Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals

n. Right to Demand Partition — Prescription

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Case DigestChapter III — Co-ownership

Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-29759 · May 18, 1989 · Supreme Court

n. Right to Demand Partition — Prescription

Gist

An eighteen-year-old sued for acknowledgment as a natural child and for partition of his alleged father's estate, seven years after the intestate proceedings that had left him out were closed. The Supreme Court held the suit barred three times over — by the final order of distribution, by the four-year period to rescind a partition, and by laches — and made the point that matters for co-ownership: the imprescriptibility of a partition action under Article 494 protects only someone the others have recognized as a co-owner.

Core Doctrine

Article 494's rule that an action for partition does not prescribe operates only "so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized." Where the defendants "had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly," the rule "does not apply," and the claimant is thrown back on the ordinary periods — here the four years of Article 1100 to rescind a partition approved by the intestate court, which had long run. Minority is no shield: under Article 1108 prescription runs against minors who have parents or guardians.

Facts

On 10 September 1942, Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. was born to Andrea Jongco, who alleged that in 1941 she and Antonio C. Alberto "lived together as husband and wife," both then single and free to marry, and that after the birth Alberto continued to support the child and introduced him publicly as his natural son.
About 1944, Alberto and Jongco separated, and Alberto married Natividad del Rosario, of which marriage two children were born — Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr. (the legitimate namesake). (The trial court found the marriage was celebrated twice: a secret civil ceremony in Pililla, Rizal in 1941, ratified religiously in 1944 — which is why Natividad gave two different years and was, on the record, correct both times. All pre-war records of Pililla were destroyed in the war, so no certificate could be produced.)
Andrea Jongco learned of that marriage in 1944 and "took no steps to protect the interests of her child." This is the date the laches clock is measured from — sixteen years before suit, and while the alleged father was still alive to answer.
On 3 July 1949, Antonio C. Alberto died. The one date from which every period in the case is counted: four years to sue for recognition, and the point after which, as the Court puts it, the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death.
On 17 July 1949, his widow Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto instituted intestate proceedings for his estate before the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 9092, without notice to the child.
The claimant alleged that in those proceedings the widow and her children "deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs" and so "succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among themselves."
On 9 November 1953, the intestate proceedings were terminated by an order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled, the court also declaring who the heirs were. (The estate was valued in the complaint at ₱74,963.81, of which the claimant said he was entitled to at least ₱18,000.00.) This order is both the judgment that binds him and the date from which the four-year rescission period runs.
On 8 September 1960, the claimant — then eighteen, assisted by his mother as natural guardian — filed a complaint for acknowledgment and partition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying to be declared the natural child of the deceased, that his one-fourth share be turned over, and for ₱5,000.00 attorney's fees.
On 21 September 1960, the widow and her children moved to dismiss on two grounds: the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, and it was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion was denied on 11 November 1960, and the case went to trial.
On 10 August 1964, the trial court dismissed the complaint, disbelieving Andrea Jongco. It found her testimony contradicted by the deceased's brothers and sister — Jose, Zoilo and Pilar Alberto, who had "no pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome" and testified that during the period in question the deceased "lived with his mother and brothers at the family residence except for his brief stint with the army." (It also found that Jongco had five other children by four different men, from which it reasoned that her "propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness that any particular person is the father of any one of her children," and held the corroborating witnesses Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta "deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco.")
On 31 August 1968, the Court of Appeals reversed, declaring the claimant an acknowledged natural child, owner pro indiviso of one-fifth of the estate subject to the widow's usufructuary rights under Article 834 of the old Civil Code, and ordering delivery of that share with costs. It had credited Cailan and Peralta and relied on the child's birth certificate and baptismal certificate. (On review the Supreme Court points out that a birth certificate "not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.")
Reconsideration was denied on 14 October 1968, and the widow and her children came to the Supreme Court, which gave the petition due course on 27 November 1968 and decided it on 18 May 1989.

Issue

Main issue. Whether the action for partition of the estate had prescribed, given that an action for partition among co-owners ordinarily does not.

Secondary issues. (1) Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court having by then been created. (2) Whether the action was barred by prior judgment — the final order of distribution in the intestate proceedings. (3) Whether the claimant was guilty of laches. (4) Whether the Court of Appeals' factual findings on filiation could be reviewed and reversed.

