Facts
- Fabian Fangonil and Maria Lloren Fangonil of Tubao, La Union had seven children — Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso and Carmen. Fabian died 1 June 1953; Maria Lloren in February 1976. Both died intestate, leaving seven parcels of land. (Sinforoso became a Regional Trial Court Executive Judge in Baguio; he is represented in the case by his daughter Victoria Estoque. The other six children, less Carmen, are the respondents.)
- Two of the seven are the disputed ones. Parcel 6 is 17,958 square metres of agricultural land at Magsaysay, Tubao, its middle portion of 15,364 sq m declared under Tax Declaration No. 2889; Parcel 7 is 9,127 square metres of unirrigated rice land at San Nicolas East, Agoo, "visible by signs of pilapiles around its perimeter," assessed at ₱400.00 under Tax Declaration No. 6373.
- The parents pledged both parcels away in the 1950s. On 20 April 1949 Fabian, with Maria Lloren's consent, mortgaged the 15,364 sq m middle portion of parcel 6 to Francisca Saguitan for ₱1,450.00. On 12 December 1949 he sold parcel 7 to Quirino Estacio under a Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro for ₱2,600.00, reserving a ten-year right to repurchase. On 15 December 1953, Maria Lloren, then a widow, sold 4,375 sq m of parcel 6 to Constantino Oribello by Pacto de Retro for ₱1,450.00. The spouses never repurchased any of them.
- Carmen redeemed all three. She paid ₱1,950.00 to Francisca Saguitan on 20 April 1956 to release the mortgage before foreclosure; ₱1,550.00 to Constantino Oribello on 16 October 1956; and ₱2,600.00 to Quirino Estacio on 13 November 1959. The Court's arithmetic is that "the amount actually advanced for the repurchase was ₱6,100.00" — a figure that matters because everything she is ultimately awarded is computed from it.
- From then until the litigation, Carmen possessed both parcels, hired the tenants, took the produce and paid the realty taxes. (But "the receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties is still the decedent Fabian Fangonil" — the tax payments were made on his declaration, never on one transferred to her. Compare Heirs of Restar, where cancelling the decedent's declaration and issuing a new one in the possessor's own name was the repudiation.)
- On 14 November 1983 all seven heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Partial Partition covering all seven parcels. It stipulated that the spouses died intestate leaving seven parcels in their names, parcels 6 and 7 included, and that Carmen and Tomas "are the only creditors of the estate," Carmen in the amount of ₱8,700.00. Carmen signed it, but refused to accede to the proposed partition of parcel 1. This document is the case. Having signed a paper calling the parcels estate property and herself a creditor, she could not afterwards be heard to say she owned them.
- On 19 December 1994 all the heirs except Carmen executed a joint affidavit stipulating the partition of parcel 1.
- On 2 February 1995 — eleven years after the settlement — Carmen executed an affidavit repudiating the portions on parcels 6 and 7, alleging that her late brother Sinforoso, then an RTC judge, "committed misrepresentation and convinced her to sign," and asserting an oral agreement with the parents that "whoever redeems or repurchases any or all of these properties shall take possession of and own the property so redeemed or repurchased," her siblings' forbearance over the years being her proof of it. The Court dates her repudiation of the co-ownership to this refusal, and holds the affidavit itself "self-serving" — a retraction unsupported by proof of palpable mistake.
- On 1 March 1995 the six other children petitioned the RTC of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, for judicial partition of all seven parcels (Special Proceedings Case No. A-806), praying that Marina be appointed administratrix. Carmen intervened, opposing, asking to be appointed administratrix herself, and claiming exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7.
- The parties submitted the case on the pleadings, there being no disagreement about parcels 2, 3, 4 and 5; and on 16 September 1996 the respondents deposited ₱7,453.00 in court as payment to Carmen and Tomas, "the only outstanding debtors of the estate as specified in the 14 November 1983 extrajudicial settlement."
