Monteroso v. Court of Appeals

n. Right to Demand Partition — Partition

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Case DigestChapter III — Co-ownership

Monteroso v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105608 · April 30, 2008 · Supreme Court

n. Right to Demand Partition — Partition

Gist

Don Fabian Monteroso sold five parcels to his eldest daughter in 1939 but never gave up possession; she took over only when he died in 1948, and the family fought over the estate for four decades. The Supreme Court held the sales simulated, partition the proper remedy for a compulsory heir seeking his legitime, and prescription unavailable — because repudiation of the co-ownership dated only from 1961, when the demand for partition was refused, and suit followed nine years later.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is that partition is the proper remedy for a compulsory heir seeking his legitime, and it does not prescribe against a co-owner. "Before partition and eventual distribution of [the] intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate," and "[a]s a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share." The single exception requires clear repudiation of which the co-owners are apprised — and the simulated deeds of 1939 "could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs"; repudiation dated only from the 1961 refusal of a written demand for partition.

Facts

Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, married twice and "sired eight children, four from each union": by Soledad Doldol (m. 1906, d. 8 April 1927) came Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin and Tirso; by Sofia Pendejito came Florenda, Reynato, Alberto and Fabian, Jr. The properties are labelled F (first marriage) and S (second) throughout — twelve parcels in all, F-1 to F-8 and S-1 to S-4.
After his first wife's death Don Fabian himself instituted an intestate proceeding for her estate — SP No. 309 — "apparently to obviate any dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage," and the CFI approved a Proyecto de Particion dated 21 February 1935 by Orden of 11 March 1936, adjudicating Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3 and half of F-5 to Don Fabian and Parcel F-4 with the other half of F-5 to Soledad Doldol's four children in equal shares. The father's attempt to prevent a squabble is what the Court calls "unfortunate" in its opening — the litigation ran from 1969 to 2008.
In 1939 Don Fabian executed three deeds of absolute sale to his eldest daughter Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, covering Parcels F-1 (Exh. "C", 10 May 1939), F-2 (Exh. "D", 24 September 1939), and F-3, F-5, F-7 and F-8 (Exh. "E", 1 May 1939). These are the deeds later held simulated — and the reason is chronological: "Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime," and Soledad "only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabian's death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution."
Perfecto Cagampang, Soledad's husband and the notarizing officer of the deeds, "judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest." The Court calls this "[t]he more telling circumstance": the couple were already married in 1939, "[a] property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal," yet Perfecto "went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wife's paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move."
Benjamin died on 1 February 1947, leaving his wife Mauricia Nakila and four children — Ruby, Marlene, Adelita and Henrieto. Don Fabian died on 26 October 1948. Don Fabian's death is the moment the co-ownership among the eight compulsory heirs arose, and it is the reference point for every prescription argument in the case.
On 28 July 1969, Benjamin's children sued their uncle Tirso for Recovery of Property with Damages (Civil Case No. 1292) over a quarter of Parcel F-4, saying he had been entrusted with their father's share and refused to deliver it on their majority. Tirso answered that the portion was never entrusted to him but was held by their sister Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who had already exchanged her share in F-4 for Parcel F-7.
On 14 April 1970, Tirso filed Civil Case No. 1332 for Partition and Damages with Receivership over all twelve parcels against his stepmother Pendejito and all his full and half-siblings, contending that SP No. 309 was void for excluding Parcels F-6, F-7 and F-8, and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 were not Pendejito's paraphernal property. This is the complaint the petitioners say should have been for reconveyance — and the characterisation decides whether prescription applies.
Tirso's complaint itself alleged that from Don Fabian's death in 1948 the lots "have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public possession of the Cagampang spouses." The petitioners built their whole prescription case on this admission; the Court holds that exclusion from possession "does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership."
In 1961, Tirso made a written demand for the partition and distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, which the Cagampang spouses refused. This refusal, not the 1939 deeds, is the date of repudiation — and it leaves Tirso's 1970 suit comfortably within time.
Parcel S-1 had been applied for as a homestead by spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo; Don Fabian bought it from them on 8 May 1943, cultivated it and declared it for taxation, but his application "would be rejected because death supervened." In 1963, Pendejito filed her own homestead application for it.
Parcel F-5 was donated to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso, and Nakila as Benjamin's widow. The donation fails on Nakila's want of authority: she "has no disposable right thereto," holding only "usufructuary right equal to the share of her children" under Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, and she signed "in her name and not in the name of her children," who were not under her legal guardianship.
The RTC and, on 31 March 1992, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 15805) both held the 1939 deeds simulated and ordered partition; reconsideration was denied 16 December 1993.

Issue

Whether partition is the proper remedy for Tirso, a compulsory heir seeking his legitime — or whether, no co-ownership being recognised, his remedy was reconveyance, barred by extinctive prescription and laches.

Secondary issues. Whether the 1939 deeds of sale were simulated; whether invoking prescription amounts to recognising the co-ownership; whether Parcels S-1 to S-4 of the second marriage may be partitioned; and whether the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula was valid.

