Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon

n. Right to Demand Partition — Repudiation

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Case DigestChapter III — Co-ownership

Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon

G.R. No. 161720 · November 22, 2005 · Supreme Court

n. Right to Demand Partition — Repudiation

Gist

The eldest of eight heirs adjudicated an Aklan riceland to himself by joint affidavit in 1959 and had the tax declaration transferred to his name in 1960, then farmed it and paid its taxes for the rest of his life. His siblings sued for partition in 1999. The Supreme Court held the tax declaration was the first concrete act of repudiation, and thirty-eight years of open adverse possession had vested ownership in him by extraordinary prescription.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is that although "the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership." Where the repudiating co-owner has neither title nor good faith, only extraordinary prescription is open to him — thirty years of uninterrupted adverse possession under Article 1137 — and the period runs from the act of repudiation, here the 1960 transfer of the tax declaration into his own name.

Facts

In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-compulsory heirs: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar. "When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession" — but the prescriptive clock does not start here, because Flores's possession was at first that of a co-owner.
The property is Lot 3177, a 5,918-square-metre parcel at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan, then covered by Tax Declaration No. 6696 in Emilio Restar's name.
On 12 July 1959, Flores, the eldest child, executed a Joint Affidavit with one Helen Restar adjudicating the whole land to himself as his share from his father, and asked the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to declare it in his name. The parties admitted at pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer — which is why the trial court could call it "the first concrete act of repudiation."
From 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar under Tax Declaration No. 11134. This is the date everything is counted from: "The statutory period of prescription... commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name."
Flores "took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof," and paid the real estate tax and irrigation fees without any contribution from his co-heirs.
On 28 September 1973, Restar's heirs executed an extrajudicial partition notarised by Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing four other parcels in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga, Aklan among themselves; there had also been a verbal partition of a Carugdog parcel in 1945. The trial court makes this decisive: with all eight heirs alive and signing, "why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father"?
Flores died on 10 June 1989. His heirs continued in possession. "[A]nd Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs" — the thirty years therefore ran uninterrupted through the change of possessor.
On 5 November 1998, the co-heirs of Flores "discovered the cancellation of Restar's Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134."
On 21 January 1999, the heirs of Flores's deceased sisters, together with his surviving sisters Dominica and Paciencia, sued Flores's heirs in the RTC of Aklan for "partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction," impleading brothers Policarpio and Adolfo as unwilling co-plaintiffs. Thirty-nine years after the 1960 tax declaration, and almost ten years after Flores's death.
The plaintiffs alleged they had been given shares of palay from the lot during Flores's lifetime and until 1991, and that after his death his widow Esmenia asked to hold the lot to finance her children's education, on the agreement that it would afterwards be divided into eight equal parts. Both claims fail: the trial court found the "five to eight gantas each" too small to be a one-eighth share of a 60-cavan crop, and the Court asks why nobody acted after the children finished college in 1977.
The Heirs of Flores answered that they had possessed "in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years" and had "been paying realty taxes since time immemorial," denying both the sharing of produce and Esmenia's request.
Policarpio acknowledged Flores as owner but claimed 1,315 square metres by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 May 1981. Rejected: Flores's signature differed from other specimens, he was "admittedly paralyzed and bedridden" in 1981 and could not have signed in a "straight" manner when his 1980 signatures were "crooked," and his wife's name was spelt "Esmeña" rather than "Esmenia."
On 30 June 1999, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores's actual share in the estate was Cadastral Lot No. 3183, not this lot — but that he and his heirs "had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership" and had acquired it by prescription, and dismissed the complaint.
On 29 October 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the Heirs of Flores had not proved that their possession excluded their co-owners, that there was "no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation," and that the plaintiffs' delay was excused by "forbearance towards their eldest brother." It is this excuse the Supreme Court rejects — "does not impress."

Issue

Whether the Heirs of Flores Restar acquired ownership of the lot by extraordinary acquisitive prescription, notwithstanding that Flores began as a co-owner with his seven siblings.

