Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. City of Pasig

b. Legal Easements — Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)

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Case DigestChapter VII — Easement or Servitudes

Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. City of Pasig

G.R. No. 152230 · August 9, 2005 · Supreme Court

b. Legal Easements — Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)

Gist

Pasig expropriated 51 square metres of a school foundation's lot to open a three-metre access road into a slum area that no fire truck could otherwise reach. The foundation argued the taking had to satisfy the Civil Code requisites for an easement of right of way. The Supreme Court held it did not — a local government exercising eminent domain is not bound by Articles 649–657 — but reversed anyway, because the only proof of the statutorily required offer was an inadmissible photocopy and the trial court's findings rested on an ocular inspection held without notice.

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine for this topic is that a condemnor exercising the power of eminent domain to open a road is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right of way under the New Civil Code. "[I]n the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious," the test being genuine necessity of a public character — and "absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."

Facts

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly of light materials, were located. (Estimates in evidence vary: the Fire Marshall put the houses at 300 to 400.)
"The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration," and the residents also needed it "for water and electrical outlets." This is the necessity the Court finds proved — and note that it is a necessity for a road in the area, which is a different proposition from a necessity for this particular strip.
The municipality decided to acquire 51 square metres out of the 1,791-square-metre property of Lorenzo, Victor and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho, covered by TCT No. PT-66585, which abuts E. R. Santos Street.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan approved an Ordinance authorising the mayor to expropriate; it stated that the owners had been notified of the intent to purchase and had rejected the offer. On July 21, 1993 the municipality sued, amending the complaint August 6, 1993, under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, depositing 15% of the market value on the latest tax declaration, and obtaining a writ of possession. (It then built the three-metre cemented road, named Damayan Street.)
On November 26, 1993 it annotated a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. PT-92579, already in the name of Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI), which had bought the property. The sequence matters to the offer issue: the owners had agreed to sell to JILCSFI on February 27, 1993 for ₱1,719,000.00, with ₱1,000,000.00 down; the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed December 13, 1993 and TCT No. PT-92579 issued December 21, 1993.
JILCSFI intervened, contending that the expropriation was "only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless"; that the portion taken "is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it"; and that the road was built in the middle of its lot, denying it the use and enjoyment of the property. Eduardo Villanueva, its Board Chairman and President, testified the land had been bought to build a school building and a church as worship center, delayed by the ordinance.
The municipality's proof of its offer was a photocopy of a letter from Engr. Jose Reyes, Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco; messenger Rolando Togonon testified he served it at Cuanco's store, where a lady took it inside and returned it signed by Luz Bernarte — though on cross he admitted he never met Luz Bernarte. The trial court rejected the letter for being a mere photocopy, and that rejection ultimately decides the case: the Court of Appeals relied on the excluded document, and the Supreme Court holds it could not.
On necessity, Augusto Paz of the City Engineer's Office said the road they built was 70 metres long and 3 metres wide and that "there is no other road through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid"; Fire Marshall Manuel Tembrevilla said Damayan Street "is the only road in the area." For the intervenor, Normita del Rosario said there are other roads to E. R. Santos Street and only about ten urban-poor households use the new one; Danilo Caballero named three streets he could use — Catalina, Damayan and Bagong Taon — but admitted on cross that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through Damayan Street.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, declared the municipality "as having a lawful right to take the property," holding there was substantial compliance with Section 19's definite-and-valid-offer requirement and that the strip was the most convenient access. Its findings described an inspection of the vicinity showing the alternative alley on Bagong Taon Street was half foot-path, flanked by permanent structures and longer than the proposed road. No showing appears in the record that an ocular inspection was ever ordered, and the petitioner was never notified of one — which is why those findings are later stripped of probative weight.
On March 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed, treating the Reyes letter as substantial compliance and adding that the lis pendens gave constructive notice; on reconsideration it held it could consider the excluded photocopy because its existence was corroborated by the messenger's testimony and by the ordinance. Reconsideration was denied February 18, 2002.

Issue

Whether the requisites for an easement of right of way under Articles 649 to 657 of the Civil Code may be dispensed with where a local government expropriates land for a road.

Secondary issues. Whether the respondent complied with Section 19 of the Local Government Code, which requires a valid and definite offer to the owner before suit; and whether property already intended for a public purpose may still be expropriated.