Ruling

Main issue. Partition is the proper remedy, and it is not barred. "[P]artition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent," and "[a]n action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved" — so Tirso need not have pleaded co-ownership expressly: "his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld." Nor does his admission of the Cagampangs' exclusive possession defeat him: "The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership." Being a compulsory heir, his right "covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death," 26 October 1948, and "[b]efore partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed... Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share." Reconveyance is therefore not his remedy: "Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime... is concerned." Repudiation is the sole exception, and it must be "clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal of the co-ownership relation," with the co-owners "apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership." It "happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate." The new Civil Code being then in force, "Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file," and he sued in 1970, "only nine years after the considered express repudiation"; besides, "in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed," which "would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian.

Secondary issues. The deeds were simulated; invoking prescription concedes the co-ownership; the S-parcels are partible; the donation is void. On simulation, "Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime" and Soledad took possession "nine years after contract execution" — "[t]he gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby"; and "[t]he more telling circumstance" is Perfecto's judicial move to have only his wife named on the titles when "[a] property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal." The Court also credited Tirso's account that the couple "tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the properties which have to be 'hidden' by means of simulated conveyances." On the third issue, the petitioners erred by "compartmentalizing what the CA wrote": since the right to partition is imprescriptible save where a co-owner repudiates, "by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso." On Parcels S-1 to S-4, Tirso's acknowledgment of the second family's possession "cannot be viewed as the required repudiation," because "it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating," and the records show no such acts by Pendejito and her children; the children of the first marriage "have a hereditary right over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets" of the second marriage. As to Parcel S-1, Section 105 of C.A. No. 141 subrogates "his heirs in law" to a homestead applicant who dies before the patent issues, so "the heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1," Soliman v. Icdang having read that section as abrogating the widow's former right to a patent in her own name. On the donation of Parcel F-5, Nakila "cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto" — nemo dat quod non habet — holding only a usufructuary right, and she signed "in her name and not in the name of her children," who were not under her guardianship; that nobody objected is immaterial, since "[t]he circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied."

"WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 1992 and December 16, 1993, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

Standard of review. Jurisdiction under Rule 45 "is limited to reviewing errors of law," and findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive subject to ten recognised exceptions. "None of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case."
The sales were simulated — the possession gap. "Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime"; the deeds were executed 1 May, 10 May and 24 September 1939, yet "Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang... only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabian's death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby."
And the title manoeuvre. "The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest." The couple were already married when the deeds were executed, and "[a] property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wife's paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move." The Court also "accord[ed] credence to Tirso's allegation that the Cagampang spouses tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the properties which have to be 'hidden'."
Invoking prescription concedes the co-ownership. The petitioners' error "flows from compartmentalizing what the CA wrote." Read in context: partition "by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches," and "[t]he only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an action for partition is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner." Hence "by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to set in."
Exclusion from possession is not proof against co-ownership. "The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership."
Nor need co-ownership be pleaded by name. "While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld... By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon."
Partition is the remedy. "[P]artition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent." "An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved," and Section 1, Rule 69 requires the plaintiff to set forth "the nature and extent of his title" and to join "all other persons interested in the property."
The right accrues at death and is imprescriptible. Tirso's right "covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death, i.e., on October 26, 1948." "Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate... Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share."
Reconveyance is the wrong remedy here. "Contrary to petitioners' stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned."
The exception, and when it was triggered. "Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, 'where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.'" Here "no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other compulsory heirs... because effective repudiation had not timely been made": "the repudiation which must be clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal of the co-ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian."
The periods. "[C]onsidering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that Tirso's cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation." And "acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961... since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed... Such would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian."
The second-marriage parcels. Tirso's acknowledgment of the second family's possession "cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso from pursuing his right to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners... of such intention." "There can be no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets" of the second marriage.
Parcel S-1 goes to the heirs. Section 105 of C.A. No. 141 provides that a homestead applicant who dies before the patent issues "shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations... by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent." Don Fabian bought Parcel S-1 on 8 May 1943, cultivated and declared it, and "[t]he application, however, would be rejected because death supervened"; Pendejito filed her own homestead application in 1963. "[T]he heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1," Soliman v. Icdang having read Section 105 as "having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of Act No. 926... a patent in her own name."
The donation of Parcel F-5 is void. Nakila "cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet applies... as Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Besides, Nakila signed the deed of donation in her name and not in the name of her children who are the heirs in representation of their father, Benjamin," and the then minor children "were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila." That no one objected "is of little consequence": "The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied."