Ruling

Main issue. YES — ownership vested by extraordinary prescription, and the complaint was rightly dismissed. Article 494 bars prescription in favour of a co-owner "so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," and the two rules must be held together: "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership." Prescription being "ordinary or extraordinary," and ordinary requiring "possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years" while "[w]ithout good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years" — the ten-year route of Article 1134 was unavailable and Article 1137 governed. On the facts, "[w]hen Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999... In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof." But the clock did not start at the death: "The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim." Hence "Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years." The trial court's reasoning is approved: the 1959 Joint Affidavit and the resulting transfer "was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership"; the heirs who managed an amicable partition of other parcels in 1973 with all eight alive and signing gave no reason why they "did not demand the inclusion of the land in question"; and they "had all the chances to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive," suing only "almost ten (10) years after Flores' death." "While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription." The claim to have received shares of produce "was correctly discredited" — "[a] few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping." The acts establishing adverse possession are enumerated: "the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs." The appellate court's excuse of forbearance "does not impress": "assuming such justification to be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores' continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?" Flores and his heirs having possessed for "more than 38 years... in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed," they "have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex."

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The two rules stated together. Article 494 is quoted, and then: "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership."
Ordinary versus extraordinary. "Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years." The Court quotes Article 1134 (ten years, ordinary) and Article 1137 (thirty years, "without need of title or of good faith").
Why the Court reviews the facts. "While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record."
The co-ownership and the contrast in conduct. "When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition... In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof."
When the clock started. "The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim. Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with... Article 1137."
The trial court's findings, approved. "[A]s far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name... So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar. This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question."
The 1973 partition as the telling omission. "Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973. If they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?"
And the delay. "Plaintiffs had all the chances to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores' death... Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years."
Tax declarations plus possession. "While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription."
The produce-sharing claim discredited. "[P]laintiffs' claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce cannot be sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for cultivation and production."
The acts of adverse possession, enumerated. "[T]he cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs."
Forbearance rejected. The appellate court's crediting of "forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support their children's education — does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores' continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?"
Conclusion. Flores and his heirs possessed "for more than 38 years... in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents," so "he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex."

Doctrine

Two Rules, Not One (Art. 494): "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership."
A Repudiating Co-Owner Usually Takes the Long Road (Art. 1117): Ordinary prescription needs good faith and just title; without them only extraordinary prescription is available.
Thirty Years, Uninterrupted (Art. 1137): "[W]ithout need of title or of good faith" — and the possession of the repudiator's heirs continues his, without restarting the count.
The Clock Starts at Repudiation, Not at Death: It "commenced not in 1935 but in 1960," when the tax declaration was secured in the repudiator's own name.
A Tax Declaration in One's Own Name Is Repudiation, and Notice: Securing it is "the first concrete act of repudiation," and the co-heirs are "deemed to have... become aware of the adverse claim" on that date.
Tax Declarations Coupled With Possession: Not conclusive of ownership, but "when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription."
Partitioning Other Parcels While Ignoring This One Tells Against the Claimants: Heirs who could demand and obtain partition of four other parcels in 1973, with all eight siblings signing, cannot explain leaving this lot out.
Forbearance Is Not an Indefinite Excuse: A justification for delay must account for the whole delay — the excuse ended when the children finished college in 1977, twenty-two years before suit.

