Facts
- On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints — Civil Case Nos. 98-599 and 98-598 — in the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against petitioner Roger V. Navarro, praying for writs of replevin over two motor vehicles in his possession. She sued as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES" — the form the Court later holds is exactly right for a sole proprietorship.
- Kargo Enterprises is "in the business of, among others, buying and selling motor vehicles, including hauling trucks and other heavy equipment," and is a sole proprietorship registered in Karen Go's name, she being described in the complaints as "a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO." That she is married is what turns the registration question into a conjugal-property question — and "[t]hat Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to each other is a fact never brought in issue."
- The first complaint rested on a Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase of August 8, 1997 over a FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE, Serial No. FK416K-51680, Plate No. GHK-378, under which Navarro delivered six post-dated checks of ₱66,333.33 each; the fifth and sixth (PBCom Cagayan de Oro Nos. 017112 and 017113, dated January 8 and February 8, 1998) were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds, leaving ₱132,666.66 owing.
- The second complaint was essentially the same, on a Lease Agreement of October 1, 1997 over another FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE, Serial No. FK416K-510528, with three post-dated checks of ₱100,000.00 each, the third of which was dishonoured.
- The lease agreements were signed by Glenn O. Go, described in them as "herein referred to as the LESSOR-SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager." This clause is what defeats Navarro: "by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements."
- On October 12 and 14, 1998, the RTC issued writs of replevin, and the Sheriff seized both vehicles and delivered them to Karen Go.
- Navarro answered that the complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the lease agreements — the actionable documents. The cases were consolidated on December 13, 1999.
- In its May 8, 2000 order the RTC dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; but on July 26, 2000, acting on Karen Go's motion for reconsideration, it set the dismissal aside, holding on the presumption that Glenn Go's leasing business is conjugal property that she had sufficient interest to sue — while directing her to move for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff under Section 4, Rule 3. That order is what Navarro attacked: he said a complaint with no cause of action "could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment."
- Reconsideration was denied March 7, 2001; the Court of Appeals denied Navarro's certiorari petition on October 16, 2001 and reconsideration on May 29, 2002.
- Navarro also argued the complaints were premature for want of a prior demand. He had, however, "already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles."
Issue
Whether Karen Go is the real party-in-interest entitled to sue on lease agreements signed by her husband as manager of her sole proprietorship — and whether her husband Glenn Go is an indispensable party whose non-joinder required dismissal rather than amendment.
Secondary issues. Whether Kargo Enterprises is paraphernal or conjugal property; and whether a prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Ruling
Main issue. YES, she is the real party-in-interest; and NO, Glenn Go's non-joinder did not require dismissal. A sole proprietorship is neither a natural nor a juridical person under Article 44, so under Rule 3, Section 1 "Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action." Following Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, "there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships... to bring suit in court"; the complaint "should have been filed in the name of the owner," with the descriptive words "doing business as" added to the title "as is customarily done" — which is precisely how Karen Go sued. Under Rule 3, Section 2, "[a]s the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case," so "it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement." As to Glenn Go: the business being conjugal, Article 108 of the Family Code subjects the partnership to the rules on partnership, and Article 1811 makes a partner "a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property," so "Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties." Article 484 then applies co-ownership rules "in default of contracts, or special provisions," bringing in Article 487 — and though "ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property," following Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman the rule reaches this case too: "in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners." Glenn Go therefore "only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit" under the rule that "[h]usband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly." And in any event Rule 3, Section 11 provides that "[n]either misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action": "the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action," and "[o]nly upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed." The RTC's order requiring Karen Go to join her husband was thus "fully in order."
Secondary issues. Conjugal, and no prior demand is required. "The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married." By law "all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved", and per Castro v. Miat the article "does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear." Only "the bare allegation of Navarro" opposed it, so "for purposes solely of this case... we hold that it is conjugal property." As to demand, Rule 60, Section 2 requires only an affidavit and a bond in double the value: "We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin." More importantly, Navarro "has already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him," so his position "is therefore totally unmeritorious."