Ruling

Main issue. YES — the action had prescribed, and Article 494's rule of imprescriptibility did not save it. The Court applies Article 1100 — "The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made" — and identifies the substance of the complaint by way of Article 1104: "That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104." The period runs "from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court," which here was 9 November 1953, "so that said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9, 1957. Hence, the present action filed on September 8, 1960... is already barred by prescription." Relabelling the suit does not help: "Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription, for... to be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible." Then comes the sentence the case is assigned for: "While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar." Minority is no answer, because Article 1108 makes prescription run "against... [m]inors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives," and the claimant "who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision." The filiation claim fails on the same ground: under Article 285 the action may be brought during the parent's lifetime, or within four years of majority if the parent died during minority, but "if the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority," so "the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father." The father died 3 July 1949; the complaint came "eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in." And in any event the suit fails under Article 1146 and Article 1149, "which provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues."

Secondary issue (1) — jurisdiction. NO, the objection fails. Raised for the first time on appeal, it is "untenable": "the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal," and "a party who had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction." The point is moreover academic — "there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts."

Secondary issue (2) — bar by prior judgment. YES, the suit is barred. "[I]nsolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound." The court "acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed... and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them." So "a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees," and the only opening is "when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence" — and even then "the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action."

Secondary issue (3) — laches. YES, the claimant is guilty of it. Laches is "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier," and warrants "a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The delay is unexplained and prejudicial: the action could have been filed "in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of the marriage of the deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become too old to give coherent testimony." As the trial court put it, "[u]ndue delay in the separate enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of lack of merit in this claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded." And the Court's own summation: "laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites subvenit."

Secondary issue (4) — review of the facts. YES, review was proper and the trial court is restored. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are ordinarily final, but this case "falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court." On the merits, "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated... is not competent evidence of paternity"; the appellate court's inference that Pililla was chosen so that no marriage certificate need be produced "is purely conjectural"; and "conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses." "After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the contending parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial court."

"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Article 494 rule is conditional, and the condition failed. "While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar."
A preterited heir's remedy is rescission, and rescission has a period. Article 1104 shows that "an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested," and Article 1100 gives it "four years from the time the partition was made."
The four years run from court approval. "[T]he four years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court" — approval 9 November 1953, expiry 9 November 1957, complaint 8 September 1960.
Recharacterising the action does not restart the clock. "[T]o be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations."
And every fallback label is also time-barred. Article 1146 and Article 1149 "provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues."
Minority does not suspend prescription where there is a parent or guardian. "Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives" — and the claimant, whose mother filed the suit for him, "falls squarely under the above-cited provision."
The same rule shortens the recognition action. Under Article 285 a child whose presumed parent died during his minority normally has four years from majority, "[h]owever, if the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority," so the action "must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father."
Settlement of an estate binds the world. "[I]nsolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound."
A final order of distribution vests title. It "vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees," and may be undone only where a party "is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence" — the proper move being a motion to reopen the same case, "instead of an independent action, the effect of which, if successful, would be... for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of."
Laches, defined and applied. "[T]he failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier," raising "a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
Why delay prejudices, in the Court's own words. "Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly lost... laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
The maxim. "Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites subvenit" — and "The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act."
When appellate findings may be reviewed. Among the recognised exceptions is "when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court," which is this case.
An unsigned birth certificate proves nothing as to paternity. "[A] birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity."

Doctrine

Imprescriptibility Under Article 494 Depends on Recognition: The action for partition does not prescribe "so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized." Against parties who "never recognized [the claimant] as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly," the rule "does not apply."
A Preterited Compulsory Heir Sues to Rescind (Art. 1104), and Has Four Years (Art. 1100): Counted from the court's approval of the partition, not from discovery of the omission.
Recovery of Property Presupposes Rescission: A claim to property already distributed cannot be pressed without first unwinding the partition, so it inherits the rescission period.
Residual Periods Close the Gap (Arts. 1146 and 1149): Four years for injury to rights, five for anything unclassified.
Minority Is Not a Suspension Where There Is a Parent or Guardian (Art. 1108): Prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, runs against such a minor — and correspondingly shortens the recognition action under Article 285 to four years from the parent's death.
Settlement Proceedings Are In Rem: Binding on all interested persons "whether they were notified or not," through publication.
A Final Order of Distribution Vests Title: Relief for one left out lies by motion to reopen within the reglementary period, not by an independent action years later.
Laches Is a Separate Bar: Unreasonable, unexplained delay raises a presumption of abandonment and "may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
Appellate Findings May Be Reviewed When They Contradict the Trial Court's, whose advantage in seeing the witnesses is decisive absent strong and cogent reasons.

