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Delima v. Court of Appeals

n. Right to Demand Partition — Repudiation
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Title

Delima v. Court of Appeals

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 46296 September 24, 1991

A title first issued to "the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima" was cancelled on Galileo's own affidavit of self-adjudication and reissued in his name alone in 1954. His co-heirs sued for partition in 1968. The Supreme Court held the action barred: issuing the new title was an open repudiation of the trust, and ten years of adverse possession from that date vested ownership in him by prescription.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is the exception to imprescriptibility. "[N]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership" — but "from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership," and imprescriptibility "can no longer be invoked." Repudiation requires three concurring elements: unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the beneficiary, positive acts of repudiation made known to him, and clear and conclusive evidence of both — and a new certificate of title in the repudiator's sole name supplies all three, being "notice to the whole world."

Case Digest (G.R. No. 46296)

Case DigestChapter III — Co-ownership

Delima v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 46296 · September 24, 1991 · Supreme Court

n. Right to Demand Partition — Repudiation

Gist

A title first issued to "the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima" was cancelled on Galileo's own affidavit of self-adjudication and reissued in his name alone in 1954. His co-heirs sued for partition in 1968. The Supreme Court held the action barred: issuing the new title was an open repudiation of the trust, and ten years of adverse possession from that date vested ownership in him by prescription.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is the exception to imprescriptibility. "[N]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership" — but "from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership," and imprescriptibility "can no longer be invoked." Repudiation requires three concurring elements: unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the beneficiary, positive acts of repudiation made known to him, and clear and conclusive evidence of both — and a new certificate of title in the repudiator's sole name supplies all three, being "notice to the whole world."

Facts

  • Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu "by sale on installments from the government," and died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister — Eulalio, Juanita, Galileo and Vicente Delima. Four co-heirs, and thus a co-ownership from 1921 — the community whose repudiation is the whole issue.
  • On 3 August 1953, TCT No. 2744 was issued "in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima" — a title that recognises the co-ownership on its face, Galileo appearing only as representative.
  • On 22 September 1953, Galileo Delima executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." On the strength of it, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on 4 February 1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone, "to the exclusion of the other heirs." This is the repudiation, and 4 February 1954 is the date from which everything is counted. Compare Adlawan v. Adlawan, where an affidavit of self-adjudication cost the claimant his standing to sue as a co-owner; here the same instrument starts the clock against his co-heirs.
  • Galileo "declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965." Ten years and more of open, exclusive, adverse possession following the new title — the period that vests ownership by prescription.
  • On 29 February 1968, the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita sued in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for reconveyance and/or partition and annulment of TCT No. 3009, with damages, against their uncles Galileo and Vicente; Vicente was joined as a party defendant "for his refusal to join the latter in their action." Fourteen years after the title issued — four years past the ten-year period the Court applies.
  • On 16 January 1970, the trial court declared the lot owned pro indiviso in four equal shares by Vicente, the heirs of Juanita, the heirs of Eulalio and the heirs of Galileo; declared TCT No. 3009 null and void; ordered a new title issued to the co-owners; ordered the heirs of Galileo, after credit for taxes paid since 1958, to turn over the others' shares of the fruits "computed at ₱170.00 per year" with legal interest; and directed partition within sixty days.
  • On 19 May 1977, the Court of Appeals reversed, upholding Galileo's claim "that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon." The Supreme Court affirms the result but on a different footing — not waiver, but prescription running from the 1954 title.

Issue

Whether the petitioners' action for partition is barred by the statutory period, so as to allow Galileo Delima to perfect a claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of his co-heirs.

Ruling

Main issue. YES — the action is barred by prescription. Article 494§ provides that "[e]ach co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common," and that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." Consistently with that, "possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all," a co-owner holding pro indiviso for himself and in representation of the others being "under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee"; hence "an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor." But the protection has a condition. "However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription." Since "possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee," repudiation requires three concurring elements: "1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive."§ All three are present. Following Castillo v. Court of Appeals, "when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run." And since reconveyance on an implied or constructive trust "prescribes after ten (10) years," it is "from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted." Here TCT No. 2744 was cancelled on Galileo's own affidavit and TCT No. 3009 issued in his sole name on 4 February 1954: "The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription." "As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription."§ The suit having been filed on 29 February 1968, "such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time."
"ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  • The rule, with its condition. Article 494§ is quoted in full, including that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
  • Why a co-owner's possession is not adverse. "As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee" (Bargayo v. Camumot; Segura v. Segura). "Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor."
  • When the character of the case changes. "However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership" (De Castro v. Echarri; Bargayo v. Camumot; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa). "In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription."
  • The three elements of repudiation. "It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive" (Valdez v. Olorga; Pangan v. Court of Appeals).§
  • A new sole-name title is such a repudiation. Per Castillo v. Court of Appeals, "when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder."
  • The period and its starting point. "Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted" (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals).
  • Applied. "Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in [his] name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription."
  • Registration as notice. "As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription."§
  • The result. "Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time."

