Hans Case Digest Repo
Hans Case Digest Repo — Study Smart, Pass the Bar
Home/Property/Chapter XI — Donation/Di Siock Jian v. Sy Lioc Suy

Di Siock Jian v. Sy Lioc Suy

a. Kinds — As to consideration (Arts. 725, 726, 733)
Subject Home
16px
←Previous: Jutic v. Court of AppealsPrevious case
Primary source ↗Next: City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co.Next case→

On this page

  • Gist
  • Facts
  • Issue
  • Ruling
  • Ratio
  • Doctrine
  • Provisions
Primary source ↗

Title

Di Siock Jian v. Sy Lioc Suy

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. L-17783 June 22, 1922

A father donated property to his minor children on condition that whoever accepted for them would feed, house, clothe and launder for him for life. Their mother accepted — but she had not yet been appointed judicial guardian. He later sold the same property to third parties. The Court let the sale stand: a donation burdened with support is conditional, not pure, and a parent without judicial authority cannot bind a child to that burden.

Core Doctrine

A donation that imposes on the donee an obligation to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime is a conditional or onerous donation, not a pure one. Because such a grant is not an act of pure beneficence, acceptance on behalf of minor donees must be made by a representative with judicial authority; and until a valid acceptance is communicated, the donor is not bound and may validly withdraw the offer.

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-17783)

Case DigestChapter XI — Donation

Di Siock Jian v. Sy Lioc Suy

G.R. No. L-17783 · June 22, 1922 · Supreme Court

a. Kinds — As to consideration (Arts. 725, 726, 733)

Gist

A father donated property to his minor children on condition that whoever accepted for them would feed, house, clothe and launder for him for life. Their mother accepted — but she had not yet been appointed judicial guardian. He later sold the same property to third parties. The Court let the sale stand: a donation burdened with support is conditional, not pure, and a parent without judicial authority cannot bind a child to that burden.

Core Doctrine

A donation that imposes on the donee an obligation to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime is a conditional or onerous donation, not a pure one. Because such a grant is not an act of pure beneficence, acceptance on behalf of minor donees must be made by a representative with judicial authority; and until a valid acceptance is communicated, the donor is not bound and may validly withdraw the offer.

Facts

  • Respondent Sy Lioc Suy executed a document of donation (Exhibit A) and a supplemental document (Exhibit B) over certain real property in favour of his minor children.
  • The donation was made subject to the condition that the person accepting on behalf of the minor donees must defray the donor's lodging, food, clothing and laundry during his lifetime. (That burden is what converted the grant from a pure donation into a conditional or onerous one, and everything else in the case follows from the reclassification.)
  • Di Siock Jian, the children's mother, accepted the donation on their behalf in the same instrument.
  • At the time of that acceptance she was the children's natural guardian but had not yet been judicially appointed guardian of their property. Capacity is measured at the moment of acceptance, and a natural guardian may perform acts of simple administration but cannot saddle a minor's patrimony with a lifetime obligation of support.
  • The donation documents were registered, and Di Siock Jian took possession of the property, collected rents and paid taxes for the minors. (None of this cured the defect — registration and possession publicise a contract rather than create one.)
  • The Court of First Instance afterwards formally appointed Di Siock Jian judicial guardian of the minors and their properties. The appointment came too late: it could not reach back and validate an acceptance that was void when made.
  • Sy Lioc Suy thereafter executed a document (Exhibit D) and a deed of sale conveying the same property to co-defendants for valuable consideration; the deed was registered and a certificate of title issued in the purchasers' names.
  • Di Siock Jian, now as judicial guardian, sued to nullify the sale and have the minors declared owners by virtue of the donation. The lower court dismissed the complaint for want of a valid acceptance, and the Supreme Court affirmed on June 22, 1922.

Issue

Whether a donation requiring the donee to support the donor is pure or conditional/onerous under Article 725§ and Article 726§, and whether a parent without judicial appointment can validly accept such a grant for minor children.
Secondary issue. Whether a donor is bound by a registered donation if the acceptance in it was legally defective.