How to place this case in the chapter. Every other case under this heading asks whether an admitted co-ownership was broken by repudiation. This one asks the prior question — whether the claimant was ever in the co-ownership at all. Read it as the front gate: Article 494 suspends prescription for recognised co-owners, so a claimant whose very status is denied must win that fight within the ordinary periods before the shelter is available to him. Set beside Heirs of Restar v. Heirs of Cichon and Delima v. Court of Appeals, where the claimants were indisputably co-heirs and still lost by sleeping on their rights, the chapter's lesson is uniform: the imprescriptibility of partition is narrower than students remember.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., born 10 September 1942 to Andrea Jongco, sued on 8 September 1960 to be acknowledged as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto, who died 3 July 1949, and to be given a share of an estate that had been settled and distributed in Special Proceedings No. 9092, terminated 9 November 1953. The CFI of Manila dismissed; the Court of Appeals reversed and gave him a one-fifth pro indiviso share; the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court. The action was barred by the final order of distribution (a proceeding in rem), by prescription — four years from approval of the partition, with minority no defence — and by laches. For the chapter, the holding is that Article 494's non-prescription rule "does not apply" where the defendants "had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly."

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

In 1941, according to the complaint, Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco "lived together as husband and wife," both single and without legal impediment to marry.
Also in 1941, according to the defence, Alberto and Natividad del Rosario were married in a secret civil ceremony at Pililla, Rizal, sponsored among others by Damaso Herrera; the marriage was religiously ratified in 1944. All pre-war records of Pililla were destroyed during the war.
On 10 September 1942, Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. was born. The complaint alleged that his father continued to support him, "introduc[ed] him to the public as his natural child," and that "even the family of his father recognized him as such."
About 1944, the father and mother separated; Andrea Jongco learned of Alberto's marriage to Natividad del Rosario. Two children were born of that marriage — Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.
On 3 July 1949, Antonio C. Alberto died.
On 17 July 1949, Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto instituted intestate proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Special Proceedings No. 9092, without notice to the claimant.
On 9 November 1953, the intestate proceedings were terminated by an order of distribution "directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto," the court also declaring who the heirs of the deceased were.
On 8 September 1960, the claimant — a minor of eighteen, assisted by his mother as natural guardian — filed a complaint for acknowledgment and partition in the same court, alleging the deliberate omission of his name from the intestate proceedings, an estate worth ₱74,963.81, an entitlement of at least ₱18,000.00, and "absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings." He prayed to be acknowledged as a natural child, for delivery of his one-fourth share, and for ₱5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs.
On 21 September 1960, the defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of prior judgment and the statute of limitations; opposition was filed 22 October 1960, and the motion denied on 11 November 1960.
On 18 November 1964, the defendants answered; on 23 November 1964 the claimant answered the counterclaim.
On 10 August 1964, the trial court (Judge Francisco Arca) rendered judgment for the defendants: "the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed." It disbelieved Andrea Jongco, whose account was contradicted by the deceased's siblings Jose, Zoilo and Pilar Alberto — disinterested witnesses who placed the deceased at the family residence throughout — and found the corroborating testimony of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta "inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco." It also found Jongco had five other children by four different men.
On 31 August 1968, the Court of Appeals (penned by Justice Carmelino J. Alvendia, with Justices Julio Villamor and Ruperto G. Martin) reversed, declaring the claimant "an acknowledged Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto" and "the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate," subject to the widow's usufructuary rights under Article 834 of the old Civil Code, with costs. It credited Cailan and Peralta and relied on the birth certificate and baptismal certificate, and doubted Natividad's credibility over the two marriage dates and the missing certificate.
On 14 October 1968, reconsideration was denied. The petition for review was given due course on 27 November 1968.
On 18 May 1989, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's dismissal.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto and her children)

Seven errors were assigned. First, that the CFI had no jurisdiction, questions of paternity and acknowledgment belonging after R.A. No. 1401 to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court — an objection admittedly raised for the first time on appeal, but urged as non-waivable. Second, that the action was barred by prior judgment, the intestate proceedings having been terminated 9 November 1953 with a declaration of heirs. Third, that it had prescribed. Fourth, that the claimant was guilty of laches. Fifth to seventh, that the Court of Appeals reversed on a misapprehension of facts, gave credence to testimony the trial court found riddled with "serious contradictions, inconsistencies and improbabilities," "arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded petitioners' evidence," and erred in declaring the claimant an acknowledged natural child owning one-fifth of the estate.