Doctrine

Partition Is the Heir's Remedy for His Legitime: "[P]artition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent" — not reconveyance, where the claimant asserts only his share and not total ownership.
What a Partition Action Is (Rule 69, Sec. 1): "[A]t once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion" — so co-ownership need not be separately pleaded.
Co-Ownership Arises at Death (Art. 777, Art. 1078): Before partition the heirs own the estate in common, and the co-heir's right to his pro indiviso share "is imprescriptible."
Prescription Does Not Run Against a Co-Heir (Art. 494): "[A]cquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share."
The Repudiation Exception, and Its Requirements: There must be "a clear repudiation of the co-ownership" and "the co-owners... apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership"; it must be "clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal." Simulated deeds do not qualify — they "could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs." A refusal of a written demand for partition does.
Invoking Prescription Concedes the Co-Ownership: Because repudiation is the only route to prescription against a co-owner, a defendant who pleads prescription "deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership."
Exclusion From Possession Proves Nothing: It "does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership"; and the burden of repudiating lies on the one "desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership," not on the excluded heir.
Bad Faith Forces the Thirty-Year Period (Art. 1141): With evident bad faith only extraordinary prescription is available, and thirty years had not run from 1948 or 1961.
Simulation Shown by Conduct: A nine-year gap between deed and possession, unexplained, plus a manoeuvre to record conjugal property as paraphernal, establish that "the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby."
Homestead of a Deceased Applicant (C.A. 141, Sec. 105): The heirs in law are subrogated and entitled to the patent; the widow may not take it in her own name.
Void Contracts Cannot Be Ratified: "The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract."

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Don Fabian Monteroso, Sr. left eight children by two marriages and twelve parcels of land in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. In 1939 he executed three deeds of sale over five parcels to his eldest daughter Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, but kept possession until his death on 26 October 1948. His son Tirso sued for partition in 1970; the Cagampang spouses pleaded prescription and laches. The RTC and Court of Appeals held the deeds simulated and ordered partition, and the Supreme Court affirmed in toto. The central doctrine is that partition is the compulsory heir's remedy for his legitime and does not prescribe: "Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible", subject only to a clear repudiation of which the co-owners are apprised — which the simulated 1939 deeds could not supply, and which dated only from the 1961 refusal of a written demand for partition.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., former justice of the peace and municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, married Soledad Doldol in 1906, by whom he had Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin and Tirso.
On 8 April 1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso died; "[a] little over a year later," Don Fabian married Sofia Pendejito, by whom he had Florenda, Reynato, Alberto and Fabian, Jr.
After his first wife's death Don Fabian filed before the CFI of Agusan an intestate proceeding for her estate, SP No. 309, "apparently to obviate any dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage."
The CFI approved a Proyecto de Particion of 21 February 1935 by Orden of 11 March 1936, adjudicating Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3 and one-half of F-5 to Don Fabian, and Parcel F-4 with the other half of F-5 to Soledad Doldol's four children "in equal shares." A Mocion was later filed for delivery of their shares.
In 1939, Don Fabian executed three deeds of absolute sale in favour of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang: Exhibit "E" on 1 May 1939 (Parcels F-3, F-5, F-7 and F-8), Exhibit "C" on 10 May 1939 (Parcel F-1, for ₱2,500), and Exhibit "D" on 24 September 1939 (Parcel F-2). Her husband Perfecto Cagampang was the notarizing officer.
On 1 February 1947, Benjamin died, leaving his wife Mauricia Nakila and children Ruby, Marlene, Adelita and Henrieto.
On 26 October 1948, Don Fabian died. Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang "only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabian's death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution."
In 1961, Tirso made a written demand on the Cagampang spouses "for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian," which they refused.
In 1963, Pendejito filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1, which Don Fabian had purchased from the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo, on 8 May 1943, and had cultivated and declared for taxation before his application "would be rejected because death supervened."
On 28 July 1969, the children of Benjamin filed Civil Case No. 1292 for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle Tirso, over a portion of Parcel F-4 of 6 hectares, 99 ares and 32 centares, alleging it had been entrusted to him as their father's share. Tirso answered that it was held by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who had exchanged her F-4 share for Parcel F-7.
On 14 April 1970, Tirso filed Civil Case No. 1332 for Partition and Damages with Receivership over all twelve parcels against Pendejito and his full and half-siblings, later amended to include Perfecto and Pendejito as guardian ad litem for the minor children of Fabian, Jr., who died in 1970.
Tirso alleged that the twelve parcels belonged to the conjugal partnerships of the two marriages; that SP No. 309 was void for excluding Parcels F-6, F-7 and F-8; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 were not Pendejito's paraphernal property. The defendants maintained the validity of SP No. 309 as res judicata for Parcels F-1 to F-5, the 1939 sales, the donation of Parcel F-6 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, and Pendejito's exclusive title to the S parcels by homestead patent, adverse possession and purchase.
On 31 March 1992, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 15805) affirmed the RTC; on 16 December 1993 it denied reconsideration. On 30 April 2008, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Spouses Perfecto and Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, et al.)