- Parcels 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were divided by drawing lots, on 25 April 1997, 2 May 1997 and 27 August 1998. (Carmen "boycotted the draw" for parcels 6 and 7, so the trial court ruled that "since there are seven rolled papers for the seven heirs to draw, the last undrawn rolled-paper containing the lot number shall be for Carmen Herrera.")
- On 9 October 1998 the RTC (Judge Clifton U. Ganay) ruled for the respondents, declaring parcels 6 and 7 part of the estate, partitioning parcel 1 as the respondents proposed, and ordering the six other heirs to reimburse Carmen ₱138,100.00 — the present equivalent of her ₱6,100.00 — at ₱19,728.57 each. It excused her from accounting for the produce, having "considered the produce of the said two (2) parcels, which she appropriated from the '50s to the present as interest on her money."
- On 30 January 2004 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto (CA-G.R. CV No. 61990), holding she "failed to adduce any evidence that would support her claim that the distribution was not equal" and that she "is simply holding the said property in trust for the other co-heirs"; reconsideration was denied 15 July 2005. (Its text quoted ₱138,100.00 but its penultimate paragraph said ₱130,100.00 — "obviously a typographical error," the Supreme Court held, since it affirmed the RTC in toto.)
Issue
Main issue. Whether exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7 vested in Carmen — by the alleged oral agreement, by her redemption of the parcels, or by acquisitive prescription through forty years of possession.
Secondary issues. (1) Whether the partition of parcel 1 was unfair. (2) Whether the siblings' claim was barred by laches. (3) How the reimbursement should be computed. (4) Whether the petition was procedurally defective for impleading the Court of Appeals and raising only questions of fact.
Ruling
Main issue. NO — she is a creditor of the estate, not the owner of parcels 6 and 7. Paying the redemption price does not convey: "The fact that it was petitioner's money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her the owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would indicate such." Her possession is explained otherwise — "petitioner was allowed to maintain possession and enjoy the fruits of the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co-owners" — and her tax receipts, while "indicia of ownership, such are not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other circumstances and evidence showing otherwise"; indeed "the receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties is still the decedent Fabian Fangonil." What settles it is her own paper. The extrajudicial settlement of 14 November 1983, "taken together with petitioner's comment in the same proceedings, are clear and categorical evidences that the transaction between petitioner and her parents was a mere loan": under it the heirs "included parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of their deceased parents" and stated that she and Tomas "are the only creditors of the estate," and in her comment "she categorically admitted... that the amount totaling ₱8,700.00... represents the personal money she used for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7. Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6 and 7." "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made." Her 1995 affidavit "deserves scant consideration for being self-serving. Absent positive proof that the earlier statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable mistake, retractions thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack credence." On prescription, "petitioner's possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession. In order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Clearly, petitioner cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner. Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership... In this case, we find that petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioner's only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994." And the rule behind it: "possession by a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them. A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property."
Secondary issue (1) — the partition of parcel 1. NO, it was not unfair. "[S]he was not able to adduce substantial evidence aliunde to support her allegations." The parents had "appropriated portions of Parcel 1 to Carmen, Pura, Tomas, Marina, and Sinforoso, by pointing out specific areas pertaining to each"; Carmen, Tomas and Marina built their houses on it; and an ocular inspection by the RTC found those structures, and a store of Carmen's, in place. That arrangement, "allotting an equal area of 362 square meters to each of the heirs," became the approved partition.
Secondary issue (2) — laches. NO. Laches is "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier," and requires four circumstances: conduct by the defendant giving rise to the complaint; delay by a complainant who had knowledge or notice and an opportunity to sue; the defendant's lack of knowledge that the right would be asserted; and injury or prejudice to the defendant if relief is granted. "Petitioner failed to prove the presence of all four established requisites of laches." Besides, "there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances," and "[b]ecause laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice."
