."
The deeds as an admission against interest. The recital "That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme" is "in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir" — "By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's [rights] thereto as a co-heir/co-owner."
An unproved purchase leaves the property inherited. The riceland was sold in 1945 with "[n]o written evidence"; "[f]or all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property."
Laches follows prescription. "[N]either can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription... the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply."
Attorney's fees need a stated reason. Article 2208 requires an allegation and a justification; the award "is a conclusion without a premise" where the fees are "touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision."

Doctrine

Partition Is Imprescriptible Only While the Thing Is Still Held in Common (Art. 494): "An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common."
A Co-Owner Can Acquire by Prescription: The contrary proposition — that a trustee co-owner may never prescribe — is expressly corrected as "not legally correct."
The Case Changes From Partition to Ownership the moment a co-owner "claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner... and denies the others any share therein."
Three Concurring Requisites of Adverse Possession Against a Co-Owner (Act 190, Sec. 41): unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster; made known to the other co-owner; proved by clear and convincing evidence.
What Does Not Count: silent possession, receipt of rents, fruits or profits, buildings, fences, planted trees, and payment of land taxes — "[a]cts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-owners."
Repudiation Cannot Be Made Known to Someone You Believe Is Dead: notice is an element, not a formality.
Old Possession Is Measured by Old Law (Art. 1116): prescription already running before 30 August 1950 is governed by Act No. 190, whose longest period is ten years.
No Prescription, No Laches: absent adverse and exclusive possession the case is not one of ownership at all, and the imprescriptibility of partition governs.
Attorney's Fees Require Allegation and Reasons in the Body of the Decision (Art. 2208): an award appearing only in the fallo falls.

How to place this case against its neighbours. This is the chapter's clearest failed repudiation, and it is worth learning as a matched pair with the successful ones. Heirs of Restar v. Heirs of Cichon succeeded because the possessor cancelled the decedent's tax declaration and took out one in his own name — an act the co-heirs were deemed to know of. Bicarme fails although Maria also paid taxes, because paying taxes on a declaration is not the same as replacing the declaration, and because Maria never told anyone. Delima v. Court of Appeals succeeded because a certificate of title issued, which is notice to the world. Set beside Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, the chapter's two limits on Article 494 stand out: it does not protect a claimant whose status as co-owner is denied (Alberto), and it does not survive a proved repudiation (Restar, Delima) — but short of those, as here, it holds.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya left a cornland and a riceland in Palao, Bangued, Abra to three children; two survived to matter — Maria, and Victorina, whose daughter Cristina took her place. Maria possessed both parcels alone for decades, paid the taxes, sold the cornland in three pieces between 1965 and 1973, and claimed she had bought the land from the Bidaya spouses in 1925 and 1926. Cristina sued for partition in 1974. The CFI of Abra declared them co-heirs in equal shares and voided the sales as to Cristina's half; the Court of Appeals affirmed on 28 August 1979; the Supreme Court affirmed with the sole modification that attorney's fees were eliminated. The central doctrine has two halves: a co-owner can acquire the common property by prescription — the trial court was wrong to say otherwise — but only on clear and convincing proof of unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster, made known to the other co-owner. Silent possession and tax payments are not such acts.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Spouses Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of two parcels in Palao, Bangued, Abra: a cornland, bounded north by a hill, east by Brono Barbers, south by Casimiro Palos and west by Clemente Baldozan, about 8,721 sq m, assessed at ₱400.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7764; and a riceland, bounded north by Macario Bolos, east by Roberto Bicarme, south by Juliana Baldozan and west by Telesporo, about 1,539 sq m, assessed at ₱60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7765.
The spouses died intestate, survived by Victorina, Sebastian and Maria Bicarme. Sebastian died a little boy, without issue.
Victorina died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme, who thereby succeeded to her mother's one-half interest and became co-heir with her aunt Maria.
Victorina and Maria never partitioned the parcels, even orally, and after Victorina's death the land "remained undivided and were therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme."
Cristina left Barrio Palao at eleven and returned only at twenty-two, by then married and residing at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City. By her return her grandmother Florencia was dead.
On her return Cristina claimed her hereditary share; Maria ignored and repudiated the demand. Cristina "admitted that ever since the Japanese occupation when she was already of age, her aunt Maria refused to recognize her rights to said lands."
Maria's account was different: she "acquired these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose," and had since possessed openly, publicly, peacefully, continuously and adversely as absolute owner; Cristina "never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes"; and Cristina "was presumed already dead." The private document of purchase was never produced, allegedly because the papers "were placed in a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese Occupation."
In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence of that sale was submitted either.
On 16 June 1965, Maria executed a Deed of Sale in favour of Casimira Pacopia over portion No. 1 of the cornland, about 1,265 sq m.
On 27 April 1973, Maria executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of Marina Pizarro over portion No. 3, about 740 sq m, and on the same date another in favour of Saturnino Pacopia over portion No. 2, about 1,836 sq m — 3,481 sq m in all, all "without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then of legal age."
Each of the three deeds contained the same recital: "That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme."
In 1974, Cristina filed this action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch 1 (Civil Case No. 786), her grievance being Maria's refusal to share the yearly fruits.
On 22 December 1975 the trial court ruled for Cristina, declaring the two "the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners... entitled in equal shares"; declaring the deeds of sale "null and void in so far as they affect and/or cover the one-half undivided share and inheritance of plaintiff"; ordering Maria "to account and/or pay the value corresponding to the one-half (½) undivided shares of Cristina Bicarme in the yearly fruits of the land and to commence from the filing of this complaint; that is seventy five bundles of palay valued at ₱375.00 with legal interest"; ordering the parties within fifteen days to "amicably agree upon a written partition" and appoint a Commissioner; ordering Maria "and her hirelings and representatives... forever... to refrain from molesting the Commissioner"; and ordering Maria to pay attorney's fees and costs.
On 28 August 1979 the Court of Appeals affirmed, and on 5 October 1979 denied reconsideration.
On 6 June 1990 the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed, with the sole modification that the award of attorney's fees was eliminated, and declared the decision "immediately executory."

