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Plasabas v. Court of Appeals

j. Ejectment
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Title

Plasabas v. Court of Appeals

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009

After a trial that began in 1974 and ran until both sides had rested, the trial court dismissed a suit to recover a coconut land because the plaintiff had not impleaded her three siblings, who turned out to be co-owners. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: under Article 487 any one co-owner may sue to recover the property without joining the others, the suit being deemed brought for the benefit of all — and in any case non-joinder is never a ground for dismissal.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is that Article 487 — "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment" — covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. "A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all"; a favourable judgment benefits them, an adverse one cannot prejudice them. The single exception is where the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, who claims to be sole owner. Procedurally, "the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action" — the remedy is to implead them.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 166519)

Case DigestChapter III — Co-ownership

Plasabas v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 166519 · March 31, 2009 · Supreme Court

j. Ejectment

Gist

After a trial that began in 1974 and ran until both sides had rested, the trial court dismissed a suit to recover a coconut land because the plaintiff had not impleaded her three siblings, who turned out to be co-owners. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: under Article 487 any one co-owner may sue to recover the property without joining the others, the suit being deemed brought for the benefit of all — and in any case non-joinder is never a ground for dismissal.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is that Article 487 — "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment" — covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. "A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all"; a favourable judgment benefits them, an adverse one cannot prejudice them. The single exception is where the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, who claims to be sole owner. Procedurally, "the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action" — the remedy is to implead them.

Facts

  • In 1974, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, docketed Civil Case No. R-1949. (The case was still undecided on the merits when it reached the Supreme Court in 2009 — thirty-five years of "protracted trial," which is what makes the dismissal on a technicality so costly.)
  • The property was a parcel of coconut land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, of 2.6360 hectares, declared under Tax Declaration No. 3587 in the name of petitioner Nieves.
  • Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered "confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages." The prayer combines a declaration of title with an order to vacate, which is why the courts below argued over whether this was ejectment or a reivindicatory action — a question the Supreme Court holds to be beside the point.
  • Respondents denied petitioners' ownership and possession and interposed as their main defence "that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas."
  • The trial revealed that Nieves was not the sole and absolute owner. On petitioners' own witnesses' testimony, the property passed from Francisco to his son Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, Nieves's grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to Nieves and her siblings — Jose, Victor and Victoria. That admission is the pivot. It destroys the sole-ownership allegation in the complaint, but it also brings the case squarely within Article 487 rather than its exception.
  • After both parties had rested, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for failure to implead indispensable parties — the other co-owners, Jose, Victor and Victoria. (Raised only in a memorandum, after trial, in a case then nineteen years old.)
  • By Order of April 19, 1993, the trial court dismissed both complaint and counterclaim without prejudice, "without ruling on the merits," invoking Section 7, Rule 3 and holding that the spouses "have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves." It acknowledged its own reluctance — "much as it wants to decide the instant case on the merits, being one of the old inherited cases left behind" — but concluded that "rules are rules."
  • On May 12, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed, adding that non-joinder "would violate the principle of due process," and that Article 487§ "could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action." Reconsideration was denied December 1, 2004. This is the reading the Supreme Court rejects: Article 487 is not confined to ejectment.
  • Petitioners acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and had been authorised by the co-owners to pursue the case on their behalf.

Issue

Whether a co-owner who sues to recover the property must implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties — so that the failure to do so warrants dismissal — where the complaint is for recovery of title rather than for ejectment.

Ruling

Main issue. NO — the petition is granted and the case remanded for decision on the merits. Article 487§ "provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment," and "[t]he article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action." Consequently "[a] co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all," and the outcome is asymmetrical by design: "[a]ny judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners." Since the article reaches both kinds of action, "there is no need to determine whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title" — the Court of Appeals' distinction is immaterial, and "petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties." The exception does not apply: it operates only "when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof," and although the complaint alleged sole ownership, that allegation "is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's behalf." And there is a second, independent error. "[T]he trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable." Parties "may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action," and only "[i]f petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court" may the complaint be dismissed.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate proceedings. The trial court is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH DISPATCH. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

  • Article 487§ "provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment," and its reach is not limited by that word: "The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action."
  • The reason a single co-owner suffices is the capacity in which he sues: "A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all."
  • Hence the asymmetry of the judgment: "Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners."
  • The Court of Appeals' distinction therefore falls away: "With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions. Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties."
  • The exception, and why it does not bite. "The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties." Here "the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's behalf. Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because... the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all."
  • The procedural error, independent of Article 487. "In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith."