Secondary issue (3) — the reimbursement. It is recomputed, and this is the only modification. The Court corrects the RTC's exchange rate: the peso stood at "₱2.00:$1.00" in the 1950s, not ₱3.90, so the present equivalent of the ₱6,100.00 is "[(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)] multiplied by ₱6,100.00," to be "proportionately paid by all the heirs."
Secondary issue (4) — the procedural objections. Both are excused. Impleading the Court of Appeals was error, but "where the Court of Appeals is impleaded as respondent in the Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes Rule 45, the Court of Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case" — done here "as a liberal interpretation of the rules on technicality, in pursuit of the ends of justice and equity." As to raising only questions of fact, "this Court is not a trier of facts," and "factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court. Absent any palpable error or arbitrariness, the findings of fact of the lower court are conclusive. On this ground alone, the appeal warrants a dismissal" — but the Court proceeded to the merits anyway.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2004 and (b) its Resolution dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 February 2004 are hereby affirmed, with MODIFICATION as to the amount to be reimbursed to petitioner. The present peso equivalent of the ₱6,100.00 indebtedness is hereby ordered reimbursed to petitioner which amount shall be computed based on current peso-dollar exchange rates at the time of finality of judgment, applying the formula below: [(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)] multiplied by ₱6,100.00. The equivalent amount shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each and every heir having a share in the said indebtedness. No Costs. SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- Paying the redemption price does not transfer ownership. "The fact that it was petitioner's money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her the owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would indicate such. This is more so if other evidence was adduced to show such is not the case."
- Nor do acts of ownership, when they are explained by tolerance. "It is evident that petitioner was allowed to maintain possession and enjoy the fruits of the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co-owners."
- Tax receipts are indicia, not proof — and these named the decedent. "[A]lthough we recognize that real estate tax receipts indicating payment of realty tax and possession of the parcels are indicia of ownership, such are not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other circumstances and evidence showing otherwise... the receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties is still the decedent Fabian Fangonil."
- Her own documents establish a loan, not a sale. The extrajudicial settlement and her comment "are clear and categorical evidences that the transaction between petitioner and her parents was a mere loan... Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6 and 7."
- Judicial admissions need no proof and are hard to escape. "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made."
- A late retraction is self-serving. "Absent positive proof that the earlier statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable mistake, retractions thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack credence."
- The three requisites of adverse possession between co-owners. "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing."
- A signed recognition forecloses the claim. "[P]etitioner cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner."
- The catalogue of what is not enough. "Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners."
- The date of repudiation, fixed. "In this case, we find that petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioner's only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994."
- Co-ownership as trust. "[P]ossession by a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them. A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property."
- The rule, in the article's own words. "[P]rescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property."
- The four requisites of laches. Conduct giving rise to the complaint; delay by a complainant with knowledge and opportunity; the defendant's want of notice that the right would be asserted; and prejudice to the defendant if relief is granted — all four required, none of them proved.
- Laches is equitable and discretionary. "[T]here is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches... Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice."
- The limits of Rule 45 review. "[F]actual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court. Absent any palpable error or arbitrariness, the findings of fact of the lower court are conclusive."
Doctrine
- Redemption by One Co-Heir Makes Him a Creditor, Not an Owner: absent convincing proof of a transfer, the money spent is a claim against the estate, reimbursable.
- Possession and Fruits Enjoyed by Tolerance Are Not Adverse.
- Tax Receipts Naming the Decedent Prove the Opposite of Exclusivity: they are indicia only, and "not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other circumstances and evidence showing otherwise."
- A Co-Owner Who Signs a Document Recognising the Co-Ownership Cannot Claim Adverse Possession — recognition and adversity cannot coexist.
- Judicial Admissions Need No Proof (Rule 129, Sec. 4) and may be contradicted only by showing palpable mistake; a bare later retraction is self-serving.
- Three Concurring Requisites of Adverse Possession Between Co-Owners: unequivocal acts amounting to ouster; made known; clear and convincing evidence.
- Silent Possession, Fruits, Improvements and Taxes Are Not Enough.