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Maria Bicarme, assisted by Jose Balubar)

That the parcels were not inherited but purchased from the Bidaya spouses in 1925 and 1926, and held ever since "in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner"; that Cristina never contributed to the taxes and was presumed dead; and that in any event the claim was barred by prescription under Sections 40 and 41 of Act No. 190, the applicable law by force of Article 1116, "where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten years." Since Maria's repudiation dated from the Japanese Occupation, "Cristina's right of action already accrued and the period of prescription began to run," and the 1974 complaint came "some 34 years after it accrued. If she had any rights at all, Cristina slept on her rights."

B. Private Respondent (Cristina Bicarme)

That on her grandparents' death her mother Victorina and her aunt Maria became co-owners of the two parcels, and that on her mother's death she succeeded to Victorina's one-half share, becoming co-heir with Maria; and that she was compelled to sue for partition because Maria "refused to share with her the yearly fruits of the disputed parcels of land."

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether Maria acquired exclusive ownership by acquisitive prescription under Section 41 of Act No. 190, so as to defeat Cristina's action for partition.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether a co-owner, being a trustee for the others, can never acquire the common property by prescription — as the trial court held.
Whether Cristina's claim was barred by laches.
Whether the award of attorney's fees was proper.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

NO. The conditions of Section 41 were not met, the failing one being that "the possession must be adverse against the whole world." Adversity against a co-owner requires "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing." Here "[p]ayment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights"; "[n]either did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead"; and other than tax declarations "there is no written evidence" of the alleged purchase. Maria's own deeds recited that the cornland was inherited from her father, which "in effect, recognized Cristina's [rights] thereto as a co-heir/co-owner," and the riceland sale of 1945 being unproved, "[f]or all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property." Section 40's ten years therefore never began to run.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

The trial court's premise — corrected. "It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked... the trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-owner/trustee."
Laches — NO. "[N]either can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription... the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition will therefore prosper."
Attorney's fees — eliminated. No allegation in the complaint and no showing of any of the eleven exceptions in Article 2208; and fees "cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded."

"ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award on attorney's fees is eliminated. Costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The rule and its limit, in one passage. "It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire the property by prescription."
Why the limit exists. "An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners."
The change of character. "From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership."
The applicable law. Act No. 190 applies through Article 1116, "where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten years"; Section 40 gives ten years from accrual to recover real property.
The operative condition. "One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole world."
The three requisites. "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing."
Application, requisite by requisite. "Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are the inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations in her name, there is no written evidence that these were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes."
The general rule on silent possession. "Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-owners. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners."
The trust provision in the deeds. The recital that Maria was "the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme" was "in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir. We agree. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's [rights] thereto as a co-heir/co-owner."
The unproved purchases. "However, the private document relative to the purchase, was not produced at the trial... In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence was submitted. For all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property. The Identity of the cornland as inherited property can no longer be disputed, in view of Maria's admission in the deeds of sale she had executed, containing the trust provisions."
Laches rides on prescription. "[I]t follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription, (i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the right of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply."
Attorney's fees. Article 2208 requires an allegation or one of eleven exceptions; paragraph 11 "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture"; and "the matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Partition Is Imprescriptible Only While the Property Is Still Held in Common (Art. 494).
A Co-Owner May Acquire the Common Property by Prescription — the contrary proposition is "not legally correct."
When Exclusive Dominion Is Claimed, the Case Becomes One of Ownership, Not Partition.
Three Concurring Requisites of Adverse Possession Against a Co-Owner (Act 190, Sec. 41): unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster; made known to the co-owner; clear and convincing evidence.
Payment of Land Taxes Is Not Repudiation, nor are silent possession, receipt of fruits, buildings, fences or planted trees.
Notice Is an Element: a repudiation the co-owner could not learn of — here because she was believed dead — is no repudiation at all.
A Recital of Inheritance in One's Own Deed Is an Admission of Co-Ownership, operating as a trust provision in the omitted co-heir's favour.
Pre-1950 Possession Is Governed by Act No. 190 Through Article 1116, whose longest period is ten years.
Laches Cannot Apply Where Acquisitive Prescription Fails, because the case is then not one of ownership.
Attorney's Fees Must Be Alleged and Justified in the Body of the Decision (Art. 2208).

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Court does not say a co-owner's tax payments are irrelevant — only that alone they are equivocal. In Heirs of Restar v. Heirs of Cichon the possessor cancelled the decedent's declaration and issued one in his own name, which the Court there called "the first concrete act of repudiation," and tax declarations "coupled with actual possession" were evidence of great weight.
The correction of the trial court is a correction of reasoning, not of result: the decision below was affirmed in full but for the fees.
The ten-year period of Act No. 190 applies only because the possession predates the Civil Code; a possession begun after 30 August 1950 without title or good faith needs thirty years under Article 1137.
The nullity of the three deeds is only pro tanto — "in so far as they affect and/or cover the one-half undivided share and inheritance of plaintiff." Maria could and did validly sell her own undivided half.
The accounting runs only "from the filing of this complaint," not from the beginning of the exclusive possession.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
This case is where the chapter's central rule gets its precise statement. Students remember "an action for partition does not prescribe" and stop there; the Court's own gloss is that the maxim holds because "[a]n action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common," and it ends the moment that premise does.
Learn the three requisites here verbatim — unequivocal acts amounting to ouster, made known, clear and convincing evidence — because they are the test every other case in this group is applying, whether or not it lists them.
Use the case as the negative control. Maria did nearly everything a possessor does — decades of sole possession, all the taxes, sales to strangers, an express claim to be "sole and absolute owner" — and still failed, for two reasons worth separating: her acts were equivocal (taxes, silence) and her one unequivocal act, the deeds, contradicted her own defence by reciting inheritance.
Note the neat inversion of laches here against Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals. There, laches independently destroyed a claim; here, the Court holds laches cannot even be reached absent adverse possession, because the case is not one of ownership. The difference is that Alberto's claimant was never an admitted co-owner and Bicarme's was.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Leo D. Medialdea for the First Division, with Justice Narvasa (Chairman) and Justices Cruz and Gancayco concurring; Justice Griño-Aquino was on leave.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

The rule the Court both affirms and disciplines. Possession by one co-owner "is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe."

Then the correction, which is the reason this case is in the syllabus: "It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked... An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common."

Read that last sentence as the hinge. Article 494 keeps the remedy alive only while its premise holds — that the thing is still held in common. "From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership."

So the trial court reached the right result by the wrong route. Its proposition that "[n]o one of the co-owners may acquire exclusive ownership of the common property thru prescription" is too broad, and the Court says so: "the trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-owner/trustee."

Civil Code

Article 1116, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 1 (General Provisions)

Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required. (1939)

Why it is cited here

Why a 1990 decision measures possession by a 1901 statute. "Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required."

The aunt dated her possession to 1925 and 1926 and her refusal of the niece's demand to the Japanese Occupation — all long before the Civil Code took effect on 30 August 1950. So the applicable law is Act No. 190, "where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten years."