How to place this case against Delima. Both are successful repudiations; the instruments differ, and so do the periods. Delima's repudiator obtained a certificate of title, which is notice to the world and carried a ten-year period; Restar's obtained only a tax declaration, which sufficed as notice but left him to the thirty-year extraordinary period, having neither title nor good faith. And against Monteroso, where the alleged repudiation was by simulated private deeds that "could not have amounted to a clear notice," and the claim failed.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Emilio Restar died intestate in 1935 leaving eight children as pro indiviso co-owners of Lot 3177 in Lezo, Aklan. In 1959 his eldest, Flores, adjudicated the lot to himself by Joint Affidavit, and from 1960 had it declared in his name; he farmed it, improved it and paid its taxes and irrigation fees until his death in 1989, his heirs continuing after him. The other heirs sued for partition on 21 January 1999. The RTC dismissed on prescription; the Court of Appeals reversed for want of adequate notice of repudiation; the Supreme Court reinstated the RTC. The central doctrine is that "[w]hile the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership" — and a repudiator with "neither title nor good faith" acquires only by thirty years of uninterrupted adverse possession, counted from the repudiation.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight compulsory heirs: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
Among the properties left was Lot 3177, of 5,918 square metres, at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan, covered by Tax Declaration No. 6696 in Restar's name.
In 1945 the heirs made a verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan.
On 12 July 1959, Flores Restar executed a Joint Affidavit with one Helen Restar, adjudicating the whole lot to himself as his share from his father, and requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to declare the land in his name.
In 1960, on the basis of that affidavit, Tax Declaration No. 6696 was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 11134 issued in Flores's name.
Flores took possession after his father's death and "exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof," paying real estate tax and irrigation fees.
On 28 September 1973, Restar's heirs executed an extrajudicial partition, notarised by Atty. Jose Igtanloc, "dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land" in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga, Aklan — all eight heirs then alive and signing.
On 14 May 1981, a Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly executed by Flores in favour of his brother Policarpio over 1,315 square metres of the lot.
On 10 June 1989, Flores died, and his heirs continued in possession.
On 5 November 1998, the co-heirs of Flores "discovered the cancellation of Restar's Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134" in his name.
On 21 January 1999, the heirs of the deceased sisters Dolores, Perpetua and Maria, with surviving sisters Dominica and Paciencia, filed a complaint for "partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the RTC of Aklan, impleading Policarpio and Adolfo as unwilling co-plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs alleged that during Flores's lifetime and until 1991 they were "given their shares of palay from the lot," and that after his death his widow Esmenia "appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children," on condition that after the children finished, it would be "divided into eight (8) equal parts."
By Answer of 23 February 1999, the Heirs of Flores claimed possession "in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years" and payment of realty taxes "since time immemorial," denying the sharing of produce and Esmenia's request, and pointing out that by 1977 the children "had already finished their respective courses."
Adolfo Restar answered that the complaint stated no cause of action against him, he interposing no objection to partition. Policarpio Restar, by Amended Answer, acknowledged Flores as owner but claimed the 1,315-square-metre portion under the 1981 deed.
On 30 June 1999, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores's share in the estate was Cadastral Lot No. 3183, not this lot, but that Flores and his heirs "had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership" and had acquired the lot by prescription; it discredited Policarpio's deed — Flores's signature differed from other specimens, he was "admittedly paralyzed and bedridden" in 1981 when his 1980 signatures were "crooked," and his wife's name was spelt "Esmeña" instead of "Esmenia" — and dismissed the complaint.
On 29 October 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding no proof that the possession excluded the co-owners, "no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation," no "categorical assertion" of exclusive right, and the plaintiffs' delay excusable as "forbearance towards their eldest brother"; it sustained the rejection of Policarpio's deed. Reconsideration was denied.
On 22 November 2005, the Supreme Court granted the petition of the Heirs of Flores and reinstated the trial court's decision.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Heirs of Flores Restar)

Petitioners assigned as error that the Court of Appeals "patently erred in reversing the ruling of the lower court that the petitioners as heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership by adverse possession," and in "not ruling that there was acquisitive prescription... notwithstanding that the land in question has been declared in the name of Flores Restar... as early as 1960 and that petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession... in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years."

B. Respondents (Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon, et al.)

Respondents sought partition, alleging that they had received shares of palay from the lot during Flores's lifetime and until 1991, and that they had agreed to let his widow hold it to fund the children's education on condition of a later eight-way division; on demand for partition, the Heirs of Flores refused, "claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores."

C. Co-Defendants

Adolfo Restar interposed no objection to partition. Policarpio Restar acknowledged Flores as owner but claimed 1,315 square metres by the 1981 deed and asked that partition exclude that portion.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether the petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

YES. "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership." Without good faith and just title "acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years. "The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim." "Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with... Article 1137." Flores and his heirs having possessed for "more than 38 years... in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner," they "have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex."