Ruling

Main issue. It is a CONDITIONAL / ONEROUS donation, and the acceptance was INVALID. The grant was "conditional, for the reason that it was made with the condition that the person accepting it on behalf of the minor donees, should defray his [the donor's] lodging, food, clothing, and laundry." Under Article 726§ a gift that imposes a burden — even one worth less than the thing given — is not a pure donation; and "where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but a conditional one." Being conditional, it required proper representation to bind the minors to the burden, and the mother "was not yet appointed by the court as guardian of her children when she accepted said donations," so she "could not validly accept" it.
Secondary issue. NO. Under Article 734§ a donation is perfected only from the moment the donor knows of a valid acceptance. The acceptance here being a nullity, the donation never reached perfection, and the donor "was not bound by any contract" and could validly withdraw the offer. Registration of the documents did not cure the absence of a perfected contract.
The judgment appealed from was in all other respects AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellant.
"Where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but a conditional one."

Ratio

  • Classification by burden. The Court ruled the donation "conditional, for the reason that it was made with the condition that the person accepting it on behalf of the minor donees, should defray his lodging, food, clothing, and laundry." Under Article 726§, a gift imposing a burden — even one less than the value of the thing given — is not a pure donation.
  • The support condition is of the essence. An obligation to support the donor is not a mere incidental request: "Where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but a conditional one."
  • Defective representation in acceptance. Being conditional, the donation required a valid concurrence of minds to bind the minors to the burden. The mother "was not yet appointed by the court as guardian of her children when she accepted said donations," and so under Article 741§ could not validly accept on behalf of their property interests.
  • Theory of cognition. Under Article 734§, a donation is perfected only from the moment the donor knows of a valid acceptance. The acceptance here being a nullity, the donation never reached perfection, and the donor "was not bound by any contract" and could validly withdraw the offer.
  • Registration cures nothing. The recording of the donation documents did not supply the missing perfected contract.

Doctrine

  1. The support-obligation rule: a donation requiring the donee to provide for the donor's needs — food, clothing, lodging — is a conditional or onerous donation, not a pure one.
  2. Parental capacity versus judicial guardianship: a natural guardian has no authority to accept a conditional or onerous donation for a minor child without judicial appointment, because such an acceptance assumes liabilities for the minor.
  3. Right of withdrawal: an offer of donation, even if recorded, remains revocable at the donor's will until perfected by a valid acceptance from a person with legal capacity to bind the donee.

Full Digest — Recitation Format

I. Gist and Central Doctrine

Relationship to requested topic: DIRECT.
This case involves an action filed by a mother, acting as the judicially appointed guardian of her minor children, to annul a contract of sale executed by the children's father (the respondent) and to recognise the children's title to the property based on a prior donation. The respondent-father had executed a deed of donation in favour of the minors, which the mother accepted before her judicial appointment, but the father later withdrew the offer and sold the property to third parties. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, ruling that the donation was conditional or onerous and failed for lack of valid acceptance. The central doctrine is that under the Civil Code (Arts. 725§, 726§, 733§), a donation that imposes an obligation on the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime is classified as a conditional or onerous donation rather than a pure one; because such a grant is not an act of pure beneficence, the acceptance on behalf of minor donees must be made by a representative with proper judicial authority, and until such a valid acceptance is communicated, the donor is not bound and may validly withdraw the offer.

II. Chronological Narration of Material Facts

  • Respondent Sy Lioc Suy executed a document of donation (Exhibit A) and a supplemental document (Exhibit B) over certain real property in favour of his minor children, Kiong Chuan and Sy Lioc Suy.
  • Terms of the grant. The donation was made subject to the condition that the person accepting on behalf of the minor donees must defray the donor's lodging, food, clothing and laundry during his lifetime.
  • Di Siock Jian, the children's mother, accepted the donation on behalf of the minors in the same instrument.
  • At the time of this acceptance, Di Siock Jian was the natural guardian of the children but had not yet been judicially appointed as guardian of their property.
  • The donation documents (Exhibits A and B) were registered, and Di Siock Jian took possession of the property, collected rents and paid taxes for the minors.
  • Subsequently, the Court of First Instance formally appointed Di Siock Jian as the judicial guardian of the minors and their properties.
  • Sy Lioc Suy thereafter executed a document (Exhibit D) and a deed of sale, conveying the same property to co-defendants for a valuable consideration.
  • The deed of sale was registered, and a Certificate of Title was issued in the names of the purchasers.
  • Di Siock Jian, now as judicial guardian, filed a complaint to nullify the sale and have the minors declared owners by virtue of the donation.
  • The lower court dismissed the complaint, finding the donation lacked valid acceptance.
  • June 22, 1922. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Plaintiff-Appellant (Di Siock Jian as Guardian)

The petitioner argued that the donation was a pure donation and that ownership transferred to the minors upon the execution and registration of the deed. She contended that as the mother, her acceptance was sufficient to perfect the gift, and that the subsequent sale by the father was a fraudulent act intended to deprive the children of their vested rights.