Note which side this transitional rule favours. Under Act 190 the possessor needs only ten years, against the thirty an Article 1137 possessor without title or good faith would need. A claimant facing an old possession is therefore in a worse position, not a better one — which is exactly why the aunt's counsel invoked it.

Labor Code

Section 40, Act No. 190

Period of prescription as to real estate

Act No. 190 (7 August 1901), Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings, Part I, Chapter III, Section 40

Period of prescription as to real estate. - An action for recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues.

Repealed law, still applied to old possession. Act No. 190 was the Code of Civil Procedure in force before the Civil Code of 1950. It survives in these cases through Article 1116 of the Civil Code — "Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force" — so a possession that began in the 1920s or 1940s is measured by ten years under Act 190, not by the thirty of Article 1137.

The practical effect is that the older the possession, the shorter the period the claimant faces. That is why counsel in these cases press Act 190 rather than the Civil Code.

Why it is cited here

The extinctive half of the aunt's defence: "An action for recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues."

Her argument built on it is arithmetically strong and was rejected on a premise, not on the count: the niece "asserted her claims 34 years after her right of action accrued," because "ever since the Japanese occupation when she was already of age, her aunt Maria refused to recognize her rights to said lands," and "[f]rom that moment when Maria ignored and repudiated Cristina's hereditary rights, Cristina's right of action already accrued and the period of prescription began to run."

The answer is that no cause of action ever accrued, because the co-ownership was never repudiated in the way the law requires. Where possession is not adverse, there is nothing for a ten-year clock to measure.

Labor Code

Section 41, Act No. 190

Title to land by prescription — the conditions of adverse possession

Act No. 190 (7 August 1901), Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings, Part I, Chapter III, Section 41

Title to land by prescription. - Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants. But failure to occupy or cultivate land solely by reason of war shall not be deemed to constitute an interruption of possession of the claimant, and his title by prescription shall be complete, if in other respects perfect, notwithstanding such failure to occupy or cultivate the land during the continuance of war.

The second sentence is the operative one in co-ownership cases. Possession must be "actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants" — and it is the last phrase, adversity against the whole world, that a co-owner almost never satisfies without proving repudiation.

The saving clause for "persons under disabilities" points to Section 42, which gives a claimant who was a minor, of unsound mind or in prison when the cause of action accrued three years after the disability is removed, over and above the ten.

The war proviso is not decorative. Possession interrupted only by the Japanese Occupation is treated as continuous, which is why claims resting on possession across the 1940s are not defeated by the years of displacement.

Why it is cited here

The acquisitive half, and the provision the case is actually decided under. The Court frames the question as "whether or not Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive prescription in her favor," and isolates the condition that fails: "One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole world."

For a co-owner, adversity has a three-part test, which is the sentence to memorise: "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing."

Each limb failed here. The acts were equivocal — "[p]ayment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights." Nothing was made known — "[n]either did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead." And the evidence was not clear and convincing: other than tax declarations, "there is no written evidence" of the claimed purchase.

Civil Code

Article 2208, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title XVIII (Damages1), Chapter 2 (Actual or Compensatory Damages)

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

Why it is cited here

The one point on which the petitioner won, and a drafting lesson worth keeping. Attorney's fees "cannot be recovered" absent stipulation "except" in the eleven enumerated instances.

The Court eliminates the award "in the absence of any specific allegation thereon in her complaint, or that the same is covered by any of the eleven (11) exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208." Even the catch-all of paragraph 11 — where the court deems fees just and equitable — "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture."

And the procedural rule that follows from it: "the matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded." Here it appeared only in the fallo, so it fell.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1116, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 1 (General Provisions)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Section 40, Act No. 190

Labor Code

Period of prescription as to real estate

Act No. 190 (7 August 1901), Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings, Part I, Chapter III, Section 40

The practical effect is that the older the possession, the shorter the period the claimant faces. That is why counsel in these cases press Act 190 rather than the Civil Code.