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The article and the qualification. Article 494 quoted, then: "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership."
The two kinds of prescription. "Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years" — Article 1134 and Article 1137 quoted.
Review of the facts. "While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence."
The contrast in conduct. "Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999... In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon."
The commencement date. "The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name... And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim."
The first concrete act of repudiation. "[A]s far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit... So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar. This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question."
The 1973 omission. "If they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?"
The delay. "Plaintiffs had all the chances to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores' death... the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years."
Tax declarations. "While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription."
The produce claim. "A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas."
The acts of adverse possession. "[T]he cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs."
Forbearance rejected. "[A]ssuming such justification to be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores' continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?"
Conclusion. The possession was "open, adverse and continuous... in the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents," so ownership vested "by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Action Imprescriptible, Thing Prescriptible (Art. 494): The right to demand partition never lapses, but the property itself may be acquired by a repudiating co-owner.
Requisites of the Exception: A clear repudiation, and the co-owners apprised of the adverse and exclusive claim.
No Good Faith, No Ten Years (Art. 1117, Art. 1134): A co-heir who adjudicates the whole to himself lacks good faith and just title.
Thirty Years (Art. 1137): "[W]ithout need of title or of good faith," and the heirs' possession continues the decedent's.
The Period Runs From Repudiation: Not from the decedent's death, and not from the co-heirs' discovery.
Tax Declaration in One's Own Name: Both the act of repudiation and the moment the co-heirs are deemed aware of it.
Tax Declarations Plus Possession Are Evidence of Great Weight.
Excuses for Delay Must Cover the Whole Delay.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The trial court found Flores's actual share in his father's estate was Cadastral Lot No. 3183, not this lot — so he prevailed not as heir to it but purely by prescription.
Policarpio's claimed 1,315 square metres was rejected on the evidence: a signature inconsistent with specimens, a paralysed and bedridden signatory, and a misspelt spouse's name.
The Court did not disturb the rule that a co-owner's possession is presumed to benefit all; it found that presumption displaced from 1960 onward.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
On "Repudiation," this case supplies the thirty-year branch, and it is best learned beside Delima v. Court of Appeals, which supplies the ten-year branch. What the repudiator obtains determines both the notice and the clock: a certificate of title is notice to the world and opens the short period; a tax declaration is notice enough to start the long one, but leaves the possessor without title or good faith.
Read all three repudiation cases as one sequence with Monteroso: simulated private deeds are not repudiation; a refusal of a written demand is, and starts a period; a tax declaration in one's own name is; a certificate of title is, most emphatically.
The examinable habit is the same throughout — identify the act, date it, then count. Here: 1960 plus thirty is 1990; the complaint came in 1999, nine years too late.
The case also carries a warning about family conduct as evidence. Partitioning four other parcels in 1973 while leaving this one alone, and letting twenty-two years pass after the stated excuse expired in 1977, told more powerfully against the claimants than any document.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, with Justice Panganiban (Chairman) and Justices Corona and Garcia concurring; Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez was on leave.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

The starting point, quoted for both halves. "No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common... No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

The Court then states the two propositions that must be held together: "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership."

Read carefully, these are not in tension. The action never prescribes; but the thing may be acquired by another, and once it is, there is nothing left to partition. That is how a suit filed in 1999 over a 1935 succession fails without anyone saying the right to demand partition expired.

Civil Code

Article 1117, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. (1940a)

Why it is cited here

The fork that decides which period applies. "Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law."

"Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years."

The finding that fixes Flores on the long road is blunt: he "had neither title nor good faith." A co-heir who adjudicates the whole to himself knows he is not the sole owner, so good faith is unavailable to him almost by definition — which is why thirty years, not ten, is the usual figure in repudiation cases where the repudiator is a co-owner rather than a stranger.

Civil Code

Article 1137, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (1959a)

Why it is cited here

The period actually applied. "Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."

Counted from 1960, thirty years expired in 1990 — a year after Flores died in 1989, and nine years before the complaint of 21 January 1999. As the trial court put it, "the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years."