B. Defendant-Appellee (Sy Lioc Suy)

The respondent maintained that the donation was not pure but conditional or onerous, because it imposed a burden of support on the donees. He argued that because the mother lacked judicial authority at the time of the grant, her acceptance was a nullity. Consequently, he asserted, no contract was perfected and he remained free to withdraw the offer and sell the property.

C. Common Ground

The parties admitted the existence of the donation deed and the fact that the mother's formal appointment as judicial guardian occurred only after she had already signed the acceptance.

IV. Issues

A. MAIN ISSUE

Whether a donation requiring the donee to support the donor is classified as pure or conditional/onerous under Articles 725§ and 726§, and whether a parent without judicial appointment can validly accept such a grant for minor children.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

Whether a donor is bound by a registered donation if the acceptance therein was legally defective.

V. Ruling / Disposition

A. MAIN ISSUE

It is a CONDITIONAL / ONEROUS donation. The acceptance was INVALID.

B. SECONDARY ISSUES

NO. The donor can validly withdraw the offer if the acceptance is void.
FALLO. "Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is in all other respects affirmed … with the costs against the appellant."

VI. Ratio Decidendi and Doctrines

A. Ratio Decidendi

  • Classification based on burden (Art. 726§). The Court ruled that the donation was "conditional, for the reason that it was made with the condition that the person accepting it on behalf of the minor donees, should defray his [the donor's] lodging, food, clothing, and laundry." A gift which imposes a burden — even if the burden is less than the value of the gift — is not a pure donation.
  • Nature of the support condition. The Court emphasised that an obligation to support the donor is not a mere incidental request: "Where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but a conditional one." The condition is the very essence of the agreement.
  • Defective representation in acceptance. Because the donation was conditional or onerous under Article 733§, it required a valid concurrence of minds to bind the minors to the burden. The mother "was not yet appointed by the court as guardian of her children when she accepted said donations," and so "could not validly accept said donation" on behalf of the minors' property interests — the representation Article 741§ requires.
  • Application of the theory of cognition (Art. 734§). A donation is perfected only from the moment the donor knows of a valid acceptance. Since the acceptance here was a nullity, the donation never reached perfection. The Court ruled that Sy Lioc Suy, as donor, "was not bound by any contract, and he can validly withdraw the offer." The registration of the documents did not cure the lack of a perfected contract.

B. Doctrines/Rules

  1. The Support Obligation Rule: A donation requiring the donee to provide for the donor's needs (food, clothing, lodging) is a conditional or onerous donation, not a pure one.
  2. Parental Capacity vs. Judicial Guardianship: A natural guardian (parent) has no authority to accept a conditional or onerous donation for a minor child without a judicial appointment, as such acceptance involves assuming liabilities for the minor.
  3. Right of Withdrawal: An offer of donation, even if recorded, remains revocable at the donor's will until it is perfected by a valid acceptance from a person with legal capacity to bind the donee.

C. Limitations/Exceptions

  • The Court noted that the mother's status as a natural guardian allows her to perform acts of simple administration, but the acceptance of a contract involving reciprocal obligations — support — requires judicial oversight to protect the child's patrimony.
  • Her later judicial appointment did not validate the earlier acceptance: capacity is measured as of the moment the acceptance is made.

D. Topic Integration

  • This case is DIRECTLY controlling for "Donation — Kinds as to Consideration (Arts. 725§, 726§, 733§)." It provides the judicial boundary between a pure donation and a conditional one.
  • It teaches that the nature of a donation is determined by the presence of a burden: if the donor benefits from the grant through support, the transaction is treated as something other than pure liberality.
  • It establishes that the practical effect of an onerous donation is the necessity of strict legal representation for minor donees, failing which the donation fails as a mode of acquisition and remains a mere offer the donor may validly ignore by selling the property to others.