Ruling

Main issue. YES — they may be dispensed with; the Civil Code requisites do not apply. "The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code." What governs instead is the law of eminent domain: "[c]ase law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious." "Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken." On public use, the concept "is just as broad as public welfare" — "whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use" — so that "only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation... does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use." On necessity, the residents' testimony that "although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street" is "more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice." But the city still loses. "Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere." Its claims that the 51-square-metre strip was the shortest and best ingress rested on trial-court findings drawn from an inspection of the vicinity — and "there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial"; if one was, "the petitioner was not notified thereof" and "was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process," since "an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial." Those findings "ha[ve] no probative weight" and "must, therefore, be rejected."

Secondary issues. The offer requirement was not proved. The only evidence of the valid and definite offer required by Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 was the photocopy of Engr. Reyes's letter, which the trial court rejected for being a mere photocopy — and the petitioner also pressed that "mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase," and that any offer had in any event to be made to the owner, JILCSFI having contracted for the property as early as February 1993. The Court of Appeals had cured the gap with the excluded photocopy, the messenger's corroboration, the ordinance's recital and the constructive notice of the lis pendens; that reasoning does not survive. The complaint is accordingly dismissed without prejudice to refiling, leaving the municipality free to begin again on proper proof.

"IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Civil Code requisites are beside the point. The petitioner asserted "that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway," complaining that the strip taken lay "at the middle portion of the petitioner's entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center." The answer: "The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code."
The condemnor chooses the route. "Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
But it must be justified. "Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken."
Public use is as broad as public welfare. "[A]t present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use"; the Constitution is "a dynamic instrument" and "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store" (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration), what has emerged being "a concept of public use which is just as broad as public welfare." Hence "that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use," and what matters is "the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power."
Necessity for a road in the area was proved. "The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Necessity for this land was not. "Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere." The ordinance's whereas clause called the 51-square-metre lot "the shortest and most suitable access road" and the complaint alleged it had been "surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress" — but "the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims."
The trial court's contrary findings are rejected. They rested on an inspection of the vicinity showing the Bagong Taon alley "only about one-half (1/2) of its entire length is passable by vehicle and the other half is merely a foot-path," flanked by permanent structures and "considerably longer than the proposed access road." But "there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process."
Why that matters. "It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected."
The offer requirement. The petitioner stressed "that the law explicitly requires that a valid and definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that such offer was not accepted"; that the photocopy of the Reyes letter "cannot be considered because the trial court did not admit it in evidence"; that even if admissible "it would not prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner because mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase"; and that the offer "should be made to the proper party, that is, to the owner of the property" — JILCSFI having been the owner as of February 1993.

Doctrine

Eminent Domain Is Not Governed by the Servitude Articles: A condemnor taking land to build a road "is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code." Articles 649–657 govern a private claim between neighbours; expropriation answers to the Constitution and the enabling statute.
The Condemnor Selects the Route: "[I]n the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
Public Use = Public Welfare: "[W]hatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use," and "that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use."
Genuine Necessity, Not Absolute Necessity: "Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character," and "absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Necessity Must Be Shown for This Property: Proof that a road is needed in the area does not prove it is needed on this lot; the condemnor must "show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere," by a preponderance of evidence.
Ocular Inspection Is Part of the Trial: "[E]vidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial." Findings from an inspection of which a party had no notice "ha[ve] no probative weight" and must be rejected — a denial of due process.
The Statutory Offer: Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 requires a valid and definite offer to the owner before suit; an excluded photocopy will not prove it, and a "mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase."