- Prescription Does Not Run While the Co-Ownership Is Recognised (Art. 494), and Partition Is Imprescriptible.
- A Repudiation Is Dated to the First Act That Actually Rejects the Co-Ownership — here, the refusal to honour the settlement in 1994.
- Laches Has Four Requisites, All of Which Must Be Proved, and is applied by equitable discretion.
How to place this case in the chapter. Fangonil-Herrera is the chapter's clearest example of a co-owner defeated by her own paper. In Bicarme v. Court of Appeals the possessor's deeds recited that the land was inherited from her father, and the recital was read as a trust provision in the omitted co-heir's favour; here the petitioner signed an extrajudicial settlement listing the parcels as estate property and herself as a creditor. Both lost because the strongest document in the record was one they had executed themselves. Set against Pangan v. Court of Appeals, which holds that a co-heir's spoken refusal is not enough, this case supplies the opposite proposition — a co-heir's written recognition is quite enough, and a retraction eleven years later cannot undo it. And note the date the Court fixes for repudiation: 1994, not the 1950s when the possession began. Repudiation is measured from the first act that rejects the co-ownership, and years of possession before that act count for nothing.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
I. Gist and Central Doctrine
Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT.
Fabian and Maria Lloren Fangonil of Tubao, La Union died intestate leaving seven parcels and seven children. In the 1950s the parents had mortgaged part of parcel 6 and sold parcel 7 and another part of parcel 6 under pacto de retro, and never redeemed them; their daughter Carmen redeemed all three for a total of ₱6,100.00, then possessed both parcels, took the produce and paid the taxes for four decades. When six of her siblings petitioned for judicial partition in 1995, she claimed parcels 6 and 7 exclusively. The RTC of Agoo and the Court of Appeals held them estate property; the Supreme Court affirmed, modifying only the reimbursement formula. The central doctrine is that a co-owner "cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner," and that "prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership" — her only repudiation being her refusal to honour the extrajudicial settlement in 1994.
II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts
- Fabian Fangonil and Maria Lloren Fangonil of Tubao, La Union had seven children: Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso and Carmen.
- They owned seven parcels: (1) 1,800 sq m residential land at Poblacion, Tubao, facing the town plaza; (2) 922 sq m residential lot at Barangay Sta. Barbara, Agoo; (3) 54,759 sq m at Francia West, Tubao; (4) 84,737 sq m at Francia West, Tubao; (5) 5,821 sq m at Francia Sur, Tubao; (6) 17,958 sq m at Magsaysay, Tubao; and (7) 9,127 sq m at San Nicolas East, Agoo.
- On 20 April 1949, Fabian, with Maria Lloren's consent, executed a Deed of Mortgage over the 15,364 sq m middle portion of parcel 6 in favour of Francisca Saguitan for ₱1,450.00, reserving a right of redemption for the same amount "without interest thereon except enjoying the fruits and products of said portion of land" by the mortgagee.
- On 12 December 1949, Fabian sold parcel 7 to Quirino Estacio under a Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro for ₱2,600.00, reserving the right to repurchase "within the period of TEN (10) years," failing which "this instrument shall automatically become an absolute deed of sale."
- On 1 June 1953, Fabian Fangonil died.
- On 15 December 1953, Maria Lloren, by then a widow, sold 4,375 sq m of parcel 6 to Constantino Oribello under a Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale for ₱1,450.00, with a right to repurchase "in any time during the month of May of each year within the period of TEN (10) years."
- The spouses never repurchased or redeemed any of the parcels.
- On 20 April 1956, before foreclosure, Carmen paid ₱1,950.00 to Francisca Saguitan and the mortgaged portion of parcel 6 was released.
- On 16 October 1956, Carmen paid ₱1,550.00 to Constantino Oribello and repurchased the pacto de retro portion of parcel 6.
- On 13 November 1959, Carmen paid ₱2,600.00 to Quirino Estacio and repurchased parcel 7. "Petitioner paid the total amount of ₱6,100.00 for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7."