VII. Separate Opinions

NOT IN RECORD.

Cited Laws & Provisions

Every statute, rule, and issuance the decision turns on — the text as written, and the work it does in this case.

Civil Code

Article 725, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. (618a)

Why it is cited here

The baseline the donation had to be measured against, and the classification the petitioner needed and did not get.

"Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it."

A pure donation under this article is unmixed beneficence: the donee gets something and gives up nothing. That is why the law is relaxed about who may accept for a minor — there is no downside to guard against.

The mother's whole case rested on the deed being of this kind. If it were, her acceptance as natural guardian would have been good, perfection would have followed on the donor's knowledge of it, and the later sale to the co-defendants would have conveyed nothing.

The support condition took the deed out of this article and into Article 726, and with it out of the relaxed acceptance rule. One clause about lodging, food, clothing and laundry decided who owned the land.

Civil Code

Article 726, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter's merits or of the services rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation. (619)

Why it is cited here

The article that decides the classification, and the classification decides the case.

"When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter's merits or of the services rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation."

Read the last clause carefully. A gift carrying a burden less than the value of the thing is still a donation — but it is a conditional or onerous one, not a pure one, and that difference governs everything downstream.

The burden here was that whoever accepted for the minors must "defray his lodging, food, clothing, and laundry" for the donor's lifetime. The Court held that this is no incidental request: "Where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but a conditional one."

Why it matters so much: a pure donation only benefits the donee, so the law is relaxed about who may accept for a minor. A conditional one saddles the minor with a liability, and the law will not let that happen without proper representation.

Civil Code

Article 733, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. (622)

Why it is cited here

Where a conditional or onerous donation is sent once it has been classified: "Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed."

That referral is what raised the bar on acceptance here. Under the law on contracts, a party who assumes a reciprocal obligation must have the capacity to bind himself to it. Minors do not, and their representative must be authorised to incur liabilities on their behalf — not merely to administer what they already have.

So the chain runs: the support burden makes the donation conditional under Article 726 → this article sends it to contract law → contract law demands a representative competent to accept a liability → the mother, not yet judicially appointed, was not one.

City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co. is the same article working the other way: there the donee had performed the burden, so contract law made the conveyance demandable. Here the donee never validly took the burden on, so nothing was ever owed.

Civil Code

Article 741, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 2 (Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation)

Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done through their parents or legal representatives. (626a)

Why it is cited here

The rule the mother's acceptance ran into, and the reason her being the children's mother was not enough.

"Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done through their parents or legal representatives."

That looks permissive, and for a pure donation it is: a parent may accept, because a gift that costs the child nothing needs no protective machinery, and the article names "parents or legal representatives" in the alternative.

The Court read it more narrowly where the gift carries a burden. Accepting a liability for a minor is not an act of simple administration, and the parent who does it must be acting with the authority of a legal representative — which, for the child's patrimony, means judicial appointment.

Di Siock Jian was the children's natural guardian, which lets her perform acts of simple administration. It does not let her assume reciprocal obligations on their behalf. She "was not yet appointed by the court as guardian of her children when she accepted said donations," and so "could not validly accept" a grant that bound them to support their father for life.

The sequencing is the trap and it is worth noticing: she was judicially appointed — but afterwards. Capacity is measured at the moment of acceptance, and a later appointment does not reach back to validate what was void when done.

Civil Code

Article 734, Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)

Why it is cited here

Why the father could still sell the land, and the answer turns on a word most summaries drop.

"The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

The acceptance the article means is a valid one. A void acceptance perfects nothing, so the donation here never came into existence as a contract — it remained an offer. And an offer may be withdrawn.

Hence the Court's conclusion that the donor "was not bound by any contract" and could validly withdraw and sell to the co-defendants, who registered their deed and took a certificate of title.

Two further points worth holding. Registration did not cure the defect — the donation documents were registered and the mother had taken possession, collected rents and paid taxes, and none of it mattered, because registration publicises a contract rather than creating one. And the whole outcome would have flipped had the donation been pure: the mother's acceptance would have been good, perfection would have followed, and the later sale would have conveyed nothing.