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Section 41, Act No. 190

Labor Code

Title to land by prescription — the conditions of adverse possession

Act No. 190 (7 August 1901), Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings, Part I, Chapter III, Section 41

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 2208, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title XVIII (Damages1), Chapter 2 (Actual or Compensatory Damages)

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

Why it is cited here

The one point on which the petitioner won, and a drafting lesson worth keeping. Attorney's fees "cannot be recovered" absent stipulation "except" in the eleven enumerated instances.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

Spouses Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of two parcels in Palao, Bangued, Abra: a cornland of about 8,721 square metres assessed at ₱400.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7764, and a riceland of about 1,539 square metres assessed at ₱60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7765.
The spouses died intestate, survived by three children — Victorina, Sebastian and Maria Bicarme. Sebastian died as a little boy without issue, and Victorina later died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme — so the co-ownership narrowed to two, Maria in her own right and Cristina by representation of her mother, each to one-half.
Victorina and Maria never partitioned the two parcels, even orally, and after Victorina's death the land "remained undivided and were therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme," Cristina having left Barrio Palao at eleven for Manila, where she married and lived at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, returning only at twenty-two, by which time her grandmother Florencia was dead.
Maria denied the co-ownership entirely, claiming she "acquired these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose" and had since been "in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner"; that Cristina never contributed to the taxes; and that Cristina "was presumed already dead." (The private document of purchase was never produced, allegedly because the papers "were placed in a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese Occupation." The riceland was sold in 1945 with no written evidence either — so "[f]or all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property.")
On her return as a married woman Cristina claimed her hereditary share, and Maria ignored and repudiated her demand — a refusal Maria's own counsel dated to "ever since the Japanese occupation when she was already of age." This is the moment the petitioner said the ten-year clock started; the Court holds it never started at all, because a bare refusal, unproved and unaccompanied by acts of ouster, is not the repudiation Section 41 requires.
Maria sold the cornland in three pieces: by Deed of Absolute Sale of 27 April 1973 to Marina Pizarro (portion No. 3, about 740 sq m); by another deed of the same date to Saturnino Pacopia (portion No. 2, about 1,836 sq m); and by a deed of 16 June 1965 to Casimira Pacopia (portion No. 1, about 1,265 sq m) — 3,481 square metres in all, "without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then of legal age."
Each of those deeds recited that Maria was "the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme." The recital destroys her own defence: by calling the land inherited she conceded it was never bought from the Bidaya spouses, and the trial court read the clause as a trust provision in Cristina's favour — "By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's rights thereto as a co-heir/co-owner."
Cristina sued for partition in 1974 before the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch 1 (Civil Case No. 786), her stated grievance being that Maria "refused to share with her the yearly fruits." (Maria's refusal, the Court later notes, "stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes" — a quarrel over contribution, not a claim of exclusive dominion.)
On 22 December 1975 the trial court ruled for Cristina: the two were "the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners... entitled in equal shares"; the deeds of sale were void as to Cristina's undivided one-half; Maria was to account for and pay the value of Cristina's half of the yearly fruits from the filing of the complaint — "seventy five bundles of palay valued at ₱375.00 with legal interest"; the parties were to agree on a written partition within fifteen days and appoint a Commissioner; Maria and "her hirelings and representatives" were forever enjoined from molesting him; and Maria was to pay attorney's fees and costs. (Attorney's fees appeared only in that dispositive paragraph and nowhere in the body of the decision — the defect that cost Cristina the award on review.)
On 28 August 1979 the Court of Appeals affirmed, and on 5 October 1979 denied reconsideration. Maria, assisted by her husband Jose Balubar, brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue

Ruling

"ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award on attorney's fees is eliminated. Costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The imprescriptibility rule, stated. "It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe."
And immediately qualified. "It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked... An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners."
The moment the case changes character. "From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership."
The trial court's error, named. "[T]he trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-owner/trustee."
Which law applies, and why. Maria invoked "Secs. 40 and 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1116, Civil Code) then the applicable law, where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten years"; Section 40 fixes ten years from accrual for actions to recover real property.
The condition that failed. The question is "whether or not Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure... One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole world."
The three-part test for adversity between co-owners. "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing."
Tax payment is not repudiation. "Payment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights."
Nor was anything made known. "Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes."
What silent possession cannot prove. "A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners."
Acts adverse to strangers may not be adverse to co-owners. "Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-owners."
The deeds as an admission against interest. The recital "That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme" is "in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir" — "By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's [rights] thereto as a co-heir/co-owner."
An unproved purchase leaves the property inherited. The riceland was sold in 1945 with "[n]o written evidence"; "[f]or all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property."
Laches follows prescription. "[N]either can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription... the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply."
Attorney's fees need a stated reason. Article 2208 requires an allegation and a justification; the award "is a conclusion without a premise" where the fees are "touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision."