- In February 1976, Maria Lloren Fangonil died. "Prior to an extrajudicial settlement executed by the heirs in 1983, there was never any settlement of the estate."
- On 14 November 1983, the parties executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Partial Partition covering all seven parcels, stipulating that the spouses died intestate leaving seven parcels in their names — parcels 6 and 7 included — and that Carmen and Tomas are the only creditors of the estate, Carmen in the amount of ₱8,700.00. Carmen signed but refused to accede to the proposed partition of parcel 1. It further provided that parcels 6 and 7 "shall be partitioned and settled in a separate agreement for the reason that they have not yet agreed on the manner of the disposal of the same."
- On 19 December 1994, all the heirs except Carmen executed a joint affidavit stipulating the partition of parcel 1.
- On 2 February 1995, Carmen executed an affidavit repudiating the settlement as to parcels 6 and 7, alleging that Sinforoso, "a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge then, committed misrepresentation and convinced her to sign"; that her siblings' forbearance was "in abiding with an oral agreement of partition with our parents who... enjoined their children that whoever redeems or repurchases any or all of these properties shall take possession of and own the property so redeemed or repurchased"; and that her signature "ha[d] been procured against my better judgment."
- On 1 March 1995, the six other children filed with the RTC of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 a petition for judicial partition of all seven parcels with a prayer to appoint Marina administratrix — Special Proceedings Case No. A-806. Carmen intervened in opposition, asked to be appointed administratrix, and claimed exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7.
- The parties submitted the case on the pleadings, there being no disagreement as to parcels 2, 3, 4 and 5.
- On 16 September 1996, the respondent heirs deposited ₱7,453.00 in court as payment to Carmen and Tomas, the estate's only creditors under the 1983 settlement.
- Drawings of lots were conducted for parcel 3 on 25 April 1997 (by Geodetic Engineer Gerardo Dacayanan), parcel 5 on 2 May 1997, and parcels 4, 6 and 7 on 27 August 1998. Carmen boycotted the draws for parcels 6 and 7, so the court assigned her "the last undrawn rolled-paper."
- On 2 September 1998 the respondents filed a Manifestation/Motion proposing to convert the ₱6,100.00 by the peso-dollar rate — ₱3.90:$1.00 in 1959 against ₱42.00:$1.00 in 1998 — yielding ₱65,790.00, or ₱9,398.57 per heir. On 7 October 1998 the RTC approved the manifestation but modified the amount to ₱138,100.00.
- On 9 October 1998, the RTC (Judge Clifton U. Ganay) decided for the respondents: parcels 6 and 7 are estate property; parcel 1 is partitioned as the respondents proposed, its eastern portion to Tomas, Sinforoso (represented by Victoria Estoque) and Marina, its south-western part to Pura and its north-western part to Carmen; the six heirs are to reimburse Carmen ₱138,100.00 at ₱19,728.57 each; and Carmen need not account for the produce, the court having "considered the produce of the said two (2) parcels, which she appropriated from the '50s to the present as interest on her money."
- On 30 January 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto in CA-G.R. CV No. 61990, finding no evidence that the distribution was unequal and holding that Carmen "is simply holding the said property in trust for the other co-heirs"; reconsideration was denied 15 July 2005.
- On 28 August 2007, the Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming with a modification only as to the computation of the reimbursement.
III. Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioner (Carmen Fangonil-Herrera)
Five errors were assigned. That the partition of parcel 1 was "clearly uneven and unfair," leaving her share "at the rear portion of the said lot." That parcels 6 and 7 should be hers solely, she "being the only one who redeemed and repurchased said parcels in the 1950's even while the parents of the parties were still alive." That the respondents' right to claim a share "had long prescribed as a result of their inaction for more than forty (40) years." That the claim was "long barred by laches" for the same reason. And that the ₱138,100.00 equivalent was too low. She relied on her realty tax receipts, on being "the only one hiring tenants for and benefiting from the produce," and on the respondents' failure to seek partition of parcels 6 and 7 within ten years of the parents' deaths or to reimburse her, as showing "they never considered the said parcels part of the estate." Behind all of it lay the claimed oral agreement that whoever redeemed a property would own it.
