Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.

b. Legal Easements — Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)

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Case DigestChapter VII — Easement or Servitudes

Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.

G.R. No. 75905 · October 12, 1987 · Supreme Court

b. Legal Easements — Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)

Gist

A homeowner in Parañaque was walled off from Gatchalian Avenue, the nearest route to Sucat Road, by a 7–8 foot concrete wall built by the subdivision developer. He sued for a compulsory right of way. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition: his own subdivision had provided him a road lot, and the fact that it was undeveloped, bumpy and flooded made his situation inconvenient, not isolated — "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough."

Core Doctrine

The central doctrine is that a compulsory right of way "can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence" is on the claimant; and that the first requisite — no adequate outlet to a public highway — is not satisfied merely because the existing outlet is inconvenient. Where the claimant's own subdivision provided him a road lot, "[t]he fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite," because "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."

Facts

Petitioner Ramos owns a house and lot of 901 square metres covered by TCT No. 14927 at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, acquired from the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision and described in the subdivision survey plan as Lot 4133-G-11. (That he bought from Lombos — and not from Gatchalian Realty or the Asprecs — is the fact the Court leans on at the end: his claim for access lay first against his own subdivision.)
Two road lots abut his property: Lot 4133-G-12, of 2,160 square metres, "clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan," and Lot 4135 of the Parañaque Cadastre, now Pambansa Road but commonly called Gatchalian Avenue. This is the whole case in one sentence: he already had a road lot of his own. Whether it was developed is a different question from whether it existed.
Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135, and had granted respondent Gatchalian Realty a road right of way and drainage along it to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions. (Hence the Asprecs' objection that a grant to Ramos would derogate from their "Contract of Easement of Road Right-of-Way and of Drainage" with the realty company.)
Ramos built his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue and had lived there with his family from 1977. During construction, Gatchalian Realty built a 7–8 foot high concrete wall right in front of his premises, blocking his entrance and exit to Gatchalian Road — "the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway, formerly Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue" — his house being "only about 100 meters from Sucat Road passing thru Gatchalian Avenue." His own pleading calls the blocked route the "most convenient" one, which is the word that decides the case against him.
He and his counsel had sent demand letters, and in September 1977 a conference was held at which the corporation "manifested its conformity to grant appellant the requested right of way upon payment of proper indemnity," asking him to inform the Asprecs; he accordingly wrote Cleto Asprec on September 16, 1977. (A manifested conformity is not a concluded agreement — which is why the voluntary-easement route is "ruled out" in a single sentence.)
With the wall built, he and his family were "constrained to pass through the back portion of their lot bounded by other lots belonging to different owners, which is grassy and cogonal," as a temporary ingress and egress, "with great inconvenience and hardship... all the more pronounced during the rainy season due to flood and mud"; he also alleged the wall was "dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises."
On April 30, 1981, he filed a complaint for an easement of right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction. Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action and bar by prior judgment, the complaint being a reproduction of one filed October 26, 1972 in Civil Case No. 5930-P, dismissed October 30, 1980 for failure to prosecute; on November 20, 1981 the lower court denied the motion, that dismissal not being an adjudication on the merits.
Gatchalian Realty answered that it had never entered into a verbal agreement granting a road right of way; that Gatchalian Avenue is a private street for the exclusive use of its residents and lot buyers; that a grant "is not a legal necessity, because such lot has an [existing] road right of way, more particularly Lot 4133-G-12, towards Dr. Arcadio Santos Avenue (Sukat Road)"; and that reasonable compensation would be "some ₱800,000.00," the portion involved being some 2,000 square metres of prime property at ₱400 per square metre.
On July 9, 1982, after a hearing on the injunction, the lower court granted Ramos a right of way through Palanyag Road on payment of ₱5,000 indemnity to the Asprecs, limited to him, his family and persons dealing with them, through a three-metre opening with an iron gate at his expense. (That victory did not survive: on July 8, 1983 a new judge set the decision aside as "rendered prematurely," the defendants not having presented evidence on the main case.)
On November 14, 1984, on the corporation's motion after Ramos rested, the RTC, Branch CXI at Pasay City, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence; on August 29, 1986 the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that he "failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions," with costs against him.

Issue

Whether the petitioner successfully showed that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of right of way in his favour are present — in particular the first, that his estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway.