Doctrine

Partition Is Imprescriptible Only While the Thing Is Still Held in Common (Art. 494): "An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common."
A Co-Owner Can Acquire by Prescription: The contrary proposition — that a trustee co-owner may never prescribe — is expressly corrected as "not legally correct."
The Case Changes From Partition to Ownership the moment a co-owner "claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner... and denies the others any share therein."
Three Concurring Requisites of Adverse Possession Against a Co-Owner (Act 190, Sec. 41): unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster; made known to the other co-owner; proved by clear and convincing evidence.
What Does Not Count: silent possession, receipt of rents, fruits or profits, buildings, fences, planted trees, and payment of land taxes — "[a]cts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-owners."
Repudiation Cannot Be Made Known to Someone You Believe Is Dead: notice is an element, not a formality.
Old Possession Is Measured by Old Law (Art. 1116): prescription already running before 30 August 1950 is governed by Act No. 190, whose longest period is ten years.
No Prescription, No Laches: absent adverse and exclusive possession the case is not one of ownership at all, and the imprescriptibility of partition governs.
Attorney's Fees Require Allegation and Reasons in the Body of the Decision (Art. 2208): an award appearing only in the fallo falls.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Spouses Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of two parcels in Palao, Bangued, Abra: a cornland, bounded north by a hill, east by Brono Barbers, south by Casimiro Palos and west by Clemente Baldozan, about 8,721 sq m, assessed at ₱400.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7764; and a riceland, bounded north by Macario Bolos, east by Roberto Bicarme, south by Juliana Baldozan and west by Telesporo, about 1,539 sq m, assessed at ₱60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 7765.
The spouses died intestate, survived by Victorina, Sebastian and Maria Bicarme. Sebastian died a little boy, without issue.
Victorina died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme, who thereby succeeded to her mother's one-half interest and became co-heir with her aunt Maria.
Victorina and Maria never partitioned the parcels, even orally, and after Victorina's death the land "remained undivided and were therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme."
Cristina left Barrio Palao at eleven and returned only at twenty-two, by then married and residing at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City. By her return her grandmother Florencia was dead.
On her return Cristina claimed her hereditary share; Maria ignored and repudiated the demand. Cristina "admitted that ever since the Japanese occupation when she was already of age, her aunt Maria refused to recognize her rights to said lands."
Maria's account was different: she "acquired these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose," and had since possessed openly, publicly, peacefully, continuously and adversely as absolute owner; Cristina "never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes"; and Cristina "was presumed already dead." The private document of purchase was never produced, allegedly because the papers "were placed in a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese Occupation."
In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence of that sale was submitted either.
On 16 June 1965, Maria executed a Deed of Sale in favour of Casimira Pacopia over portion No. 1 of the cornland, about 1,265 sq m.
On 27 April 1973, Maria executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of Marina Pizarro over portion No. 3, about 740 sq m, and on the same date another in favour of Saturnino Pacopia over portion No. 2, about 1,836 sq m — 3,481 sq m in all, all "without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then of legal age."
Each of the three deeds contained the same recital: "That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme."
In 1974, Cristina filed this action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch 1 (Civil Case No. 786), her grievance being Maria's refusal to share the yearly fruits.
On 22 December 1975 the trial court ruled for Cristina, declaring the two "the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners... entitled in equal shares"; declaring the deeds of sale "null and void in so far as they affect and/or cover the one-half undivided share and inheritance of plaintiff"; ordering Maria "to account and/or pay the value corresponding to the one-half (½) undivided shares of Cristina Bicarme in the yearly fruits of the land and to commence from the filing of this complaint; that is seventy five bundles of palay valued at ₱375.00 with legal interest"; ordering the parties within fifteen days to "amicably agree upon a written partition" and appoint a Commissioner; ordering Maria "and her hirelings and representatives... forever... to refrain from molesting the Commissioner"; and ordering Maria to pay attorney's fees and costs.
On 28 August 1979 the Court of Appeals affirmed, and on 5 October 1979 denied reconsideration.
On 6 June 1990 the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed, with the sole modification that the award of attorney's fees was eliminated, and declared the decision "immediately executory."