Because the defect is one of proof rather than of power, the dismissal is expressly without prejudice to refiling — the municipality may expropriate the same strip if it proves its offer and the necessity for taking that particular land.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. The Municipality (now City) of Pasig expropriated 51 square metres of a 1,791-square-metre lot to open a three-metre road, Damayan Street, giving fire trucks access to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid. JILCSFI, which had bought the lot to build a school and worship centre, intervened, arguing that the taking had to satisfy the Civil Code requisites for an easement of right of way. The RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the expropriation; the Supreme Court reversed. On the assigned topic the holding is that the city "is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code," the applicable test being genuine necessity of a public character, with the condemnor free to choose the route "unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious." The expropriation nevertheless failed for want of proof — of the valid and definite offer required by Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and of the necessity for taking this land rather than another.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located; the road "had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration," and residents needed it "for water and electrical outlets."
The municipality decided to acquire 51 square metres out of the 1,791-square-metre property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho under TCT No. PT-66585, abutting E. R. Santos Street.
On February 23, 1993, messenger Rolando Togonon served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, on Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store; a lady received it and returned it bearing the signature of Luz Bernarte. On cross-examination Togonon "admitted that he never met Luz Bernarte."
On February 27, 1993, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and his co-owners agreed to sell the property to JILCSFI for ₱1,719,000.00, on a down payment of ₱1,000,000.00.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorising the mayor to initiate expropriation and appropriating funds; it stated that the owners had been notified of the intent to purchase for public use as an access road but had rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed its complaint — amended August 6, 1993 — under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, appending a photocopy of the Reyes letter, and deposited 15% of the market value on the latest tax declaration; on motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession.
On November 26, 1993, the municipality annotated a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. PT-92579 in the name of JILCSFI; the municipality then constructed the three-metre cemented road, "called Damayan Street."
On December 13, 1993, after full payment, the Ching Cuancos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale; on December 21, 1993, TCT No. PT-92579 was issued to JILCSFI, which declared the property for taxation in its name. (Tax Mapper Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. testified their records showed JILCSFI became owner only on January 13, 1994.)
On August 26, 1994, the RTC granted JILCSFI leave to intervene. In its answer-in-intervention it argued the taking was "only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless," that the portion taken "is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it," and later that the road was built "in the middle portion," denying it use and enjoyment; it cross-claimed against its vendors and counterclaimed for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Testimony for the municipality. Edgardo del Rosario, a resident since 1982, said they used to cross a slippery wooden bridge where many met accidents, and that after the road was built the residents had water and electricity. Augusto Paz of the City Engineer's Office, project engineer, said the road was 70 metres long and 3 metres wide and that "there is no other road through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid." Fire Marshall Manuel Tembrevilla confirmed a fire truck could pass, estimated 300 to 400 houses, and said Damayan Street "is the only road in the area."
The letter was excluded. The municipality offered the photocopy of Engr. Reyes's letter to prove a definite and valid offer, but "the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy."
Testimony for the intervenor. Normita del Rosario, owner of the property across, said there are other roads to E. R. Santos Street and only about ten urban-poor houses use the new one. Danilo Caballero, a seven-year resident, said he could use Catalina, Damayan and Bagong Taon Streets, but "admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through the newly constructed Damayan Street." Eduardo Villanueva, JILCSFI's Board Chairman and President, said the land was bought "for purposes of constructing a school building and a church as worship center," delayed by the expropriation ordinance.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, declared the municipality "as having a lawful right to take the property" and directed the parties to nominate commissioners, holding there was substantial compliance with Section 19 and that the strip was the most convenient access.
On March 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed, treating the Reyes letter as substantial compliance with the "valid and definite offer" requirement, noting the constructive notice furnished by the lis pendens, and relying on Article 33 of the LGC's implementing rules, which regards the "construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks" as public use.
On February 18, 2002, the CA denied reconsideration, holding it could consider the excluded photocopy because its existence was corroborated by the messenger's testimony and the ordinance, the presumption of regularity being unrebutted.
On August 9, 2005, the Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the complaint dismissed without prejudice.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc.)

JILCSFI raised three issues: whether the respondent complied with Section 19 of the Local Government Code's requirement of "a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint"; whether property "already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated"; and "whether the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with." It argued the photocopy "cannot be considered because the trial court did not admit it in evidence"; that in any case "mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase"; that the offer "should be made to the proper party, that is, to the owner," JILCSFI having owned the property since February 1993; and that the strip taken lay "at the middle portion" of its lot, "splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center."

B. Respondent (Municipality, now City, of Pasig)

The municipality maintained that its ordinance recited notice to and rejection by the owners, that the Reyes letter and the lis pendens sufficed as notice, that the 51-square-metre strip was "the shortest and most suitable access road" and had been "surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress," and that the road was needed so that fire trucks could reach Sto. Tomas Bukid as the Fire Code requires.