Doctrine

  1. Article 487 Covers Every Recovery Action: "Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," and the article "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action." The label on the complaint does not matter.
  2. Suit for the Benefit of All: A co-owner may sue alone "because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all"; the other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
  3. Asymmetry of the Judgment: A judgment for the plaintiff benefits the other co-owners; a judgment against him cannot prejudice them.
  4. The Sole Exception: Where the action is "for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner," the other co-owners are indispensable and must be impleaded.
  5. A Pleaded Claim of Sole Ownership Is Not Decisive: Where the plaintiff admits the co-ownership at trial and is authorised by the co-owners to prosecute the case, the allegation of sole ownership in the complaint "is immaterial."
  6. Non-Joinder Is Not a Ground for Dismissal (Rule 3, Sec. 7§): "The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable." Parties may be added "at any stage of the action"; dismissal follows only on a refusal to comply with an order to implead.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Petitioners sued in 1974 to recover a 2.6360-hectare coconut land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, alleging sole ownership in petitioner Nieves. The trial disclosed that the land had descended to Nieves and her siblings Jose, Victor and Victoria as co-owners, and after both sides rested the trial court dismissed the case for failure to implead them as indispensable parties; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Article 487§ inapplicable because the action was reivindicatory rather than for ejectment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The central doctrine is that Article 487 "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession," so a co-owner may sue alone, "the suit... deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all" — subject only to the exception where the plaintiff sues as sole owner for his own benefit; and that in any event "the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action."

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

  • In 1974, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte, docketed Civil Case No. R-1949.
  • The subject property was "a parcel of coconut land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, declared under Tax Declaration No. 3587 in the name of petitioner Nieves with an area of 2.6360 hectares."
  • Petitioners prayed "that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages."
  • Respondents "denied petitioners' allegation of ownership and possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas."
  • "Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land." On petitioners' witnesses' testimony, the property passed "from Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves' grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her siblings — Jose, Victor and Victoria."
  • After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum "the argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioners' failure to implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners — Jose, Victor and Victoria."
  • By Order of April 19, 1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim without prejudice, "without ruling on the merits," reasoning that petitioners "have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final determination of the case," and citing Section 7, Rule 3 along with Borlasa v. Polistico, Pobre v. Blanco, Palarca v. Baginsi and Sanidad v. Cabataje.
  • On May 12, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed in CA-G.R. CV No. 43085, declaring "that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action."
  • On December 1, 2004, the appellate court denied reconsideration, and petitioners took the present petition under Rule 45.
  • On March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners (Spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte)

Petitioners sought confirmation of their rights and legal title to the coconut land and an order for the defendants to vacate and pay damages, and resisted the dismissal, contending that they need not implead the other co-owners.

B. Respondents

Respondents denied petitioners' ownership and possession and asserted that the land "was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas." Only after both sides had rested did they argue, in their memorandum, that the case should have been terminated at inception for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties.

C. Common Ground

Petitioners "acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings," and it was established that they "have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's behalf."

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether petitioners were bound to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties, and whether their failure to do so justified the dismissal of the case.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

NO on both counts. Article 487§ "covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners." Hence "there is no need to determine whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title," and "petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties." The sole-owner exception does not apply because petitioners admitted the co-ownership at trial and were authorised by the co-owners to sue. Independently, "[t]he rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable."
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate proceedings. The trial court is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH DISPATCH. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

  • The article and its reach. "Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action."
  • Why one co-owner suffices. "A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all."
  • The effect of the judgment. "Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners."
  • The CA's distinction is immaterial. "With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions. Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties."
  • The exception. "The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties."
  • Why it does not apply. "Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's behalf. Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because... the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all."
  • The independent procedural error. "In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith."