Ruling

Main issue. NO — he failed at the first requisite, and the petition is dismissed. A voluntary easement is out of the question at the threshold: an easement "is established either by law... or by the will of the parties", and "[s]ince there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out." What remains is the compulsory easement, and following Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company v. Capitol Subdivision, its four preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 are: "(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) After payment of proper indemnity; (3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts; and (4) That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.'" And: "By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on" the claimant. Here "the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue": the records show "a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots," and "[t]he fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite." The remedy lay elsewhere: he "should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec." To rule otherwise "simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained" — that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it." The first requisite failing, "we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions."

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The assigned errors "center on the issue of whether or not the petitioner has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present."
Article 613 defines the servitude as "an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner," and Article 619 divides easements into legal and voluntary.
The voluntary branch is disposed of at once: "Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way."
The four preconditions come from Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, Inc. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc.: a claimant "could not claim any such servitude without first establishing the pre-conditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and 650" — surrounded with no adequate outlet; after payment of proper indemnity; isolation not due to its own acts; and the way at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, so far as consistent, shortest.
The burden rule is stated categorically: "By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on the Central" — citing also Angela Estate, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On the first requisite, the petitioner argued that the wall had forced him onto adjoining lots that are "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses," and that the alternative road the respondents pointed to "is not an existing road but has remained a proposed road."
"The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit." The Court found "no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue": the records disclose "a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots."
Undeveloped is not the same as non-existent. "The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite."
The claim was directed at the wrong party. The petitioner "should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec."
Convenience is not necessity. To allow access through Gatchalian Avenue despite the road right of way his own subdivision provided, "simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that 'mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.'"
The first requisite is a threshold. "Considering that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way."
Standard of review. "[F]indings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and [may] not be overturned when supported by the evidence on record save in the known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts."

Doctrine

Two Sources (Art. 619): An easement arises by law or by the will of the parties. Absent an agreement, only the compulsory easement is in play — and a manifested willingness to grant one "upon payment of proper indemnity" is not an agreement.
Four Preconditions (Arts. 649 and 650): (1) surrounded by other immovables with no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity; (3) isolation not due to the claimant's own acts; (4) at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, so far as consistent, the shortest distance.
Burden of Proof: "[A] compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence" lies on the claimant.
Undeveloped ≠ Non-existent: An existing but unimproved road lot defeats the first requisite. "The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience... does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite."
Necessity, Not Convenience: "[M]ere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
Look to the Vendor First: A lot buyer whose subdivision provided a road lot must demand its improvement and maintenance from that subdivision, not burden a neighbouring estate from which he bought nothing.