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Roger V. Navarro. SO ORDERED."
Ratio
- The trade name is the "central factor." The complaint identified the plaintiff as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and the attached Lease Agreement described Glenn Go as "representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager," "thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O. Go represented."
- But the trade name cannot sue. A sole proprietorship "is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44," so under Rule 3, Section 1 "Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action."
- Juasing Hardware answers who may. "[T]here is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court... It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner... The descriptive words 'doing business as Juasing Hardware' may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done."
- Karen Go fits the definition. Rule 3, Section 2 defines a real party in interest as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit," and "[a]s the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case." The Court expressly reserves whether Glenn Go could validly sign as manager — "a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits."
- The business is conjugal. "The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married." All property acquired during the marriage is presumed conjugal, and Castro v. Miat confirms the presumption "applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear." The record shows no contrary proof, only "the bare allegation of Navarro."
- From conjugal partnership to co-ownership. Article 124 of the Family Code gives administration and enjoyment to "both spouses jointly," so "[n]o need exists... for one to obtain the consent of the other before performing an act of administration." Article 108 subjects the partnership to the rules on partnership, and in the absence of a marriage settlement "we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance" — Article 1811, under which "Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties."
- And from co-ownership to Article 487. Article 484 provides that "in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title," giving "further support in Article 487... that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned property." "While ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property, we find that this rule can be applied to the circumstances of the present case," following Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, where one spouse sued alone to recover a credit — personal property — held conjugally.
- Carandang stated in full. "In the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v. Hular and Adlawan v. Adlawan, we held that, in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In the latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of Appeals, we also held that Article 487 of the Civil Code... covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners."
- Glenn Go's status. "[S]ince Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit," the rule being that "[h]usband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law."
- Non-joinder is not fatal in any case. "Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." Per Domingo v. Scheer, "the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action... Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed." Hence "the RTC Order of July 26, 2000 requiring plaintiff Karen Go to join her husband as a party plaintiff is fully in order."
- No prior demand for replevin. Rule 60, Section 2 requires only the affidavit and the double-value bond. "We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin." And Navarro "is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters."
Doctrine
- A Sole Proprietorship Cannot Sue (Art. 44): It is "neither a natural person, nor a juridical person"; the action is brought in the name of the owner, with "doing business as" added to the title.
- Real Party-in-Interest (Rule 3, Sec. 2): The registered owner of the business "will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment," and so may sue on contracts signed by a manager in the business's name.
- Conjugal Presumption (Art. 160): Registration of a trade name in one spouse's name does not make it paraphernal; all property acquired during the marriage is presumed conjugal, and the presumption "applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear."
- Spouses as Co-Owners (Art. 1811): Through Article 108 of the Family Code and the partnership rules, spouses are co-owners of specific conjugal property with "an equal right to seek possession."
- Article 487 Covers Any Recovery Action, Including of Personalty (Art. 487, Art. 484): "[A]ny one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties."
- Only the Suing Co-Owner Is Indispensable: "The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties," the suit being presumed filed for the benefit of all. A spouse is joined as a pro-forma party only.
- Non-Joinder Is Curable (Rule 3, Sec. 11): Dismissal follows only on "unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend."
- No Prior Demand for Replevin (Rule 60, Sec. 2): Affidavit and double-value bond are all the Rules require.
Full Digest — Recitation Format
I. Gist and Central Doctrine
Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT.
Karen T. Go, registered owner of the sole proprietorship Kargo Enterprises, sued Roger V. Navarro for replevin of two crane trucks leased under agreements her husband Glenn O. Go had signed as the business's manager. Navarro moved to dismiss for want of a cause of action, arguing she was not a party to the leases; the RTC first dismissed, then reinstated the case and directed her to implead her husband, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied Navarro's petition. The central doctrines are that a sole proprietorship has no personality so its owner is the real party-in-interest; that the business is presumed conjugal, making the spouses co-owners through Article 108 of the Family Code and Article 1811; and that under Article 487 "any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties," the other co-owners being "not indispensable parties... not even necessary parties."