Two details worth carrying. Possession must be uninterrupted, and the Court stresses that "Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs" — the clock does not restart on the possessor's death. And the co-heirs' inaction is what supplies the "uninterrupted" element: they "never possessed the lot... much less asserted their claim thereto" until 1999.

Civil Code

Article 1134, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. (1957a)

Why it is cited here

The ordinary alternative the Court quotes but does not reach: "Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years."

It is set out to make the contrast explicit. Ten years is available only with good faith and just title — the route taken in Delima v. Court of Appeals, where the repudiating co-heir obtained an actual certificate of title in his own name and the Court applied the ten-year period for reconveyance on an implied trust from the date of that title.

Here there was no title at all, only a tax declaration, so the ten-year route was closed and the claimant had to wait out thirty. The lesson is that what the repudiator obtains determines both the notice and the clock: a Torrens title is notice to the world and opens the short period; a tax declaration is notice enough to start the long one.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1117, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. (1940a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1137, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (1959a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1134, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 2 (Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights)

Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. (1957a)

Why it is cited here

The ordinary alternative the Court quotes but does not reach: "Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years."

Full entry below ↓

Facts

In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-compulsory heirs: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar. "When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession" — but the prescriptive clock does not start here, because Flores's possession was at first that of a co-owner.
The property is Lot 3177, a 5,918-square-metre parcel at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan, then covered by Tax Declaration No. 6696 in Emilio Restar's name.
On 12 July 1959, Flores, the eldest child, executed a Joint Affidavit with one Helen Restar adjudicating the whole land to himself as his share from his father, and asked the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to declare it in his name. The parties admitted at pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer — which is why the trial court could call it "the first concrete act of repudiation."
From 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar under Tax Declaration No. 11134. This is the date everything is counted from: "The statutory period of prescription... commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name."
Flores "took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof," and paid the real estate tax and irrigation fees without any contribution from his co-heirs.
On 28 September 1973, Restar's heirs executed an extrajudicial partition notarised by Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing four other parcels in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga, Aklan among themselves; there had also been a verbal partition of a Carugdog parcel in 1945. The trial court makes this decisive: with all eight heirs alive and signing, "why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father"?
Flores died on 10 June 1989. His heirs continued in possession. "[A]nd Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs" — the thirty years therefore ran uninterrupted through the change of possessor.
On 5 November 1998, the co-heirs of Flores "discovered the cancellation of Restar's Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134."
On 21 January 1999, the heirs of Flores's deceased sisters, together with his surviving sisters Dominica and Paciencia, sued Flores's heirs in the RTC of Aklan for "partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction," impleading brothers Policarpio and Adolfo as unwilling co-plaintiffs. Thirty-nine years after the 1960 tax declaration, and almost ten years after Flores's death.
The plaintiffs alleged they had been given shares of palay from the lot during Flores's lifetime and until 1991, and that after his death his widow Esmenia asked to hold the lot to finance her children's education, on the agreement that it would afterwards be divided into eight equal parts. Both claims fail: the trial court found the "five to eight gantas each" too small to be a one-eighth share of a 60-cavan crop, and the Court asks why nobody acted after the children finished college in 1977.
The Heirs of Flores answered that they had possessed "in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years" and had "been paying realty taxes since time immemorial," denying both the sharing of produce and Esmenia's request.
Policarpio acknowledged Flores as owner but claimed 1,315 square metres by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 May 1981. Rejected: Flores's signature differed from other specimens, he was "admittedly paralyzed and bedridden" in 1981 and could not have signed in a "straight" manner when his 1980 signatures were "crooked," and his wife's name was spelt "Esmeña" rather than "Esmenia."
On 30 June 1999, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores's actual share in the estate was Cadastral Lot No. 3183, not this lot — but that he and his heirs "had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership" and had acquired it by prescription, and dismissed the complaint.
On 29 October 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the Heirs of Flores had not proved that their possession excluded their co-owners, that there was "no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation," and that the plaintiffs' delay was excused by "forbearance towards their eldest brother." It is this excuse the Supreme Court rejects — "does not impress."