The first requisite operates as a threshold: failing it, the Court expressly declined to reach indemnity, self-inflicted isolation, or least prejudice. And the concurrent factual findings of the Court of Appeals on the existence of an adequate outlet are binding absent gross misappreciation or misapprehension of facts.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT. Petitioner Ramos built his house on a lot bought from the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision in Parañaque, fronting Gatchalian Avenue, the shortest route to Sucat Road. Gatchalian Realty walled off his frontage with a 7–8 foot concrete wall, and he sued for a compulsory right of way. The trial court first granted it, then vacated its own decision, then dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence; the Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The central doctrine is that a compulsory right of way "can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist," the burden being on the claimant, and that the first — no adequate outlet — is not met where the claimant's own subdivision provided him a road lot, since "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Petitioner Ramos is the owner of a house and lot of 901 square metres covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14927, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, acquired from the Sobrina (Sabrina) Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision and described in the subdivision survey plan of Lot 4133-G, (LRC) PSD-172544, as Lot 4133-G-11.
Two road lots abut his property: Lot 4133-G-12, of 2,160 square metres, "clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan," and Lot 4135 of the Parañaque Cadastre, now known as Pambansa Road but commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue.
Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135; Gatchalian Realty was granted by the Asprecs a road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions.
Petitioner constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue and resided there with his family "from 1977 up to the present"; during construction, Gatchalian Realty built a 7–8 feet high concrete wall right in front of his premises, blocking his entrance and exit to Gatchalian Road, "the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road[ ]or highway, formerly Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque," his house being "only about 100 meters from Sucat[ ]Road passing thru Gatchalian Avenue."
Petitioner and his counsel had sent separate request/demand letters to the defendant company; in September 1977 a meeting was held at which the corporation "manifested its conformity to grant appellant the requested right of way upon payment of proper indemnity," with the request that he inform the Asprecs, and he accordingly wrote Cleto Asprec on September 16, 1977.
With the wall built, petitioner and his family "have been constrained to pass through the back portion of their lot bounded by other lots belonging to different owners, which is grassy and cogonal[,] as temporary ingress/egress with great inconvenience and hardship," the more so "during the rainy season due to flood and mud"; and the wall was "dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises posing great danger or hazard."
On April 30, 1981, petitioner filed a complaint for an easement of right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction.
On May 20, 1981, the respondent corporation moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action and bar by prior judgment, the complaint being "merely a reproduction of that filed on October 26, 1972 in Civil Case No. 5930-P which was dismissed on October 30, 1980 for failure to prosecute"; the Asprecs joined the motion. On November 20, 1981 the lower court denied it, the earlier dismissal not being an adjudication on the merits.
On November 26, 1981, petitioner moved ex parte for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, and the court temporarily enjoined the defendants from erecting any wall or enclosure abutting his premises and from preventing him and his household from using Gatchalian Avenue.
On December 1, 1981, Gatchalian Realty answered, averring that it "has never entered into a verbal agreement with plaintiff to grant the latter a road right of way"; that Gatchalian Avenue "is not a public road but a private street... intended for the sole and exclusive use of its residents and lot buyers"; that a grant "is not a legal necessity, because such lot has an [existing] road right of way, more particularly Lot 4133-G-12, towards Dr. Arcadio Santos Avenue (Sukat Road)"; that opening the avenue would "unduly cause great prejudice" to its regulation of the private road; and that reasonable compensation would be "some ₱800,000.00," the strip being some 2,000 square metres at ₱400 per square metre, apart from upkeep and taxes. On December 2, 1981 the Asprecs answered to the same effect.
On July 9, 1982, after a hearing at which both sides presented oral and documentary evidence, the lower court rendered judgment for the petitioner, ordering a right of way through Palanyag Road upon payment of ₱5,000 indemnity to the Asprecs, the easement to run only in favour of petitioner, his family and persons dealing with them, through an opening "only three (3) meters wide" fitted with an iron gate at his expense.
The respondents moved for reconsideration — the corporation on the ground that only the injunction application had been heard, the Asprecs on the ground that the grant would derogate from their "Contract of Easement of Road Right-of-Way and of Drainage" with the realty company. On July 8, 1983, the lower court under a new judge set aside and vacated its decision as "rendered prematurely as the defendants had not presented their evidence on the main evidence."
After petitioner rested, the corporation moved to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence, and on November 14, 1984 the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXI at Pasay City, granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.
On August 29, 1986, the Court of Appeals found that petitioner "failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions" and affirmed the dismissal in all respects, with costs against him.
On October 12, 1987, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Ramos, Sr.)

Petitioner argued that since the corporation's concrete wall blocked his ingress and egress via Gatchalian Avenue — "the nearest, most convenient and adequate road" to a public highway — he had been constrained to use adjoining lots as a "temporary" way, which is "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon"; and that the alternative the respondents pointed to "is not an existing road but has remained a proposed road as indicated in the subdivision plan of the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision." He assigned error in the affirmance of the dismissal, in the holding that he had not met the requirements of law, and in the failure to reinstate the July 9, 1982 decision granting him the way.

B. Respondents (Gatchalian Realty, Inc. and the Asprecs)

Respondents denied any verbal agreement granting a right of way; asserted that Gatchalian Avenue is a private street for the exclusive use of their residents and lot buyers; contended that a grant "is not a legal necessity" because petitioner's lot "has an [existing] road right of way, more particularly Lot 4133-G-12," toward Sucat Road; that opening the avenue would prejudice the corporation's regulation of the road; and that any indemnity would run to "some ₱800,000.00." The Asprecs added that a grant would derogate from their Contract of Easement of Road Right-of-Way and of Drainage with the realty company.

C. Common Ground

Both sides presented oral and documentary evidence at the injunction hearing, and neither disputed the existence of Lot 4133-G-12 in the Lombos subdivision plan — only its condition and legal sufficiency as an outlet.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether the petitioner "has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present" — and in particular whether his estate has no adequate outlet to a public highway.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

NO. A voluntary easement is "ruled out" for want of any agreement, so only the compulsory easement remains; and following Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, Inc. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., "a compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence" is the claimant's. "We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue." There is "a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots," and "[t]he fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite." He "should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12." To hold otherwise merely because Gatchalian Avenue affords "much greater ease" would ignore the settled rule that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it." The first requisite failing, "we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions."