II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts
- On August 8, 1997, a Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase was entered into between KARGO ENTERPRISES, "then represented by its Manager, the aforementioned GLENN O. GO," and Roger Navarro, over a FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE, Serial No. FK416K-51680, Motor No. 6D15-338735, Plate No. GHK-378; Navarro delivered six post-dated checks of ₱66,333.33 each as rentals.
- On October 1, 1997, a second Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase covered another FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE, Serial No. FK416K-510528, Motor No. 6D14-423403, with three post-dated checks of ₱100,000.00 each.
- The fifth and sixth checks under the first agreement — PBCom Cagayan de Oro Nos. 017112 and 017113, dated January 8 and February 8, 1998 — were "dishonored and/or returned by the drawee bank" for insufficiency of funds, leaving a principal liability of ₱132,666.66; the third check under the second agreement was likewise dishonoured.
- Demands "written and oral" were made on Navarro to pay or return the vehicles, "but said demands were, and still are, in vain."
- On September 12, 1998, Karen T. Go, "doing business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES," filed two complaints — Civil Case Nos. 98-599 and 98-598 — for replevin and/or sum of money with damages before the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, attaching an affidavit and a bond "double the value of the personal property."
- On October 12 and 14, 1998, the RTC issued writs of replevin; the Sheriff seized both vehicles and delivered them to Karen Go.
- In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defence "that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase – the actionable documents on which the complaints were based."
- On December 13, 1999, on Navarro's motion, both cases were consolidated.
- In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the cases "on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action."
- On July 26, 2000, acting on Karen Go's motion for reconsideration of May 26, 2000, the RTC set aside the dismissal. "Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go's leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against Navarro," but ordered her to move for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff under Section 4, Rule 3.
- On March 7, 2001, the RTC denied Navarro's motion for reconsideration; he then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
- On October 16, 2001, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 64701); on May 29, 2002 it denied reconsideration.
- On November 27, 2009, the Supreme Court denied Navarro's petition for review.
III. Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioner (Roger V. Navarro)
Navarro argued that even if the leases were in Kargo Enterprises' name, "since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go," so Karen Go "was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a cause of action"; that the RTC erred in ordering an amendment "instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading"; that including Glenn Go "drastically changed the theory of the complaints, to his great prejudice"; that since Karen Go is the registered owner, the vehicles "are her paraphernal properties"; that the trial court violated Rule 10 by setting trial in the same order requiring amendment; that the complaints were premature for want of prior demand; and that the vehicles, seized on flawed complaints, should be returned to him.
B. Respondent (Karen T. Go)
Karen Go answered that "she is the owner of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of Kargo Enterprises"; that the paraphernal-property claim "is without basis" since "all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal property"; and that the order to include her husband "was merely to comply with the rule that spouses should sue jointly, and was not meant to cure the complaints' lack of cause of action."
C. Common Ground
"That Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to each other is a fact never brought in issue in the case," and Navarro admitted that Karen Go "is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises."
IV. Issues
A. MAIN ISSUE
Whether Karen Go is the real party-in-interest in complaints founded on lease agreements signed by her husband as manager of her sole proprietorship, and whether Glenn Go's non-joinder required dismissal rather than amendment.
B. SECONDARY ISSUES
Whether Kargo Enterprises is paraphernal or conjugal property; and whether prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
V. Ruling / Disposition
A. MAIN ISSUE
She is; and non-joinder did not require dismissal. A sole proprietorship is not a juridical person and "cannot be a party to a civil action," so the suit belongs to the owner — Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza. "As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case." The business being conjugal, Article 1811 makes the spouses co-owners "with an equal right to seek possession," and through Article 484 the co-ownership rules — including Article 487 — apply: "any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties... The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties." Glenn Go "only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party." And "[n]either misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action"; "[o]nly upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed."