Study digest — refer to the full text of the decision for accuracy. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1922/jun1922/gr_17783_1922.html

Cited laws & provisions

Article 725, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. (618a)

Why it is cited here

The baseline the donation had to be measured against, and the classification the petitioner needed and did not get.

"Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it."

A pure donation under this article is unmixed beneficence: the donee gets something and gives up nothing. That is why the law is relaxed about who may accept for a minor — there is no downside to guard against.

The mother's whole case rested on the deed being of this kind. If it were, her acceptance as natural guardian would have been good, perfection would have followed on the donor's knowledge of it, and the later sale to the co-defendants would have conveyed nothing.

The support condition took the deed out of this article and into Article 726, and with it out of the relaxed acceptance rule. One clause about lodging, food, clothing and laundry decided who owned the land.

Full entry below ↓

Article 726, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter's merits or of the services rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation. (619)

Why it is cited here

The article that decides the classification, and the classification decides the case.

"When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter's merits or of the services rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation."

Read the last clause carefully. A gift carrying a burden less than the value of the thing is still a donation — but it is a conditional or onerous one, not a pure one, and that difference governs everything downstream.

The burden here was that whoever accepted for the minors must "defray his lodging, food, clothing, and laundry" for the donor's lifetime. The Court held that this is no incidental request: "Where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but a conditional one."

Why it matters so much: a pure donation only benefits the donee, so the law is relaxed about who may accept for a minor. A conditional one saddles the minor with a liability, and the law will not let that happen without proper representation.

Full entry below ↓

Article 733, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. (622)

Why it is cited here

Where a conditional or onerous donation is sent once it has been classified: "Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed."

That referral is what raised the bar on acceptance here. Under the law on contracts, a party who assumes a reciprocal obligation must have the capacity to bind himself to it. Minors do not, and their representative must be authorised to incur liabilities on their behalf — not merely to administer what they already have.

So the chain runs: the support burden makes the donation conditional under Article 726 → this article sends it to contract law → contract law demands a representative competent to accept a liability → the mother, not yet judicially appointed, was not one.

City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co. is the same article working the other way: there the donee had performed the burden, so contract law made the conveyance demandable. Here the donee never validly took the burden on, so nothing was ever owed.

Full entry below ↓

Article 741, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 2 (Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation)

Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done through their parents or legal representatives. (626a)

Why it is cited here

The rule the mother's acceptance ran into, and the reason her being the children's mother was not enough.

"Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done through their parents or legal representatives."

That looks permissive, and for a pure donation it is: a parent may accept, because a gift that costs the child nothing needs no protective machinery, and the article names "parents or legal representatives" in the alternative.

The Court read it more narrowly where the gift carries a burden. Accepting a liability for a minor is not an act of simple administration, and the parent who does it must be acting with the authority of a legal representative — which, for the child's patrimony, means judicial appointment.

Di Siock Jian was the children's natural guardian, which lets her perform acts of simple administration. It does not let her assume reciprocal obligations on their behalf. She "was not yet appointed by the court as guardian of her children when she accepted said donations," and so "could not validly accept" a grant that bound them to support their father for life.

The sequencing is the trap and it is worth noticing: she was judicially appointed — but afterwards. Capacity is measured at the moment of acceptance, and a later appointment does not reach back to validate what was void when done.

Full entry below ↓

Article 734, Civil Code

Civil Code

Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Title III (Donation), Chapter 1 (Nature of Donations)

The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)

Why it is cited here

Why the father could still sell the land, and the answer turns on a word most summaries drop.

"The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

The acceptance the article means is a valid one. A void acceptance perfects nothing, so the donation here never came into existence as a contract — it remained an offer. And an offer may be withdrawn.

Hence the Court's conclusion that the donor "was not bound by any contract" and could validly withdraw and sell to the co-defendants, who registered their deed and took a certificate of title.

Two further points worth holding. Registration did not cure the defect — the donation documents were registered and the mother had taken possession, collected rents and paid taxes, and none of it mattered, because registration publicises a contract rather than creating one. And the whole outcome would have flipped had the donation been pure: the mother's acceptance would have been good, perfection would have followed, and the later sale would have conveyed nothing.

Full entry below ↓