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Framing. "An easement or servitude i[s] an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner as defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established either by law, in which case it is called legal[,] or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement" (Art. 619).
Voluntary easement ruled out. "Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way."
The preconditions, from Bacolod-Murcia. A claimant "could not claim any such servitude without first establishing the pre-conditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: (1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) After payment of proper indemnity; (3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts; and (4) That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.'"
The burden rule. "By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on the Central."
Petitioner's argument. He contended that the wall forced him onto adjoining lots that are "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon," and that the alternative was "not an existing road but has remained a proposed road."
Rejected on the facts. "The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots."
Undeveloped is not enough. "The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite."
The right defendant. "We agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec."
Convenience is not necessity. "To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that 'mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.'"
Threshold effect. "Considering that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way."
Review. "[F]indings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and [may] not be overturned when supported by the evidence on record save in the known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Legal vs. Voluntary (Art. 619): Without an agreement there is no voluntary easement, and the claim stands or falls as a compulsory one.
The Four Preconditions (Arts. 649–650): No adequate outlet; proper indemnity; isolation not self-inflicted; least prejudicial point and, consistently, shortest distance.
Burden on the Claimant: The four requisites must "first be shown to exist," and the burden is his.
An Existing but Unimproved Outlet Suffices: Inconvenience in using a road lot that exists does not satisfy the "no adequate outlet" requirement.
Necessity, Not Convenience: "[T]here must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
Claim Against the Vendor First: The buyer's demand for an improved road lot lies against the subdivision that sold him the lot, not against a neighbouring estate.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Court decided only the first requisite and expressly left the other three unexamined — so the case is authority on adequacy of outlet, not on indemnity or placement.
The holding rests on findings of fact affirmed by the Court of Appeals, binding save for gross misappreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts.
Nothing in the decision denies that the petitioner may pursue the Lombos subdivision for the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 — indeed the Court points him there.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
The case belongs to "Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)," and is the leading illustration of the first requisite: what Article 649 asks is whether an outlet exists, not whether it is pleasant to use.
It completes the trio on this list. Valdez v. Tabisula fails because the claimant has two existing accesses; Quintanilla v. Abangan fails on least prejudice (and on a public road fifty metres away); Ramos fails because his own subdivision gave him a road lot he never asked to have improved.
The practical lesson for recitation is to ask who sold the claimant his lot. A subdivision buyer's access is, in the first instance, the subdivision's responsibility — and a servitude is not the remedy for a developer's failure to grade a road.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. Justices Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes concurred.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 613, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VII (Easements of Servitudes), Chapter 1 (Easements in General), Section 1 (Different Kinds of Easements)

An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.

The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)

Why it is cited here

The starting definition: "An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner."

The Court uses it to frame the whole inquiry. Because a servitude burdens somebody else's land, it is not conjured out of inconvenience; it must be traced either to an agreement or to the law.

Civil Code

Article 619, Civil Code

Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements. (536)

Why it is cited here

The fork that structures the judgment: an easement "is established either by law, in which case it is called legal[,] or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement."

The voluntary branch is closed in a sentence: "Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement... is ruled out."

Note what that disposes of. Ramos had pleaded a 1977 conference at which Gatchalian Realty "manifested its conformity to grant [him] the requested right of way upon payment of proper indemnity," and a follow-up letter to Cleto Asprec. A manifested willingness to grant, without a concluded agreement, is not a voluntary easement — the same lesson as the deed clause in Valdez v. Tabisula.

Civil Code

Article 649, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book II (Property, Ownership, and Its Modifications), Title VII (Easements of Servitudes), Chapter 2 (Legal Easements), Section 3 (Easement of Right of Way)

The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)

Why it is cited here

The compulsory easement, and the requisite on which the case is decided. The owner of an immovable "surrounded by other immovables... and without adequate outlet to a public highway" may demand a right of way "after payment of the proper indemnity"; and it "is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts."

Following Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. v. Capitol Subdivision, the Court lists four preconditions — surrounded with no adequate outlet; proper indemnity; isolation not self-inflicted; and (from Article 650) least prejudicial point and shortest distance — then states the rule that matters most in practice: "By express provision of law... a compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on" the claimant.

The first requisite is a threshold, not a factor to be weighed. Fail it and the rest are never reached: "Considering that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite... we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions."