Petitioners contended that the finding of simulation was unsupported; that "the benefit of prescription may be availed of without necessarily recognizing co-ownership," the two being "diametrically opposed legal concepts"; that partition is proper "only where co-ownership is recognized," and none obtained since Tirso himself alleged the Cagampangs' "exclusive, adverse, and public possession" from 1948; that his remedy was reconveyance, prescribed either in 1949 (ten years after registration) or 1958 (ten years after Don Fabian's death) under Act No. 190 in relation to Article 1116, citing Osorio v. Tan; that the CA erred in dating repudiation to 1961; that Parcels S-1 to S-4 were beyond partition, Parcel S-1 being Pendejito's paraphernal property by homestead application; and that the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula was valid, its signatories not having questioned it.

B. Respondent (Tirso D. Monteroso)

Tirso sought partition of all twelve parcels as a compulsory heir, contending the 1939 deeds were simulated — the Cagampang spouses having "tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the properties which have to be 'hidden'" — that SP No. 309 failed to comprehend the entire estate, and that the S parcels were conjugal property of the second marriage in which the children of the first marriage share.

C. Common Ground

The relationships, the dates of the two marriages and of the deaths, the existence and dates of the three 1939 deeds, and the fact that Soledad took possession only after 1948, were not in dispute.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether partition was the proper remedy for Tirso, or whether his action was one for reconveyance barred by extinctive prescription and laches.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether the 1939 deeds were simulated; whether invoking prescription amounts to admitting the co-ownership; whether Parcels S-1 to S-4 may be partitioned; and whether the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula M. Bayan was valid.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

Partition is proper and is not barred. "[P]artition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved." Tirso's right accrued at Don Fabian's death on 26 October 1948, and "Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share." Repudiation "happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939... but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition," and the 1970 suit came "only nine years after the considered express repudiation".

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Simulated; prescription concedes co-ownership; S-parcels partible; donation void. "The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby," and "[t]he more telling circumstance" was Perfecto's move to record the parcels as his wife's paraphernal property. By pleading prescription — "the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner" — the Cagampangs "are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso." As to the S parcels, "it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating," and no such acts were shown; Parcel S-1 belongs to the heirs under Section 105 of C.A. No. 141. The donation of Parcel F-5 fails for want of authority in Nakila — nemo dat quod non habet — and "void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied."

"WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 1992 and December 16, 1993, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Review is for errors of law. Findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive subject to ten exceptions; "[n]one of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case."
Simulation — the possession gap. "Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime," and Soledad took possession "nine years after contract execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby."
Simulation — the title manoeuvre. "The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest... A property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wife's paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move."
Prescription concedes co-ownership. The petitioners erred by "compartmentalizing what the CA wrote." Partition "by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches"; "[t]he only exception... is provided in a case where the co-ownership... had been properly repudiated by a co-owner"; hence "by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to set in."
Exclusion is not disproof. "The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership."
The theory need not be named. "While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale."
Partition defined. "An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved," and Section 1, Rule 69 requires the complaint to set forth "the nature and extent of his title" and to join "all other persons interested in the property."
The right and its imprescriptibility. "His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death, i.e., on October 26, 1948." "Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible."
Reconveyance is not the remedy. "Contrary to petitioners' stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso... Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned."
The repudiation exception. "Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, 'where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.'" But here "effective repudiation had not timely been made": it "happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed apprised of the repudiation."
The periods run in his favour. "Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action... he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961... since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian."
The second-marriage parcels. "Tirso's acknowledgment of Pendejito and her children's possession of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 cannot be viewed as the required repudiation... Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such intention." And "[t]here can be no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage."
Parcel S-1. Under Section 105 of C.A. 141, a homestead applicant who dies before the patent issues "shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations... by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent." "[T]he heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1," Soliman v. Icdang reading the section as "having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of Act No. 926... a patent in her own name."
The donation of Parcel F-5. Nakila "cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet applies to this instance as Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889." She signed "in her name and not in the name of her children," who "were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila." That no one objected "is of little consequence": "The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Partition for the Legitime: The compulsory heir's remedy is partition, not reconveyance, where he claims only his share.
Partition = Declaration + Segregation (Rule 69, Sec. 1): So co-ownership need not be pleaded as a separate theory.
Co-Ownership From Death (Art. 777, Art. 1078): Over the whole undivided estate, until partition and distribution.
Imprescriptibility (Art. 494): Prescription "does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share."
Repudiation Must Be Clear and Communicated: Simulated deeds are not notice; a refusal of a written demand for partition is.
Pleading Prescription Admits the Co-Ownership.
The Repudiator Bears the Burden: "[I]t behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating."
Bad Faith Leaves Only Extraordinary Prescription (Art. 1141): Thirty years, which had not run.
Homestead of a Deceased Applicant (C.A. 141, Sec. 105): Heirs are subrogated; the widow cannot take the patent in her own name.
Void Contracts Cannot Be Ratified.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The imprescriptibility is not absolute: "[a]cquisitive prescription... may still set in in favor of a co-owner, where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership" — the rule applied against the claimant in Delima and Heirs of Restar.
Even after repudiation, the period depends on faith: bad faith removes ordinary ten-year prescription and leaves the thirty-year extraordinary period.
The Court affirmed the CA in toto on findings of fact, none of the ten Rule 45 exceptions applying.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
On "Right to Demand Partition — Partition," this is the fullest statement in the chapter of why partition does not prescribe and of what it takes to make it prescribe. Keep the two halves together: the right is imprescriptible; the exception is repudiation, and repudiation has requirements of its own.
It also supplies the diagnostic for choosing the remedy: ask what the plaintiff claims. Claiming the whole property means reconveyance, with its ten-year clock; claiming only one's legitime means partition, with no clock at all until repudiation.
Pair it with Cruz v. Cristobal — same imprescriptibility, reached because an excluded heir was never bound by the settlement — and read it immediately before the repudiation cases (Delima, Heirs of Restar, Heirs of Reyes), where the requirements stated here are actually met and the clock does start.
The evidentiary lesson on simulation is worth carrying too: a deed is exposed not by the price recited but by what the parties did — who kept possession, for how long, and what they quietly asked the registry to record.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. for the Second Division, with Justices Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio Morales, Tinga and Brion concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