B. Private Respondent (Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., assisted by Andrea Jongco)

That he was the natural child of the deceased, born when both parents were free to marry, supported and publicly acknowledged; that he was deliberately omitted from the intestate proceedings, of which he had "absolutely no previous knowledge," learning of them "only recently"; and that on demand the petitioners refused to give him his share. He resisted prescription on the ground of his minority.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether the action for partition of the decedent's estate had prescribed, notwithstanding the rule that an action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over an action for acknowledgment and partition after the creation of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Whether the action was barred by prior judgment — the terminated intestate proceedings and their order of distribution.
Whether the claimant was guilty of laches.
Whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals on filiation could be reviewed and reversed.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

YES, the action had prescribed. Article 1104 identifies rescission as the proper action for a preterited compulsory heir alleging bad faith or fraud, and Article 1100 gives it "four years from the time the partition was made," running "from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court." Approval was 9 November 1953; "said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9, 1957"; the complaint was filed 8 September 1960. Recovery of property cannot be sought without first rescinding, and the partition "can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations"; in any case Articles 1146 and 1149 would bar it. "While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar." Minority is no exemption, and under Article 285 as applied to a minor with a guardian, "the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father" — here eleven years had passed.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Jurisdiction — objection rejected. "[T]he question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal"; a party who "voluntarily participated in the trial... cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction"; and "there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today," their functions having passed to the Regional Trial Courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Prior judgment — YES, barred. Settlement of a decedent's estate is a proceeding in rem, "binding against the whole world," and "a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees." Relief for one left out is by motion to reopen within the reglementary period, not an independent action.
Laches — YES. The delay was "unreasonable and unexplained" and prejudicial; suit could have been brought in 1944 rather than sixteen years later, "when the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death."
Review of facts — YES, and the trial court is restored. The case falls in the exception "when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court," and "no cogent reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial court."

"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The conditional character of Article 494. "While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized... petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription... does not apply to the case at bar."
Rescission is the preterited heir's action. "That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104."
Four years from approval. "Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9, 1957." "[T]he four years period... should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court."
No escape by recharacterisation. "[T]o be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings... Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations."
The residual periods. Article 1146 and Article 1149 "provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues."
Minority with a parent or guardian. "Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision."
The recognition period. "[I]f the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority... In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father."
A proceeding in rem. "[I]nsolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound."
The order of distribution. It "vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees," undoable only for "circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence," and then better by reopening than by an independent action that would "reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of."
Laches defined. "[T]he failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier."
Why delay is fatal. "The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts. Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses... laches or unreasonable delay... is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
Trial court's advantage. "[C]onclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying."
Unsigned birth certificate. "[A] birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Recognition Is the Condition of Imprescriptibility (Art. 494).
Preterition of a Compulsory Heir Is Remedied by Rescission (Art. 1104), Within Four Years of the Court's Approval (Art. 1100).
A Recovery Claim Against a Distributed Estate Presupposes Rescission and Shares Its Period.
Four and Five Years Are the Residual Floors (Arts. 1146, 1149).
Prescription Runs Against a Minor Who Has a Parent or Guardian (Art. 1108) — and so the Article 285 action runs from the parent's death, not from majority.
Estate Settlement Binds the World; the Order of Distribution Vests Title.
Laches Bars Independently of Prescription.
Jurisdiction Not Raised Below Cannot Be Raised on Appeal by One Who Litigated on the Merits.
Appellate Findings Contrary to the Trial Court's May Be Reviewed.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Court did not hold that a preterited heir is remediless. Article 1104 itself preserves a proportionate money claim against the other heirs, and the in rem rule leaves open relief for one "left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence" — but by motion to reopen within the reglementary period.
The Article 1108 rule cuts only against a minor who has a parent, guardian or legal representative; the same article gives such a person "a right to claim damages from [his] legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription."
The filiation ruling rests on the trial court's credibility findings, not on any rule that natural children cannot inherit; and the Court expressly did not reach the sixth and seventh assignments of error.
A dating caveat. The reported sequence has the trial court's decision on 10 August 1964 and the answer on 18 November 1964; the decision reproduces both dates without reconciling them.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
The chapter's other prescription and repudiation cases all begin from an admitted co-ownership. This one supplies the missing premise: Article 494 protects the co-owner whose status is recognised, and where it is denied outright the claimant must establish it inside the ordinary periods.
Practically, this reorders the analysis. Before asking "was there a repudiation, and when?" ask "is this person admitted to be a co-owner at all?" If not, no repudiation is needed — there is nothing to repudiate — and the ordinary prescriptive periods apply from the start.
It also introduces laches as an independent bar in this chapter, one that can defeat a claim even where a period has not technically expired. Note the pairing the Court makes: prescription is about the calendar; laches is about prejudice — sealed lips, aged witnesses, properties long since "distributed and disposed of."
Finally, it marks the boundary between estate settlement and partition of a co-ownership. Once an order of distribution becomes final, the vehicle is a motion to reopen in that proceeding, not a fresh partition suit — which is why the imprescriptible-partition argument was never really available to this claimant.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin for the Third Division, with Chief Justice Fernan and Justices Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