C. Common Ground

Both sides accepted that a road existed and had been built; the intervenor's own witness admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through Damayan Street.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether "the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with" where a local government expropriates land to build a road.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether the respondent complied with Section 19 of the Local Government Code's requirement of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property before suit; and whether property already intended for a public purpose may still be expropriated.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

YES — the Civil Code requisites do not apply. "The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken." Necessity for a road was established — "absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice" — but "the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere," and the findings supporting that claim rested on an ocular inspection of which the petitioner had no notice, so they "ha[ve] no probative weight" and "must... be rejected."

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

The offer was not proved. The sole evidence of the valid and definite offer was a photocopy the trial court had rejected, and the petitioner's objections — that a notice of intent is not an offer, and that the offer must go to the owner — were not met. The petition is granted and the complaint dismissed without prejudice to the refiling thereof.

"IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Public use is as broad as public welfare. "It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use"; the Constitution is "a dynamic instrument" and "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store" (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration); what has emerged is "a concept of public use which is just as broad as public welfare."
A small class of beneficiaries does not defeat public use. "[W]hat should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power," and "that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use."
The Civil Code requisites do not bind a condemnor. Against the petitioner's insistence on least prejudice and no adequate outlet: "The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code."
Route selection belongs to the condemnor. "[I]n the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
The limits. "Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken."
Necessity for a road: established. "The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Necessity for this parcel: not established. "Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere." The ordinance's whereas clause and the complaint asserted the strip was the shortest and best, but "the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims."
The supporting findings are stripped out. "[T]here is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Expropriation Is Not a Servitude Claim: A condemnor building a road "is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code."
Condemnor's Choice of Route: Absent legislative restriction, the grantee of eminent domain "may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
Public Use: As broad as public welfare; a small number of direct beneficiaries does not diminish it.
Genuine Necessity: Required, but "absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Site-Specific Necessity: The condemnor must prove the need to take this property "and not elsewhere," by a preponderance of evidence.
Ocular Inspection and Due Process: An inspection "is part of the trial"; findings from one held without notice to a party carry no probative weight.
Valid and Definite Offer: Required by Section 19, R.A. No. 7160, and must be proved by admissible evidence and made to the owner.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The dismissal is without prejudice to refiling: the defect is evidentiary, not jurisdictional, so the same strip may be expropriated on proper proof of the offer and of site-specific necessity.
The condemnor's freedom to choose a route is bounded by the twin qualifiers capricious and wantonly injurious — the concern behind Article 650's least-prejudice rule reappearing here in a different register.
Nothing in the ruling questions that a three-metre Fire Code access road into a densely built area of light-material houses serves a public use.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
On the syllabus line "Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)," this case marks the outer boundary of the topic: it identifies when the requisites do not apply at all.
Learn it as the pair to NPC v. Villamor. There, the State could not use the label "easement" to escape the consequences of a taking (paying full just compensation); here, a private owner could not use the label "easement" to impose the Civil Code's requisites on a taking. The lesson runs both ways: what governs is the power actually exercised, not the name attached to the burden.
Set beside Valdez, Quintanilla and Ramos it completes the picture. In those three a private claimant must prove no adequate outlet, indemnity, non-self-inflicted isolation and least prejudice. Where the State takes, none of that applies — but the substitute test, genuine necessity of a public character, is not a formality, and Pasig failed it as to this particular lot.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., with Justices Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario concurring.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 649, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VII (Easements of Servitudes), Chapter 2 (Legal Easements), Section 3 (Easement of Right of Way)

The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)

Why it is cited here

The article the petitioner tried to impose on the city, and the one the Court holds inapplicable. Article 649 conditions a private claim for a right of way on the dominant estate being surrounded and "without adequate outlet to a public highway," on payment of proper indemnity, and on the isolation not being self-inflicted.

The petitioner's argument was that Pasig had to prove the same things — no adequate outlet, least prejudice — before it could take a strip of the school's land for a road.

The answer is a matter of which power is being exercised. "The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code." Articles 649–657 govern a neighbour demanding passage from a neighbour; eminent domain is the sovereign taking property for public use, and it answers to the Constitution and the Local Government Code, not to the servitude articles.

Civil Code

Article 650, Civil Code

The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (565)

Why it is cited here

The placement rule the petitioner invoked in its stronger form: the way must be "at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate." Its complaint was concrete — the 51-square-metre strip was taken from the middle of its lot, "splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center."