B. SECONDARY ISSUES
Conjugal; and no prior demand is required. "The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married." The conjugal presumption applies "even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear", and only Navarro's "bare allegation" opposed it. As to demand, Rule 60, Section 2 requires only an affidavit and a double-value bond: "prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin," and Navarro admitted receiving the demand letters anyway.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Roger V. Navarro. SO ORDERED."
VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines
A. Ratio Decidendi
- The trade name is the central factor. The complaint named "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and the Lease Agreement described Glenn Go as "representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager," "expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O. Go represented."
- The trade name has no personality. A sole proprietorship "is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code," so under Rule 3, Section 1, "Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action."
- Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza. "[T]here is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court... It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner... The descriptive words 'doing business as Juasing Hardware' may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done."
- Karen Go is that owner. Under Rule 3, Section 2, "Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises."
- Conjugal, not paraphernal. "The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married." Article 160 and Castro v. Miat: the presumption "does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear."
- Administration is joint. Article 124 of the Family Code "allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in managing their conjugal property"; "[n]o need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other before performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose of or encumber their conjugal property."
- The partnership analogy. Article 108 makes the conjugal partnership governed by the rules on partnership; absent a marriage settlement "we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance," and Article 1811 makes "Glenn and Karen Go... effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties."
- Co-ownership rules apply. Article 484 — "in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title" — gives "further support in Article 487." "While ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property, we find that this rule can be applied to the circumstances of the present case," per Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, which concerned the recovery of a credit.
- The Carandang holding. "In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners."
- Glenn Go is pro forma. "[S]ince Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit," under the rule that "[h]usband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law."
- Non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Rule 3, Section 11, Macababbad v. Masirag and Domingo v. Scheer: "the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action... Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed." Hence "the RTC Order of July 26, 2000 requiring plaintiff Karen Go to join her husband as a party plaintiff is fully in order."
- Replevin needs no prior demand. Rule 60, Section 2 requires only an affidavit of ownership or entitlement, wrongful detention, freedom from custodia legis, market value, and a double-value bond. "We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand... Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin." Navarro also "admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters," so his position "is therefore totally unmeritorious."
B. Doctrines/Rules
- Sole Proprietorships Cannot Sue (Art. 44): The owner sues, adding "doing business as" to the title.
- Real Party-in-Interest (Rule 3, Sec. 2): The one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment.
- Conjugal Presumption (Art. 160): Registration in one spouse's name does not rebut it, and no proof of the source of funds is needed.
- Spouses Are Co-Owners of Conjugal Property (Art. 1811): Through Article 108 of the Family Code, with an equal right to possess.
- Article 487 Reaches Any Recovery Action, Including Personalty (Art. 487): "[A]ny one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties."
- Only the Suing Co-Owner Is Indispensable: The others are "not even necessary parties."
- Non-Joinder Is Curable (Rule 3, Sec. 11): Dismissal only on refusal to obey an order to implead.
- No Prior Demand for Replevin (Rule 60, Sec. 2).
C. Limitations/Exceptions
- The conjugal characterisation is expressly confined: "for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold that it is conjugal property."
- The Court reserved the question "[w]hether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship" — "a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits."
- Article 124's joint administration covers acts of administration only, "so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouse's consent."
D. Topic Integration
- The relationship is DIRECT.
- Within "j. Ejectment," this case pushes Article 487 to its widest reach: not only every kind of action, but personal property as well — two crane trucks recovered by replevin.
- It is also the sharpest statement of party status in the chapter. Plasabas holds the other co-owners need not be joined; Navarro holds they are "not even necessary parties," and that only the suing co-owner is indispensable. Put beside Adlawan, the trio maps the whole rule: sue for the co-ownership and you need nobody; sue as sole owner and you need everybody.
- The route it takes is worth memorising because it is not obvious: sole proprietorship → owner sues → conjugal presumption → Family Code Art. 108 → partnership → Art. 1811 co-ownership → Art. 484 → Art. 487. Each link is doing real work, and dropping any one of them puts the wife out of court.
VII. Separate Opinions
NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion for the Second Division, with Justices Carpio (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo and Abad concurring.