The provision the case is assigned for, and it appears here as a limit rather than a shelter. The Court states the rule and then withdraws it in a single breath: "While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar."

That is the sentence to carry away. Imprescriptibility is not a property of partition suits as such — it is a consequence of a subsisting, acknowledged co-ownership. A claimant whose status as co-owner is itself denied cannot borrow the protection, because the very thing that suspends prescription (recognition) is what he is suing to establish.

Compare the repudiation cases, which come at the same rule from the other side. There the claimant was admittedly a co-owner and the defendant had to prove he broke the recognition; here the claimant was never inside the co-ownership to begin with, so there was nothing to repudiate and nothing to suspend.

Civil Code

Article 1100, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Subsection 3 (Rescission and Nullity of Partition)

The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made. (1076)

Why it is cited here

The period that actually barred the suit. "The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made."

The Court reads the complaint for what it substantively is: to recover from an estate already distributed, the claimant "must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible." Calling the action one for recovery of property does not escape the period.

Counting is done from court approval, not from discovery: "the four years period provided in Article 1100... should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36)." Approval came 9 November 1953, so the period expired 9 November 1957; the complaint was filed 8 September 1960.

Civil Code

Article 1104, Civil Code

A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him. (1080)

Why it is cited here

Why rescission is the right vehicle for a preterited heir, which is what makes Article 1100's four years the governing period. "A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested."

The Court uses it as a classification tool: "That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104."

Note the article's second half, which the decision does not reach but which is worth knowing: even where rescission is refused, the other heirs "shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him" — a money remedy that survives the refusal to unwind the partition, though it too must be sued on in time.

Civil Code

Article 1108, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 1 (General Provisions)

Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:

(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives;

(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before their disappearance, or appointed by the courts;

(3) Persons living abroad, who have managers or administrators;

(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.

Persons who are disqualified from administering their property have a right to claim damages from their legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription. (1932a)

Why it is cited here

The answer to the plea of minority. "Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives."

The claimant was born in 1942 and sued at eighteen; his mother, Andrea Jongco, filed for him as natural guardian. That is exactly the case the paragraph covers — "Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision."

The provision has a matching consolation the Court does not need to apply: a person disqualified from administering his property "[has] a right to claim damages from [his] legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription." The clock runs, but the guardian who let it run may answer for it.

Civil Code

Article 285, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book I (Persons), Title VIII (Paternity and Filiation), Chapter 4 (Illegitimate Children), Section 1 (Recognition of Natural Children)

The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (137a)

Why it is cited here

The filiation half of the bar, quoted for its first exception: the action for recognition of a natural child may be brought "only during the lifetime of the presumed parents," except that "[i]f the father or mother died during the minority of the child... the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority."

That exception looked like the claimant's best route — his alleged father died in 1949, when he was seven. The Court closes it with the guardian rule: "if the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority," in which event "the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father." Death was 3 July 1949; the complaint came "eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in."

Civil Code

Article 1146, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 3 (Prescription of Actions)

The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)

Why it is cited here

The first of the two catch-all periods the Court invokes as a final alternative — "The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff."

"[E]ven granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, this action would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code which provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues."

The reasoning is worth the habit it teaches: when a claimant recharacterises his action to dodge a period, ask what period the new characterisation carries. Here every available label — rescission, injury to rights, or none of the above — produced a period shorter than the eleven years that had passed.

(The paragraph on Martial Law acts in the library text was added by P.D. No. 1755, 24 December 1980. It is not in play here; only paragraph (1) is.)

Civil Code

Article 1149, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 3 (Prescription of Actions)

All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n)

Why it is cited here

The residual period, cited alongside Article 1146 to close the last escape: "All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues."

It matters because it is the floor. Even an action the Code nowhere classifies gets five years — so a claimant who waited eleven cannot be saved by finding a category no one has thought of. That is why the Court can dispose of the prescription assignment without settling precisely what the action was.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1100, Civil Code

Civil Code

The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made. (1076)

Why it is cited here

The period that actually barred the suit. "The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made."