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Maria Bicarme, assisted by Jose Balubar)

B. Private Respondent (Cristina Bicarme)

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether Maria acquired exclusive ownership by acquisitive prescription under Section 41 of Act No. 190, so as to defeat Cristina's action for partition.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether a co-owner, being a trustee for the others, can never acquire the common property by prescription — as the trial court held.
Whether Cristina's claim was barred by laches.
Whether the award of attorney's fees was proper.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

The trial court's premise — corrected. "It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked... the trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-owner/trustee."
Laches — NO. "[N]either can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription... the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition will therefore prosper."
Attorney's fees — eliminated. No allegation in the complaint and no showing of any of the eleven exceptions in Article 2208; and fees "cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The rule and its limit, in one passage. "It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire the property by prescription."
Why the limit exists. "An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners."
The change of character. "From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership."
The applicable law. Act No. 190 applies through Article 1116, "where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten years"; Section 40 gives ten years from accrual to recover real property.
The operative condition. "One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole world."
The three requisites. "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing."
Application, requisite by requisite. "Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are the inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations in her name, there is no written evidence that these were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes."
The general rule on silent possession. "Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-owners. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners."
The trust provision in the deeds. The recital that Maria was "the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme" was "in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir. We agree. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's [rights] thereto as a co-heir/co-owner."
The unproved purchases. "However, the private document relative to the purchase, was not produced at the trial... In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence was submitted. For all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property. The Identity of the cornland as inherited property can no longer be disputed, in view of Maria's admission in the deeds of sale she had executed, containing the trust provisions."
Laches rides on prescription. "[I]t follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription, (i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the right of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply."
Attorney's fees. Article 2208 requires an allegation or one of eleven exceptions; paragraph 11 "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture"; and "the matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Partition Is Imprescriptible Only While the Property Is Still Held in Common (Art. 494).
A Co-Owner May Acquire the Common Property by Prescription — the contrary proposition is "not legally correct."
When Exclusive Dominion Is Claimed, the Case Becomes One of Ownership, Not Partition.
Three Concurring Requisites of Adverse Possession Against a Co-Owner (Act 190, Sec. 41): unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster; made known to the co-owner; clear and convincing evidence.
Payment of Land Taxes Is Not Repudiation, nor are silent possession, receipt of fruits, buildings, fences or planted trees.
Notice Is an Element: a repudiation the co-owner could not learn of — here because she was believed dead — is no repudiation at all.
A Recital of Inheritance in One's Own Deed Is an Admission of Co-Ownership, operating as a trust provision in the omitted co-heir's favour.
Pre-1950 Possession Is Governed by Act No. 190 Through Article 1116, whose longest period is ten years.
Laches Cannot Apply Where Acquisitive Prescription Fails, because the case is then not one of ownership.
Attorney's Fees Must Be Alleged and Justified in the Body of the Decision (Art. 2208).

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Court does not say a co-owner's tax payments are irrelevant — only that alone they are equivocal. In Heirs of Restar v. Heirs of Cichon the possessor cancelled the decedent's declaration and issued one in his own name, which the Court there called "the first concrete act of repudiation," and tax declarations "coupled with actual possession" were evidence of great weight.
The correction of the trial court is a correction of reasoning, not of result: the decision below was affirmed in full but for the fees.
The ten-year period of Act No. 190 applies only because the possession predates the Civil Code; a possession begun after 30 August 1950 without title or good faith needs thirty years under Article 1137.
The nullity of the three deeds is only pro tanto — "in so far as they affect and/or cover the one-half undivided share and inheritance of plaintiff." Maria could and did validly sell her own undivided half.
The accounting runs only "from the filing of this complaint," not from the beginning of the exclusive possession.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
This case is where the chapter's central rule gets its precise statement. Students remember "an action for partition does not prescribe" and stop there; the Court's own gloss is that the maxim holds because "[a]n action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common," and it ends the moment that premise does.
Learn the three requisites here verbatim — unequivocal acts amounting to ouster, made known, clear and convincing evidence — because they are the test every other case in this group is applying, whether or not it lists them.
Use the case as the negative control. Maria did nearly everything a possessor does — decades of sole possession, all the taxes, sales to strangers, an express claim to be "sole and absolute owner" — and still failed, for two reasons worth separating: her acts were equivocal (taxes, silence) and her one unequivocal act, the deeds, contradicted her own defence by reciting inheritance.
Note the neat inversion of laches here against Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals. There, laches independently destroyed a claim; here, the Court holds laches cannot even be reached absent adverse possession, because the case is not one of ownership. The difference is that Alberto's claimant was never an admitted co-owner and Bicarme's was.