The article at the centre of the case, and of the petitioners' misreading. "No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."

The petitioners argued that partition presupposes a recognised co-ownership, and that since Tirso himself pleaded the Cagampangs' "exclusive, adverse, and public possession" since 1948, no co-ownership existed and his only remedy was reconveyance — which does prescribe.

The Court's answer inverts it. Exclusion from possession does not disprove co-ownership: "The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership." And Tirso need not have pleaded the theory — "his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir."

Hence "[t]he right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches," with the single exception of a repudiated co-ownership.

Civil Code

Article 777, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title IV (Succession), Chapter 1 (General Provisions)

The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)

Why it is cited here

Why Tirso was a co-owner from the outset. "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

His right "as a compulsory heir, accrued at the moment of death of Don Fabian," and "covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death" — 26 October 1948.

This is what makes the case a partition case rather than a reconveyance case: Tirso "is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father... is concerned." A claimant asserting the whole sues to reconvey; a claimant asserting his share sues to partition.

Civil Code

Article 1078, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Subsection 1 (Partition)

Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)

Why it is cited here

The regime that arises on death and lasts until distribution: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs."

"Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible."

And the rule that follows: "As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share."

Implementing Rules

Section 1, Rule 69, Rules of Court

Complaint in action for partition of real estate

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 69 (Partition)

A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (1a)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

What an action for partition is and what it does. "A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property."

The Court's gloss answers the objection that Tirso never pleaded co-ownership: "An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved." The declaration is built into the remedy — a partition complaint necessarily asserts the plaintiff's co-ownership, whether or not it uses the word.

Note also the joinder requirement, which distinguishes partition from the possession suits of Plasabas and Navarro: partition must join "all other persons interested in the property," because it ends the community for everyone.

Civil Code

Article 1141, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 3 (Prescription of Actions)

Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. (1963)

Why it is cited here

The period that applied once repudiation was found. "Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription."

Because "the new Civil Code was already then in effect" in 1961, "Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court," and his 1970 suit came "only nine years after the considered express repudiation."

The Court then adds a belt-and-braces holding on acquisitive prescription: even taking 1961 as a valid repudiation, "in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed" — and that would hold "even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian" in 1948, since 1948 to 1970 is twenty-two years.

Bad faith matters because it removes ordinary ten-year prescription from the table and leaves only the thirty-year extraordinary period.

Special Law

Section 105, C.A. No. 141

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act, 1936)

If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or leased under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the purposes of this Act.

The Public Land Act has been amended many times — most consequentially for land registration by R.A. No. 1942, P.D. No. 1073 and, in 2021, by R.A. No. 11573, which rewrote the possession period in Section 48(b). LawPhil carries the 1936 text, so check the date of the decision against the amendment before relying on the wording quoted here.

Why it is cited here

Why the homestead parcel fell to the heirs rather than to the widow who applied for it. If an applicant or grantee "shall die before the issuance of the patent," he "shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for" by "his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent."

Don Fabian had bought Parcel S-1 from the original applicants on 8 May 1943, cultivated it and declared it for taxation, and his application "would be rejected because death supervened." Pendejito filed her own homestead application in 1963.

Section 105 answers that: "the heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1," and as Soliman v. Icdang holds, the section abrogated the widow's former right under Section 3 of Act No. 926 to secure a patent in her own name.

The general point for the chapter: a co-owner cannot convert common property into her own by re-applying for it in her own name.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 494, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Why it is cited here

Hence "[t]he right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches," with the single exception of a repudiated co-ownership.

Full entry below ↓

Article 777, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title IV (Succession), Chapter 1 (General Provisions)

The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)

Why it is cited here

Why Tirso was a co-owner from the outset. "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

Full entry below ↓

Article 1078, Civil Code

Civil Code

Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)

Why it is cited here

The regime that arises on death and lasts until distribution: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs."

Full entry below ↓

Section 1, Rule 69, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Complaint in action for partition of real estate

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 69 (Partition)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 1141, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title V (Prescription), Chapter 3 (Prescription of Actions)

Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. (1963)

Why it is cited here

Bad faith matters because it removes ordinary ten-year prescription from the table and leaves only the thirty-year extraordinary period.