Full entry below ↓

Article 1104, Civil Code

Civil Code

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1108, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 1 (General Provisions)

Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:

(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives;

(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before their disappearance, or appointed by the courts;

(3) Persons living abroad, who have managers or administrators;

(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.

Persons who are disqualified from administering their property have a right to claim damages from their legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription. (1932a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 285, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book I (Persons), Title VIII (Paternity and Filiation), Chapter 4 (Illegitimate Children), Section 1 (Recognition of Natural Children)

The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (137a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1146, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 3 (Prescription of Actions)

The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

Why it is cited here

(The paragraph on Martial Law acts in the library text was added by P.D. No. 1755, 24 December 1980. It is not in play here; only paragraph (1) is.)

Full entry below ↓

Article 1149, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 3 (Prescription of Actions)

All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Facts

On 10 September 1942, Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. was born to Andrea Jongco, who alleged that in 1941 she and Antonio C. Alberto "lived together as husband and wife," both then single and free to marry, and that after the birth Alberto continued to support the child and introduced him publicly as his natural son.
About 1944, Alberto and Jongco separated, and Alberto married Natividad del Rosario, of which marriage two children were born — Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr. (the legitimate namesake). (The trial court found the marriage was celebrated twice: a secret civil ceremony in Pililla, Rizal in 1941, ratified religiously in 1944 — which is why Natividad gave two different years and was, on the record, correct both times. All pre-war records of Pililla were destroyed in the war, so no certificate could be produced.)
Andrea Jongco learned of that marriage in 1944 and "took no steps to protect the interests of her child." This is the date the laches clock is measured from — sixteen years before suit, and while the alleged father was still alive to answer.
On 3 July 1949, Antonio C. Alberto died. The one date from which every period in the case is counted: four years to sue for recognition, and the point after which, as the Court puts it, the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death.
On 17 July 1949, his widow Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto instituted intestate proceedings for his estate before the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 9092, without notice to the child.
The claimant alleged that in those proceedings the widow and her children "deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs" and so "succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among themselves."
On 9 November 1953, the intestate proceedings were terminated by an order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled, the court also declaring who the heirs were. (The estate was valued in the complaint at ₱74,963.81, of which the claimant said he was entitled to at least ₱18,000.00.) This order is both the judgment that binds him and the date from which the four-year rescission period runs.
On 8 September 1960, the claimant — then eighteen, assisted by his mother as natural guardian — filed a complaint for acknowledgment and partition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying to be declared the natural child of the deceased, that his one-fourth share be turned over, and for ₱5,000.00 attorney's fees.
On 21 September 1960, the widow and her children moved to dismiss on two grounds: the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, and it was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion was denied on 11 November 1960, and the case went to trial.
On 10 August 1964, the trial court dismissed the complaint, disbelieving Andrea Jongco. It found her testimony contradicted by the deceased's brothers and sister — Jose, Zoilo and Pilar Alberto, who had "no pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome" and testified that during the period in question the deceased "lived with his mother and brothers at the family residence except for his brief stint with the army." (It also found that Jongco had five other children by four different men, from which it reasoned that her "propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness that any particular person is the father of any one of her children," and held the corroborating witnesses Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta "deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco.")
On 31 August 1968, the Court of Appeals reversed, declaring the claimant an acknowledged natural child, owner pro indiviso of one-fifth of the estate subject to the widow's usufructuary rights under Article 834 of the old Civil Code, and ordering delivery of that share with costs. It had credited Cailan and Peralta and relied on the child's birth certificate and baptismal certificate. (On review the Supreme Court points out that a birth certificate "not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.")
Reconsideration was denied on 14 October 1968, and the widow and her children came to the Supreme Court, which gave the petition due course on 27 November 1968 and decided it on 18 May 1989.