B. Respondents (Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros Fangonil and Victoria Fangonil Estoque)
That parcels 6 and 7 are part of the estate, as the 1983 extrajudicial settlement they all signed provides, Carmen being named there as a creditor for what she advanced. That the partition of parcel 1 reflects the parents' own allocation and the parties' oral agreement, confirmed by the houses actually standing on it. Procedurally, that the petition improperly combined Rule 45 and Rule 65 by impleading the Court of Appeals while raising only questions of fact, and should be dismissed outright.
IV. Issues
A. MAIN ISSUE
Whether exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7 has vested in the petitioner — by agreement, by her redemption, or by acquisitive prescription.
B. SECONDARY ISSUES
- Whether the partition of parcel 1 was unfair and prejudicial.
- Whether the respondents' claim was barred by laches.
- How the reimbursement of the ₱6,100.00 should be computed.
- Whether the petition should be dismissed for impleading the Court of Appeals and for raising only questions of fact.
V. Ruling / Disposition
A. MAIN ISSUE
NO. "The fact that it was petitioner's money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her the owner thereof"; she "was allowed to maintain possession and enjoy the fruits of the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co-owners"; and her tax receipts "state that the declared owner of the properties is still the decedent Fabian Fangonil." The 1983 settlement and her own comment "are clear and categorical evidences that the transaction between petitioner and her parents was a mere loan... Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6 and 7." A judicial admission "does not require proof" and may be contradicted "only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made"; her retraction is "self-serving." On prescription, the three requisites are not met — "petitioner cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner" — and "[p]etitioner's only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994." "[P]rescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership... An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible."
B. SECONDARY ISSUES
- Parcel 1 — the partition stands. "[S]he was not able to adduce substantial evidence aliunde to support her allegations"; the parents had allocated specific areas, houses stood on them, an ocular inspection confirmed it, and each heir received "an equal area of 362 square meters."
- Laches — NO. Its four requisites must all be present and "[p]etitioner failed to prove the presence of all four"; and being equitable, laches "should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice."
- Reimbursement — recomputed. The 1950s rate was "₱2.00:$1.00," so the present equivalent is "[(Current exchange rate... as of the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)] multiplied by ₱6,100.00," proportionately borne by all the heirs. The Court of Appeals' "₱130,100.00" was "obviously a typographical error."
- Procedure — excused. The Court of Appeals "is merely omitted from the title of the case"; and although on the factual-issues ground "the appeal warrants a dismissal," the Court resolved the merits.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED... affirmed, with MODIFICATION as to the amount to be reimbursed to petitioner... The equivalent amount shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each and every heir having a share in the said indebtedness. No Costs. SO ORDERED."
VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines
A. Ratio Decidendi
- Payment of the redemption price is not a mode of acquiring ownership. "The fact that it was petitioner's money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her the owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would indicate such."
- Acts of ownership explained by tolerance. "It is evident that petitioner was allowed to maintain possession and enjoy the fruits of the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co-owners."
- Tax receipts, and what these ones showed. "[R]eal estate tax receipts indicating payment of realty tax and possession of the parcels are indicia of ownership, such are not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other circumstances and evidence showing otherwise... the receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties is still the decedent Fabian Fangonil."
- The documents establish a loan. The extrajudicial settlement "taken together with petitioner's comment in the same proceedings, are clear and categorical evidences that the transaction between petitioner and her parents was a mere loan... Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6 and 7."
- Judicial admissions. "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made."
- Retractions. "We find that petitioner's affidavit retracting her acquiescence... deserves scant consideration for being self-serving. Absent positive proof that the earlier statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable mistake, retractions thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack credence."
- The three requisites. "(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing."