Doctrine

  1. Imprescriptibility Is Conditional (Art. 494§): No prescription runs against co-heirs "so long as [the possessor] expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
  2. A Co-Owner's Possession Benefits All: It "will not be presumed to be adverse"; the possessing co-owner stands "under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee."
  3. The Case Changes Character on Repudiation: "[F]rom the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner... the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership."
  4. Three Concurring Elements (implied trust§): (1) unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (2) those acts made known to him; (3) clear and conclusive evidence of them.
  5. Cancelling the Heirs' Title and Taking a New One Alone Is Repudiation: It "in effect den[ies] or repudiat[es] the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares," and starts the statute running.
  6. Ten Years From the Date of the Title: Reconveyance on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, counted "from the date of the issuance of such title."
  7. Registration Is Notice to the World (Sec. 51§): Which is why the second element — communication of the repudiation — needs no separate proof.
How to place this case. It is the mirror of Monteroso, which states the same three-element test and finds it unmet (simulated deeds "could not have amounted to a clear notice"). The distinguishing fact is the registry: Galileo did not hide behind private documents but took a certificate of title in his own name, and that public act both ousted his co-heirs and told them so.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Lino Delima died in 1921 leaving four co-heirs. In 1953 a certificate issued to "the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima... represented by Galileo Delima"; on Galileo's affidavit of Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs it was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 issued in his sole name on 4 February 1954, and he paid the taxes from 1954 to 1965. His co-heirs' successors sued for reconveyance and/or partition on 29 February 1968. The CFI of Cebu ruled for them; the Court of Appeals reversed on a theory of waiver; the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on prescription. The central doctrine is that imprescriptibility lasts only "so long as [the possessor] expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership"§, and that a new certificate of title in the co-owner's sole name is "an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership" which, being "notice to the whole world," starts a ten-year period.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

  • During his lifetime Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu "by sale on installments from the government."
  • Lino Delima died in 1921, "leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima."
  • On 3 August 1953, TCT No. 2744 of the property was issued "in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima."
  • On 22 September 1953, Galileo Delima executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs."
  • On 4 February 1954, on the strength of that affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 issued "in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs."
  • "Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965."
  • On 29 February 1968, the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for "reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages" against Galileo and Vicente Delima, joining Vicente as a defendant "for his refusal to join the latter in their action."
  • On 16 January 1970, the trial court declared Vicente, the heirs of Juanita, the heirs of Eulalio and the heirs of Galileo owners of Lot No. 7758 "each sharing a pro indiviso share of one-fourth"; declared TCT No. 3009 null and void and ordered a new title issued to them; ordered the heirs of Galileo, after credit for taxes paid since 1958, to turn over the others' shares of the fruits "computed at ₱170.00 per year up to the present time with legal (interest)"; ordered partition within sixty days and immediate delivery of possession; and dismissed the counterclaim with costs against the defendants.
  • On 19 May 1977, the Court of Appeals reversed, upholding Galileo's claim "that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima... had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon."
  • On 24 September 1991, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima)

Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erred "[i]n not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of inheritance is imprescriptible," adding that "[i]f it does, the defenses of prescription and laches have already been waived"; and "[i]n disregarding the evidence of the petitioners."

B. Respondents (Heirs of Galileo Delima)

Respondents maintained Galileo's exclusive ownership, asserting that the other brothers and sister "had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor," Galileo alone having paid the balance of the purchase price and the realty taxes, and pleaded prescription and laches.

C. Common Ground

The antecedent facts were "as found both by the respondent appellate court and by the trial court" — the succession in 1921, the 1953 title in the heirs' name, the 1953 affidavit, the 1954 sole-name title, and the tax payments from 1954 to 1965.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

"[W]hether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property."

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

YES — barred. "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership"§; but "from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership," and "the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied." Repudiation requires unequivocal acts of ouster, made known to the cestui que trust, on clear and conclusive evidence.§ "The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription." "As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription."§ The 1968 action "was already barred."
"ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

  • The article and its last paragraph. Article 494§ permits partition "at any time" and bars prescription "so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
  • Possession benefits all. "As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all," the possessing co-heir being "under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee"; hence "an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor."
  • Until it does not. "However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription."
  • The test. "It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive."§
  • The controlling precedent. Castillo v. Court of Appeals: cancelling the predecessor's title and obtaining a new one in one's own name is "in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares," whereupon "the statute of limitations started to run."
  • The clock. "Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted" (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals).
  • The facts fit exactly. TCT No. 2744 "was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima," and on 4 February 1954 TCT No. 3009 issued "to the exclusion of his co-heirs." "The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession... was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription."
  • Notice. "As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription."§
  • Conclusion. "Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time."