Article 650 does not bind the condemnor. But the concern behind it reappears in the eminent-domain test in a different form: the grantee may choose the route "unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious," and "[g]overnment may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken."

And the city lost on precisely that footing. It "failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere" — necessity for a road in the area was proved; necessity for this strip was not.

Constitution

Article III, Section 9, 1987 Constitution

Bill of Rights

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III (Bill of Rights)

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Why it is cited here

The constitutional source of the power actually exercised: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

The case shows how broadly public use is now read. It "is just as broad as public welfare": "whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use," the Constitution being "a dynamic instrument" not "to be construed narrowly or pedantically." Hence "that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use" — and a three-metre firetruck access into a slum plainly qualifies.

The constraint that bites is therefore not public use but genuine necessity, and the procedural conditions the legislature has attached to the delegated power.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 649, Civil Code

Civil Code

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)

Why it is cited here

The petitioner's argument was that Pasig had to prove the same things — no adequate outlet, least prejudice — before it could take a strip of the school's land for a road.

Full entry below ↓

Article 650, Civil Code

Civil Code

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article III, Section 9, 1987 Constitution

Constitution

Bill of Rights

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III (Bill of Rights)

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Why it is cited here

The constitutional source of the power actually exercised: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

The constraint that bites is therefore not public use but genuine necessity, and the procedural conditions the legislature has attached to the delegated power.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly of light materials, were located. (Estimates in evidence vary: the Fire Marshall put the houses at 300 to 400.)
"The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration," and the residents also needed it "for water and electrical outlets." This is the necessity the Court finds proved — and note that it is a necessity for a road in the area, which is a different proposition from a necessity for this particular strip.
The municipality decided to acquire 51 square metres out of the 1,791-square-metre property of Lorenzo, Victor and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho, covered by TCT No. PT-66585, which abuts E. R. Santos Street.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan approved an Ordinance authorising the mayor to expropriate; it stated that the owners had been notified of the intent to purchase and had rejected the offer. On July 21, 1993 the municipality sued, amending the complaint August 6, 1993, under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, depositing 15% of the market value on the latest tax declaration, and obtaining a writ of possession. (It then built the three-metre cemented road, named Damayan Street.)
On November 26, 1993 it annotated a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. PT-92579, already in the name of Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI), which had bought the property. The sequence matters to the offer issue: the owners had agreed to sell to JILCSFI on February 27, 1993 for ₱1,719,000.00, with ₱1,000,000.00 down; the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed December 13, 1993 and TCT No. PT-92579 issued December 21, 1993.
JILCSFI intervened, contending that the expropriation was "only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless"; that the portion taken "is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it"; and that the road was built in the middle of its lot, denying it the use and enjoyment of the property. Eduardo Villanueva, its Board Chairman and President, testified the land had been bought to build a school building and a church as worship center, delayed by the ordinance.
The municipality's proof of its offer was a photocopy of a letter from Engr. Jose Reyes, Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco; messenger Rolando Togonon testified he served it at Cuanco's store, where a lady took it inside and returned it signed by Luz Bernarte — though on cross he admitted he never met Luz Bernarte. The trial court rejected the letter for being a mere photocopy, and that rejection ultimately decides the case: the Court of Appeals relied on the excluded document, and the Supreme Court holds it could not.
On necessity, Augusto Paz of the City Engineer's Office said the road they built was 70 metres long and 3 metres wide and that "there is no other road through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid"; Fire Marshall Manuel Tembrevilla said Damayan Street "is the only road in the area." For the intervenor, Normita del Rosario said there are other roads to E. R. Santos Street and only about ten urban-poor households use the new one; Danilo Caballero named three streets he could use — Catalina, Damayan and Bagong Taon — but admitted on cross that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through Damayan Street.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, declared the municipality "as having a lawful right to take the property," holding there was substantial compliance with Section 19's definite-and-valid-offer requirement and that the strip was the most convenient access. Its findings described an inspection of the vicinity showing the alternative alley on Bagong Taon Street was half foot-path, flanked by permanent structures and longer than the proposed road. No showing appears in the record that an ocular inspection was ever ordered, and the petitioner was never notified of one — which is why those findings are later stripped of probative weight.
On March 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed, treating the Reyes letter as substantial compliance and adding that the lis pendens gave constructive notice; on reconsideration it held it could consider the excluded photocopy because its existence was corroborated by the messenger's testimony and by the ordinance. Reconsideration was denied February 18, 2002.