Full entry below ↓

Section 105, C.A. No. 141

Special Law

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act, 1936)

Why it is cited here

The general point for the chapter: a co-owner cannot convert common property into her own by re-applying for it in her own name.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, married twice and "sired eight children, four from each union": by Soledad Doldol (m. 1906, d. 8 April 1927) came Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin and Tirso; by Sofia Pendejito came Florenda, Reynato, Alberto and Fabian, Jr. The properties are labelled F (first marriage) and S (second) throughout — twelve parcels in all, F-1 to F-8 and S-1 to S-4.
After his first wife's death Don Fabian himself instituted an intestate proceeding for her estate — SP No. 309 — "apparently to obviate any dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage," and the CFI approved a Proyecto de Particion dated 21 February 1935 by Orden of 11 March 1936, adjudicating Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3 and half of F-5 to Don Fabian and Parcel F-4 with the other half of F-5 to Soledad Doldol's four children in equal shares. The father's attempt to prevent a squabble is what the Court calls "unfortunate" in its opening — the litigation ran from 1969 to 2008.
In 1939 Don Fabian executed three deeds of absolute sale to his eldest daughter Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, covering Parcels F-1 (Exh. "C", 10 May 1939), F-2 (Exh. "D", 24 September 1939), and F-3, F-5, F-7 and F-8 (Exh. "E", 1 May 1939). These are the deeds later held simulated — and the reason is chronological: "Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime," and Soledad "only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabian's death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution."
Perfecto Cagampang, Soledad's husband and the notarizing officer of the deeds, "judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest." The Court calls this "[t]he more telling circumstance": the couple were already married in 1939, "[a] property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal," yet Perfecto "went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wife's paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move."
Benjamin died on 1 February 1947, leaving his wife Mauricia Nakila and four children — Ruby, Marlene, Adelita and Henrieto. Don Fabian died on 26 October 1948. Don Fabian's death is the moment the co-ownership among the eight compulsory heirs arose, and it is the reference point for every prescription argument in the case.
On 28 July 1969, Benjamin's children sued their uncle Tirso for Recovery of Property with Damages (Civil Case No. 1292) over a quarter of Parcel F-4, saying he had been entrusted with their father's share and refused to deliver it on their majority. Tirso answered that the portion was never entrusted to him but was held by their sister Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who had already exchanged her share in F-4 for Parcel F-7.
On 14 April 1970, Tirso filed Civil Case No. 1332 for Partition and Damages with Receivership over all twelve parcels against his stepmother Pendejito and all his full and half-siblings, contending that SP No. 309 was void for excluding Parcels F-6, F-7 and F-8, and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 were not Pendejito's paraphernal property. This is the complaint the petitioners say should have been for reconveyance — and the characterisation decides whether prescription applies.
Tirso's complaint itself alleged that from Don Fabian's death in 1948 the lots "have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public possession of the Cagampang spouses." The petitioners built their whole prescription case on this admission; the Court holds that exclusion from possession "does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership."
In 1961, Tirso made a written demand for the partition and distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, which the Cagampang spouses refused. This refusal, not the 1939 deeds, is the date of repudiation — and it leaves Tirso's 1970 suit comfortably within time.
Parcel S-1 had been applied for as a homestead by spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo; Don Fabian bought it from them on 8 May 1943, cultivated it and declared it for taxation, but his application "would be rejected because death supervened." In 1963, Pendejito filed her own homestead application for it.
Parcel F-5 was donated to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso, and Nakila as Benjamin's widow. The donation fails on Nakila's want of authority: she "has no disposable right thereto," holding only "usufructuary right equal to the share of her children" under Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, and she signed "in her name and not in the name of her children," who were not under her legal guardianship.
The RTC and, on 31 March 1992, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 15805) both held the 1939 deeds simulated and ordered partition; reconsideration was denied 16 December 1993.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 1992 and December 16, 1993, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