B. Doctrines/Rules

  1. Conditional Imprescriptibility (Art. 494§): The bar on prescription lasts only while the co-ownership is recognised.
  2. Co-Owner as Trustee: His possession "will be held to benefit all" until he repudiates.
  3. Partition Becomes Ownership: Once exclusive ownership is claimed and the others' shares denied, "the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership."
  4. Three Elements of Repudiation: Unequivocal ouster; communicated; proved clearly and conclusively.
  5. Sole-Name Title = Repudiation: Cancelling the heirs' title on a self-adjudication affidavit and taking a new one alone satisfies all three.
  6. Ten Years From Issuance: Reconveyance on implied trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date of the new title.
  7. Registration Is Notice to the World (Sec. 51§): The register supplies the communication element.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

  • The Court of Appeals had reasoned from waiver — that the co-heirs relinquished their rights because Galileo alone paid the balance and the taxes. The Supreme Court affirms the result but rests it on prescription; payment of taxes alone is not the ground.
  • Nothing here disturbs the general rule of Monteroso and Cruz: partition remains imprescriptible until a repudiation satisfying all three elements occurs.
  • The ten-year period is that of reconveyance on an implied or constructive trust; where the possessor is in bad faith and the claim is one of acquisitive prescription, Monteroso applies the thirty-year extraordinary period instead.

D. Topic Integration

  • The relationship is DIRECT.
  • This is the chapter's clearest example of Repudiation actually succeeding, and it is best learned as the negative image of Monteroso: identical three-element test, opposite outcome, and the difference is publicity. Simulated private deeds are not notice; a certificate of title in one's own name is.
  • The practical drill for these cases is to find the date of repudiation and count from it. Here: 4 February 1954 plus ten years, against a complaint filed 29 February 1968 — four years late. In Monteroso: 1961 plus ten (at least), against a 1970 complaint — nine years, in time.
  • Note also the double-edged character of an affidavit of self-adjudication. In Adlawan it defeated the affiant's own standing to sue as a co-owner; here it defeated his co-heirs' claims by starting the clock. The same document repudiates the co-ownership either way — what changes is who is hurt by it.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Medialdea, with Justices Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

The article, quoted here in the fullness that matters — including its last paragraph, which is the one this case turns on: "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

Read the condition, not just the rule. Imprescriptibility lasts only so long as the possessing co-owner recognises the community. "As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all," because a co-owner in possession "is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee."

When recognition stops, so does the protection: "from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership." At that point "the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription."

This is the exception Monteroso states and finds unproved; here it is proved.

Civil Code

Article 1456, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title V (Trusts (N)), Chapter 3 (Implied Trusts)

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

Why it is cited here

Why the co-owner in possession is a trustee, and why the clock is a ten-year one. Property acquired through mistake or fraud makes the holder "a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

"It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee," and the question is when that possession turns adverse to the beneficiary of that trust. Three elements must concur:

1. "that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust"; 2. "that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust"; 3. "that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive."

And because "an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years," the ten years run "from the date of the issuance of such title" — that being when "the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted."

Special Law

Section 51, P.D. No. 1529

Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.

Why it is cited here

What makes registration the moment of notice. Registration "is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned," and the act of registration is "notice to all persons."

That is the second element of repudiation supplied at a stroke. The Court holds that "[t]he issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership," and that "[a]s the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription."

Note the sharp contrast with the same doctrine elsewhere in this chapter. In Cruz v. Cristobal the excluded heirs' claim survived despite titles in the respondents' names — because the deed was a Rule 74 settlement that never bound them. Here the co-heirs were not strangers to a settlement but cestuis que trust whose trustee openly disavowed them, and the register did the work of notice.

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/sep1991/gr_46296_1991.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

The article, quoted here in the fullness that matters — including its last paragraph, which is the one this case turns on: "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

Read the condition, not just the rule. Imprescriptibility lasts only so long as the possessing co-owner recognises the community. "As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all," because a co-owner in possession "is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee."

When recognition stops, so does the protection: "from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership." At that point "the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription."

This is the exception Monteroso states and finds unproved; here it is proved.

Full entry below ↓

Article 1456, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book IV (Obligations and Contracts), Title V (Trusts (N)), Chapter 3 (Implied Trusts)

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

Why it is cited here

Why the co-owner in possession is a trustee, and why the clock is a ten-year one. Property acquired through mistake or fraud makes the holder "a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

"It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee," and the question is when that possession turns adverse to the beneficiary of that trust. Three elements must concur:

1. "that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust"; 2. "that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust"; 3. "that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive."

And because "an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years," the ten years run "from the date of the issuance of such title" — that being when "the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted."

Full entry below ↓

Section 51, P.D. No. 1529

Special Law

Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree, 1978)

An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.

Why it is cited here

What makes registration the moment of notice. Registration "is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned," and the act of registration is "notice to all persons."

That is the second element of repudiation supplied at a stroke. The Court holds that "[t]he issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership," and that "[a]s the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription."

Note the sharp contrast with the same doctrine elsewhere in this chapter. In Cruz v. Cristobal the excluded heirs' claim survived despite titles in the respondents' names — because the deed was a Rule 74 settlement that never bound them. Here the co-heirs were not strangers to a settlement but cestuis que trust whose trustee openly disavowed them, and the register did the work of notice.

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