Issue

Main issue. Whether the action for partition of the estate had prescribed, given that an action for partition among co-owners ordinarily does not.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Article 494 rule is conditional, and the condition failed. "While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar."
A preterited heir's remedy is rescission, and rescission has a period. Article 1104 shows that "an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested," and Article 1100 gives it "four years from the time the partition was made."
The four years run from court approval. "[T]he four years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court" — approval 9 November 1953, expiry 9 November 1957, complaint 8 September 1960.
Recharacterising the action does not restart the clock. "[T]o be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations."
And every fallback label is also time-barred. Article 1146 and Article 1149 "provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues."
Minority does not suspend prescription where there is a parent or guardian. "Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives" — and the claimant, whose mother filed the suit for him, "falls squarely under the above-cited provision."
The same rule shortens the recognition action. Under Article 285 a child whose presumed parent died during his minority normally has four years from majority, "[h]owever, if the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority," so the action "must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father."
Settlement of an estate binds the world. "[I]nsolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound."
A final order of distribution vests title. It "vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees," and may be undone only where a party "is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence" — the proper move being a motion to reopen the same case, "instead of an independent action, the effect of which, if successful, would be... for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of."
Laches, defined and applied. "[T]he failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier," raising "a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
Why delay prejudices, in the Court's own words. "Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly lost... laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
The maxim. "Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites subvenit" — and "The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act."
When appellate findings may be reviewed. Among the recognised exceptions is "when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court," which is this case.
An unsigned birth certificate proves nothing as to paternity. "[A] birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity."

Doctrine

Imprescriptibility Under Article 494 Depends on Recognition: The action for partition does not prescribe "so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized." Against parties who "never recognized [the claimant] as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly," the rule "does not apply."
A Preterited Compulsory Heir Sues to Rescind (Art. 1104), and Has Four Years (Art. 1100): Counted from the court's approval of the partition, not from discovery of the omission.
Recovery of Property Presupposes Rescission: A claim to property already distributed cannot be pressed without first unwinding the partition, so it inherits the rescission period.
Residual Periods Close the Gap (Arts. 1146 and 1149): Four years for injury to rights, five for anything unclassified.
Minority Is Not a Suspension Where There Is a Parent or Guardian (Art. 1108): Prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, runs against such a minor — and correspondingly shortens the recognition action under Article 285 to four years from the parent's death.
Settlement Proceedings Are In Rem: Binding on all interested persons "whether they were notified or not," through publication.
A Final Order of Distribution Vests Title: Relief for one left out lies by motion to reopen within the reglementary period, not by an independent action years later.
Laches Is a Separate Bar: Unreasonable, unexplained delay raises a presumption of abandonment and "may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
Appellate Findings May Be Reviewed When They Contradict the Trial Court's, whose advantage in seeing the witnesses is decisive absent strong and cogent reasons.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

In 1941, according to the complaint, Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco "lived together as husband and wife," both single and without legal impediment to marry.
Also in 1941, according to the defence, Alberto and Natividad del Rosario were married in a secret civil ceremony at Pililla, Rizal, sponsored among others by Damaso Herrera; the marriage was religiously ratified in 1944. All pre-war records of Pililla were destroyed during the war.
On 10 September 1942, Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. was born. The complaint alleged that his father continued to support him, "introduc[ed] him to the public as his natural child," and that "even the family of his father recognized him as such."
About 1944, the father and mother separated; Andrea Jongco learned of Alberto's marriage to Natividad del Rosario. Two children were born of that marriage — Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.
On 3 July 1949, Antonio C. Alberto died.
On 17 July 1949, Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto instituted intestate proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Special Proceedings No. 9092, without notice to the claimant.
On 9 November 1953, the intestate proceedings were terminated by an order of distribution "directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto," the court also declaring who the heirs of the deceased were.
On 8 September 1960, the claimant — a minor of eighteen, assisted by his mother as natural guardian — filed a complaint for acknowledgment and partition in the same court, alleging the deliberate omission of his name from the intestate proceedings, an estate worth ₱74,963.81, an entitlement of at least ₱18,000.00, and "absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings." He prayed to be acknowledged as a natural child, for delivery of his one-fourth share, and for ₱5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs.
On 21 September 1960, the defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of prior judgment and the statute of limitations; opposition was filed 22 October 1960, and the motion denied on 11 November 1960.
On 18 November 1964, the defendants answered; on 23 November 1964 the claimant answered the counterclaim.
On 10 August 1964, the trial court (Judge Francisco Arca) rendered judgment for the defendants: "the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed." It disbelieved Andrea Jongco, whose account was contradicted by the deceased's siblings Jose, Zoilo and Pilar Alberto — disinterested witnesses who placed the deceased at the family residence throughout — and found the corroborating testimony of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta "inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco." It also found Jongco had five other children by four different men.
On 31 August 1968, the Court of Appeals (penned by Justice Carmelino J. Alvendia, with Justices Julio Villamor and Ruperto G. Martin) reversed, declaring the claimant "an acknowledged Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto" and "the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate," subject to the widow's usufructuary rights under Article 834 of the old Civil Code, with costs. It credited Cailan and Peralta and relied on the birth certificate and baptismal certificate, and doubted Natividad's credibility over the two marriage dates and the missing certificate.
On 14 October 1968, reconsideration was denied. The petition for review was given due course on 27 November 1968.
On 18 May 1989, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's dismissal.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto and her children)