Standard of review. Jurisdiction under Rule 45 "is limited to reviewing errors of law," and findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive subject to ten recognised exceptions. "None of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case."
The sales were simulated — the possession gap. "Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime"; the deeds were executed 1 May, 10 May and 24 September 1939, yet "Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang... only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabian's death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby."
And the title manoeuvre. "The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest." The couple were already married when the deeds were executed, and "[a] property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wife's paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move." The Court also "accord[ed] credence to Tirso's allegation that the Cagampang spouses tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the properties which have to be 'hidden'."
Invoking prescription concedes the co-ownership. The petitioners' error "flows from compartmentalizing what the CA wrote." Read in context: partition "by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches," and "[t]he only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an action for partition is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner." Hence "by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to set in."
Exclusion from possession is not proof against co-ownership. "The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership."
Nor need co-ownership be pleaded by name. "While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld... By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon."
Partition is the remedy. "[P]artition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent." "An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved," and Section 1, Rule 69 requires the plaintiff to set forth "the nature and extent of his title" and to join "all other persons interested in the property."
The right accrues at death and is imprescriptible. Tirso's right "covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death, i.e., on October 26, 1948." "Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate... Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share."
Reconveyance is the wrong remedy here. "Contrary to petitioners' stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned."
The exception, and when it was triggered. "Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, 'where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.'" Here "no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other compulsory heirs... because effective repudiation had not timely been made": "the repudiation which must be clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal of the co-ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian."
The periods. "[C]onsidering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that Tirso's cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation." And "acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961... since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed... Such would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian."
The second-marriage parcels. Tirso's acknowledgment of the second family's possession "cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso from pursuing his right to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners... of such intention." "There can be no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets" of the second marriage.
Parcel S-1 goes to the heirs. Section 105 of C.A. No. 141 provides that a homestead applicant who dies before the patent issues "shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations... by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent." Don Fabian bought Parcel S-1 on 8 May 1943, cultivated and declared it, and "[t]he application, however, would be rejected because death supervened"; Pendejito filed her own homestead application in 1963. "[T]he heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1," Soliman v. Icdang having read Section 105 as "having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of Act No. 926... a patent in her own name."
The donation of Parcel F-5 is void. Nakila "cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet applies... as Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Besides, Nakila signed the deed of donation in her name and not in the name of her children who are the heirs in representation of their father, Benjamin," and the then minor children "were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila." That no one objected "is of little consequence": "The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied."

Doctrine

Partition Is the Heir's Remedy for His Legitime: "[P]artition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent" — not reconveyance, where the claimant asserts only his share and not total ownership.
What a Partition Action Is (Rule 69, Sec. 1): "[A]t once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion" — so co-ownership need not be separately pleaded.
Co-Ownership Arises at Death (Art. 777, Art. 1078): Before partition the heirs own the estate in common, and the co-heir's right to his pro indiviso share "is imprescriptible."
Prescription Does Not Run Against a Co-Heir (Art. 494): "[A]cquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share."
The Repudiation Exception, and Its Requirements: There must be "a clear repudiation of the co-ownership" and "the co-owners... apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership"; it must be "clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal." Simulated deeds do not qualify — they "could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs." A refusal of a written demand for partition does.
Invoking Prescription Concedes the Co-Ownership: Because repudiation is the only route to prescription against a co-owner, a defendant who pleads prescription "deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership."
Exclusion From Possession Proves Nothing: It "does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership"; and the burden of repudiating lies on the one "desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership," not on the excluded heir.
Bad Faith Forces the Thirty-Year Period (Art. 1141): With evident bad faith only extraordinary prescription is available, and thirty years had not run from 1948 or 1961.
Simulation Shown by Conduct: A nine-year gap between deed and possession, unexplained, plus a manoeuvre to record conjugal property as paraphernal, establish that "the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby."
Homestead of a Deceased Applicant (C.A. 141, Sec. 105): The heirs in law are subrogated and entitled to the patent; the widow may not take it in her own name.
Void Contracts Cannot Be Ratified: "The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract."

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., former justice of the peace and municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, married Soledad Doldol in 1906, by whom he had Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin and Tirso.
On 8 April 1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso died; "[a] little over a year later," Don Fabian married Sofia Pendejito, by whom he had Florenda, Reynato, Alberto and Fabian, Jr.
After his first wife's death Don Fabian filed before the CFI of Agusan an intestate proceeding for her estate, SP No. 309, "apparently to obviate any dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage."
The CFI approved a Proyecto de Particion of 21 February 1935 by Orden of 11 March 1936, adjudicating Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3 and one-half of F-5 to Don Fabian, and Parcel F-4 with the other half of F-5 to Soledad Doldol's four children "in equal shares." A Mocion was later filed for delivery of their shares.
In 1939, Don Fabian executed three deeds of absolute sale in favour of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang: Exhibit "E" on 1 May 1939 (Parcels F-3, F-5, F-7 and F-8), Exhibit "C" on 10 May 1939 (Parcel F-1, for ₱2,500), and Exhibit "D" on 24 September 1939 (Parcel F-2). Her husband Perfecto Cagampang was the notarizing officer.
On 1 February 1947, Benjamin died, leaving his wife Mauricia Nakila and children Ruby, Marlene, Adelita and Henrieto.
On 26 October 1948, Don Fabian died. Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang "only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabian's death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution."
In 1961, Tirso made a written demand on the Cagampang spouses "for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian," which they refused.
In 1963, Pendejito filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1, which Don Fabian had purchased from the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo, on 8 May 1943, and had cultivated and declared for taxation before his application "would be rejected because death supervened."
On 28 July 1969, the children of Benjamin filed Civil Case No. 1292 for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle Tirso, over a portion of Parcel F-4 of 6 hectares, 99 ares and 32 centares, alleging it had been entrusted to him as their father's share. Tirso answered that it was held by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who had exchanged her F-4 share for Parcel F-7.
On 14 April 1970, Tirso filed Civil Case No. 1332 for Partition and Damages with Receivership over all twelve parcels against Pendejito and his full and half-siblings, later amended to include Perfecto and Pendejito as guardian ad litem for the minor children of Fabian, Jr., who died in 1970.
Tirso alleged that the twelve parcels belonged to the conjugal partnerships of the two marriages; that SP No. 309 was void for excluding Parcels F-6, F-7 and F-8; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 were not Pendejito's paraphernal property. The defendants maintained the validity of SP No. 309 as res judicata for Parcels F-1 to F-5, the 1939 sales, the donation of Parcel F-6 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, and Pendejito's exclusive title to the S parcels by homestead patent, adverse possession and purchase.
On 31 March 1992, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 15805) affirmed the RTC; on 16 December 1993 it denied reconsideration. On 30 April 2008, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Spouses Perfecto and Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, et al.)