- Recognition and adversity cannot coexist. "Clearly, petitioner cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner."
- What is not proof of exclusive ownership. "Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners."
- The date of repudiation. "In this case, we find that petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioner's only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994."
- Co-ownership as trust. "A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property."
- The rule. "[P]rescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property."
- Laches defined, and its four requisites. "Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier"; there must be conduct giving rise to the complaint, delay by a complainant with knowledge and opportunity, the defendant's want of notice that the right would be asserted, and prejudice to the defendant.
- Its equitable character. "Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice."
- Rule 45 review. "[F]actual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court."
B. Doctrines/Rules
- Redemption Makes a Creditor of the Estate, Not an Owner.
- Possession by Tolerance Is Not Adverse Possession.
- Tax Receipts Are Indicia Only, and receipts naming the decedent as declared owner cut against exclusivity.
- A Co-Owner Who Has Signed a Recognition Cannot Assert Adverse Possession.
- Judicial Admissions Bind (Rule 129, Sec. 4), escapable only by proof of palpable mistake.
- Three Concurring Requisites of Adverse Possession Between Co-Owners.
- Prescription Does Not Run While the Co-Ownership Is Recognised, and Partition Is Imprescriptible (Art. 494).
- Repudiation Is Dated From the First Act Rejecting the Co-Ownership.
- Laches Requires Four Concurring Circumstances and is applied by equitable discretion.
- A Petition Under Rule 45 That Wrongly Impleads the Court of Appeals Is Not Dismissed; the court is simply dropped from the title.
C. Limitations/Exceptions
- The Court did not hold the redeeming heir remediless. She recovers the full present value of her ₱6,100.00, proportionately from all the heirs, and was excused from accounting for four decades of produce — the trial court having treated the produce "as interest on her money."
- The alleged oral agreement — that whoever redeemed would own — was not rejected as legally impossible, only as unproved against her own contrary writings.
- The prescription and laches holdings are alternative, not cumulative. Even had she shown a repudiation, the Court noted her possession was by tolerance; even had laches been available in principle, she proved none of its four requisites.
- The reimbursement is stated as a formula, not a sum, keyed to the exchange rate "as of the date of finality of this judgment" — so the figures in the decisions below (₱138,100.00 and ₱130,100.00) are both superseded.
- On the procedural side, the Court twice said the appeal could have been dismissed outright — for pleading only questions of fact — and twice went on to the merits anyway.
D. Topic Integration
- The relationship is DIRECT.
- This is the chapter's study in written recognition. Where the other cases weigh conduct — possession, taxes, silence, refusals — this one starts from a document the claimant signed, and everything else follows. The lesson to carry into an exam is to look for a paper before weighing behaviour: an extrajudicial settlement, a deed's recital, a pleading's admission.
- Note the direction of the three requisites here. Ordinarily the possessor must prove ouster, notice and clear evidence; here she could not even reach the first, because her own instrument recognised the co-ownership. Recognition and repudiation are mutually exclusive, and Article 494 keys the suspension of prescription to recognition precisely for that reason.
- Read the money holding alongside the property holding. The chapter's cases repeatedly involve one heir who spent to save the family land. The answer is consistent — reimbursement, not ownership — and the reasoning is that outlay creates a credit, and a credit is not a mode of acquiring dominion.
- Contrast the treatment of tax payments with Heirs of Restar v. Heirs of Cichon. There the possessor cancelled the decedent's tax declaration and took out a new one in his own name, and that was the repudiation. Here the receipts still named Fabian Fangonil as declared owner. The same species of evidence points in opposite directions depending on whose name the declaration is in — a distinction worth writing out.
- Finally, the case shows how a court dates a repudiation. Forty years of possession did not start any clock; the clock would have started, if at all, in 1994 — and the petition for partition came the next year. That is the mechanical habit the chapter is teaching: identify the act, date it, then count.
VII. Separate Opinions
NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario for the Third Division, with Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson) and Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and Ruben T. Reyes concurring.