Issue

Whether the requisites for an easement of right of way under Articles 649 to 657 of the Civil Code may be dispensed with where a local government expropriates land for a road.

Ruling

"IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The Civil Code requisites are beside the point. The petitioner asserted "that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway," complaining that the strip taken lay "at the middle portion of the petitioner's entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center." The answer: "The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code."
The condemnor chooses the route. "Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
But it must be justified. "Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken."
Public use is as broad as public welfare. "[A]t present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use"; the Constitution is "a dynamic instrument" and "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store" (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration), what has emerged being "a concept of public use which is just as broad as public welfare." Hence "that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use," and what matters is "the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power."
Necessity for a road in the area was proved. "The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Necessity for this land was not. "Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere." The ordinance's whereas clause called the 51-square-metre lot "the shortest and most suitable access road" and the complaint alleged it had been "surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress" — but "the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims."
The trial court's contrary findings are rejected. They rested on an inspection of the vicinity showing the Bagong Taon alley "only about one-half (1/2) of its entire length is passable by vehicle and the other half is merely a foot-path," flanked by permanent structures and "considerably longer than the proposed access road." But "there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process."
Why that matters. "It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected."
The offer requirement. The petitioner stressed "that the law explicitly requires that a valid and definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that such offer was not accepted"; that the photocopy of the Reyes letter "cannot be considered because the trial court did not admit it in evidence"; that even if admissible "it would not prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner because mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase"; and that the offer "should be made to the proper party, that is, to the owner of the property" — JILCSFI having been the owner as of February 1993.

Doctrine

Eminent Domain Is Not Governed by the Servitude Articles: A condemnor taking land to build a road "is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code." Articles 649–657 govern a private claim between neighbours; expropriation answers to the Constitution and the enabling statute.
The Condemnor Selects the Route: "[I]n the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
Public Use = Public Welfare: "[W]hatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use," and "that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use."
Genuine Necessity, Not Absolute Necessity: "Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character," and "absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Necessity Must Be Shown for This Property: Proof that a road is needed in the area does not prove it is needed on this lot; the condemnor must "show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere," by a preponderance of evidence.
Ocular Inspection Is Part of the Trial: "[E]vidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial." Findings from an inspection of which a party had no notice "ha[ve] no probative weight" and must be rejected — a denial of due process.
The Statutory Offer: Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 requires a valid and definite offer to the owner before suit; an excluded photocopy will not prove it, and a "mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase."

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located; the road "had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration," and residents needed it "for water and electrical outlets."
The municipality decided to acquire 51 square metres out of the 1,791-square-metre property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho under TCT No. PT-66585, abutting E. R. Santos Street.
On February 23, 1993, messenger Rolando Togonon served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, on Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store; a lady received it and returned it bearing the signature of Luz Bernarte. On cross-examination Togonon "admitted that he never met Luz Bernarte."
On February 27, 1993, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and his co-owners agreed to sell the property to JILCSFI for ₱1,719,000.00, on a down payment of ₱1,000,000.00.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorising the mayor to initiate expropriation and appropriating funds; it stated that the owners had been notified of the intent to purchase for public use as an access road but had rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed its complaint — amended August 6, 1993 — under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, appending a photocopy of the Reyes letter, and deposited 15% of the market value on the latest tax declaration; on motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession.
On November 26, 1993, the municipality annotated a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. PT-92579 in the name of JILCSFI; the municipality then constructed the three-metre cemented road, "called Damayan Street."
On December 13, 1993, after full payment, the Ching Cuancos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale; on December 21, 1993, TCT No. PT-92579 was issued to JILCSFI, which declared the property for taxation in its name. (Tax Mapper Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. testified their records showed JILCSFI became owner only on January 13, 1994.)
On August 26, 1994, the RTC granted JILCSFI leave to intervene. In its answer-in-intervention it argued the taking was "only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless," that the portion taken "is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it," and later that the road was built "in the middle portion," denying it use and enjoyment; it cross-claimed against its vendors and counterclaimed for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Testimony for the municipality. Edgardo del Rosario, a resident since 1982, said they used to cross a slippery wooden bridge where many met accidents, and that after the road was built the residents had water and electricity. Augusto Paz of the City Engineer's Office, project engineer, said the road was 70 metres long and 3 metres wide and that "there is no other road through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid." Fire Marshall Manuel Tembrevilla confirmed a fire truck could pass, estimated 300 to 400 houses, and said Damayan Street "is the only road in the area."
The letter was excluded. The municipality offered the photocopy of Engr. Reyes's letter to prove a definite and valid offer, but "the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy."
Testimony for the intervenor. Normita del Rosario, owner of the property across, said there are other roads to E. R. Santos Street and only about ten urban-poor houses use the new one. Danilo Caballero, a seven-year resident, said he could use Catalina, Damayan and Bagong Taon Streets, but "admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through the newly constructed Damayan Street." Eduardo Villanueva, JILCSFI's Board Chairman and President, said the land was bought "for purposes of constructing a school building and a church as worship center," delayed by the expropriation ordinance.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, declared the municipality "as having a lawful right to take the property" and directed the parties to nominate commissioners, holding there was substantial compliance with Section 19 and that the strip was the most convenient access.
On March 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed, treating the Reyes letter as substantial compliance with the "valid and definite offer" requirement, noting the constructive notice furnished by the lis pendens, and relying on Article 33 of the LGC's implementing rules, which regards the "construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks" as public use.
On February 18, 2002, the CA denied reconsideration, holding it could consider the excluded photocopy because its existence was corroborated by the messenger's testimony and the ordinance, the presumption of regularity being unrebutted.
On August 9, 2005, the Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the complaint dismissed without prejudice.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc.)