Civil Code

Article 650, Civil Code

The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (565)

Why it is cited here

Supplies the fourth precondition in the Bacolod-Murcia enumeration: the way claimed must be "at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest."

It is quoted here but never applied, the claim having failed at the first requisite. Its role on this page is structural: it shows that the four requisites are drawn from two articles read together, which is why the standard formulation is always "Articles 649 and 650."

For the article actually put to work, see Quintanilla v. Abangan, where the least- prejudice criterion is held to prevail over shortest distance.

Cited laws & provisions

Article 613, Civil Code

Civil Code

An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.

The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)

Why it is cited here

The starting definition: "An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner."

The Court uses it to frame the whole inquiry. Because a servitude burdens somebody else's land, it is not conjured out of inconvenience; it must be traced either to an agreement or to the law.

Full entry below ↓

Article 619, Civil Code

Civil Code

Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements. (536)

Why it is cited here

The fork that structures the judgment: an easement "is established either by law, in which case it is called legal[,] or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement."

Full entry below ↓

Article 649, Civil Code

Civil Code

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)

Why it is cited here

Full entry below ↓

Article 650, Civil Code

Civil Code

Why it is cited here

For the article actually put to work, see Quintanilla v. Abangan, where the least- prejudice criterion is held to prevail over shortest distance.

Full entry below ↓

Facts

Petitioner Ramos owns a house and lot of 901 square metres covered by TCT No. 14927 at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, acquired from the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision and described in the subdivision survey plan as Lot 4133-G-11. (That he bought from Lombos — and not from Gatchalian Realty or the Asprecs — is the fact the Court leans on at the end: his claim for access lay first against his own subdivision.)
Two road lots abut his property: Lot 4133-G-12, of 2,160 square metres, "clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan," and Lot 4135 of the Parañaque Cadastre, now Pambansa Road but commonly called Gatchalian Avenue. This is the whole case in one sentence: he already had a road lot of his own. Whether it was developed is a different question from whether it existed.
Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135, and had granted respondent Gatchalian Realty a road right of way and drainage along it to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions. (Hence the Asprecs' objection that a grant to Ramos would derogate from their "Contract of Easement of Road Right-of-Way and of Drainage" with the realty company.)
Ramos built his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue and had lived there with his family from 1977. During construction, Gatchalian Realty built a 7–8 foot high concrete wall right in front of his premises, blocking his entrance and exit to Gatchalian Road — "the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway, formerly Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue" — his house being "only about 100 meters from Sucat Road passing thru Gatchalian Avenue." His own pleading calls the blocked route the "most convenient" one, which is the word that decides the case against him.
He and his counsel had sent demand letters, and in September 1977 a conference was held at which the corporation "manifested its conformity to grant appellant the requested right of way upon payment of proper indemnity," asking him to inform the Asprecs; he accordingly wrote Cleto Asprec on September 16, 1977. (A manifested conformity is not a concluded agreement — which is why the voluntary-easement route is "ruled out" in a single sentence.)
With the wall built, he and his family were "constrained to pass through the back portion of their lot bounded by other lots belonging to different owners, which is grassy and cogonal," as a temporary ingress and egress, "with great inconvenience and hardship... all the more pronounced during the rainy season due to flood and mud"; he also alleged the wall was "dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises."
On April 30, 1981, he filed a complaint for an easement of right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction. Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action and bar by prior judgment, the complaint being a reproduction of one filed October 26, 1972 in Civil Case No. 5930-P, dismissed October 30, 1980 for failure to prosecute; on November 20, 1981 the lower court denied the motion, that dismissal not being an adjudication on the merits.
Gatchalian Realty answered that it had never entered into a verbal agreement granting a road right of way; that Gatchalian Avenue is a private street for the exclusive use of its residents and lot buyers; that a grant "is not a legal necessity, because such lot has an [existing] road right of way, more particularly Lot 4133-G-12, towards Dr. Arcadio Santos Avenue (Sukat Road)"; and that reasonable compensation would be "some ₱800,000.00," the portion involved being some 2,000 square metres of prime property at ₱400 per square metre.
On July 9, 1982, after a hearing on the injunction, the lower court granted Ramos a right of way through Palanyag Road on payment of ₱5,000 indemnity to the Asprecs, limited to him, his family and persons dealing with them, through a three-metre opening with an iron gate at his expense. (That victory did not survive: on July 8, 1983 a new judge set the decision aside as "rendered prematurely," the defendants not having presented evidence on the main case.)
On November 14, 1984, on the corporation's motion after Ramos rested, the RTC, Branch CXI at Pasay City, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence; on August 29, 1986 the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that he "failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions," with costs against him.