Issue

Whether the Heirs of Flores Restar acquired ownership of the lot by extraordinary acquisitive prescription, notwithstanding that Flores began as a co-owner with his seven siblings.

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The two rules stated together. Article 494 is quoted, and then: "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership."
Ordinary versus extraordinary. "Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years." The Court quotes Article 1134 (ten years, ordinary) and Article 1137 (thirty years, "without need of title or of good faith").
Why the Court reviews the facts. "While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record."
The co-ownership and the contrast in conduct. "When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition... In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof."
When the clock started. "The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim. Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with... Article 1137."
The trial court's findings, approved. "[A]s far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name... So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar. This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question."
The 1973 partition as the telling omission. "Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973. If they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?"
And the delay. "Plaintiffs had all the chances to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores' death... Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years."
Tax declarations plus possession. "While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription."
The produce-sharing claim discredited. "[P]laintiffs' claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce cannot be sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for cultivation and production."
The acts of adverse possession, enumerated. "[T]he cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs."
Forbearance rejected. The appellate court's crediting of "forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support their children's education — does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores' continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?"
Conclusion. Flores and his heirs possessed "for more than 38 years... in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents," so "he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex."

Doctrine

Two Rules, Not One (Art. 494): "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership."
A Repudiating Co-Owner Usually Takes the Long Road (Art. 1117): Ordinary prescription needs good faith and just title; without them only extraordinary prescription is available.
Thirty Years, Uninterrupted (Art. 1137): "[W]ithout need of title or of good faith" — and the possession of the repudiator's heirs continues his, without restarting the count.
The Clock Starts at Repudiation, Not at Death: It "commenced not in 1935 but in 1960," when the tax declaration was secured in the repudiator's own name.
A Tax Declaration in One's Own Name Is Repudiation, and Notice: Securing it is "the first concrete act of repudiation," and the co-heirs are "deemed to have... become aware of the adverse claim" on that date.
Tax Declarations Coupled With Possession: Not conclusive of ownership, but "when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription."
Partitioning Other Parcels While Ignoring This One Tells Against the Claimants: Heirs who could demand and obtain partition of four other parcels in 1973, with all eight siblings signing, cannot explain leaving this lot out.
Forbearance Is Not an Indefinite Excuse: A justification for delay must account for the whole delay — the excuse ended when the children finished college in 1977, twenty-two years before suit.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight compulsory heirs: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
Among the properties left was Lot 3177, of 5,918 square metres, at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan, covered by Tax Declaration No. 6696 in Restar's name.
In 1945 the heirs made a verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan.
On 12 July 1959, Flores Restar executed a Joint Affidavit with one Helen Restar, adjudicating the whole lot to himself as his share from his father, and requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to declare the land in his name.
In 1960, on the basis of that affidavit, Tax Declaration No. 6696 was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 11134 issued in Flores's name.
Flores took possession after his father's death and "exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof," paying real estate tax and irrigation fees.
On 28 September 1973, Restar's heirs executed an extrajudicial partition, notarised by Atty. Jose Igtanloc, "dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land" in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga, Aklan — all eight heirs then alive and signing.
On 14 May 1981, a Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly executed by Flores in favour of his brother Policarpio over 1,315 square metres of the lot.
On 10 June 1989, Flores died, and his heirs continued in possession.
On 5 November 1998, the co-heirs of Flores "discovered the cancellation of Restar's Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134" in his name.
On 21 January 1999, the heirs of the deceased sisters Dolores, Perpetua and Maria, with surviving sisters Dominica and Paciencia, filed a complaint for "partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the RTC of Aklan, impleading Policarpio and Adolfo as unwilling co-plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs alleged that during Flores's lifetime and until 1991 they were "given their shares of palay from the lot," and that after his death his widow Esmenia "appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children," on condition that after the children finished, it would be "divided into eight (8) equal parts."
By Answer of 23 February 1999, the Heirs of Flores claimed possession "in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years" and payment of realty taxes "since time immemorial," denying the sharing of produce and Esmenia's request, and pointing out that by 1977 the children "had already finished their respective courses."
Adolfo Restar answered that the complaint stated no cause of action against him, he interposing no objection to partition. Policarpio Restar, by Amended Answer, acknowledged Flores as owner but claimed the 1,315-square-metre portion under the 1981 deed.
On 30 June 1999, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores's share in the estate was Cadastral Lot No. 3183, not this lot, but that Flores and his heirs "had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership" and had acquired the lot by prescription; it discredited Policarpio's deed — Flores's signature differed from other specimens, he was "admittedly paralyzed and bedridden" in 1981 when his 1980 signatures were "crooked," and his wife's name was spelt "Esmeña" instead of "Esmenia" — and dismissed the complaint.
On 29 October 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding no proof that the possession excluded the co-owners, "no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation," no "categorical assertion" of exclusive right, and the plaintiffs' delay excusable as "forbearance towards their eldest brother"; it sustained the rejection of Policarpio's deed. Reconsideration was denied.
On 22 November 2005, the Supreme Court granted the petition of the Heirs of Flores and reinstated the trial court's decision.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Heirs of Flores Restar)