B. Respondent (Municipality, now City, of Pasig)

C. Common Ground

Both sides accepted that a road existed and had been built; the intervenor's own witness admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through Damayan Street.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether "the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with" where a local government expropriates land to build a road.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Public use is as broad as public welfare. "It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use"; the Constitution is "a dynamic instrument" and "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store" (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration); what has emerged is "a concept of public use which is just as broad as public welfare."
A small class of beneficiaries does not defeat public use. "[W]hat should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power," and "that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use."
The Civil Code requisites do not bind a condemnor. Against the petitioner's insistence on least prejudice and no adequate outlet: "The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code."
Route selection belongs to the condemnor. "[I]n the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
The limits. "Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken."
Necessity for a road: established. "The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Necessity for this parcel: not established. "Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere." The ordinance's whereas clause and the complaint asserted the strip was the shortest and best, but "the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims."
The supporting findings are stripped out. "[T]here is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Expropriation Is Not a Servitude Claim: A condemnor building a road "is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code."
Condemnor's Choice of Route: Absent legislative restriction, the grantee of eminent domain "may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious."
Public Use: As broad as public welfare; a small number of direct beneficiaries does not diminish it.
Genuine Necessity: Required, but "absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice."
Site-Specific Necessity: The condemnor must prove the need to take this property "and not elsewhere," by a preponderance of evidence.
Ocular Inspection and Due Process: An inspection "is part of the trial"; findings from one held without notice to a party carry no probative weight.
Valid and Definite Offer: Required by Section 19, R.A. No. 7160, and must be proved by admissible evidence and made to the owner.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The dismissal is without prejudice to refiling: the defect is evidentiary, not jurisdictional, so the same strip may be expropriated on proper proof of the offer and of site-specific necessity.
The condemnor's freedom to choose a route is bounded by the twin qualifiers capricious and wantonly injurious — the concern behind Article 650's least-prejudice rule reappearing here in a different register.
Nothing in the ruling questions that a three-metre Fire Code access road into a densely built area of light-material houses serves a public use.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
On the syllabus line "Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)," this case marks the outer boundary of the topic: it identifies when the requisites do not apply at all.
Learn it as the pair to NPC v. Villamor. There, the State could not use the label "easement" to escape the consequences of a taking (paying full just compensation); here, a private owner could not use the label "easement" to impose the Civil Code's requisites on a taking. The lesson runs both ways: what governs is the power actually exercised, not the name attached to the burden.
Set beside Valdez, Quintanilla and Ramos it completes the picture. In those three a private claimant must prove no adequate outlet, indemnity, non-self-inflicted isolation and least prejudice. Where the State takes, none of that applies — but the substitute test, genuine necessity of a public character, is not a formality, and Pasig failed it as to this particular lot.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. The decision was penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., with Justices Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario concurring.