B. Respondent (Tirso D. Monteroso)

C. Common Ground

The relationships, the dates of the two marriages and of the deaths, the existence and dates of the three 1939 deeds, and the fact that Soledad took possession only after 1948, were not in dispute.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether partition was the proper remedy for Tirso, or whether his action was one for reconveyance barred by extinctive prescription and laches.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Review is for errors of law. Findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive subject to ten exceptions; "[n]one of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case."
Simulation — the possession gap. "Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime," and Soledad took possession "nine years after contract execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby."
Simulation — the title manoeuvre. "The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest... A property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wife's paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move."
Prescription concedes co-ownership. The petitioners erred by "compartmentalizing what the CA wrote." Partition "by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches"; "[t]he only exception... is provided in a case where the co-ownership... had been properly repudiated by a co-owner"; hence "by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to set in."
Exclusion is not disproof. "The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership."
The theory need not be named. "While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale."
Partition defined. "An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved," and Section 1, Rule 69 requires the complaint to set forth "the nature and extent of his title" and to join "all other persons interested in the property."
The right and its imprescriptibility. "His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death, i.e., on October 26, 1948." "Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible."
Reconveyance is not the remedy. "Contrary to petitioners' stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso... Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned."
The repudiation exception. "Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, 'where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.'" But here "effective repudiation had not timely been made": it "happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed apprised of the repudiation."
The periods run in his favour. "Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action... he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961... since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian."
The second-marriage parcels. "Tirso's acknowledgment of Pendejito and her children's possession of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 cannot be viewed as the required repudiation... Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such intention." And "[t]here can be no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage."
Parcel S-1. Under Section 105 of C.A. 141, a homestead applicant who dies before the patent issues "shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations... by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent." "[T]he heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1," Soliman v. Icdang reading the section as "having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of Act No. 926... a patent in her own name."
The donation of Parcel F-5. Nakila "cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet applies to this instance as Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889." She signed "in her name and not in the name of her children," who "were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila." That no one objected "is of little consequence": "The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Partition for the Legitime: The compulsory heir's remedy is partition, not reconveyance, where he claims only his share.
Partition = Declaration + Segregation (Rule 69, Sec. 1): So co-ownership need not be pleaded as a separate theory.
Co-Ownership From Death (Art. 777, Art. 1078): Over the whole undivided estate, until partition and distribution.
Imprescriptibility (Art. 494): Prescription "does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share."
Repudiation Must Be Clear and Communicated: Simulated deeds are not notice; a refusal of a written demand for partition is.
Pleading Prescription Admits the Co-Ownership.
The Repudiator Bears the Burden: "[I]t behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating."
Bad Faith Leaves Only Extraordinary Prescription (Art. 1141): Thirty years, which had not run.
Homestead of a Deceased Applicant (C.A. 141, Sec. 105): Heirs are subrogated; the widow cannot take the patent in her own name.
Void Contracts Cannot Be Ratified.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The imprescriptibility is not absolute: "[a]cquisitive prescription... may still set in in favor of a co-owner, where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership" — the rule applied against the claimant in Delima and Heirs of Restar.
Even after repudiation, the period depends on faith: bad faith removes ordinary ten-year prescription and leaves the thirty-year extraordinary period.
The Court affirmed the CA in toto on findings of fact, none of the ten Rule 45 exceptions applying.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
On "Right to Demand Partition — Partition," this is the fullest statement in the chapter of why partition does not prescribe and of what it takes to make it prescribe. Keep the two halves together: the right is imprescriptible; the exception is repudiation, and repudiation has requirements of its own.
It also supplies the diagnostic for choosing the remedy: ask what the plaintiff claims. Claiming the whole property means reconveyance, with its ten-year clock; claiming only one's legitime means partition, with no clock at all until repudiation.
Pair it with Cruz v. Cristobal — same imprescriptibility, reached because an excluded heir was never bound by the settlement — and read it immediately before the repudiation cases (Delima, Heirs of Restar, Heirs of Reyes), where the requirements stated here are actually met and the clock does start.
The evidentiary lesson on simulation is worth carrying too: a deed is exposed not by the price recited but by what the parties did — who kept possession, for how long, and what they quietly asked the registry to record.