B. Respondents (Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon, et al.)

C. Co-Defendants

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether the petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

The article and the qualification. Article 494 quoted, then: "While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership."
The two kinds of prescription. "Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years" — Article 1134 and Article 1137 quoted.
Review of the facts. "While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence."
The contrast in conduct. "Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999... In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon."
The commencement date. "The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name... And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim."
The first concrete act of repudiation. "[A]s far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit... So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar. This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question."
The 1973 omission. "If they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?"
The delay. "Plaintiffs had all the chances to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores' death... the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years."
Tax declarations. "While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription."
The produce claim. "A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas."
The acts of adverse possession. "[T]he cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs."
Forbearance rejected. "[A]ssuming such justification to be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores' continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?"
Conclusion. The possession was "open, adverse and continuous... in the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents," so ownership vested "by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Action Imprescriptible, Thing Prescriptible (Art. 494): The right to demand partition never lapses, but the property itself may be acquired by a repudiating co-owner.
Requisites of the Exception: A clear repudiation, and the co-owners apprised of the adverse and exclusive claim.
No Good Faith, No Ten Years (Art. 1117, Art. 1134): A co-heir who adjudicates the whole to himself lacks good faith and just title.
Thirty Years (Art. 1137): "[W]ithout need of title or of good faith," and the heirs' possession continues the decedent's.
The Period Runs From Repudiation: Not from the decedent's death, and not from the co-heirs' discovery.
Tax Declaration in One's Own Name: Both the act of repudiation and the moment the co-heirs are deemed aware of it.
Tax Declarations Plus Possession Are Evidence of Great Weight.
Excuses for Delay Must Cover the Whole Delay.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The trial court found Flores's actual share in his father's estate was Cadastral Lot No. 3183, not this lot — so he prevailed not as heir to it but purely by prescription.
Policarpio's claimed 1,315 square metres was rejected on the evidence: a signature inconsistent with specimens, a paralysed and bedridden signatory, and a misspelt spouse's name.
The Court did not disturb the rule that a co-owner's possession is presumed to benefit all; it found that presumption displaced from 1960 onward.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
On "Repudiation," this case supplies the thirty-year branch, and it is best learned beside Delima v. Court of Appeals, which supplies the ten-year branch. What the repudiator obtains determines both the notice and the clock: a certificate of title is notice to the world and opens the short period; a tax declaration is notice enough to start the long one, but leaves the possessor without title or good faith.
Read all three repudiation cases as one sequence with Monteroso: simulated private deeds are not repudiation; a refusal of a written demand is, and starts a period; a tax declaration in one's own name is; a certificate of title is, most emphatically.
The examinable habit is the same throughout — identify the act, date it, then count. Here: 1960 plus thirty is 1990; the complaint came in 1999, nine years too late.
The case also carries a warning about family conduct as evidence. Partitioning four other parcels in 1973 while leaving this one alone, and letting twenty-two years pass after the stated excuse expired in 1977, told more powerfully against the claimants than any document.