B. Private Respondent (Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., assisted by Andrea Jongco)

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether the action for partition of the decedent's estate had prescribed, notwithstanding the rule that an action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over an action for acknowledgment and partition after the creation of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Whether the action was barred by prior judgment — the terminated intestate proceedings and their order of distribution.
Whether the claimant was guilty of laches.
Whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals on filiation could be reviewed and reversed.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Jurisdiction — objection rejected. "[T]he question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal"; a party who "voluntarily participated in the trial... cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction"; and "there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today," their functions having passed to the Regional Trial Courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Prior judgment — YES, barred. Settlement of a decedent's estate is a proceeding in rem, "binding against the whole world," and "a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees." Relief for one left out is by motion to reopen within the reglementary period, not an independent action.
Laches — YES. The delay was "unreasonable and unexplained" and prejudicial; suit could have been brought in 1944 rather than sixteen years later, "when the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death."
Review of facts — YES, and the trial court is restored. The case falls in the exception "when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court," and "no cogent reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial court."

"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The conditional character of Article 494. "While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized... petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription... does not apply to the case at bar."
Rescission is the preterited heir's action. "That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104."
Four years from approval. "Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9, 1957." "[T]he four years period... should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court."
No escape by recharacterisation. "[T]o be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings... Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations."
The residual periods. Article 1146 and Article 1149 "provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues."
Minority with a parent or guardian. "Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision."
The recognition period. "[I]f the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority... In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father."
A proceeding in rem. "[I]nsolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound."
The order of distribution. It "vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees," undoable only for "circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence," and then better by reopening than by an independent action that would "reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of."
Laches defined. "[T]he failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier."
Why delay is fatal. "The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts. Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses... laches or unreasonable delay... is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
Trial court's advantage. "[C]onclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying."
Unsigned birth certificate. "[A] birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Recognition Is the Condition of Imprescriptibility (Art. 494).
Preterition of a Compulsory Heir Is Remedied by Rescission (Art. 1104), Within Four Years of the Court's Approval (Art. 1100).
A Recovery Claim Against a Distributed Estate Presupposes Rescission and Shares Its Period.
Four and Five Years Are the Residual Floors (Arts. 1146, 1149).
Prescription Runs Against a Minor Who Has a Parent or Guardian (Art. 1108) — and so the Article 285 action runs from the parent's death, not from majority.
Estate Settlement Binds the World; the Order of Distribution Vests Title.
Laches Bars Independently of Prescription.
Jurisdiction Not Raised Below Cannot Be Raised on Appeal by One Who Litigated on the Merits.
Appellate Findings Contrary to the Trial Court's May Be Reviewed.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Court did not hold that a preterited heir is remediless. Article 1104 itself preserves a proportionate money claim against the other heirs, and the in rem rule leaves open relief for one "left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence" — but by motion to reopen within the reglementary period.
The Article 1108 rule cuts only against a minor who has a parent, guardian or legal representative; the same article gives such a person "a right to claim damages from [his] legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription."
The filiation ruling rests on the trial court's credibility findings, not on any rule that natural children cannot inherit; and the Court expressly did not reach the sixth and seventh assignments of error.
A dating caveat. The reported sequence has the trial court's decision on 10 August 1964 and the answer on 18 November 1964; the decision reproduces both dates without reconciling them.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
The chapter's other prescription and repudiation cases all begin from an admitted co-ownership. This one supplies the missing premise: Article 494 protects the co-owner whose status is recognised, and where it is denied outright the claimant must establish it inside the ordinary periods.
Practically, this reorders the analysis. Before asking "was there a repudiation, and when?" ask "is this person admitted to be a co-owner at all?" If not, no repudiation is needed — there is nothing to repudiate — and the ordinary prescriptive periods apply from the start.
It also introduces laches as an independent bar in this chapter, one that can defeat a claim even where a period has not technically expired. Note the pairing the Court makes: prescription is about the calendar; laches is about prejudice — sealed lips, aged witnesses, properties long since "distributed and disposed of."
Finally, it marks the boundary between estate settlement and partition of a co-ownership. Once an order of distribution becomes final, the vehicle is a motion to reopen in that proceeding, not a fresh partition suit — which is why the imprescriptible-partition argument was never really available to this claimant.