Issue

Ruling

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

Ratio

The assigned errors "center on the issue of whether or not the petitioner has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present."
Article 613 defines the servitude as "an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner," and Article 619 divides easements into legal and voluntary.
The voluntary branch is disposed of at once: "Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way."
The four preconditions come from Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, Inc. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc.: a claimant "could not claim any such servitude without first establishing the pre-conditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and 650" — surrounded with no adequate outlet; after payment of proper indemnity; isolation not due to its own acts; and the way at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, so far as consistent, shortest.
The burden rule is stated categorically: "By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on the Central" — citing also Angela Estate, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On the first requisite, the petitioner argued that the wall had forced him onto adjoining lots that are "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses," and that the alternative road the respondents pointed to "is not an existing road but has remained a proposed road."
"The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit." The Court found "no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue": the records disclose "a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots."
Undeveloped is not the same as non-existent. "The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite."
The claim was directed at the wrong party. The petitioner "should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec."
Convenience is not necessity. To allow access through Gatchalian Avenue despite the road right of way his own subdivision provided, "simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that 'mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.'"
The first requisite is a threshold. "Considering that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way."
Standard of review. "[F]indings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and [may] not be overturned when supported by the evidence on record save in the known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts."

Doctrine

Two Sources (Art. 619): An easement arises by law or by the will of the parties. Absent an agreement, only the compulsory easement is in play — and a manifested willingness to grant one "upon payment of proper indemnity" is not an agreement.
Four Preconditions (Arts. 649 and 650): (1) surrounded by other immovables with no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity; (3) isolation not due to the claimant's own acts; (4) at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, so far as consistent, the shortest distance.
Burden of Proof: "[A] compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence" lies on the claimant.
Undeveloped ≠ Non-existent: An existing but unimproved road lot defeats the first requisite. "The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience... does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite."
Necessity, Not Convenience: "[M]ere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
Look to the Vendor First: A lot buyer whose subdivision provided a road lot must demand its improvement and maintenance from that subdivision, not burden a neighbouring estate from which he bought nothing.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

Petitioner Ramos is the owner of a house and lot of 901 square metres covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14927, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, acquired from the Sobrina (Sabrina) Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision and described in the subdivision survey plan of Lot 4133-G, (LRC) PSD-172544, as Lot 4133-G-11.
Two road lots abut his property: Lot 4133-G-12, of 2,160 square metres, "clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan," and Lot 4135 of the Parañaque Cadastre, now known as Pambansa Road but commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue.
Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135; Gatchalian Realty was granted by the Asprecs a road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions.
Petitioner constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue and resided there with his family "from 1977 up to the present"; during construction, Gatchalian Realty built a 7–8 feet high concrete wall right in front of his premises, blocking his entrance and exit to Gatchalian Road, "the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road[ ]or highway, formerly Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque," his house being "only about 100 meters from Sucat[ ]Road passing thru Gatchalian Avenue."
Petitioner and his counsel had sent separate request/demand letters to the defendant company; in September 1977 a meeting was held at which the corporation "manifested its conformity to grant appellant the requested right of way upon payment of proper indemnity," with the request that he inform the Asprecs, and he accordingly wrote Cleto Asprec on September 16, 1977.
With the wall built, petitioner and his family "have been constrained to pass through the back portion of their lot bounded by other lots belonging to different owners, which is grassy and cogonal[,] as temporary ingress/egress with great inconvenience and hardship," the more so "during the rainy season due to flood and mud"; and the wall was "dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises posing great danger or hazard."
On April 30, 1981, petitioner filed a complaint for an easement of right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction.
On May 20, 1981, the respondent corporation moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action and bar by prior judgment, the complaint being "merely a reproduction of that filed on October 26, 1972 in Civil Case No. 5930-P which was dismissed on October 30, 1980 for failure to prosecute"; the Asprecs joined the motion. On November 20, 1981 the lower court denied it, the earlier dismissal not being an adjudication on the merits.
On November 26, 1981, petitioner moved ex parte for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, and the court temporarily enjoined the defendants from erecting any wall or enclosure abutting his premises and from preventing him and his household from using Gatchalian Avenue.
On December 1, 1981, Gatchalian Realty answered, averring that it "has never entered into a verbal agreement with plaintiff to grant the latter a road right of way"; that Gatchalian Avenue "is not a public road but a private street... intended for the sole and exclusive use of its residents and lot buyers"; that a grant "is not a legal necessity, because such lot has an [existing] road right of way, more particularly Lot 4133-G-12, towards Dr. Arcadio Santos Avenue (Sukat Road)"; that opening the avenue would "unduly cause great prejudice" to its regulation of the private road; and that reasonable compensation would be "some ₱800,000.00," the strip being some 2,000 square metres at ₱400 per square metre, apart from upkeep and taxes. On December 2, 1981 the Asprecs answered to the same effect.
On July 9, 1982, after a hearing at which both sides presented oral and documentary evidence, the lower court rendered judgment for the petitioner, ordering a right of way through Palanyag Road upon payment of ₱5,000 indemnity to the Asprecs, the easement to run only in favour of petitioner, his family and persons dealing with them, through an opening "only three (3) meters wide" fitted with an iron gate at his expense.
The respondents moved for reconsideration — the corporation on the ground that only the injunction application had been heard, the Asprecs on the ground that the grant would derogate from their "Contract of Easement of Road Right-of-Way and of Drainage" with the realty company. On July 8, 1983, the lower court under a new judge set aside and vacated its decision as "rendered prematurely as the defendants had not presented their evidence on the main evidence."
After petitioner rested, the corporation moved to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence, and on November 14, 1984 the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXI at Pasay City, granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.
On August 29, 1986, the Court of Appeals found that petitioner "failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions" and affirmed the dismissal in all respects, with costs against him.
On October 12, 1987, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner (Ramos, Sr.)