B. Doctrines/Rules

  1. Scope of Article 487§: It covers all actions for the recovery of possession — ejectment, accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria alike.
  2. A Co-Owner May Sue Alone: The suit "is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all," so the other co-owners are not indispensable.
  3. One-Way Effect: A favourable judgment benefits the co-owners; an adverse one does not bind them.
  4. Exception — Suing as Sole Owner: Where the plaintiff claims the property as his alone, the other co-owners become indispensable and must be impleaded.
  5. Admission at Trial Governs the Pleading: An allegation of sole ownership is "immaterial" where the plaintiff admits the co-ownership at trial and sues with the co-owners' authority.
  6. Non-Joinder Is Curable, Not Fatal (Rule 3, Sec. 7§): Parties may be added "at any stage of the action"; dismissal is warranted only on refusal to comply with an order to implead.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

  • The sole-owner exception is real: a plaintiff who genuinely litigates for himself alone, to the exclusion of his co-owners, must bring them in.
  • The Court did not decide the merits of the ownership dispute; it remanded, directing the trial court "to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH DISPATCH."

D. Topic Integration

  • The relationship is DIRECT.
  • The case belongs to the co-ownership sub-topic "j. Ejectment," and its contribution is to read Article 487§ functionally rather than literally: the article says "ejectment" but governs every action to recover the property.
  • The practical test it supplies is about capacity, not caption. Ask for whom the plaintiff sues. Suing for the co-ownership, he needs nobody else; suing as sole owner against his own co-owners, he must implead them.
  • Read it with Adlawan v. Adlawan, which is the same article applied to the exception, and with the procedural point that a defect of parties is cured by amendment, never by dismissing a case that has already been tried.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura for the Third Division, with Justices Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Carpio Morales, Chico-Nazario and Peralta concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 487, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)

Why it is cited here

The whole case in one line: "Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment."

Read literally the article names only ejectment, and that is how the Court of Appeals read it — holding it inapplicable because this complaint was for recovery of title, not ejectment. The Supreme Court reads it functionally: "[t]he article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action," so "there is no need to determine whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title."

The reason a lone co-owner may sue is the capacity in which he sues: "the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all." That also fixes the asymmetry — "[a]ny judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners." A co-owner can win for everybody but cannot lose for anybody.

Hence the exception: where the plaintiff sues "for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner," he is no longer suing for the co-ownership, the other co-owners become indispensable, and they must be impleaded.

Implementing Rules

Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court

Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 3 (Parties to Civil Actions)

Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

The rule the trial court applied: "Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."

Its premise was that Nieves's siblings were indispensable. Article 487 answers that premise directly — a co-owner suing for the co-ownership makes the others not indispensable at all, because the judgment already runs to their benefit.

But note the second, independent holding, which matters far beyond co-ownership: even where a party is indispensable, "the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable" — parties "may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action." Dismissal comes only if the plaintiff refuses to comply with an order to implead.

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/mar2009/gr_166519_2009.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article 487, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title III (Co-Ownership)

Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)

Why it is cited here

The whole case in one line: "Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment."

Read literally the article names only ejectment, and that is how the Court of Appeals read it — holding it inapplicable because this complaint was for recovery of title, not ejectment. The Supreme Court reads it functionally: "[t]he article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action," so "there is no need to determine whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title."

The reason a lone co-owner may sue is the capacity in which he sues: "the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all." That also fixes the asymmetry — "[a]ny judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners." A co-owner can win for everybody but cannot lose for anybody.

Hence the exception: where the plaintiff sues "for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner," he is no longer suing for the co-ownership, the other co-owners become indispensable, and they must be impleaded.

Full entry below ↓

Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court

Implementing Rules

Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 3 (Parties to Civil Actions)

Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)

LawPhil posts the 1997 text. The 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) took effect 1 May 2020 and changed several of these rules; a decision promulgated before that date was governed by the text quoted here.

Why it is cited here

The rule the trial court applied: "Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."

Its premise was that Nieves's siblings were indispensable. Article 487 answers that premise directly — a co-owner suing for the co-ownership makes the others not indispensable at all, because the judgment already runs to their benefit.

But note the second, independent holding, which matters far beyond co-ownership: even where a party is indispensable, "the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable" — parties "may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action." Dismissal comes only if the plaintiff refuses to comply with an order to implead.

Full entry below ↓