B. Respondents (Gatchalian Realty, Inc. and the Asprecs)

C. Common Ground

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

Framing. "An easement or servitude i[s] an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner as defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established either by law, in which case it is called legal[,] or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement" (Art. 619).
Voluntary easement ruled out. "Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way."
The preconditions, from Bacolod-Murcia. A claimant "could not claim any such servitude without first establishing the pre-conditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: (1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) After payment of proper indemnity; (3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts; and (4) That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.'"
The burden rule. "By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on the Central."
Petitioner's argument. He contended that the wall forced him onto adjoining lots that are "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon," and that the alternative was "not an existing road but has remained a proposed road."
Rejected on the facts. "The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots."
Undeveloped is not enough. "The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite."
The right defendant. "We agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec."
Convenience is not necessity. "To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that 'mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.'"
Threshold effect. "Considering that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way."
Review. "[F]indings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and [may] not be overturned when supported by the evidence on record save in the known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts."

B. Doctrines/Rules

Legal vs. Voluntary (Art. 619): Without an agreement there is no voluntary easement, and the claim stands or falls as a compulsory one.
The Four Preconditions (Arts. 649–650): No adequate outlet; proper indemnity; isolation not self-inflicted; least prejudicial point and, consistently, shortest distance.
Burden on the Claimant: The four requisites must "first be shown to exist," and the burden is his.
An Existing but Unimproved Outlet Suffices: Inconvenience in using a road lot that exists does not satisfy the "no adequate outlet" requirement.
Necessity, Not Convenience: "[T]here must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
Claim Against the Vendor First: The buyer's demand for an improved road lot lies against the subdivision that sold him the lot, not against a neighbouring estate.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

The Court decided only the first requisite and expressly left the other three unexamined — so the case is authority on adequacy of outlet, not on indemnity or placement.
The holding rests on findings of fact affirmed by the Court of Appeals, binding save for gross misappreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts.
Nothing in the decision denies that the petitioner may pursue the Lombos subdivision for the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 — indeed the Court points him there.

D. Topic Integration

The relationship is DIRECT.
The case belongs to "Easement of right of way: requisites (Arts. 649, 650)," and is the leading illustration of the first requisite: what Article 649 asks is whether an outlet exists, not whether it is pleasant to use.
It completes the trio on this list. Valdez v. Tabisula fails because the claimant has two existing accesses; Quintanilla v. Abangan fails on least prejudice (and on a public road fifty metres away); Ramos fails because his own subdivision gave him a road lot he never asked to have improved.
The practical lesson for recitation is to ask who sold the claimant his lot. A subdivision buyer's access is, in the first instance, the subdivision's responsibility — and a servitude is not the remedy for a developer's failure to grade a road.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD. Justices Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes concurred.